RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 4, 2024 Feb 4, 2024 - ISW Press
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 4, 2024
Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Fredrick W. Kagan
February 4, 2024, 6:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on February 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russia's reported reserve concentrations throughout Ukraine largely align with Russia’s assessed priorities along the front, although they are not necessarily indicative of future Russian operations. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces currently have 17 regiments, 16 battalions, and two regiment-battalion level tactical detachments in reserve.[1] Mashovets stated that there are about 60,000-62,000 total Russian personnel in reserve units, but Russian forces have only equipped about 20,000 tactical and operational-tactical level reserve personnel with weapons and equipment. Mashovets stated that Russia’s reserves are concentrated in the greatest numbers in the operational zone of the Southern Grouping of Forces, followed by the Western Grouping of Forces, Dnepr Grouping of Forces, the Zaporizhia Grouping of Forces, the Eastern Grouping of Forces, and the Central Grouping of Forces. The Southern Grouping of Forces is responsible for the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions, and Mashovets noted that the reserve concentration in this area aligns with the areas where Russian forces are concentrating their offensive efforts. Mashovets observed that it is not surprising that the Dnepr Grouping of Forces — which operates in occupied Kherson Oblast — has the third highest number of reserves given that Russian forces may be concerned over a Ukrainian threat in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian officials have recently indicated that Russian forces have more than 70,000 personnel on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, but that many are concentrated deeper in the rear.[2] The Dnipro Grouping of Forces’ reserves would likely be able to easily move to the Zaporizhia direction if circumstances so required. Mashovets assessed that the Central Grouping of Forces, which is responsible for the Lyman direction, has the lowest concentration of reserves due to its smaller operational zone that requires fewer troops.[3] ISW additionally assesses that the Central Grouping of Forces has a lower concentration of reserves because Russian operations in the Lyman direction are likely meant to support the Western Grouping of Forces’ operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, as ISW will soon outline in an upcoming operational analysis of the Russian offensive on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis. Russian forces will be able to move their reserve concentrations freely between different sectors of the front as long as Russia holds the strategic initiative across the theater. ISW continues to assess that an active Ukrainian defense throughout the theater in 2024 would cede the strategic initiative to Russia allowing Moscow to determine where, when, and at what scale fighting occurs in Ukraine and to allocate Russian resources appropriately while forcing Ukraine to respond.[4] Ukraine would be able to deny Russia this ability,however, if Ukraine were able to contest the initiative.
The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is unlikely able to fully support Russia’s reserve manpower despite Russia’s ability to sustain its current tempo of operations and ongoing efforts to expand the Russian DIB. Mashovets stated that the operational and strategic reserves are generally not combat-ready, yet the Russian command tends to view its reserve component as a “bottomless barrel.”[5] Mashovets stated that the Russian DIB is able to produce about 250-300 “new and thoroughly modernized” tanks per year. Mashovets stated that Russian forces can also overhaul about 250-300 tanks that have been in long-term storage or sustained battlefield damage per year. Mashovets stated that the situation is similar for armored combat vehicles, suggesting that the Russian DIB can more or less cover Russian forces’ annual vehicle losses. Mashovets stated that the Russian DIB, however, cannot produce enough materiel to equip large Russian reserves should the need suddenly arise. The Latvian Defense Ministry’s State Secretary Janis Garisons stated on December 13 that Russia can “produce and repair” about 100-150 tanks per month.[6] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev claimed in March 2023 that Russia’s DIB could produce 1,500 main battle tanks in 2023, which suggests an average production of 125 tanks per month.[7] Even with these higher estimates the Russian DIB remains unlikely able to support a larger mobilization of manpower and would likely need to expand dramatically to support larger offensive operations that would require the use of more manpower reserves. ISW continues to assess that Russia would have the opportunity to expand its DIB and amass resources if it maintains the theater-wide initiative throughout 2024 although not likely to an extent sufficient to supply great masses of mobilized reservists or conscripts this year.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the frontline near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast and the Ukrainian Eastern Air Command in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on February 4. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi and Ukrainian Commander of the Zaporizhia Group of Forces Brigadier General Volodymyr Horbatyuk reported to Zelensky about Ukrainian defensive operations in the Avdiivka direction, the situation near Robotyne and other areas of the front, and the arrangement of Ukrainian defensive lines.[9] Zelensky also visited the Ukrainian Eastern Air Command and discussed measures to strengthen mobile fire groups and electronic warfare (EW) systems to repel Russian drone strikes, the use of Western and hybrid (Western-Ukrainian) air defense systems, and prospects for strengthening the capabilities of Ukrainian Eastern air defense groups.
