RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 27, 2023 Dec 27, 2023 - ISW Press
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 27, 2023
Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 27, 2023, 6:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on December 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian drone footage published on December 27 showed another Russian execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] The geolocated video shows Russian servicemen shooting three Ukrainian soldiers whom Russian forces captured in a tree line west of Verbove (east of Robotyne). The video later depicts one Russian soldier shooting an already dead Ukrainian serviceman again at close range.[2] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General‘s Office announced that it opened an investigation into Russian forces violating the laws and customs of war in addition to premeditated murder.[3] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office stated this incident occurred on an unspecified date in December 2023.[4] ISW previously reported observing drone footage of Russian servicemen using Ukrainian POWs as human shields near Robotyne on December 13.[5] The killing of POWs violates Article III of the Geneva Convention on the laws of armed conflict.
Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and retook positions that Ukrainian forces had captured during the summer 2023 counteroffensive, likely after Ukrainian forces withdrew to more defensible positions near Robotyne for the winter. Geolocated footage published on December 14 and 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[7] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated in an interview with BBC published on December 27 that Russia’s leadership wants to retake Avdiivka at a minimum but has a more ambitious goal of capturing all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and recapturing the territory Russian forces lost in Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[8] ISW assessed that the Ukrainian capture of nearby positions in August 2023 was tactically significant because it could have allowed Ukrainian forces to begin operating past the densest Russian minefields and subsequent Russian defensive layers but does not assess that the recapture of these positions by Russian forces is particularly significant at this time.[9] Recent Russian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast nevertheless support ISW’s assessment that the current positional war in Ukraine is not a stable stalemate because the current balance can be tipped in either direction by decisions made in the West or in Russia, and limited Russian gains could become significant especially if the West cuts off military aid to Ukraine.
The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam on June 6, 2023, reportedly postponed a Ukrainian crossing of the Dnipro River that was likely intended to support Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. The Associated Press published an interview with Ukrainian Special Operations Forces personnel on December 26 wherein Ukrainian personnel stated that they were prepared to conduct a crossing of the Dnipro River to the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast in late May 2023 but that the destruction of the KHPP dam and subsequent flooding postponed these plans.[11] The Ukrainian personnel reportedly conducted limited crossing attempts in July, August, and September 2023, but Ukrainian forces did not launch a larger crossing aimed at establishing a bridgehead on the east bank until mid-October 2023.[12]
Ukrainian operations in the east bank of Kherson Oblast in October 2023 drew Russian forces from other sectors of the front and would have likely had a similar or even more pronounced effect in June 2023 at the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[13] Russian forces also transferred elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division from Kherson Oblast following the destruction of the KHPP dam and proceeded to rely on them as critical elements of the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[14] It is unlikely that the Russian command would have transferred these elements away from Kherson in the event of a Ukrainian crossing in June 2023. Significant Ukrainian ground operations in the left bank of Kherson Oblast coordinated with Ukrainian counteroffensive operations throughout southern Ukraine and near Bakhmut would have placed greater pressure on Russian forces and would likely have limited the Russian military’s ability to balance manpower and materiel requirements for defensive operations in four directions. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam thus likely played a role in the outcome of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi described continued Ukrainian battlefield challenges and requirements for future territorial advances during an interview with BBC published on December 27. Tarnavskyi stated that well-prepared Russian defenses, including superior Russian minefields, were one of the main factors that impacted the results of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, but noted that he does not believe that the front is at an impasse.[15] Tarnavskyi reiterated that Ukrainian forces are facing ammunition shortages, particularly shortages of 122mm and 152mm shells and that Ukrainian forces need additional supplies of air defense missiles and electronic warfare (EW) systems to defend against Russian drones.[16] Tarnavskyi also reiterated the need for Ukrainian air superiority.[17] Tarnavskyi noted that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are adjusting their tactics to increasingly include radio-electronic operations, drone operations, and surveillance.
