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War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine.

Posted By: CNote

War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/27/22 12:45 AM

In a scenario straight out of a Tom Clancy novel, Vladimir Putin has initiated an invasion of Ukraine under the pretext of it always being a part of Mother Russia. However, insufficient infantry occupation forces, lack of leadership, supplies and a will to fight against the Ukrainians, has left the invasion in danger of stalling out. This could result in Putin turning towards tactical nuclear weapons as an option, especially in light of the activation of the multi national NATO Response Force and the increase in defense support to the Ukraine from around the world
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/27/22 11:03 AM

To date, the U.S. has activated 14,000 troops for Europe. Half of those have mobilized unilaterally, including 4,700 82nd Airborne Division soldiers to Poland, 1,000 2nd Cavalry Regiment soldiers to Romania and 300 XVIII Airborne Corps soldiers to Germany.

Earlier this week, another 1,000 troops started moving out, including aircrew, maintainers and staff to support six Air Force F-35 strike fighters, 32 Army AH-64 Apache helicopters and 800 members of an infantry task force battalion to the Baltic states, Poland and Romania.


With the activation of the NATO Response Force, the U.S. expects to start attaching more troops to that organization, as part of a deterrence effort should Russia’s invasion of Ukraine threaten NATO territory.

“It’s a menu of options that are going to be available to national leaders,” Kirby said. “And again, what I can promise you is, as we get solidity on this, and more specificity, we’ll detail that.”
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/...nse-force-activation-amid-russia-attack/
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/27/22 03:39 PM

Putin puts forces on nuke alert, Zelenskyy agrees to meet in Belarus
"President Vladimir Putin has ordered Russian nuclear deterrent forces put on high alert amid tensions with the West over his invasion of Ukraine.
Putin asserted at a meeting with his top officials on Sunday that leading NATO powers had made “aggressive statements” along with the West imposing hard-hitting financial sanctions against Russia, including the president himself.
The alert means Putin has ordered Russia’s nuclear weapons prepared for increased readiness to launch. He told the Russian defense minister and the chief of the military’s General Staff to put the nuclear deterrent forces in a “special regime of combat duty.
Meanwhile, the office of Ukraine’s president has confirmed that a delegation will meet with Russian officials as Moscow’s troops draw closer to Kyiv.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy office said Sunday on the Telegram messaging app that the two sides would meet at an unspecified location on the Belarusian border and did not give a precise time for the meeting.
The meeting news came shortly after President Vladimir Putin ordered Russian nuclear forces put on high alert in response to what he called “aggressive statements” by leading NATO powers."
https://www.militarytimes.com/flash...er-ukraines-2nd-largest-city-of-kharkiv/
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/27/22 03:58 PM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/28/22 03:36 PM

Ukraine Slows Russian Advance Under Shadow of Nuclear Threat
KYIV, Ukraine — Outgunned but determined Ukrainian troops slowed Russia’s advance and held onto the capital and other key cities — at least for now. In the face of stiff resistance and devastating sanctions, President Vladimir Putin ordered Russia’s nuclear forces put on high alert, threatening to elevate the war to a terrifying new level
Explosions and gunfire that have disrupted life since the invasion began last week appeared to subside around Kyiv overnight, as Ukrainian and Russian delegations met Monday on Ukraine’s border with Belarus. It's unclear what, if anything, those talks would yield.
Terrified Ukrainian families huddled in shelters, basements or corridors, waiting to find out. Exact death tolls are unclear, but the U.N. human rights chief said 102 civilians have been killed and hundreds wounded — warning that figure was likely a vast undercount — and Ukraine’s president said at least 16 children were among the dead. More than 500,000 people have fled the country since the invasion, another U.N. official said Monday — among the millions who have left their homes.
Neighboring Belarus could send troops to help Russia as soon as Monday, according to a senior American intelligence official with direct knowledge of current U.S. intelligence assessments. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly.
U.S. officials say they believe the invasion has been more difficult, and slower, than the Kremlin envisioned, though that could change as Moscow adapts. The British Defense Ministry said Monday that the bulk of Putin’s forces are about 30 kilometers (20 miles) north of Kyiv, their advance having been slowed by Ukrainian forces.
Western nations ramped up the pressure with a freeze on Russia’s hard currency reserves, threatening to bring Russia’s economy to its knees. Russians withdrew savings and sought to shed rubles for dollars and euros, while Russian businesses scrambled to protect their finances.
In addition to sanctions, the U.S. and Germany announced they will send Stinger missiles to Ukraine among other military supplies. The European Union — founded to ensure peace on the continent after World War II — is supplying lethal aid for the first time, including anti-tank weapons and ammunition. At least one Western country is studying a request from Ukraine to provide fighter jets, a European official said. She spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss information not yet public.
In addition to sanctions, the U.S. and Germany announced they will send Stinger missiles to Ukraine among other military supplies. The European Union — founded to ensure peace on the continent after World War II — is supplying lethal aid for the first time, including anti-tank weapons and ammunition. At least one Western country is studying a request from Ukraine to provide fighter jets, a European official said. She spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss information not yet public.
The Russian military claimed Monday it had taken full control of Ukraine’s airspace after showering its air bases and air defense batteries with air and missile strikes. But a similar claim on the first day of the invasion turned out to be untrue, and U.S. officials said Sunday that Moscow has failed to fully control Ukrainian skies.
In Mariupol, where Ukrainians were trying to fend off attack, a medical team at a city hospital desperately tried to revive a 6-year-old girl in unicorn pajamas who was mortally wounded in Russian shelling.
During the rescue attempt, a doctor in blue medical scrubs, pumping oxygen into the girl, looked directly into the Associated Press video camera capturing the scene.
“Show this to Putin," he said angrily. “The eyes of this child, and crying doctors."
Their resuscitation efforts failed, and the girl lay dead on a gurney, covered by her blood-splattered jacket.
https://www.military.com/daily-news...ance-under-shadow-of-nuclear-threat.html
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/28/22 07:29 PM

