UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Robert SASSO, Defendant.


Sasso was an officer of Local 282 from 1968 to 1992, holding positions as business agent, vice-president, secretary-treasurer and president. He was an associate of the Gambino Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra ("the Gambino Crime Family"). Prior to his indictment in 1992 (which eventually led to the creation of the monitorship in 1995), Sasso, as president of Local 282 from 1984 to 1992, was the highest ranking official and most powerful person engaged in the racketeering activities of the union. (Tr. at 112-113). In describing Sasso's role in the corruption of Local 282, Bruce Mouw[5] stated:

He was a prime mover, as far as construction ... of 282. He worked closely with the Gambino Family, they had a close working relationship with regard to the construction schemes.
Because of their backing of the Gambino Family, Sasso was known as a very powerful labor leader in New York. He was not only head of the most powerful labor union, Local 282, but he was backed by one of the strongest families. He had a tremendous amount of clout within the unions and construction industry.
He received orders what to do from the Gambino Family, virtually every appointment was dictated by them. Again, he was a willing conspirator and participant in the schemes, and he profited greatly from it.
(Tr. at 113).

The second most significant officer in the union was Secretary-Treasurer Michael Carbone. In describing Carbone's role in the union, Mouw testified:

Michael Carbone, a long-time business agent who later became the secretary/treasurer, the number two person at the Local. For many years he was close to John Cody. He was also in the crew of the Gambino capo named Thomas Bilotti. When Bilotti was killed, he was told to report directly to Salvatore Gravano, and for the next number of years he was a member of Gravano's crew.
Carbone was also business agent for Manhattan and Staten Island. In addition, he also handled a company - a couple of companies which were organized crime, including AJ Ross, in New Jersey. He also handled Whitestone and a couple of other employers that worked in his jurisdiction.
(Tr. at 114-115).

In comparing Carbone's role in the corruption of the union with Sasso's, Mouw stated:

All the money floated to the top. So if anybody at 282 got a payoff, they had to send a substantial portion up to Sasso.
Carbone was only involved in payoffs in his jurisdiction, which is Queens and Staten Island. Everything he got he had to declare to Gravano. Gravano would say okay, give half to Sasso or a third. He could tell him to split.
So, Carbone was an important figure, but he certainly wasn't as influential and powerful as Bobby Sasso.
(Tr. at 115).

During the time that Sasso was president, Michael Bourgal, John Probeyahn and Joseph Matarazzo were business *281 agents for Local 282. (Tr. at 116-117). According to Mouw, "Bourgal was a long-time business agent," and "headed Long Island for Local 282." In assessing Bourgal's role in the union corruption during this period, Mouw stated, "He was involved in some smaller kickbacks or shakedowns. Nothing on a large scale." (Tr. at 116).

In evaluating Probeyahn's role in the corruption of the union, Mouw testified that Probeyahn was a "long-time Brooklyn agent who later became secretary-treasurer of Local 282. He was involved in some of the individual shakedowns in his own area in Brooklyn. But certainly on a small scale compared to Sasso." (Tr. at 117). When Sasso resigned as president in 1992, Bourgal became president and Probeyahn became secretary-treasurer; however, by then, corruption within Local 282 had somewhat diminished. (Tr. at 116). According to Mouw:

When he [Bourgal] became president, it was in 1992, and at that time many of the corrupt schemes I talked about previously, the yardage scheme involving concrete had finished because of several factors. Number one, Gravano was indicted in 1990 along with John Gotti. Around this time there was a lot of, quote, heat from law enforcement and the IRB. Many of the 282 officials were summoned for depositions, including Sasso and Carbone, and also later on they were removed by the IRB. So when Bourgal and Probeyahn took over in 1992, a lot of these blatant kickback schemes or concrete schemes had gone by the wayside because of law enforcement pressure.
(Tr. at 116).

Finally, the least significant official in this action, Matarazzo, was a former business agent who handled the Queens area and retired from the union in early 1989. (Tr. at 115). In assessing Matarazzo's role in the corruption of the union, Mouw testified that he was "a minor figure compared to Sasso and Carbone." (Tr. at 115).

In summary, the record is clear that Sasso played a substantially greater role in the activities of the union than Bourgal, Probeyahn and Matarazzo, and a marginally larger role than Carbone.

Commensurate with the roles each of these five individuals played in the union, the second factor the Court considers is the degree of the breach of fiduciary duty each of these officials committed. As president of Local 282, Sasso breached his position of public trust by taking part in, as well as allowing the corrupt scheme to flourish. Additionally, as caretaker of the union and trustee of Local 282's funds, Sasso breached his fiduciary duty to the rank and file by enabling companies to circumvent contracts, and thereby diminish union funds. Carbone, additionally abused his position of public trust, as he was an official of the union as well as a trustee of Local 282's funds, who enabled companies to circumvent contracts, thereby diminishing union funds. Bourgal, Probeyahn and Matarazzo, as officers of the union, abused a position of public trust. However, the record indicates that within the scope of this enterprise, each of the latter three individuals played a minor role.

Sasso, as president, had the greatest fiduciary duty to protect the interests and rights of its union members. He not only failed to protect the union members and their funds, but also participated in and facilitated the corrupt practices of Local 282. Accordingly, he was the individual who committed the most egregious breach of fiduciary duty.

The third factor the Court considers, which overlaps with the first two factors, is the connection each defendant had with the corrupt practices that occurred in Local 282. With respect to the three business *282 agents for Local 282, Mouw testified that: (1) Bourgal "was involved in some of the smaller kickbacks or shakedowns. Nothing on a large scale;" (2) Probeyahn "was involved in some of the individual shakedowns in his own area in Brooklyn. But certainly on a small scale compared to Sasso;" and (3) Matarazzo was "[a] minor figure compared to Sasso and Carbone." (Tr. at 117). As to Carbone, Mouw stated that Carbone was "only involved in payoffs in his jurisdiction, which is Queens and Staten Island ... So Carbone was an important figure, but he certainly wasn't as influential and powerful as Bobby Sasso." (Tr. at 115).

