CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MARCH 15, 2024
Mar 15, 2024 - ISW Press
China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 15, 2024
Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: March 14 at 5 pm ETThe China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.Key Takeaways • Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that it redefined its criteria for a “first strike” against PRC military assets, which now include a “first move” by PLA aircraft and vessels across Taiwan’s territorial boundaries.
• A PRC Taiwan Affairs official participated in the negotiations on Kinmen, which is inconsistent with the CCP policy of not holding official exchanges with Taiwan’s DPP government.
• Taiwan’s Kuomintang is implementing party reforms to restrain the influence of a hardline faction and better appeal to young voters in future elections.
• The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua stated that “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan remains the PRC’s policy despite the omission of the term “peaceful” from the Two Sessions government work report.
• The PRC, Russia, and Iran held the joint Maritime Security Belt – 2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman from March 11 to 15.
• The People’s Liberation Army increased the number of military aircraft flights through the Miyako Strait in March, likely as part of an effort to normalize flights outside of the first island chain.
• The PRC portrayed the Philippines as a provocateur rather than a partner for managing disputes in the South China Sea while the Chinese Coast Guard drives heightened tensions in the South China Sea.
• The PRC defined its coastal baseline that extends its territorial waters and claims of sovereignty in the Gulf of Tonkin. The baseline is not in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, to which the PRC is a signatory.
Cross-Strait RelationsTaiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that it redefined its criteria for a “first strike” against PRC military assets, which now include a “first move” by PLA aircraft and vessels across Taiwan’s territorial boundaries. ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan that Taiwan reserves the right to take military countermeasures if enemy military planes or ships enter Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace and Taiwan fails to expel them by interception, identification, and warning. He did not clarify if the “first strike” concept applies to Taiwan’s outlying islands. Chiu said that the MND adopted the concept of a “first move” in February 2021. It further developed the concept after the large-scale PLA air and naval exercises around Taiwan in August 2022, which the PRC launched in response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Chiu said the MND’s definition of an enemy “first strike” before the policy change specifically referred to enemy artillery or missile fire at Taiwan. The reason for changing the definition was to counter the PRC’s “gray zone” operations around Taiwan.[1] The CCP has not publicly commented on the policy change as of March 13.
Chiu also described the security situation in the Taiwan Strait to legislators and explained that it is “on the brink” of escalating to a heightened threat alert level. He referenced recent events that have contributed to escalating tensions, including the PRC’s explicit denial of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and the death of two PRC fishermen near Kinmen, whose boat capsized while they fled from Taiwan’s Coast Guard. Chiu also said that the PRC has increased the frequency of its air and naval missions near Taiwan and that these missions take place closer to Taiwan than before. He said he did not expect war to break out, however.
The PRC is conducting dredging operations in the Liuwudian Channel near Taiwan’s Kinmen island group, possibly to facilitate the passage of PRC vessels. The Liuwudian Channel is located between Lieyu Island (known as Little Kinmen) and the islands of Dadan and Erdan, which are part of Taiwan’s Kinmen Island group. The ROC agreed in 2015 to let PRC ships pass through the Liuwudian Channel between Xiamen port on the PRC mainland and the sea even though the channel passes through Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited waters. The PRC did not make use of the channel after Tsai Ing-wen was elected president of Taiwan in 2016, however. Deputy Minister of Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council Chou Mei-wu said that the dredging activities were routine operations on the PRC side of the Liuwudian channel, but that the dredgers sailed through restricted and prohibited waters around Kinmen.[3]
Retired ROC General Lee Cheng-chieh said the dredging of the channel means the PRC plans to use the waterway in the future. He said the PRC could use ships in the Liuwudian channel in the future to block military supply shipments to Taiwanese garrisons on Dadan and Erdan.[4] Lee is a frequent commentator on foreign and military affairs whose opinions are often covered by KMT-aligned media and PRC media.[5] ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng said dredging vessels operating in Kinmen’s restricted waters do not constitute a “first strike” under the MND policy which authorizes Taiwan to respond with military force to enemy military incursions into its territory.[6]
Dredging sand in Taiwan-controlled waters is one of a growing range of “gray zone” tactics the PRC uses to harass Taiwan, assert its territorial claims, and strain Taiwan’s resources and response capability.[7]
Thousands of PRC dredgers have illegally operated in and around Taiwan’s restricted waters, including around the Kinmen and Matsu islands, for at least a decade. The dredgers usually extract sand and gravel from the seabed for use in construction projects.[8] Taiwan’s CGA interpreted illegal dredging to be non-political profit-seeking behavior in 2020 and agreed to cooperate with the PRC to crack down on the activity.[9] Taiwanese media and scholars were openly describing dredging activities near Taiwanese territory as “gray zone warfare tactics,” as of late 2023, however. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed a law to allow Taiwan to confiscate any vessels caught illegally dredging sand in its waters.
