RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 19, 2024 Jan 19, 2024 - ISW Press
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2024
Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 19, 2024, 8:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on January 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Note: ISW has added a new section on Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) efforts to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to track the development of Ukraine’s DIB and the international support for Ukraine’s DIB efforts. ISW will be publishing its assessments in this section based on public announcements, media reporting, and official statements.
Russia is conducting an information operation to misrepresent NATO’s defensive "Steadfast Defender 2024" exercises – a response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Russian threats directed towards NATO members - as provocative. NATO’s Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises begin this week and will continue through May 2024.[1] NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Chris Cavoli stated on January 18 that 90,000 personnel from all 31 NATO member states and Sweden will participate in "Steadfast Defender."[2] The exercises will reportedly include over 50 ships; over 80 fighter jets, helicopters, and drones; and at least 1,100 combat vehicles, including 133 tanks and 533 infantry fighting vehicles.[3] Cavoli stated that NATO ”will demonstrate its ability to reinforce the Euro-Atlantic area via trans-Atlantic movement of forces from North America...during a simulated emerging conflict scenario against a near-peer adversary.”[4] Chair of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Rob Bauer stated on January 18 that NATO must prepare for a conflict with Russia as NATO cannot take peace as ”a given” and must ”expect the unexpected.”[5] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated on January 19 that Germany must consider that Putin may try to attack a NATO member in five to eight years, given threats from the Kremlin ”almost every day.”[6]
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded to the initial announcement of the Steadfast Defender exercises in September 2023 and misleadingly claimed that NATO exercises have been increasingly provocative and aggressive in nature.[7] The Russian MFA claimed that NATO is continuing a ”demonstration of force” on Russia’s ”doorstep.” The Russian MFA claimed that Russia had regularly proposed de-escalation initiatives to NATO, called for NATO to abandon its provocative actions, and transferred Russian military exercises to the country’s interior. Russian sources claimed that NATO is using exercises to “wind up“ and incite the Baltic states to prepare for war with Russia and characterized such exercises as a "series of provocations."[8] Yulia Zhdanova, a member of the Russian delegation at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 1066th plenary meeting, similarly claimed on January 17 that NATO exercises on the Russian and Belarusian borders ”provoke a game of nerves” and ”compress the spring of escalation even more.”[9] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger dismissed Pistorius’ comments about a possible future Russian attack on NATO, claiming that European officials regularly make statements about the ”concept of the ’Russian threat’” and that few Germans actually agree with these statements.[10] The milblogger implied that the German government is attempting to artificially create a threat from Russia that doesn’t actually exist by paying experts to ”say the right words.”
The Russian information operation aimed at painting defensive NATO actions in response to real Russian aggression on NATO’s eastern flank as provocative seeks to deflect from recent aggressive Russian rhetoric and behavior towards NATO. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, recently threatened Finland and the wider NATO alliance.[11] Putin identified the West as Russia’s “enemy” and implied that Russia is fighting in Ukraine in order to defeat the West.[12] Kremlin officials and Kremlin-affiliated actors have also repeatedly attempted to set information conditions for future aggressive action against NATO member states and their neighbors.[13] Russian electronic warfare (EW) exercises in Kaliningrad may have caused unprecedently high levels of GPS jamming across northern and central Poland and the southern Baltic region on December 25-27, 2023 and January 10 and 16, 2024.[14] ISW continues to assess that Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022 not to defend Russia against a nonexistent threat from NATO but rather to weaken and ultimately destroy NATO – a goal he still pursues.
Russian forces will be able to determine the location, tempo, and operational requirements of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024 as some US officials are reportedly pressing Kyiv to do.The Financial Times (FT) reported on January 19 that US officials are advocating for Ukraine to take a more “conservative” operational approach focused on holding current territory and generating materiel and forces in 2024 for future counteroffensive operations in 2025.[16] One US official reportedly argued that a strategy of “active defense” would allow Ukraine to build out operational requirements and prepare for a counteroffensive in 2025.[17] US military doctrine defines an active defense as the ”employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the enemy.”[18] Ukrainian officials have stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting active defensive operations in areas where Russian forces are engaged in localized offensive efforts.[19] An active defense throughout the theater, however, would require routine and widespread Ukrainian counterattacks and therefore still demand that Ukrainian forces commit considerable offensive capabilities to the front. FT reported that US officials believe that Ukrainian forces still could opportunistically exploit weak spots in the Russian defense while conducting a theater-wide active defense.[20] Limited opportunistic counterattacks - especially when not resourced adequately- are unlikely to result in gains commensurate with the resources they will inevitably consume, however.