Ukrainian officials highlighted the Ukrainian defense industrial base’s (DIB) increased production in 2023 and offered projections of Ukraine’s domestic drone production capabilities on December 27. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine produced three times as much equipment and weapons in 2023 as in 2022.[19] Zelensky added that Ukraine is systematically expanding its production of ordnance for drones and has significantly increased its production of projectiles and missiles.[20] Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin stated that Ukraine also increased the production of mortar rounds by a factor of 42, the production of artillery shells by a factor of 2.8, and the production of armored personnel carriers by a factor of five in 2023.[21] Kamyshin stated that Ukraine is capable of producing over one million first-person viewer (FPV) systems, over 10,000 medium range strike drones, and over 1,000 drones with a range of 1,000 kilometers within an unspecified timeframe, presumably within the next year.[22] Kamyshin added that Ukraine is also developing hybrid air defense systems and that so-called FrankenSAM systems that merge advanced Western air defense missiles with modified Soviet launchers or other missile launchers are already operating on the battlefield.
Russian forces launched another series of Shahed-136/131 drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on December 27. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 46 Shaheds in several waves from the directions of Balaklava (occupied Crimea) and Primorsko-Akhtarsk (Krasnodar Krai, Russia).[24] Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down 32 Shaheds, and Ukrainian air defense systems activated over Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhia, Khmelnytskyi, and Kirovohrad oblasts. Ukrainian military officials reported that most of the drones that Ukrainian forces could not shoot down hit frontline areas, especially in Kherson Oblast.[25] Several Shaheds also fell without any consequences. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk reported that Russian forces have changed their tactics and are now attempting to direct Shaheds through residential areas, where Ukrainian forces reportedly cannot maintain stationary air defense systems.
Satellite imagery from the successful December 26 Ukrainian strike on a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessel in occupied Feodosia, Crimea indicates that the strike damaged the surrounding port infrastructure. Satellite imagery published on December 27 taken on December 26 indicates that the Ukrainian strike on the BSF’s Novocherkassk Ropucha-class landing ship also damaged a pier at the Feodosia port and a nearby warehouse.[27] The satellite imagery shows that most of the ship is heavily burned and mostly submerged.[28] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmitry Pletenchuk stated on December 27 that the strike may have killed up to 80 Russian personnel.[29] Russian opposition news outlet Astra reported that there were 77 Russian military personnel aboard the Novocherkassk at the time of the strike of whom 33 are missing and 19 are wounded.[30] A Russian sailor who reportedly served on the Novocherkassk told Astra that conscripts and contract servicemen (kontraktniki) were on the ship at the time of the strike.[31] Russian military officials have repeatedly stated that Russian conscripts would not deploy to Ukraine.[32] Russian conscripts were also aboard the BSF‘s flagship Moskva missile cruiser when Ukrainian forces destroyed it in April 2022.
Russia maintains its maximalist objectives in Ukraine and is uninterested in good faith negotiations despite reports that Western officials are becoming more amenable to eventual Ukrainian negotiations with Russia to end the war. An unspecified Biden administration official and a European diplomat told Politico in an article published on December 27 that the Biden administration and European officials are shifting their focus from supporting Ukraine’s total victory over Russia to improving Ukraine’s position in presumed eventual negotiations with Russia to end the war.[34] Politico noted that such negotiations would likely force Ukraine to cede territory to Russia.[35] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on December 27 that the West intends to freeze the war in Ukraine then frame it as a victory and rhetorically asked what victories the United States achieved in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq after having attempted the same thing.[36] Lavrov’s references to US involvement in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq suggest that Lavrov views the Western discussion about freezing the war and preparing for eventual Ukrainian negotiations with Russia as a Western willingness to accept Ukraine’s defeat. Lavrov’s statement is also consistent with recent Russian officials’ statements that Russia is not interested in freezing the war or engaging in honest negotiations and will continue to pursue its expansionist territorial goals and efforts to “demilitarize” Ukraine.[37] ISW previously assessed that a temporary ceasefire would likely provide the Russian military time to prepare for renewed aggression against Ukraine and that Russia would still ultimately maintain the same maximalist objectives for that renewed aggression.