ROC National Security Bureau Director Tsai Ming-yen said the PRC’s "joint combat readiness patrols" around Taiwan are related to Taiwan’s exchanges with foreign countries. Tsai said the PRC patrols occur every 7–10 days on average and involve around 10 military aircraft and 3 to 4 naval ships. Tsai said that whenever other countries pass resolutions friendly to Taiwan, foreign vessels pass through the Taiwan Strait, or foreign dignitaries visit Taiwan, the PRC coordinates its existing regular patrols to coincide with these diplomatic events.
Tsai further said the PRC is likely to intensify its “push and pull” tactics against Taiwan before and after President-elect Lai Ching-te’s May 20 inauguration, including military and political intimidation combined with economic incentives for Taiwanese people to further the cause of “reunification.”[11] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said in a report to the Legislative Yuan that the PRC has stepped up “multi-front saturated gray-zone tactics” around Taiwan, including balloons, drones, and civilian vessels, along with increased patrols of military ships and planes. The MND report said the PRC aimed to "increase burdens of [Taiwan’s] naval and air forces and to obscure the existence of the median line in the strait.[12] ISW has reported that some of “gray zone” tactics increased during Taiwan’s 2023-2024 election season in tandem with influence operations over local Taiwanese officials and businesspeople, as well as the PRC’s ongoing push for economic “cross-strait integration.”
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) denied media reports that ROC-PRC negotiations on the “Kinmen incident” broke down and said they would resume after Kinmen prosecutors finish investigating the incident. The Kinmen incident refers to the February 14 event in which a PRC fishing boat in Taiwan’s prohibited waters near Taiwan’s Kinmen Island, which is roughly 10 kilometers from the PRC city of Xiamen, capsized while fleeing from a legal Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit. The capsizing resulted in the deaths of two of the four fishermen onboard. PRC and ROC representatives have held 15 rounds of negotiations on Kinmen to resolve disputes around the incident, including PRC demands that Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) apologize, reveal the truth of what happened, and return the capsized boat. Taiwanese media reported that the negotiations collapsed on March 6 because the two sides failed to reach a consensus and went home. The CGA claimed the negotiations broke down because the PRC demanded to interrogate CGA personnel and did not recognize Taiwan’s maritime boundaries or law enforcement rights.[13] The MAC denied that negotiations had “broken down,” however, and merely said the first phase of negotiations had ended. MAC officials said negotiations would resume after Taiwan’s judicial investigation into the incident concludes.
A PRC Taiwan Affairs official participated in the negotiations on Kinmen, which is inconsistent with the CCP policy of not holding official exchanges with Taiwan’s DPP government. Quanzhou Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) deputy director Li Zhaohui was one of three leaders of a PRC delegation to negotiate with Taiwanese authorities about the February 14 capsizing incident.[16] The other two were Jinjiang Red Cross chairman Cao Rongshan and Director of the Coordination Department of the China Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) Xu Weiwei.[17] Quanzhou and Jinjiang are PRC cities near the Kinmen islands. Although Li is a TAO official, PRC state media CGTN, Enlightenment Daily, and other PRC media described him as an associate or advisor to the Red Cross in articles about the negotiations.[18] The ROC side of the negotiations was led by CGA officials including Deputy Director-General Hsu Ching-chih and Fleet Branch Director Liao Te-cheng.[19]
The presence of a PRC government official at the negotiations is inconsistent with the CCP policy of not directly interacting with the Taiwanese government. This has been the CCP’s policy since Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party became president of Taiwan in 2016. The CCP insists that all cross-strait negotiations must be held on the mutual basis of the “1992 consensus,” which Tsai and the DPP do not recognize. The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” to be the People’s Republic of China, however, while the KMT interprets it to be the Republic of China.
