UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------X
ALEX RUDAJ, :
NARDINO COLOTTI,
NIKOLA DEDAJ, :
PRENKA IVEZAJ,
LJUSA NUCULOVIC, and :
ANGELO DIPIETRO,
:
Defendants.
-----------------------------------X
S3 04 Cr. 1110 (DLC)
GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM
TIMOTHY J. TREANOR
JENNIFER G. RODGERS
BENJAMIN GRUENSTEIN
Assistant United States Attorneys
- Of Counsel –
:
MICHAEL J. GARCIA
United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 2 of 76
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Point I -- ISSUES ADDRESSED BY MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS.............2
A. Enhancements Under the Extortion Guideline......2
B. The Defendants Do Not Warrant A Two-Level
Decrease Based On Acceptance Of Responsibility
With Respect To The Gambling-Related Charges....9
C. The PSRs Properly Group the Offenses of
Conviction.....................................15
D. The Court Should Adopt The Probation
Department’s Calculation Of Enhancements
Based On The Defendants’ Roles As Organizers,
Leaders, Supervisors and Managers Of Extensive
Criminal Activity..............................19
E. The PSRs’ Loss Enhancements Were Properly
Calculated.....................................21
1. The PSR Loss Amounts Are Legally Sound.....22
2. The PSR Loss Amounts Are Supported By
The Record.................................23
F. The Court Should Apply Enhancements Based on
the Bodily Injuries of Balampanis and Hirakis..31
1. Balampanis’s Injuries Were “Serious”.......31
2. Hirakis Suffered Permanent Injuries........32
G. Acquitted Conduct/Uncharged Conduct............42
Point II -- ISSUES RELATED TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS............54
A. Colotti Is Appropriately In Criminal History
Category III...................................54
B. Ivezaj’s Participation in Various
Offenses.......................................55
i

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Point III -- DISCUSSION OF § 3553(A) FACTORS...................56
A. Defendant Rudaj................................56
B. Defendant Colotti..............................59
C. Defendant Dedaj................................61
D. Defendant Ivezaj...............................63
E. Defendants Nuculovic and DiPietro..............66
Conclusion.....................................................68
ii

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Andres v. United States, No. 97 Civ. 3246 (AKH),
2001 WL 290053 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2001)..................35
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)...................44
United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1991)............61
United States v. Baggett, 342 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2003).........40
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).............16,44,45
United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2000)...........23
United States v. Castano, 234 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000)..........21
United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005)...........46
United States v. Damico, 99 F.3d 1431 (7th Cir. 1996).......19,20
United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005)........46
United States v. Eng, 14 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 1994)...............11
United States v. Ferby, 2005 WL 1544802
(W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005)...................................46
United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998)..........44
United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2005)........40,46
United States v. Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133 (2d Cir. 1995)...........17
United States v. Ginn, 87 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996).............12
United States v. Hawkins, 87 F.3d 722 (5th Cir. 1996)..........40
United States v. Hazut, 140 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 1998)............44
United States v. Hughes, 211 F.3d 676 (1st Cir. 2000)..........31
United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997)............23
iii

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 5 of 76
United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992)..........60
United States v. Kleinebreil, 966 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1992).....12
United States v. Londono, 76 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1996)............60
United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672 (10th Cir. 2005).....46
United States v. May, 413 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2005).............38
United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1989).........12
United States v. Molina, 106 F.3d 1118 (2d Cir. 1997)..........31
United States v. Price, 149 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 1998)...........36
United States v. Ramos, No. 01-14010, 130 Fed. Appx. 415
(11th Cir. May 5, 2005).............................36,38,39
United States v. Shonubi, 998 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1993)...........23
United States v. SKW Metals & Alloys, Inc., 195 F.3d 83
(2d Cir. 1999)............................................44
United States v. Tejeda, 146 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1997)............60
United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2005).....44,45,46
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997)....................44
United States v. Yeager, 210 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2000)........20
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 924(c).........................................passim
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)........................................passim
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.1..............32,34,36
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.3.................43,44
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2B3.1....................22
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2B3.2................passim
iv

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 6 of 76
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.4...............3,4,5,6
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3D1.2................passim
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1.................10,11
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.1.................54,55
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5H1.6....................60
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5K2.21...................45
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 6A1.3....................44
v

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403
Filed 06/09/06
Page 7 of 76
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------X
ALEX RUDAJ, :
NARDINO COLOTTI,
NIKOLA DEDAJ, :
PRENKA IVEZAJ,
LJUSA NUCULOVIC, and :
ANGELO DIPIETRO,
:
Defendants.
-----------------------------------X
S3 04 Cr. 1110 (DLC)
GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM
The Government respectfully submits this Memorandum to
apprise the Court of the Government’s position with respect to
various sentencing matters, and in opposition to the sentencing-
related submissions of defendants Alex Rudaj, Nardino Colotti,
Nikola Dedaj, Prenka Ivezaj, and Ljusa Nuculovic. This
submission is structured as follows: first, the Government
responds to those arguments of defense counsel that affect more
than one defendant; second, the Government responds to those
defense arguments affecting individual defendants; and finally,
the Government addresses, with respect to each defendant, the
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), in arguing that each
defendant should be sentenced within the appropriately calculated
Sentencing Guidelines range. The Government relies on the
Presentence Investigation Report for its general description of
the Rudaj Organization and the various crimes of which the
1
:

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 8 of 76
defendants were convicted after trial.
I. ISSUES ADDRESSED BY MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
A. Enhancements Under the Extortion Guideline
Section 2B3.2 of the U.S.S.G. applies to extortion
offenses and, as a result, is the applicable guideline for a
number of the racketeering acts and offenses of conviction in
this matter. This guideline carries a base offense level of 18
and then provides for several possible enhancements based on
specific offense characteristics. The defendants argue that a
number of the enhancements within the guidelines section are not
properly used in the calculation of the defendants’ sentences in
this matter because each of the defendants has been convicted of,
and will be sentenced at the same time for, using and carrying a
firearm during and in furtherance of the racketeering offense, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c). (See
Rudaj Ltr. 14-15, 22; Colotti Ltr. 2 n.3; Dedaj Ltr. 12, 13, 15;
Ivezaj Ltr. 24; Nuculovic Ltr. 1-2, 5.) In other words, the
defendants argue that, in light of the firearms conviction, the
application of certain enhancements would constitute
impermissible double-counting. Specifically, the defendants
collectively argue that the following enhancements are subsumed
within, and superseded by, the firearms conviction: (1) the two-
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(1) that applies if
2