Chechens Are Fighting on Both Sides of Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

https://themedialine.org/top-storie...oth-sides-of-russian-ukrainian-conflict/
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/22 12:00 AM

US-RUSSIA nuclear war would kill 34 million people within hours and is increasingly likely.
The simulation, the result of a study at Princeton‘s Science and Global Security programme (SGS), suggests 34 million people would be killed and 57 million injured in the first hours of an all-out nuclear conflagration – not counting those left ill by fallout and other long-term problems.
In the animation, electronic trails of ballistic missiles arc across the screen, before blossoming into a carpet of white discs.
Worldwide destruction would include the nuclear incineration of Europe, which scientists claimed could be brought about by the escalation of a conventional war between Nato and Russia.
SGS claims the video is “based on real force postures, targets and fatality estimates”. The first simulated nuclear blast appears to occur just inside Poland, near Wroclaw and the borders with Germany and the Czech.
They say: In hopes of halting a US-NATO advance, Russia launches a nuclear warning shot from a base near the city of Kaliningrad. NATO retaliate with a single air strike. As the nuclear threshold is crossed, fighting escalates to a tactical nuclear war in Europe. Russia sends 300 nuclear warheads via aircraft and short-range missiles to hit Nato bases and advancing troops. Nato responds with approximately 180 nuclear warheads via aircraft.
After that, hundreds of further strikes are made on both sides against military nuclear forces. In the video, Russia’s red streaks lift away from the ground moments before America’s rain of blue obliterates swathes of the country; then, Moscow’s bombs crash into the US from coast to coast.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/...tin-simulation-europe-nato-a9109116.html


Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/22 12:06 AM

Russia-Ukraine news: Ukrainian ambassador accuses Russia of using devastating ‘vacuum bomb’

https://nypost.com/2022/02/28/russia-ukraine-news-latest-updates-of-war-in-europe/
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/22 02:18 AM

Originally Posted by Hollander
Chechens Are Fighting on Both Sides of Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

https://themedialine.org/top-storie...oth-sides-of-russian-ukrainian-conflict/


The treacherous Ramzan Kadyrov is about as big a snake as you can ask for. He fought against the Russians in the First Chechen War and sided with Russia in the Second Chechen war and became president of Chechnya after his father, who was president before him, was assassinated in 2004, most likely by Russia..
"A Russian daily, Gazeta, reported that according to a poll conducted by the independent Levada Center, only 33 percent of Russians believe that Kadyrov can be trusted, while 35 percent believed that he cannot. Asked whether they thought Kadyrov could normalise the situation in Chechnya and end the bloodshed there, 31 percent said yes and 38 percent said no."
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/22 08:05 AM

Originally Posted by Giacalone
Russia-Ukraine news: Ukrainian ambassador accuses Russia of using devastating ‘vacuum bomb’

https://nypost.com/2022/02/28/russia-ukraine-news-latest-updates-of-war-in-europe/


International Criminal Court in The Hague is already investigating "war crimes" in Ukraine.
Posted By: TheKillingJoke

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/22 08:41 AM

Originally Posted by CNote
Originally Posted by Hollander
Chechens Are Fighting on Both Sides of Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

https://themedialine.org/top-storie...oth-sides-of-russian-ukrainian-conflict/


The treacherous Ramzan Kadyrov is about as big a snake as you can ask for. He fought against the Russians in the First Chechen War and sided with Russia in the Second Chechen war and became president of Chechnya after his father, who was president before him, was assassinated in 2004, most likely by Russia..
"A Russian daily, Gazeta, reported that according to a poll conducted by the independent Levada Center, only 33 percent of Russians believe that Kadyrov can be trusted, while 35 percent believed that he cannot. Asked whether they thought Kadyrov could normalise the situation in Chechnya and end the bloodshed there, 31 percent said yes and 38 percent said no."