A theater-wide defensive posture would cede the strategic initiative to Russia and permit Russia to launch major attacks at times of its choosing, forcing Ukraine to burn scarce resources it would supposedly be generating during a period of “active defense.” Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Andriy Zahorodnyuk stated to FT that focusing on defense without any offensive component would be ”a mistake of historic proportions” for Ukraine as it would hand Russian President Vladimir Putin the initiative and allow Putin to double down on ongoing efforts to convince the West and the rest of the world that Ukraine cannot win the war.[21] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov similarly stated that Ukrainian forces need to continue to press Russian forces, particularly through operations that target Russian logistics in occupied Crimea.[22] A Ukrainian ”active defense” into 2025 would cede the theater-wide initiative to Russian forces for at least a year and possibly longer, allowing the Russian command to determine where, when, and at what scale fighting occurs over that period. This extended period of theater initiative would also give the Russian command significant control over determining what resources both Ukrainian and Russian forces must bring to bear. The Russian command would therefore have an ample operational window to conduct a series of campaigns of differing intensities across the theater in Ukraine that could be specifically designed to constrain and degrade critical Ukrainian operational capacities needed for a future counter-offensive.
Offensive and defensive operations place similar requirements and constraints on Ukrainian materiel and personnel, and Ukrainian defensive operations do not necessarily present Ukraine with more opportunities to husband materiel and expand reserves for future counteroffensive operations. Russian and Ukrainian forces rely on the same weapons and equipment to conduct both defensive and offensive operations. Equipment such as armored vehicles, artillery, and drones are just as critical for defending positions as they are for capturing positions. Defensive operations do not eliminate manpower requirements or losses, moreover, as holding positions and counterattacking can produce significant force requirements and losses, particularly when the aggressor can set the terms of battle each time. The stability of a defensive line relies in part on the ability of defending forces to conduct sufficient rotations, rapidly reinforce weakened sectors of the frontline, establish physical fortifications, and when necessary, conduct orderly withdrawals from threatened positions, all of which require significant resources and a significant amount of committed and immediately available manpower. Offensive operations have required more materiel and manpower than defensive operations in Ukraine as in most wars, but both Russian and Ukrainian forces have regularly suffered significant losses on the defensive as well.
Just as defensive operations do not guarantee that Ukraine will be able to amass resources for future counteroffensives, offensive operations do not necessarily preclude Russia from continuing efforts to build out stockpiles of equipment and establish operational reserves. ISW currently assesses that the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign is enabling Russian forces to conduct regular operational-level rotations but that Russian forces are unlikely to be able to rapidly establish operational reserves.[24] Russian forces have recently expended considerable amounts of equipment on failed offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine and are currently consuming artillery ammunition far faster than Russia’s gradually mobilized defense industrial base (DIB) can produce.[25] Ukrainian officials have indicated that Russian forces are funneling newly produced weapons and ammunition to the frontline for immediate use and not for expanding stockpiles for future operations.[26] These constraints on Russian materiel and manpower are not inevitable characteristics of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, however. Russian forces could ease these constraints while still conducting offensive operations if the Russian command changed the intensity or tactics of these operations, intensified force generation efforts, or significantly expanded efforts to mobilize Russia’s DIB. Granting Russia a year or more of holding the theater-wide initiative would allow the Russian command to choose freely between prioritizing its own offensive efforts and operational requirements, amassing its own resources for future use, and forcing Ukraine to expend the resources Kyiv would be seeking to amass for future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
Russian forces will likely choose to conduct localized offensive operations as well as larger offensive efforts throughout the theater in order to force Ukraine to commit scarce materiel and manpower to defensive efforts. Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on January 19 that the entire eastern front from Kupyansk to Bakhmut is active and reported intensified Russian assaults in the Kupyansk-Lyman and Bakhmut directions.[27] Fityo warned that while Ukrainian forces are destroying Russian tanks and armored vehicles, Russian forces have “a large reserve of resources.“[28] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces have recently ”switched to the offensive” in certain areas of the Lyman direction, particularly west of Svatove and west and southwest of Kreminna.[29] Mashovets noted that Russian forces are likely preparing for larger-scale actions in the Lyman direction in the near future.[30] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also claimed that Russian forces have begun a ”massive offensive” in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[31] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may intensify efforts to capture Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast in the coming weeks.[32] Russian sources have repeatedly acknowledged Russia’s intent to continue active operations throughout Ukraine intended to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[33]