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 9 of 76
the offense involved an express or implied threat of death,
bodily injury, or kidnapping; (2) the three-level enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(3)(B) that applies if the offense
involved, among other things, preparation to carry out a threat
of death or serious bodily injury, or if the participants in the
offense otherwise demonstrated the ability to carry out such a
threat; and (3) the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(4) that
applies if any victim sustained bodily injury. For the following
reasons, the Government submits that the firearms conviction does
not cancel out the extortion guideline enhancement for implied
threat of bodily injury or the enhancement for actual bodily
injury. In addition, the Government submits that the Court
should not apply to any of the extortion-related offenses or
racketeering acts in this matter the three-level enhancement for
preparation to carry out, or demonstration of the ability to
carry out, a threat of death or serious bodily injury.
Section 2K2.4 of the U.S.S.G. is the guideline that
applies to firearms convictions under Title 18, United States
Code, Section 924(c). Section 2K2.4(b) states, in relevant part,
that the guidelines sentence for a 924(c) firearms conviction is
the minimum term of imprisonment required by statute. U.S.S.G. §
2K2.4(b). The application notes to Section 2K2.4 further
instruct that, where a sentence under Section 2K2.4 is imposed in
3

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 10 of 76
conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, the Court
should “not apply any specific offense characteristic for
possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of an explosive or
firearm when determining the sentence for the underlying
offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, Appl. n.4. As explained in the
application note, “[a] sentence under this guideline accounts for
any explosive or weapon enhancement for the underlying offense of
conviction, including any such enhancement that would apply based
on conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3
(Relevant Conduct).” There is no mention in the guideline or the
application note that the sentence imposed for the 924(c)
firearms conviction should substitute for any other specific
offense characteristic set forth in the guidelines.
In this matter, the defendants argue, without
authority, that the imposition of a sentence for the 924(c)
conviction should operate to preclude far more than just an
enhancement based on the “possession, brandishing, use, or
discharge of an explosive or firearm” as provided for in the
application notes. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 Appl. n.4. Instead, the
defendants argue that the imposition of a sentence for the
firearms conviction vitiates any enhancement in the guideline
that is based on either a threat or violence, including the
enhancement for an implied threat of death or bodily injury and
4

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 11 of 76
the enhancement for actual bodily injury. Not only is there no
authority for such a broad proposition, but the Guidelines
themselves clearly do not contemplate that the imposition of a
sentence for a 924(c) firearms conviction would operate in such a
preclusive fashion.
Application note 4 of Section 2K2.4 specifically
addresses and defines the preclusive effect of the imposition of
a sentence for a 924(c) firearms conviction, and by its explicit
terms, it only precludes an enhancement based on the “possession,
brandishing, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm.”
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 Appl. n.4. Section 2B3.2 – the extortion
guideline – includes a firearms enhancement that, by operation of
section 2K2.4, cannot be applied to the extortion offenses in
this matter, and here the Probation Department has appropriately
declined to apply this enhancement in its calculation of the
applicable sentencing range. The other enhancements set forth
within the guideline that do not specifically require the
“possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of an explosive or
firearm” are clearly not precluded by imposition of a sentence
for the 924(c) firearms conviction and, where appropriate, should
be applied.
We believe, however, that in the calculation of the
guidelines for the racketeering offenses in this matter the Court
5

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should not apply the three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
2B3.2(b)(3)(B) for preparation or demonstration of ability to
carry out a threat of death or serious bodily injury. Section
2B3.2(b)(3)(B) is inapplicable in cases where the firearms
enhancement set forth in Section 2B3.2(b)(3)(A) is applicable.
See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, Appl. n.6. Section 2K2.4 Appl. n.4
effectively establishes that the imposition of a sentence for a
924(c) conviction serves as a substitute for the imposition of
the firearms enhancement under § 2B3.2(b)(3)(A). Because the
924(c) conviction in this matter applies to the entire
racketeering and racketeering conspiracy offenses, we believe
that imposition of a sentence for a § 924(c) firearms conviction
precludes application of any of the enhancements under §
2B3.2(b)(3).
Defendant Rudaj argues, with regard to the enhancement
for implied threat of death or bodily injury and the enhancement
for actual bodily injury, that application of the enhancements
should be precluded by imposition of a sentence for the 924(c)
firearms offense because “the device by which the defendants were
allegedly able to actualize the requisite ‘force, violence, or
fear,’ according to the government, was the persistent possession
of the firearms as charged in the 924(c) count.” (Rudaj Ltr. 14-
15). This characterization gravely misstates the Government’s
6

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case against the defendants. The Government presented
overwhelming evidence that the defendants, both as a group and
individually, regularly intimidated people and used violence
without using firearms. While it is true that the defendants
regularly carried firearms, and at times actually used them, the
defendants employed many other means to intimidate people, such
as publicly beating people, threatening people, appearing
regularly in groups, and establishing their own identity as an
independent criminal organization, among other means. In most
cases, these measures were sufficient without the use of firearms
to satisfy the requisite element of “force, violence, or fear”
that is a part of all extortions.
Defendants Rudaj, Ivezaj, and Nuculovic argue that, for
each one of the extortion offenses, they should not be subject to
the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(1) for
express or implied threat of death, bodily injury, or kidnapping.
In an argument that strains credibility, these defendants argue
that the facts of each of the extortion offenses do not include
such an implied or express threat. For example, Ivezaj and
Nuculovic argue that no express or implied threats were ever made
to Antonios Balampanis or Foti Dimopoulos. (Ivezaj Ltr. 23;
Nuculovic Ltr. 1). Nonetheless, common sense dictates that
wrapped up in the vicious beating that Ivezaj and others
7