In contrast (and as previously discussed), Mouw testified that Sasso was "the prime mover, as far as ... corruption of 282," "was backed by one of the strongest families," "received orders what to do from the Gambino Family," and "if anybody at 282 got a payoff, they had to send a substantial portion up to Sasso." (Tr. at 113, 115). Moreover, Mouw testified that Sasso was the point person for matters and decisions regarding the pour tax, sweetheart contracts, the concrete fee and appointment of organized crime figures as business agents and on-site stewards, all of which significantly facilitated corruption in the union. (Tr. at 103-114). Finally, Robert Machado, corruption officer for the monitorship, testified that

Mr. Sasso became president of the union in 1984. And during his period of time from 1984 to 1992 he had contact or direct contact with members of organized crime. He permitted members of organized crime to become members of Local 282, and appointed them to positions as on-site stewards. He took part in schemes to defraud the Local 282 Funds and deprive members of their rightful benefits and took part in activities to accept money or get money from employers or contractors.
(Tr. at 38-39).

In sum, as organized crime's point person, in charge of the union, Sasso played a dominant role in the decisions of the union to engage in illegal activities and enable organized crime's control.

The fourth factor the Court considers is the share of the proceeds illegally collected through union activities with organized crime that each defendant received from their participation in the enterprise.

Mouw testified that during the course of his investigation, he assessed that the Gambino Crime Family generated approximately $2 million annually from its unlawful activities.[6] (Tr. at 105-116; Def. Post-Trial *283 Mem. at 12). Mouw stated:

This is a fairly good estimate where every year ? I am sorry, every month Sammy Gravano would give $100,000 to John Gotti. And this represented the Gambino Family's interest in the labor racketeering with regard to construction. The bulk of this money was generated by Local 282, but a small portion was generated by the other corrupt construction unions, primarily 1018 laborers, Local 23 of the laborers.
So, in the course of the year John Gotti would make 1.2 million every year. Gravano kept 20 percent, i.e., 300 thousand a year. And I estimate the &mdash that Sasso and 282 would keep a quarter, roughly 500,000, and a million and a half go to the administration of the family. Of the 500,000, it is hard to say exactly how much Sasso got, but probably close to 250, in that ballpark. And that's a rough estimate of it.
(Tr. at 113-114).

In short, Sasso received approximately $250,000 annually of the $2 million generated and the remaining $250,000 went to Carbone, the other settling defendants and other corrupt union officials. Thus, of the five named defendants in this action, Sasso most benefitted from the corrupt activities, receiving the largest share of the proceeds.

In the case at hand there is ample evidence in the record that other RICO conspirators, who were not named in the complaint in this action, knew about and agreed to facilitate the corruption in Local 282. For example, there were predecessors of Sasso who were at least if not more responsible for corruption in the union, including but not limited to such individuals as Paul Castellano, John Cody, Neil Del La Croce, Joseph Gallo, Thomas Bilotti, Salvatore Gravano, Robert DiBernardo, Alphonse Mosca, Frank DiCicco. (Tr. at 99-103). In addition, there were individuals who became members of Local 282 after Sasso became president and who were also associates or members of organized crime. (Tr. at 72-85) (listing as members of organized crime and union members Joseph Cammarano, Jr. and Sr., Joseph Watts, Frank Fappiano, Michael DiLeonardo, Robert DiBernardo, Peter Menechino, Dino Cammarano and stating there were many others).

Owners of corporations who had collective bargaining agreements with Local 282 likewise played a role in corrupting the union while Sasso was president. (Tr. at 75-76). In identifying such owners, Machado testified:

Owners of corporations or companies that I had concern with were ? contact with were those companies who had collective bargaining agreements with Local 282.
Some owners still try or attempt to pay off the on-site stewards. Some owners still continue to defraud the Local 282 Funds, depriving the members of their benefits.
(Tr. at 76).

While some of these individuals may not have participated directly in the fraudulent activities of the criminal scheme, they nonetheless knowingly facilitated the criminal enterprise. As such, all of these individuals are liable for their part in the RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).

Bruce Mouw, a former Special Supervisory Special Agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), testified about the FBI's investigation of Local 282 and the Gambino Crime Family's infiltration of Local 282 at the hearing. Mouw's testimony was largely undisputed.

[6] Mouw gave examples of such illegal activities as Sasso receiving (and getting a portion of) unlawful cash payments from representatives of companies who wanted to operate without experiencing labor unrest. (Tr. at 109-113). For example, Mouw testified:

... So the bottom line was the owner of the company paid $100,000 and that was split between the Bonanno and Gambino families. Each family got 45,000. You would ? they would give 10.000 to Robert Sasso to call off the strike. In return for that, the owner of the company ? the strike was discontinued. The organizing efforts were terminated. And Bonannos and Gambinos and Sasso got money.

There was also a little insurance clause for the owner in case the strike was too far along for Sasso to call it off, the owners were guaranteed a sweetheart contract, and he was also guaranteed, in case someone else tried to organize his workers. Sasso and 282 intervened to say, look, we were here first. That's one example.

... There was also one involving a plumbing company that was attempted to be organized by 282. The owner of the plumbing company reached out for a Gambino soldier by the name of Louis DiBono. DiBono went to Gravano, and Gravano told them the company was being organized. And it turned out that the owner paid $80,000 to stop the organization effort. Of that 80,000, Gravano got 20, DiBono got 20,000 and Sasso got 20.