FT also reported, citing unspecified Ukrainian officials, that Russian forces are planning to conduct a large-scale offensive in Ukraine in the summer of 2024 and will attempt to capture the rest of the four illegally annexed oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts).[34] FT’s unspecified Ukrainian sources did not rule out the possibility of Russian forces attempting to recapture Kharkiv of Kyiv cities.[35] German outlet BILD reported similar Russian plans on December 14, 2023, and ISW noted at the time that Russia’s reported plans for the war are generally consistent with ongoing localized offensive operations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[36] Russian offensive operations in Ukraine will likely not have to achieve significant territorial advances to force Ukraine to expend valuable and limited resources on defensive efforts. Ukrainian forces will likely be unable to husband materiel and personnel while defending against Russian offensive operations, localized or large-scale, that are meant to prevent them from doing so. Ukraine would risk consuming resources it hoped to conserve for its own counteroffensive operations in efforts to stop continuing Russian attacks, likely while losing ground, if it went over to the strategic defensive as some US officials are apparently recommending. The side in war that holds the initiative generally has the advantage, and it is unwise to suggest that Ukraine should cede that advantage to Russia for longer than is absolutely necessary.
US officials reportedly assess that Ukraine will have to fight a long war and continue efforts to secure as much security assistance as possible for Ukraine before 2025 while expecting that positional fighting may continue in Ukraine until 2026. CNN reported on January 19 that US President Joe Biden, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines met with US lawmakers on January 17 to urge lawmakers to support additional security assistance to Ukraine.[37] Biden Administration officials highlighted air defense systems and artillery ammunition as key Ukrainian capabilities that could be depleted without additional US aid, ending Ukraine‘s ability to conduct long-range strikes against occupied Crimea and Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.[38] An unspecified US official told CNN that getting as much aid to Ukraine approved as possible before 2025 is “on the minds of a lot of folks.“[39] CNN reported that unspecified US intelligence officials assess that the war will last at least two more years, with some assessing there may be up to five years of fighting. CNN reported that unspecified US officials do not believe that a short-term ”drop-off” in US assistance to Ukraine will have a major battlefield impact, but that a long-term lack of US assistance could allow Russia to regain momentum by stockpiling weapons produced domestically and by Iran and North Korea, however.[40] ISW continues to assess that the positional war in Ukraine is not a stable stalemate and could be tipped in either direction by decisions made in the West and Russia and that the collapse of Western aid to Ukraine would likely lead to the eventual collapse of Ukraine’s ability to hold off the Russian military and significant Russian advances further west, likely all the way to the western Ukrainian border with NATO member states.
Russia is trying to mend its relationship with South Korea to mitigate the impacts of its growing reliance on North Korea. Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev stated on January 18 that Russia would "welcome" South Korea into the circle of Russia’s “friendly countries” and suggested that South Korean businesses should invest in the restoration of occupied Donbas.[42] Zinoviev claimed that South Korea does not want to see Russia strategically defeated in Ukraine and warned South Korea against supplying military aid to Ukraine. Zinoviev also falsely claimed that Russian-North Korean cooperation is not violating any international sanctions. Recent direct signaling from South Korean officials suggests that South Korea is increasingly at odds with the Kremlin, particularly due to growing Russian cooperation with Pyongyang. South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol stated on September 17, 2023 that Seoul believes that Russian and North Korean military-technical agreements may violate UN Security Council sanctions, and South Korean officials have recently warned that North Korea is increasing weapons and ammunition transfers to Russia.[43] Ukraine-based open-source organization Frontelligence Insight published a report on January 19 mapping the logistics routes along which North Korea is transferring ammunition to Russia for use in Ukraine, highlighting the dramatic impact of North Korean ammunition deliveries on the Russian war effort.[44] Continued Russian cooperation with North Korea is likely further driving South Korea away from Russia, and the Kremlin likely fears the impacts of these shifting dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.