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 14 of 76
administered to Balampanis was a threat that bodily injury would
result should Balampanis, Dimopoulos, or anyone else, interfere
with the Rudaj Organization’s takeover in Astoria. Indeed, as
Ivezaj indicates in his submission, Balampanis specifically
testified that Dimopoulos believed that Balampanis’ beating was
meant to “send a message” to Dimopoulos. (Ivezaj Ltr. 23). This
“message” obviously constituted a threat of bodily injury.
Ivezaj also argues that the events at Calda’s Bar, and Ivezaj and
Nuculovic argue that the events of Cosmos Bar, did not include
threats of bodily injury because the only threats that were made
related to property. (Ivezaj Ltr. 23; Nuculovic Ltr. 6.) These
arguments conveniently overlook the circumstances of these
encounters. In each case, the owner of the bar was confronted by
multiple physically-intimidating members of a criminal
organization who demanded that the owner permit the organization
to operate an illegal gambling machine on the premises. In such
cases, the threat of physical harm is communicated loud and
clear, regardless of whether the specific words used related only
to the destruction of property.
In sum, the Government submits that, throughout the
PSR, the Probation Department has properly applied the two-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(1) that applies if the
offense involved an express or implied threat of death, bodily
8

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 15 of 76
injury, or kidnapping, and the enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
2B3.2(b)(4) that applies if any victim sustained bodily injury
(addressed in greater detail infra). In addition, the Government
requests that the Court decline to employ the three-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(3)(B) that applies if the
offense involved, among other things, preparation to carry out a
threat of death or serious bodily injury, or if the participants
in the offense otherwise demonstrated the ability to carry out
such a threat.
B. The Defendants Do Not Warrant A Two-Level Decrease
Based On Acceptance Of Responsibility With Respect To
The Gambling-Related Charges
The defendants seek a two-level downward adjustment
based on their asserted acceptance of responsibility on Counts
Five and Six of the Indictment, charging them with operating, and
conspiring to operate, an illegal gambling business, in violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1955 and 371. (Rudaj
Ltr. 8; Colotti Ltr. 2 n.2; Dedaj Ltr. 12). As an initial
matter, this argument has no bearing on the defendants’
Sentencing Guidelines ranges, as the offense level for the
gambling-related counts (referred to in the PSR as “Group 1”) is,
at its highest, 16; because that offense level is more than eight
levels less than the offense level for the highest group, Group 1
does not result in any additional units in the calculation of the
9

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 16 of 76
overall offense level. In any event, the argument that the
defendants deserve a reduced offense level for the gambling
offenses is meritless.
Section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides
that “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2
levels.” Among the factors a court may consider in determining
whether a defendant has clearly accepted responsibility are
whether the defendant “truthfully admitt[ed] the conduct
comprising the offense(s) of conviction,” whether the defendant
“truthfully admitt[ed] or [did] not falsely deny[] any additional
relevant conduct,” and “the timeliness of the defendant’s conduct
in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility.” See U.S.S.G. §
3E1.1, Appl. n.1. While not dispositive in demonstrating
acceptance of responsibility, entry of a guilty plea is
“significant evidence” that a defendant has indeed accepted
responsibility. It is equally not a sine qua non: “[c]onviction
by trial . . . does not automatically preclude a defendant from
consideration for such a reduction.” Id., Appl. n.2.
Nevertheless, only in “rare situations” does a defendant merit a
reduction for acceptance of responsibility after going to trial,
such as when, for example, he goes to trial to “make a
constitutional challenge to a statute” or to “challenge . . . the
10

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 17 of 76
applicability of a statute to his conduct.” Id. The Guidelines
further explain why it provides for reduction in offense level
when a defendant accepts responsibility for his offense: “The
reduction of offense level provided by this section recognizes
legitimate societal interests. For several reasons, a defendant
who clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his
offense by taking, in a timely fashion the actions listed above
(or some equivalent action) is appropriately given a lower
offense level than a defendant who has not demonstrated
acceptance of responsibility.” Id., Appl. n.6.
There is no basis to lower the defendants’ offense
level for Group 1 based on concessions made by their lawyers
during the trial. First, while as a general matter defendants
must plead guilty in order to merit a two-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility, the defendants here, despite
whatever concessions their lawyers made at trial, did not even
seek to enter pleas of guilty to the gambling-related counts of
the Indictment (which the Court may or may not have agreed to
accept). In addition, several courts of appeals, including the
Second Circuit, have held that a defendant is not entitled to an
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility when he has not pled
guilty to all crimes of which he was convicted. See, e.g.,
United States v. Eng, 14 F.3d 165, 171 n.3 (2d Cir. 1994) (“We
11

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 18 of 76
note, . . . that adjustments for acceptance of responsibility under Part E of Chapter Three are made only after the counts are combined.”); United States v. Ginn, 87 F.3d 367, 370-71 (9th
Cir. 1996); United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 293 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Kleinebreil, 966 F.2d 945, 951-53 (5th Cir. 1992). These courts rely on the fact that Application Note 1(a) to Section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines requires that a defendant “truthfully admit[] the offense(s) of conviction” before receiving a two-level adjustment; the use of the plural (“offense(s)”) suggests that the adjustment is appropriate only for acceptance of responsibility as to all offenses of conviction. See, e.g., McDowell, 888 F.2d at 293 (“[The Guidelines] does not contemplate calculating acceptance of responsibility for each offense.”).
Second, the defense lawyers’ concession of guilt was
hardly evidence of acceptance of responsibility, but rather
appeared to be a strategic decision intended to gain credibility
with the jury, attack the prosecution for overcharging, and avoid
convictions on the other counts of the Indictment. This is clear
from the defense jury addresses. See, e.g., Tr. 9445 (Rudaj
summation) (“this is a gambling conspiracy and not, not a
racketeering enterprise”); Tr. 9454 (Colotti summation)
(belittling the Government’s evidence on the remaining counts by
12