Russian milbloggers continued to criticize Russian authorities’ failure to properly equip Russian forces with drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems in response to a recent unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on February 4 that Russian drone production is poorly managed, limiting Russia’s ability to innovate.[11] One milblogger claimed that poor management leads to unjustified Russian losses and will be the “scourge” of Russia’s victory against Ukraine.[12] Moscow Duma Deputy Andrei Medvedev previously criticized Russia’s mass production of drones as leading to the production of a large number of drones that lack the technological adaptations necessary to compete with Ukrainian drones on the battlefield.[13] Another Russian milblogger responded to the January 30 footage of Ukrainian drones striking advancing Russian armored vehicles and tanks near Novomykhailivka by claiming that it was “negligent” for Russian commanders to allow Russian armored vehicles to go into battle without proper EW equipment.[14] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces should “abandon” the idea of deep mechanized breakthroughs until Russian forces are adequately equipped with EW systems and should conduct small infantry-led assaults with drone support in the meantime.[15] Russian milbloggers have recently fixated on this event as indicative of the Russian military’s struggle to innovate and break out of the current positional warfare in Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to face the authoritarian’s dilemma, whereby his authoritarian regime is itself systematically preventing him from receiving accurate information about military-political realities in Russia. A prominent Russian milblogger — who previously appeared on state media outlets and was temporarily detained in March 2022 — published a rant accusing the Russian bureaucracy and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) of deliberately withholding information from Putin, likely in response to recent Russian propagandists’ efforts to conceal Russian military failures near Novomykhailivka.[17] The milblogger claimed that Russia has a culture in which local authorities closely work with regional media outlets to censor and conceal from the Kremlin any negative reports. The milblogger argued that Putin created a consultative civil society institution called the Russian Civic Chamber in 2004 whose members would monitor local governments' activities in order to provide negative, but accurate, information “to the top,” but the chamber failed to do so because the chamber’s representatives decided to remain silent — just like the officials that they were elected to monitor. The milblogger observed that Putin then created the All-Russian People’s Front in 2011 to target the same problem and that the initiative was successful until representatives began to follow in the Russian Civic Chamber’s footsteps. The milblogger argued that the Russian MoD engages in similar, secretive efforts to those of regional officials to conceal its failures from Putin and resents voices that undermine these efforts. The milblogger stated that the Russian MoD made it nearly impossible for milbloggers and government officials to visit frontlines and claimed that there are rumors that the Russian military command deploys generals to Syria if they start to have frequent communication with Putin. The milblogger argued that the Kremlin can only see honest discussions about Russia’s battlefield realities from the milblogger and volunteer accounts outlined in its media monitoring reports and noted that the lack of transparency is a systematic problem among Russian government structures. The milblogger later forecasted that bureaucrats will attempt to block Telegram and arrest milbloggers following the Russian presidential election in March 2024 in response to another milblogger’s observation that Russian Telegram channels remain the only source of constructive opposition in Russia.[18]
Putin’s recent efforts to address milbloggers’ concerns over Russian drone shortages and failures to repel Ukrainian forces from east (left) bank Kherson Oblast indicate that he continues to see value in having milbloggers serve as a constructive opposition that checks Russian government and military officials.[19] Putin’s past creations of the All-Russian People’s Front and the Russian Civic Chamber, and his relatively lenient treatment of milbloggers throughout the full-scale invasion, indicate that he is unlikely to decisively censor the milblogger and volunteer communities because he likely values the ability to check on his government. Putin is unlikely to pursue a mass censorship campaign against milbloggers on his own unless select factions within the Kremlin successfully convince him that milbloggers pose an immediate threat to his regime’s stability. Kremlin officials appear to have been successful in convincing Putin to eliminate and neutralize some milbloggers and information space actors such as former Russian officer Igor Girkin and media networks affiliated with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Kremlin officials, however, have likely been unsuccessful in turning Putin against a vast community of milbloggers that criticizes the bureaucracy while avidly supporting Putin and his war effort in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia's reported reserve concentrations throughout Ukraine largely align with Russia’s assessed priorities along the front, although they are not necessarily indicative of future Russian operations. • The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is unlikely able to fully support Russia’s reserve manpower despite Russia’s ability to sustain its current tempo of operations and ongoing efforts to expand the Russian DIB. • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the frontline near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast and the Ukrainian Eastern Air Command in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on February 4. • Russian milbloggers continued to criticize Russian authorities’ failure to properly equip Russian forces with drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems in response to a recent unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast. • Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to face the authoritarian’s dilemma, whereby his authoritarian regime is itself systematically preventing him from receiving accurate information about military-political realities in Russia. • Russian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline. • Kremlin newswire TASS reported on February 4 that Vladimir Oblast will be a patron of the new Knyaz Pozharsky Borei-A class nuclear submarine. • Ukrainian officials continue international efforts aimed at returning Ukrainian citizens whom Russian authorities illegally deported to Russia. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2024