Li’s involvement in the negotiations also undermines the CCP's effort to legitimize the KMT as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan in contrast with the DPP. KMT vice chairman Andrew Hsia traveled to the PRC and met with TAO director Song Tao on February 29 to discuss the Kinmen capsizing incident concurrently with the DPP government-led negotiations on Kinmen.
Northeast Asia
JapanThe People’s Liberation Army increased the number of military aircraft flights through the Miyako Strait in March, likely as part of an effort to normalize flights outside of the first island chain. The PLA flew a Y-9 medium transport aircraft in the Miyako Strait on March 9 and 10.[38] It then flew a Y-9 and two H-6 bombers through the Miyako Strait on March 12.[39] Japan’s Joint Staff noted in January 2024 that it scrambled fighters 555 times in the last nine months of 2023.[40] 98 percent of the scrambles responded to Chinese and Russian aircraft and more than 50 percent occurred near Japan’s southwest airspace, which encompasses the Miyako Strait. [41] The concentration of the PLA component of these intrusions in the southwest indicates the PLA’s intent to operate outside the first island chain.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The PRC portrayed the Philippines as a provocateur rather than a partner for managing disputes in the South China Sea while the Chinese Coast Guard drives heightened tensions in the South China Sea. The PRC sent 11 proposals for “managing the situation at sea and carrying our maritime cooperation” to the Philippines in April 2023.[42] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbing claimed on March 12, 2024, that “the Philippines has not yet responded to most of the proposals and made frequent infringements and provocations at sea.” [43] Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr stated on March 11, 2024 that “we have not rejected any proposals that China has made to us but the premise is something that we questioned…that premise that China has made is that their territory follows what is now described as a 10 dash line.”[44] The 10 dash line is the expansive PRC territorial claim over the South China Sea and Taiwan. The PRC’s nine-dash line precursor claimed the same territory but with one less dash around Taiwan.
Wang’s comments aim to deflect blame from the PRC to the Philippines for heightened tensions over the Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. Scarborough Shoal is a contested atoll that the PRC and the Philippines claim and that has been under de facto PRC control since 2012. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) erected a floating barrier and intercepted Philippine Coast Guard vessels in February to deny the Philippines access to the shoal. The CCG has also disrupted Philippine Coast Guard missions near the shoal to ensure the security of Filipino fishermen in the area. The Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea which the Philippines and the PRC both claim. The Philippines controls the shoal with troops based on the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre. A CCG vessel attempted to block and collided with a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel escorting a supply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on March 5, causing minor damage to the Philippine ship. Two CCG ships also fired water cannons at a separate Philippine supply ship, injuring four Philippine personnel, and later collided with it.
The CCG actions in the South China Sea support PRC claims of sovereignty over nearly the entirety of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, through the “nine dash line” maritime boundary. The PRC rejects a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that found the nine dash line claims are unlawful. The PRC has constructed, seized, and attempted to seize many islands in the South China Sea so it can build a military presence throughout the critical waterway. The PRC has built military infrastructure on islands that it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase its ability to block critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. Developing the capability to monitor or restrict ships through the South China Sea would support a future PRC effort to implement a blockade of Taiwan or block US and allied reinforcements from reaching the Taiwan Strait in wartime.
The PRC and Philippines' bilateral diplomatic forums for managing tensions in the South China Sea are unlikely to change PRC behavior in the region. The CCP has a track record of engaging in dialogue while driving crises to achieve its political objective. In 2012 the party engaged in negotiations with the Philippines to end a standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, which Manilla administered at the time, while steadily increasing the number of Chinese Coast Guard ships near the shoal.[45] This resulted in the Philippines withdrawing its ships from the shoal in mid-June 2012 under a now-disputed agreement that the PRC would do the same.[46] The CCP subsequently kept its ships near the shoal and achieved its political objective of gaining de facto control of the Scarborough Shoal by July 2012.[47] In 2016 the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Arbitration Tribunal unanimously ruled in favor of the Philippines by rejecting the legitimacy of PRC claims to territory inside of the nine dash line and land reclamation activities.[48] The CCP has ignored the ruling by continuing land reclamation efforts and maritime coercion in the South China Sea over the last eight years.
These PRC efforts continue despite PRC Assistant Foreign Minister Nong Rong and Philippine Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Theresa Lazaro co-chairing the eighth meeting of the China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on the South China Sea in January 2024.[49] The PRC has continued its coercive behavior over the past decade in the South China Sea while not honoring prior diplomatic or international legal agreements.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-15-2024