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pointing to the strength of the gambling evidence and noting the
defense’s concession on those counts); Tr. 9604 (Ivezaj
summation) (“Who would think, how would anybody in this jury,
being fair and reasonable people using your common sense, would
[Ivezaj] think that he is getting involved in anything other than
a gambling situation here?”); Tr. 9641 (Ivezaj summation) (“Now,
we conceded the gambling, and I think that the prosecution is
hoping that the gambling spills over into the other counts so
that you will give more credit to their witnesses because of the
fact that the gambling, they were accurate about the gambling.”).
Third, while the defendants may have admitted in some
fashion the factual elements of the gambling charges, their
concession that they operated illegal gambling machines – a crime
that was repeatedly belittled during defense addresses to the
jury (see, e.g., Tr. 9610 (Ivezaj summation) (“A lot of people --
I don't know if you drive by Yonkers Raceway, but I think they're
putting in 5,000 slot machines in Yonkers Raceway when they
reopen. So a lot of people don't consider gambling to be such a
crime.”) – came nowhere near covering the extent of the gambling
crimes charged, which involved the defendants’ involvement in
bookmaking and gambling clubs; the defendants contested their
involvement in these additional activities. Furthermore, the
defendants certainly did not concede the relationship between
13

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 20 of 76
these gambling crimes and the charged RICO enterprise, as would
be required to accept responsibility for the racketeering act
alleging the operation of an illegal gambling business.
Fourth, not all of the defendants who suggest they
conceded their guilt as to the gambling offenses clearly
maintained that position consistently during trial. Counsel for
defendant Dedaj emphasized during his opening that his client
“with full awareness of the accusations made against him, . . .
has pled not guilty and, . . . is presumed to be innocent,” and
predicted that at the end of the trial, the jury would find Dedaj
“not guilty.” (Tr. 109). More explicitly, counsel for Mr.
Nuculovic suggested that at least a large number of the gambling
machines at issue in this case were not illegal when he asked the
Government’s video gaming expert: “Well, in any time during the
course of your -- educating yourself to become an expert, did you
learn that Court of Appeals of the state of New York, which is
the highest court in the state of New York, has determined that
the Broadway machines are not gambling devices?” (Tr. 1055-56).
In the end, it cannot be said that any of the
defendants truly accepted responsibility for their participation
in the gambling offenses in this matter. As a result, the motion
for a reduction in offense level based on acceptance of
responsibility should be denied.
14

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C. The PSRs Properly Group the Offenses of Conviction
Defendants Rudaj, Ivezaj, Colotti, and Dedaj assert
that the grouping analysis conducted by the Probation Department was incorrect, and that certain of the extortion offenses and the gambling offenses should be placed together into one group. Specifically, defendants Rudaj and Ivezaj1 argue that the gambling offenses should be grouped with the Dimopoulos/Balampanis extortion, the Soccer Fever extortion, and the Cosmos extortion, because those three extortions were committed for the purpose of facilitating the defendants’ gambling offenses, and therefore, presumably should not be in separate groups. (Rudaj Ltr. 15-16). Alternatively, Rudaj and Ivezaj argue that those extortion groups and the gambling group should be consolidated into one group pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b) because they all involve the same victim (the public at large) and are part of a common scheme or plan. (Rudaj Ltr. 15; Ivezaj Ltr. 25). Rudaj attempts to preemptively respond to the fact that the defendants’ extortion victims are readily identifiable persons by attempting to define them as not “viable” victims, because they supposedly had “nothing to surrender or
1
Defendant Colotti does not specifically address these issues
in his brief, but joins in the arguments of defendant Ivezaj
(Colotti Ltr. 2 n.1); defendant Dedaj also does not specifically
address these issues but joins in the arguments of co-counsel
(Dedaj Ltr. 15).
15