The Russian state-owned Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) found that Russians are increasingly less trusting of Russian state TV and are turning to social media and the internet for news.[39] VCIOM conducted a study in December, which found that Russian public trust in state TV channels had declined from 46 percent to 26 percent in a span of seven years. VCIOM concluded that the TV audience in Russia has also shrunk from 42 percent to 40 percent since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. VCIOM observed that the Russian audience that reportedly trusts the internet as its primary source of information constituted 44 percent of respondents and exceeded the number of Russians who relied on state TV for the first time. VCIOM specified that of Russians who prefer the internet as their primary source 19 percent rely on news sites, 14 percent get their news from social media networks, and 11 percent prefer instant messaging platforms including Telegram. The study found that over the past two years Russians’ use of instant messaging platforms as their primary source of information increased almost threefold – likely reflecting the growing popularity of Russian milbloggers on Telegram over the nearly two years of Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. VCIOM also observed an increase in the number of Russians who do not trust any media or social networks from three percent prior to the full-scale invasion to eight percent in December 2023. These Russians reported preferring “kitchen conversations” for their information, which the Russian outlet The Moscow Times compared to information learning practices in the Soviet Union.
The decrease in Russian trust and reliance on state TV is likely partially reflected in changing technology and generational shifts, as well as public disillusionment with Russian TV propaganda since the start of the full-scale invasion. ISW previously reported on statistics that showed that the number of Russian bloggers on Telegram increased by 58 percent and that Telegram saw the highest percent increase of daily published content in the first eight months of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[40] ISW assessed on November 20, 2022, that this increase of Telegram use for information purposes likely highlighted growing Russian distrust of Kremlin media.[41] The Kremlin, however, continues to support the expansion of the Russian ultranationalist online community and is attempting to lure key voices in the Russian information space to amplify state narratives to the growing internet-based audience.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on December 27 in a likely effort to maintain Russia’s critical trade relationship with India.[43] Putin told Jaishankar that Russia knows Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s position on Russian-Indian relations and attitude towards complex processes and the “situation in Ukraine.”[44] Jaishankar stated that Modi intends to visit Russia in 2024. Lavrov stated that he and Jaishankar discussed Russian-Indian military-technical cooperation and the launch of the North-South International Transport Corridor.[45] Lavrov also stated that Russia is ready to help India produce military equipment in the framework of the Make India program.[46] Indian banks and officials have routinely insisted on settling payments for Russian oil and military goods in rupees, but Russia and India suspended a months-long effort to address the issue in May 2023.[47] The Kremlin likely seeks to reassure India about this dispute in their bilateral trade relationship due to India’s increasing importance as a customer for Russian oil exports and its potential as a partner in defense production. Russian oil exports to India rapidly grew in 2023 with India becoming the second largest buyer of Russian crude oil.[48] Bloomberg reported on December 20 that roughly five million barrels of Russian crude oil that were scheduled to reach Indian refiners in the past four weeks had not done so for unspecified reasons, however.[49] Oil revenues have buoyed Russian budgets in recent months, and the Kremlin continues to search for new ways to expand defense industrial cooperation with other countries in an effort to relieve pressures on Russia’s heavily sanctioned defense industrial base (DIB).
Key Takeaways:
1. Ukrainian drone footage published on December 27 showed another Russian execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast. 2. Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and retook positions that Ukrainian forces had captured during the summer 2023 counteroffensive, likely after Ukrainian forces withdrew to more defensible positions near Robotyne for the winter. 3. The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam on June 6, 2023, reportedly postponed a Ukrainian crossing of the Dnipro River that was likely intended to support Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. 4. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi described continued Ukrainian battlefield challenges and requirements for future territorial advances during an interview with BBC published on December 27. 5. Ukrainian officials highlighted the Ukrainian defense industrial base’s (DIB) increased production in 2023 and offered projections of Ukraine’s domestic drone production capabilities on December 27. 6. Russian forces launched another series of Shahed-136/131 drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on December 27. 7. Satellite imagery from the successful December 26 Ukrainian strike on a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessel in occupied Feodosia, Crimea indicates that the strike damaged the surrounding port infrastructure. 8. Russia maintains its maximalist objectives in Ukraine and is uninterested in good faith negotiations despite reports that Western officials are becoming more amenable to eventual Ukrainian negotiations with Russia to end the war. 9. The Russian state-owned Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) found that Russians are increasingly less trusting of Russian state TV and are turning to social media and the internet for news. 10. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on December 27 in a likely effort to maintain Russia’s critical trade relationship with India. 11. Russian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Verbove as positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact. 12. A Russian insider source claimed that Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin has created his own private military company (PMC). 13. The Ukrainian “Cyber Resistance” movement obtained information about a Russian deputy commander of the 171st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (51st Air Defense Division) committing sexual crimes against minors in occupied Ukraine. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2023
