RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 20, 2023 Dec 20, 2023 - ISW Press
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 20, 2023
Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 20, 2023, 6pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on December 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill made a series of anti-migrant and xenophobic remarks that directly contradict Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing efforts to reestablish the inclusive Russian World (Russkiy Mir) ideology. During the Moscow Diocesan Assembly on December 20, Kirill blamed migrants for increasingly threatening interreligious and interethnic peace in Russia by refusing to integrate into Russian society and forming criminal and extremist organizations.[1] Kirill added that life for the ethnically Russian “indigenous population” is almost unbearable in some areas, including Moscow, claiming that if such trends continue then the Russian Orthodox people will “lose Russia.” Kirill’s statements contrast with Putin’s recent efforts to present himself as a centrist figure and to reestablish the concept of the Russian World, which includes all people of different ethnicities and religious affiliations who have lived or are living in geographical areas that belonged to Ancient Rus (Kyivan Rus), the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation.[2] Putin notably also stated during the Meeting of the Council of Legislators on December 20 that the Russian constitution and government are trying to ensure harmony in a diverse and large Russia – reemphasizing his efforts to present Russia as an inclusive and harmonious multicultural Russian state.[3]
Putin, on the one hand, has been increasingly reimagining himself as a modern tsar who is defending Russian sovereignty to justify his war in Ukraine and to appease his ultranationalist constituencies who tend to have more intolerant views on religion and Russian identity.[4] But Putin has, on the other hand, been trying to seem to be an inclusive leader to incentivize all religious and ethnic groups to support his regime and war efforts. ISW assessed on November 28 that Kirill’s anti-migrant and xenophobic rhetoric is more closely aligned with Russian government policies towards migrants and non-Russian ethnicities in Russia than Putin’s more inclusive rhetoric in the context of the Russian World.[5] These narratives and policies are thus contradictory and may ultimately complicate Putin’s efforts to appease different constituency groups in Russia and may trigger further interethnic and interreligious conflicts.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov explicitly stated that the Kremlin is uninterested in negotiations with Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin is moving away from its information operation meant to feign interest in negotiations. Peskov responded to a question on December 20 about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s December 19 statement that the issue of negotiations with Russia is currently “irrelevant,” stating that the Kremlin has repeatedly said that there is no “basis” or “foundation” for negotiations with Ukraine.[6] Peskov also stated that the “prerequisites” for negotiations are absent, likely referring to Russia‘s unchanged maximalist objectives in Ukraine - which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender.[7] ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin does not intend to engage in serious negotiations with Ukraine or the West in good faith.[8] The Kremlin previously pushed information operations feigning interest in negotiations with Ukraine in order to cast itself as a responsible party and blame Ukraine for refusing “reasonable” Russian negotiations, but the Kremlin appears to be moving away from this information operation, as ISW suggested on December 15.
Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 19 to 20. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched 19 Shahed-131/136 drones at Ukraine from Chauda and Balaklava, occupied Crimea, and that Ukrainian forces shot down 18 of the drones over Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force also reported that Russian forces launched two S-300 missiles at Kharkiv Oblast from Belgorod Oblast.[11] The Kyiv City Military Administration noted that this is the fifth Russian air attack against Kyiv Oblast in the month of December.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled Africa Corps announced a recruitment campaign targeting former and current Wagner Group personnel and people with combat experience in the war in Ukraine. The Africa Corps, a Russian MoD initiative to expand Russian military presence in the Middle East and Africa, announced that it started recruitment on December 20.[13] Africa-focused Russian media outlet African Initiative stated that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is “supervising” the new unspecified leadership of the Africa Corps.[14] The Africa Corps claimed that its command staff consists of former combat commanders of elite units in the Russian military and unspecified private military companies (PMCs) - possibly referring to the Redut PMC (affiliated with the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]).[15] The Africa Corps advertised an unspecified “high salary,” but noted that interested applicants who are currently fighting in the war in Ukraine cannot transfer to serve in the Africa Corps, though active-duty Russian military personnel not fighting in the war can transfer to serve in the Africa Corps.[16] The Africa Corps also clarified that an individual cannot transfer from Rosgvardia to the Africa Corps before completing their Rosgvardia contract.[17] The Africa Corps’ desire to clarify eligibility for service suggests that its advertisement campaign has successfully generated interest among former Wagner personnel given that some Wagner fighters signed contracts with the Russian MoD or Rosgvardia after the death of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023.[18] The Africa Corps suggested that it would operate in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso - areas consistent with ISW’s previous assessment of the Africa Corps' area of operations.