Case 1:04-cr-01110-DLC Document 403 Filed 06/09/06 Page 22 of 76
simply did not surrender anything.” (Rudaj Ltr. 15). Similarly, Ivezaj contends that the victims of the various extortions are not real victims, because no restitution is sought on their behalf. (Ivezaj Ltr. 26).2
The Probation Department properly conducted the
Guidelines grouping analysis, appropriately separating each
cluster of extortionate activity directed at a unique victim, as
well as the gambling offenses group, into separate groups. The
defendants concede, as they must, that by the express language of
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), the different extortions should not be
grouped together because the extortion guideline section, §
2B3.2, is “specifically excluded” from the subsection authorizing
grouping. (See Rudaj Ltr. 14; Ivezaj Ltr. 25). Nor is this a
case where any of the other subsections of § 3D1.2 operate to
render grouping appropriate. The extortion and gambling offenses
as currently grouped do not involve the same victim or the same
act or transaction. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a). Instead, the
victim of the gambling offenses is society generally, and the
victims of the extortion groups attacked as victimless were fully
2
Finally, as a last resort, Rudaj urges the Court to reject the
Probation Department’s grouping analysis because it overstates
the defendants’ conduct. (Rudaj Ltr. 16). This argument can and
should be swiftly rejected, as there is no legal basis for the
Court to adopt an inaccurate grouping analysis on this (or any)
ground, and ample opportunity for the Court to consider whether a
properly-calculated Guidelines range provides a “reasonable”
sentence under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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identified at trial: Dimopoulos and Balampanis were the victims
of the extortion charged in Racketeering Act 4, Hirakis, among
others, was a victim of the Soccer Fever extortion charged in
Racketeering Act 5, and Nicos Christoforou was the victim of the
Cosmos extortion charged in Racketeering Act 12.
This is simply not a case like United States v. Gelzer,
50 F.3d 1133 (2d Cir. 1995), cited by the defendants, where the
separate extortion groups were said to involve “substantially
identical offense conduct.” (Rudaj Ltr. 14). Instead, each
extortion group, while fitting into the defendants’ overall
enterprise pattern, charged different groupings of the defendants
and involved its own set of actions, resulting in different
demands, different threats, and different harms to the respective
victims.
The defendants’ claim that the extortion victims
somehow disappear for grouping purposes because they were not
actually victimized is nonsense. There is no requirement under
the Guidelines, as Rudaj seems to contend, that if an extortion
does not succeed in obtaining a legitimate property interest for
the defendants then the identifiable victim is ignored, and the
defendants’ crime magically transforms into one against society
instead. Nor is there any merit (or common sense) to Ivezaj’s
argument that the fact that no restitution is owed means that
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there were no victims. Obviously, just because the defendants
either did not succeed in a particular extortion scheme, or
succeeded in extorting something for which restitution is not
appropriate (such as illegal proceeds), does not mean that the
crime does not have a victim for grouping purposes.
Rudaj and Ivezaj further argue that the extortion
offenses should all be grouped together under U.S.S.G. §
3D1.2(c), because they had in common the use or threatened use of
a firearm, as was evident by the defendants’ conviction for use
of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). Rudaj and Ivezaj are wrong. The extortion
groups as constituted in the PSR do not “embod[y] conduct that is
treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or other
adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the
counts.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c). Indeed, as the Government
addresses in greater detail above, the extortion calculations in
fact contain no enhancements that are due to the defendants’ use
of weapons. Accordingly, there is no overlap between the
specific offense characteristics of the extortion groups and the
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) count (which, in any case, is excluded from
the grouping analysis provided by the Probation Department).
Ivezaj also argues for grouping of the extortion
offenses under § 3D1.2(c) because he received a role enhancement
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on each group. (Ivezaj Ltr. 26-27). A role enhancement,
however, is not a “specific offense characteristic,” see U.S.S.G.
§ 2B3.2(b), and is not the sort of conduct specific to one count
that falls under § 3D1.2(c)’s prohibition on double counting if
applied to more than one group. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, Comment.
n.5. Instead, the addition of three levels for acting in a
supervisory role, as Ivezaj did, is appropriately added to each
group for which the enhancement is warranted. See also infra.
D. The Court Should Adopt The Probation Department’s
Calculation Of Enhancements Based On The Defendants’
Roles As Organizers, Leaders, Supervisors and Managers
Of Extensive Criminal Activity
Several defendants contest the enhancements that the
Probation Office has calculated for their “aggravating roles” in
the offense based on the fact that the particular racketeering
predicates at issue either did not involve five or more people,
or that the particular defendant at issue did not engage in a
supervisory role in that particular racketeering act. (Ivezaj
Ltr. 18; Rudaj Ltr. 10; 3/27/06 Letter from DiPietro to
Probation, at 1). The Government submits that in calculating the
aggravating role enhancement, the Court should consider the
defendant’s position within the overall racketeering enterprise,
a position consistent with the decisions of several courts of
appeals.
In United States v. Damico, 99 F.3d 1431 (7th Cir. 19