Chechnya's a prime example of Putin's modus operandi. The Russian troops decimate the population, the Kremlin installs a bootlicking puppet government to suppress whatever's left of the local population and when push comes to shove they will use your traditionally hostile population as cannon fodder. He did this in Chechnya, he's going to do the same to Ukraine and afterwards Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia will follow.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/22 12:04 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/22 02:18 PM

US Intel agencies' top priority: understanding Putin's state of mind.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/22 03:26 PM

Originally Posted by TheKillingJoke
Originally Posted by CNote
Originally Posted by Hollander
Chechens Are Fighting on Both Sides of Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

https://themedialine.org/top-storie...oth-sides-of-russian-ukrainian-conflict/


The treacherous Ramzan Kadyrov is about as big a snake as you can ask for. He fought against the Russians in the First Chechen War and sided with Russia in the Second Chechen war and became president of Chechnya after his father, who was president before him, was assassinated in 2004, most likely by Russia..
"A Russian daily, Gazeta, reported that according to a poll conducted by the independent Levada Center, only 33 percent of Russians believe that Kadyrov can be trusted, while 35 percent believed that he cannot. Asked whether they thought Kadyrov could normalise the situation in Chechnya and end the bloodshed there, 31 percent said yes and 38 percent said no."


Chechnya's a prime example of Putin's modus operandi. The Russian troops decimate the population, the Kremlin installs a bootlicking puppet government to suppress whatever's left of the local population and when push comes to shove they will use your traditionally hostile population as cannon fodder. He did this in Chechnya, he's going to do the same to Ukraine and afterwards Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia will follow.


Also the military interventions in Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014 and Syria in 2015, Syria went very well for him and became a testing ground for Russian weapons and tactics that it can now bring to bear in Ukraine.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/22 05:04 PM

Originally Posted by Hollander
US Intel agencies' top priority: understanding Putin's state of mind.

I would say study the behavior of Vito Genovese and you will understand Putin, the wealthiest, most powerful gangster in the history of the world.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/22 08:56 PM

Hundreds of volunteers from western europe are going to Ukraine, dozens of dutch afghanistan veterans.
Posted By: blueracing347

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/22 09:36 PM

Imagine the residents of DC. they'd be giving the Russians food and killing Americans to take their fuel because they'd feel bad. Wake up America!
Posted By: Kese

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/02/22 02:37 AM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/02/22 03:08 PM