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin discussed bilateral economic cooperation with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on December 20. Mishustin stated that the previous two Russian-Chinese summits in March and October 2023 indicated the importance of further strengthening the “comprehensive partnership” and “strategic interaction” between the two countries.[20] Mishustin and Xi highlighted increased Russian-Chinese trade in 2023, which has reportedly already surpassed its goal of $200 billion, and Mishustin continued to claim that Russian and Chinese transactions are almost entirely done in national currencies (the yuan and ruble). China and Russia issued a joint communique on December 20 which stated that the “comprehensive strategic partnership” between the two countries is in line with the two states’ interests, not aimed at third parties, and not subject to external influence.[21] The communique highlighted Russian-Chinese energy and investment cooperation and the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The communique included Russian statements about Taiwan but did not mention Ukraine, which suggests that the Kremlin continues to be concerned with China’s reticence to participate fully in the no-limits partnership that Russia wants to establish, and that China continues to hold the upper hand in the Russian-Chinese relationship.
Moscow State University (MGU) is reportedly ending its master's program in “information and hybrid warfare” aimed at teaching students how to create information operations and conduct hybrid warfare, generating outrage from Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov. MGU Higher School of Telecommunications Dean Vitaly Tretyakov defended MGU’s decision to discontinue the master’s program on Solovyov’s show on December 18 because students graduating from the program would face difficulties finding employment abroad.[23] Tretyakov also argued that the master’s program, which offers a course in “special propaganda” (a Russian term for information and psychological operations), would threaten MGU’s reputation.[24] Solovyov dismissed Tretyakov’s explanations and questioned the patriotism of MGU’s students and faculty.[25] Solovyov praised the now-closing master’s program and noted that Russian universities need to teach “special propaganda” and combat Western narratives of history.[26] Former Duma Deputy Elena Panina echoed Solovyov’s support for the program and claimed that the Russian government should fund similar programs at various universities.[27] MGU announced the creation of the master’s program in 2022, the same year it admitted its first class of students, reportedly to teach and promote Russian objectives for the war in Ukraine.[28] MGU also is reportedly closing the program due to the low salaries of the professors teaching its courses and an ongoing scandal regarding faculty bribery.
The Kremlin continues to set conditions to create a veneer of legitimacy over the upcoming March 2024 presidential election. Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) Chairperson Ella Pamfilova reported on December 20 that the CEC has already received applications for 16 individuals who are running as presidential candidates and that 29 Russian federal subjects will use remote electronic voting for the first time during the presidential election.[30] ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin uses the remote electronic voting system to manipulate election results.[31] Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed that Russia has developed all the necessary legal frameworks to ensure that the election is "competitive, open, and legitimate."[32] By contrast, a Russian insider source claimed that the CEC has been tasked with ensuring a voter turnout of 75 percent, 80 to 85 percent of which will reportedly vote for Putin.[33] While ISW cannot independently verify the veracity of the insider source's claim, the insinuation that the Kremlin is interested in creating the guise of Putin's legitimate election is consistent with ISW's assessment that Putin remains interested in engaging in legal theater to legitimize his regime.
Key Takeaways:
• Head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill made a series of anti-migrant and xenophobic remarks that directly contradict Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing efforts to reestablish the inclusive Russian World (Russkiy Mir) ideology. • Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov explicitly stated that the Kremlin is uninterested in negotiations with Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin is moving away from its information operation meant to feign interest in negotiations. • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled Africa Corps announced a recruitment campaign targeting former and current Wagner Group personnel and people with combat experience in the war in Ukraine. • Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin discussed bilateral economic cooperation with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on December 20. • Moscow State University (MGU) is reportedly ending its master's program in “information and hybrid warfare” aimed at teaching students how to create information operations and conduct hybrid warfare, generating outrage from Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov. • The Kremlin continues to set conditions to create a veneer of legitimacy over the upcoming March 2024 presidential election. • Russian forces made a confirmed advance north of Bakhmut and continued positional meeting engagements along the entire line of contact. • Russian officials issued military summonses to migrants at a naturalization ceremony on December 20 as part of ongoing efforts to target naturalized migrants for crypto-mobilization efforts and to placate the Russian ultranationalist community. • Russian occupation administrators continue to use educational organizations to facilitate the temporary deportation of Ukrainians to Russia. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20-2023