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1996), for example, the Seventh Circuit held that courts should look “to the count of conviction (the overall RICO conspiracy) and all relevant conduct” before imposing the adjustment for “aggravating role.” Id. at 1437-38. The Court rejected the defendant’s approach, based on Application Note 1 to Section 2E1.1, to look at each individual predicate act, as “the predicate-by-predicate approach of Application Note 1 applies, as the note states, only for the purpose of establishing a RICO defendant’s base offense level, and not for the purpose of applying the Chapter Three adjustments.” Id. at 1438; see also United States v. Yeager, 210 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000) (“it is appropriate to judge a RICO defendant’s role in the offense with respect to the overall RICO conspiracy for the purpose of applying an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)”). This position also makes sense, given that when a crime is committed in furtherance of a racketeering enterprise, it is not so much relevant for purposes of punishment that the defendant was a leader in the particular predicate act but rather that he was a leader in the overall enterprise. For these reasons, the Court should not consider the defendants’ leadership positions on a predicate-by-predicate basis, but rather base its determination on the defendant’s overall position in the enterprise.3
3
In addition to this general request by several defendants to
take a predicate-by-predicate approach, defendant Ivezaj contests
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E. The PSR’s Loss Enhancements Were Properly Calculated Each defendant4 argues that the PSR’s calculation of
loss amounts for the various extortions of which the defendants
were convicted are improper, for two reasons: (1) loss amounts
for certain of the extortions set forth in the PSR are not
legally cognizable because they do not represent the amounts lost
by the victims, but rather the amounts that the defendants
expected to gain from the offenses; and (2) the figures set forth
the 3-level increase for his role as a “manager or supervisor” of
the Rudaj Organization, on the basis that he was “only a salaried
employee who took orders, and never received any of the
Organization’s profits or ‘a piece of the action.’” (Ivezaj Ltr.
17-18). Ivezaj also seeks a 3-level mitigating role because his
conduct was “minor” as compared to his co-conspirators with
respect to the gambling and extortion charges. (Id. at 19).
Apart from the fact that he cites the wrong standard for “minor”
participants – which requires that the defendant’s conduct pale
in comparison to the average participant in such crimes, not his
co-conspirators, United States v. Castano, 234 F.3d 111, 114 (2d
Cir. 2000) – the portrait he seeks to paint of himself is simply
inconsistent with the evidence at trial, including the testimony
of Maurizio Sanginiti regarding Ivezaj’s role at the Westchester
gambling clubs (Tr. 1344), and the testimony of Nick Kyprianou
regarding Ivezaj’s role in collecting (and pocketing a portion
of) protection payments in Astoria. (Tr. 6624, 6628-29).
Likewise, defendant Dedaj argues that he did not occupy a
supervisory position either, but rather “was the individual in
the Rudaj Organization who was responsible for repairing the
machines.” (Dedaj Ltr. 11). This assertion was refuted by the
testimony of numerous witnesses who placed Dedaj as one of the
top three leaders of the organization, including Kyprianou, who
quoted Alex Rudaj as saying that Dedaj was the third highest-
ranking member of the Rudaj Organization. (Tr. 6609).
4
Defendant DiPietro did not submit a sentencing memorandum to
the Court, but in his objections to the PSR, he challenges the
loss amount on the Mirage extortion as being unduly speculative.
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in the PSR are speculative. The defendants are wrong on both
counts.
1. The PSR Loss Amounts Are Legally Sound.
Defendants complain that the PSR’s extortion enhancements pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(2) are improperly based not on loss to the victims, but instead on expected gain to the defendants. (Rudaj Ltr. 12-13; Ivezaj Ltr. 19-21; Nuculovic Ltr. 2-3; Dedaj Ltr. 7-9). The defendants’ distinction between the victims’ loss and the defendants’ gain is misplaced and unsupported by legal authority.5
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(2) states that “If the greater of
the amount demanded or the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000,
increase by the corresponding number of levels from the table in
§ 2B3.1(b)(7).” That section, in turn, provides a table of
increases based on loss amount, and defines “loss” as “the value
of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed.” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1,
Appl. n.3. The focus of the guidelines is clearly directed at
establishing a fair value for the property that is the subject of
the extortion at the time of the extortionate conduct. In cases
5
The defendants also argue that their sentences should not be
enhanced based on such racketeering acts as the Soccer Fever
extortion because the victims had no valid property right that
could have been obtained by the defendants. (Ivezaj Ltr. 11).
As this Court held in response to the defendants’ Rule 29 motion,
however, an illegal business opportunity is “property” for
purpose of the extortion statute, and should be so construed for
purposes of sentencing.
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where the property in question is the subject of a completed
extortion, as with some of the offenses in this case, an
examination of the ultimate gain to the defendants may often be
the only way to assess the fair value of the property in
question. Indeed, the victim of a successful extortion no doubt
finds it hard to establish the value of property that the victim
no longer controls. As a result, common sense dictates that a
fair assessment of the “amount demanded” or the “loss to the
victim” or the “value of property taken” in an extortion case
often and fairly requires the Court to examine the gain to the
defendant and such an examination does not undermine the validity
of the loss amount calculation.
2. The PSR Loss Amounts Are Supported By The Record.
The Court need not find loss amount with precision, but
instead may make a “reasonable estimate of the loss, given the
available information.” United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39,
46 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82,
95 (2d Cir. 1997)). The main requirement is simply that the
Court must not base its loss findings on “speculation” or
“surmise and conjecture.” United States v. Shonubi, 998 F.2d 84,
89-90 (2d Cir. 1993). The record in this case amply demonstrates
that the amounts set forth in the PSR warrant the corresponding
sentencing enhancements.
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With respect to the Balampanis/Dimopoulos extortion,
the defendants viciously beat Balampanis to force Dimopoulos and
the Luchese LCN family to abandon their control of the Astoria
gambling community – specifically, control of the lucrative
barbout game, protection of the various card clubs and businesses
in Astoria, the right to install and collect from illegal
gambling machines, and the right to conduct loansharking
activities within that community. The defendants’ plan worked,
and the Rudaj Organization started earning many thousands of
dollars a week from Astoria, reflecting the value of the property
that the victim Dimopoulos lost as a result of the extortion.
The PSR calls for an enhancement of five levels to account for more than $1.5 million as the value of the Astoria gambling turf that the defendants extorted from their victims. There is little question that control of the Astoria gambling world was extremely lucrative. In fact, the evidence at trial was that the Rudaj Organization made millions of dollars from the gambling machines in Astoria alone,6 to say nothing of the other sources of their income including the lucrative barbout game, the collection of protection money, and the operation of a card club
6
Using a conservative estimate of 50 as the number of machines
in Astoria (see Tr. 8114), multiplied by Kyprianou’s conservative
estimate of $750 a week that the Rudaj Organization made from the
machines (Tr. 7340), results in a figure of almost $2 million a
year.
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and poker game by Nuculovic.
As the defendants would have it, the Court would have
to disregard these facts and base its assessment of loss amount