Protests in support of an imprisoned prominent Bashkort activist continued in the Republic of Bashkortostan, but Kremlin mouthpieces denied reports that the protests are significant in scale. Russian opposition sources reported that anywhere from “hundreds” to 1,500 supporters of imprisoned Bashkort activist Fail Alysnov protested in Bashkhortostan’s capital Ufa on January 19 and that Russian Special Purpose Mobile Units (OMON) detained at least 10 demonstrators.[45] Russian authorities sentenced Alysnov to four years imprisonment on January 11 for "inciting hatred" and publicized the ruling on January 17, prompting mass protests outside the courthouse in Baymak, Bashkortostan.[46] Footage published on January 19 shows dozens to hundreds of Alysnov’s supporters demonstrating in the center of Ufa, and footage published later in the day suggests that the protests concluded for the day.[47] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on January 19 that there were no mass riots in Bashkortostan and that local law enforcement is handling ”individual” local demonstrations.[48] A Russian political blogger, who reported on the initial protests and denounced Alysnov as a ”separatist” with ”neo-fascist” values, claimed that no more than 50 people protested in Ufa and that half had dispersed by midday – a claim inconsistent with footage of the actual protests.
The Russian government continues efforts to codify legal oversight of the activities of migrants living in Russia. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved an action plan for the State Concept of Migration Policy, which the Russian government will implement throughout 2024-2025.[50] The action plan includes six sections that address the entry of foreign citizens to Russian territory; the assimilation of foreigners into Russian society; the free movement of students, scientific personnel, and teaching staff between Russia and other countries; and the prevention of violations to Russian migration laws.[51] The action plan also requires the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) to submit proposals by March 20, 2024 to the Cabinet of Ministers on how to strengthen punishments for foreigners who violate Russian laws.[52] The plan also includes several provisions to facilitate the integration of migrants into Russia's domestic sphere including Russian language proficiency assessments and assimilation courses to help foreigners internalize Russian "traditional spiritual and moral values."[53] Migrants will also have to create a "digital profile" by the end of 2024, which will allow the Russian government to track arrivals of those coming from countries that have a visa-free entry regime with Russia, as well as to expand the collection of biometric data of foreigners who arrive at Moscow airports.[54] ISW previously assessed that Russia was using similar digital surveillance technologies to expand its societal control toolkit during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, and it appears that the Kremlin is applying such surveillance and control measures to monitor the activities of foreigners in Russia.[55] The Kremlin likely seeks to quickly enact this action plan in order to gain more oversight over foreigners and manage growing tensions with some migrant communities within Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allocating funds for the search, registration, and legal protection of Russian property abroad, which includes property in former territories of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.[57] The decree directs the Russian Presidential Administration’s Foreign Property Management Enterprise and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with power and funds to search for, register, and legally protect “property,” though the exact parameters of what constitutes current or historical Russian property are unclear. The Kremlin may use the “protection” of its claimed property in countries outside of its internationally recognized borders to forward soft power mechanisms in post-Soviet and neighboring states ultimately aimed at internal destabilization.[58] A prominent milblogger responded to the decree by implausibly calling for Russia to start enacting the law in "Alaska" and throughout a significant portion of eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia is conducting an information operation to misrepresent NATO’s defensive Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises – a response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Russian threats directed towards NATO members - as provocative. • Russian forces will be able to determine the location, tempo, and operational requirements of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024 as some US officials are reportedly pressing Kyiv to do. • US officials reportedly assess that Ukraine will have to fight a long war and continue efforts to secure as much security assistance as possible for Ukraine before 2025 while expecting that positional fighting may continue in Ukraine until 2026. • Russia is trying to mend its relationship with South Korea to mitigate the impacts of its growing reliance on North Korea. • Protests in support of an imprisoned prominent Bashkort activist continued in the Republic of Bashkortostan, but Kremlin mouthpieces denied reports that the protests are significant in scale. • The Russian government continues efforts to codify legal oversight of the activities of migrants living in Russia. • Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allocating funds for the search, registration, and legal protection of Russian property abroad, which includes property in former territories of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. • Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Kupyansk, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions southeast of Kupyansk amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact. • The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion stated on January 19 that it will resume fighting on the frontlines in Ukraine when the period of positional fighting ends and will “continue to serve” after the war, presumably subordinated to Rosgvardia. • Russian occupation authorities continue to leverage the provision of social benefits and healthcare to augment passportization efforts in occupied Ukraine. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024