solely upon direct evidence of the lucrative nature of the
business before the Rudaj Organization arrived in Astoria. This
is clearly not required. Using clear and detailed evidence of
the substantial profits obtained by the Rudaj Organization, the
Court can fairly conclude that the value of control of the
Astoria gambling community was worth at least $1.5 million to
Dimopoulos and the Luchese Family at the time the organized crime
turf was taken. Indeed, as established by the evidence presented
at trial, it is quite clear that the turf was worth far more than
that conservative figure.
In connection with the Soccer Fever extortion, the
Rudaj Organization protected its monopoly on the lucrative
barbout gambling game, which generated thousands of dollars per
night, by storming into Soccer Fever, shutting down that club and
beating one of the club’s partners, Mikhail Hirakis. By their
efforts, the Rudaj Organization shut down one competitor, and
forced and intimidated other potential competitors into
relinquishing any plans to open a barbout club in the area,
thereby obtaining for themselves the ability to operate their
barbout as a monopoly in Astoria. This exclusivity was worth a
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significant amount of money to the Rudaj Organization, and it
deprived the Soccer Fever victims of a significant amount of
money that, had the defendants not committed the extortion, the
victims would have been able to pursue.
The defendants argue that the Probation Department has
improperly calculated the value of the property taken at Soccer
Fever – which the PSR put at more than $800,000, adding four
levels as the appropriate Guideline enhancement. However, the
evidence at trial established unequivocally that the operation of
a barbout game was itself worth such a significant sum of money.
To begin with, Mikhail Hirakis testified that, on the first night
of its operation, the Soccer Fever club earned approximately
$8,000. (Tr. 5112). Using $8,000 as a weekly figure, instead of
a daily figure as it was, the Soccer Fever barbout would still
have made more than $400,000 over the course of a year, thereby
demonstrating the substantial value of that barbout business. No
doubt the $8,000 per night was conservative as the new barbout
would likely have grown as the business expanded its customer
base and established its presence. The substantial value of the
Soccer Fever barbout is underscored by the lucrative nature of
the defendants’ competing barbout at Skutarija. Nicos Kyprianou,
who, under the FBI’s direction, acted as a partner in Skutarija,
had access to the club’s records. He testified that in some
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weeks the Rudaj Organization’s club made as much as $66,000.
(Tr. 7416). As a result of these facts, it is undeniable that
the value of the Soccer Fever barbout business exceeded $800,000
as found by the Probation Department.
In the Mirage extortion and the Misale extortion, the
defendants demanded the same thing – a partnership in an ongoing
business. Putting aside for a moment the proper valuation of how
much the defendants demanded from their extortion victims (i.e.
how much the demanded partnerships or businesses were worth),
there can be little question that the extortions of which these
defendants were convicted did, in fact, involve such a demand.
While the defendants may, and do, quibble with the valuations
assigned by the Probation Office, they cannot credibly claim that
a demand for a portion or the entirety of a business – which is
what these attempted extortions were – is not a demand for
something of value. Moreover, that value was properly assessed
by the Probation Department.
In the Mirage extortion, defendants Rudaj, Colotti, and
DiPietro demanded from the owner of the Mirage an equal
partnership in his topless nightclub. In attempting to extort
the owner of the Mirage, the defendants caused actual losses to
the victims, as well as attempting to cause further losses and
corresponding gains to themselves, through their demands to
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become partners with the owner of the Mirage. First, the
defendants sent certain individuals to the Mirage, a strip club
in the Bronx, for the purpose of causing disturbances. During
the course of multiple visits, these individuals caused a
commotion, and even started a fight, resulting in the Mirage’s
loss of business, and the loss of employees who quit because of
the fight, prompting the Mirage’s owner to spend money on a
private security firm (Tr. 8230-33, 8242, 8283, 8293-96, 8335,
8340, 8343). The individuals sent by the defendants also refused
to pay their bar bill at the Mirage, causing additional actual
monetary loss to the Mirage (Tr. 8236-37, 8287-88). The
defendants then stepped in, offering to stop all of that trouble
for a partnership in the club. (See GX 1270). A 50% partnership
in a successful strip club obviously would be worth many
thousands of dollars, on top of the loss that the defendants
caused the Mirage owner by virtue of their extortionate
activities. This makes the Probation Department’s estimate of
$50,000 extremely reasonable, and it should be adopted by the
Court.
In the Misale extortion, defendants Rudaj, Colotti, and
Dedaj demanded from Misale a partnership in his bar, the Puerta
Roja, without offering anything in exchange, other than, at
first, the forgiveness of a $3,000 debt (Tr. 2658, 2662). While
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the defendants claim that Misale was losing money at the bar and
that therefore the bar had no value, there can be no doubt that
the business had some value, otherwise the defendants would not
have been interested in it. In any case, even if the business
were losing money, it still had value; it was an established
business with workers, a clientele, a lease, and a stock of
liquor, glasses, and other relevant supplies. All of these
things were worth money. But, in fact, the record is clear that
the business was not as unsuccessful as was portrayed by the
defendants; the business supported Misale, he was able to pay
employees such as a bartender and a bouncer (Tr. 2644, 2987), he
was able to supply the bar with liquor and other necessary
supplies (Tr. 2593), and was able to pay his lease. For all of
these reasons, the Probation Department’s estimate that a
partnership in the Puerta Roja was worth in excess of $10,000 is
highly reasonable.
The defendants claim that no loss should be attributed
to Cosmos because during that extortion they merely replaced
another person’s machine with their own, so that the Cosmos owner
did not lose anything pursuant to their extortionate behavior.
This argument ignores the difference between the owner’s
relationship with the prior machine owner, which was entirely
consensual and negotiated, and the forcible interactions they had
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with the owner, Mr. Christoforou. What the defendants obtained
from their extortion was the money they improperly earned from
the gambling machine, which they had forced into his bar more
than a year before the machine was removed during the execution
of search warrants in this case. (Tr. 5820). Moreover, Mr.
Christoforou lost the ability to voluntarily contract for
entertainment machines, and Billy Schwartz (the owner of the
machines in Cosmos before the defendants put their machines in)
lost the income he earned from the machines. (Tr. 5915). The
figure estimated by the Probation Department – in excess of
$10,000 – is very conservative given the other, more generalized
evidence about how much the gambling machines earned.
Similarly, a conservative and reasonable estimate of a
dollar figure for the amount demanded during the Calda’s Bar
extortion is in excess of $10,000, as the Probation Department
found, given the trial evidence concerning the typical earnings
of the Rudaj Organization’s gambling machines.
At bottom, the defendants argue that the loss amount
cannot be exactly calculated, and then conclude that because it
cannot be exact, no loss figure calculation should be attempted.
But the law says differently; the Court need not reach anything
close to an exact calculation of the amount demanded or loss, and
the fact that the record is not amenable to a definitive answer
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on that question does not mean that the correct answer is that
nothing was demanded, as the defendants would have it. The Court
should adopt the loss amounts used in the PSR to enhance the
defendants’ Guideline calculations.
F. The Court Should Apply Enhancements Based on the Bodily
Injuries of Balampanis and Hirakis
The defendants argue against the bodily injury
enhancements for the Dimopoulos/Balampanis extortion (four levels
included in the PSR for “serious bodily injury”), and for the
Soccer Fever extortion (the Government seeks six levels for
“permanent bodily injury”).
1. Balampanis’s Injuries Were “Serious.”7
Defendant Ivezaj and other defendants contend that
Balampanis did not suffer “serious bodily injury” within the
definition supplied by the Guidelines, because despite being
7
As an initial matter, defendant Nuculovic argues that Balampanis is not a victim of the extortion because he did not own any gambling businesses in Astoria, and that therefore the defendants are not responsible for the serious bodily injury they inflicted upon Balampanis during their beating of him. (Nuculovic Ltr. 3). Nuculovic misconstrues the law in so arguing. The Guideline section requires an enhancement if “any victim” was injured. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(4). Even if Balampanis were not the target of the extortionate demand, one can be a “victim” of an extortion without being the target of that extortion. See United States v. Hughes, 211 F.3d 676, 691 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that for purposes of the bodily injury enhancement, “victims” is broader than merely the target of the extortionate demand); see also United States v. Molina, 106 F.3d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that in robbery context, mere bystanders injured during the course of a robbery are “victims” with respect to the bodily injury enhancement).
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brutally beaten by five to seven men, Balampanis’s injuries were
not serious enough to warrant that enhancement. (Nuculovic Ltr.
3-4). Guidelines Section 2B3.2 provides a series of enhancements
in the event an extortion victim has suffered some sort of bodily
injury, including: a six-level enhancement for “permanent or
life-threatening injury”; four levels for “serious bodily
injury”; and two levels for “bodily injury.” U.S.S.G. §
2B3.2(b)(4)(A)-(C). The definition of “serious bodily injury” is
“injury involving extreme physical pain or the protracted
impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery,
hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1.
Appl. n.1(J).
Balampanis suffered serious bodily injuries under the
applicable definition. During his testimony, Balampanis stated
that:
These people, they attack me, and I thought they want
to kill me. . . . I took punches, kicking, kicked my
head[] . . . you know, my face. . . It was very
painful. I couldn’t – you know, they was beating me so
much and so fast, everybody at the same time, I don’t
know exactly what happened. . . . I feel – it felt like
somebody hit me with a pistol. . . . In my head. . . .
I thought I [lost consciousness] . . . To me [the
beating] felt like it was years. It felt, you know –
it felt very long. . . . They left me on the ground
bleeding . . . I had – my eyes, they were swelling. I
had extreme pain in my head. My jaw-way was swelling,
bruises, cuts. . . . I was [bleeding] [f]rom my head,
everywhere, my nose. I had cuts on my face.”
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(Tr. 4217-18). Following the beating, Balampanis testified that
he called 911 for an ambulance, which came and took him to the
emergency room. (Tr. 4219-20). Balampanis did not remember much
of what happened in the hospital, but indicated that numerous
tests were run, and that he was in the hospital for a few hours
before being discharged. (Tr. 4221). Balampanis also indicated
that because of the beating, he was bleeding “a lot.” (Tr.
4248). Balampanis affirmed that he was beaten “really badly”
(Tr. 4249) and “viciously” (Tr. 4277). He testified that “[t]hey
beat me up every single inch of my face,” that he was “very
serious[ly]” hurt (Tr. 4298), and that he told the ambulance
personnel that he had been “pistol-whipped” (Tr. 4452).
The serious nature of Balampanis’s injuries was
corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Chuang, the emergency room
physician who treated Balampanis following the beating (Tr. 4062-
4123), as well as medical records, including GX 561 (an ambulance
call report from the night of Balampanis’s beating indicating
head trauma, among other things), and GX 562A-E (hospital records
from Balampanis’s hospital visit, indicating Balampanis’s
injuries had been characterized as of medium severity (see Tr.
4070), that he was “punched, kicked, and pistol whipped,” that he
had vomited once, had dried blood around the nose (see Tr. 4072),
had complained of a headache and had numerous areas of redness in
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his face). These injuries were also corroborated by Mikhail
Hirakis, who testified that in June or July of 2001, he saw
Balampanis, and said that Balampanis’s “eyes were black, his lips
were swollen, and his face was very, very bad.” (Tr. 4580).
Hirakis indicated that it looked like “somebody had beaten him
up.” (Tr. 4584).
Balampanis’s injuries fall squarely within the
Guidelines definition of serious bodily injury, which, by the
wording of the applicable Guideline definition, requires proof of
one of the following: extreme physical pain, or the protracted
impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty, or requiring medical intervention such as surgery,
hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation. See U.S.S.G. §
1B1.1, Appl. n.1(J). Balampanis was brutally beaten by between
five and seven large men. He did not even have an opportunity to
try to defend himself, much less fight back. Balampanis
testified that he was in a great deal of pain (Tr. 4218 (“I had
extreme pain in my head.”), that he thought the defendants were
going to kill him, that he was bleeding, that he was hit with a
firearm, that he felt like the beating lasted for “years” (Tr.
4218), and that he was left bleeding on the ground when the
defendants were finished brutalizing him. (Tr. 4217-18).
At a minimum, Balampanis’s injuries should be
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categorized as serious because of the “extreme physical pain” to
which the defendants subjected him. There can be no dispute that
“extreme pain in my head” is exactly how Balampanis described
himself following the beating. (Tr. 4218). And, indeed, the
defendants were proud of how effectively they inflicted such
extreme pain on Balampanis, as evident in the recordings
concerning the Balampanis beating. (See GX 1262 (Rudaj
complaining that Balampanis’s blood got on his white pants during
the beating; Tr. 1569 (Sanginiti testimony about traveling to
Astoria with defendants for beating, how he saw blood on Rudaj’s
pants, and how Ivezaj and DiPietro talked afterwards in car about
how crazy it was, how Rudaj hit Balampanis with the barrel of a
gun, and how Ivezaj complimented DiPietro on how good DiPietro
kicked the guy with his knee)).
In addition to the plain language of the Guidelines and
ample support for the four-level enhancement in the record, at
least one court in this District has applied a four-level
enhancement for injuries remarkably similar to those suffered by
Balampanis. In Andres v. United States, No. 97 Civ. 3246 (AKH),
2001 WL 290053 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2001) (Hellerstein, J.), at
*3, the court found that “[b]eing handcuffed, hogtied, kicked and
threatened with death at gunpoint can reasonably be understood as
involving extreme physical pain, and that, in turn, qualifies
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under the Guidelines as ‘serious bodily injury.’”
In this case, where the severity of the beating was
readily established and the extreme pain suffered by the victim
was unquestioned in the record, the four-level enhancement for
serious bodily injury to Balampanis should be imposed.
2. Hirakis Suffered Permanent Injuries.
The Soccer Fever extortion should include a six-level upward adjustment for the injuries sustained by Hirakis.
The Sentencing Guidelines define “permanent or life-threatening bodily injury” as “injury involving a substantial risk of death; loss or substantial impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty that is likely to be permanent; or an obvious disfigurement that is likely to be permanent . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, Appl. n.1(J). As the Fifth Circuit has noted, “[t]he plain language [of the definition] encompasses injuries that may not be terribly severe but are permanent, hence the disjunctive: ‘permanent or life-threatening injuries.’” United States v. Price, 149 F.3d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Ramos, No. 01-14019, 130 Fed. Ap