Russia takes increasing aim at Ukraine urban areas on seventh day of war.
The latest details about Russia’s attack on Ukraine:
“Nobody will forgive. Nobody will forget.”
5:41 a.m. EST March 2
Ukraine’s leader decried Russia’s escalation of attacks on crowded cities as a blatant terror campaign, while U.S. President Joe Biden warned that if the Russian leader didn’t “pay a price” for the invasion, the aggression wouldn’t stop with one country.
“Nobody will forgive. Nobody will forget,” Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy vowed after Tuesday’s bloodshed on the central square in Kharkiv, the country’s second-largest city, and the deadly bombing of a TV tower in the capital. He called the attack on the square “frank, undisguised terror” and a war crime.
The assault on Kharkiv continued Wednesday, even as Russia said it would be ready to resume talks with the Ukrainian side in the evening. A Russian strike on the regional police and intelligence headquarters, according to the Ukrainian state emergency service. It said three people were wounded.
The strike blew off the roof of the police building and set the top floor on fire, and pieces of the five-story building were strewn across adjacent streets, according to videos and photos released by the emergency service.
Biden used his first State of the Union address to highlight the resolve of a reinvigorated Western alliance that has worked to rearm the Ukrainian military and adopt tough sanctions, which he said have left Russian President Vladimir Putin “isolated in the world more than he has ever been.”
“Throughout our history we’ve learned this lesson — when dictators do not pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos,” Biden said. “They keep moving. And the costs and threats to America and the world keep rising.”
As Biden spoke, a 40-mile (64-kilometer) convoy of hundreds of Russian tanks and other vehicles advanced slowly on Kyiv, the capital city of nearly 3 million people, in what the West feared was a bid by Putin to topple the government and install a Kremlin-friendly regime.
The invading forces also pressed their assault on other towns and cities, including the strategic ports of Odesa and Mariupol in the south.
As the seventh day of the war dawned Wednesday, Russia found itself increasingly isolated, beset by the sanctions that have thrown its economy into turmoil and left the country practically friendless, apart from a few nations like China, Belarus and North Korea. Leading Russian bank Sberbank announced Wednesday that it is pulling out of European markets amid the tightening Western sanctions.
As fighting raged, the humanitarian situation worsened. Roughly 660,000 people have fled Ukraine, and countless others have taken shelter underground.
The death toll was less clear, with neither Russia nor Ukraine releasing the number of troops lost. The U.N. human rights office said it has recorded 136 civilian deaths, though the actual toll is surely far higher.
One senior Western intelligence official estimated that 5,000 Russian soldiers had been captured or killed in the biggest ground war in Europe since World War II.
Many military experts worry that Russia may be shifting tactics. Moscow’s strategy in Chechnya and Syria was to use artillery and air bombardments to pulverize cities and crush fighters’ resolve.
Britain’s Defense Ministry said it had seen an increase in Russian air and artillery strikes on populated urban areas over the past two days. It also said Kharkiv and Mariupol were encircled by Russian forces and that troops had reportedly moved into the center of a third city, Kherson. Russia’s Defense Ministry said it had seized Kherson, though the claim could not be confirmed.
Ukrainian authorities said five people were killed in the attack on the TV tower near central Kyiv. A TV control room and power substation were hit, and at least some Ukrainian channels briefly stopped broadcasting, officials said.
Zelenskyy’s office reported that the site of the Babi Yar Holocaust memorial, which is adjacent to the TV tower, was also hit. A spokesman for the memorial said a Jewish cemetery at the site, where Nazi occupiers killed more than 33,000 Jews over two days in 1941, was damaged, but the extent would not be clear until daylight.
Zelenskyy expressed outrage Wednesday at the attack on Babi Yar and concern that other historically significant and religious sites, such as St. Sophia’s Cathedral, could be targeted.
“This is beyond humanity. Such missile strike means that for many Russians our Kyiv is absolutely foreign,” Zelenskyy said in a speech posted on Facebook. “They have orders to erase our history, our country and all of us.”
Russia previously told people living near transmission facilities used by Ukraine’s intelligence agency to leave their homes. But Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov claimed Wednesday that the airstrike on the TV tower did not hit any residential buildings. He did not address the reported deaths or the damage to Babi Yar.
In Kharkiv, with a population of about 1.5 million, at least six people were killed when the region’s administrative building on Freedom Square was hit with what was believed to be a missile. The Slovenian Foreign Ministry said its consulate in Kharkiv, located in another large building on the square, was destroyed.
The attack on the square — the nucleus of public life in the city — was seen by many Ukrainians as brazen evidence that the Russian invasion wasn’t just about hitting military targets but also about breaking their spirit.
The bombardment blew out windows and walls of buildings that ring the square, which was piled high with debris and dust. Inside one building, chunks of plaster were scattered, and doors lay across hallways.
Another Russian airstrike hit a residential area in the city of Zhytomyr. Ukraine’s emergency services said Tuesday’s strike killed at least two people, burned three homes and broke the windows in a nearby hospital. About 85 miles (140 kilometers) west of Kyiv, Zhytomyr is the home of the elite 95th Air Assault Brigade, which may have been the intended target.
In the southern port city of Mariupol, the mayor said the attacks were relentless.
“They have been flattening us non-stop for 12 hours now,” Mariupol Mayor Vadym Boychenko was quoted by the Interfax news agency as saying. “We cannot even take the wounded from the streets, from houses and apartments today, since the shelling does not stop.”
https://www.militarytimes.com/flash...raine-urban-areas-on-seventh-day-of-war/
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/03/22 07:07 PM

Volunteer fighters arrive in Ukraine. But the untrained should stay home.
Pussies need not apply.
Several hundred volunteers willing to fight Russians alongside Ukrainian forces have already arrived in that embattled nation, according to a government official there.
A defense official at the Ukrainian embassy in Washington D.C. told Military Times that they have already received more than 3,000 applications for U.S. citizens wanting to fight. That figure, he said, includes many military veterans. He could not say how many.
The Ukrainian officials spoke to Military Times on the condition of anonymity to discuss the plans.
On Sunday, Military Times reported that Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy created “The International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine.”
It is a new effort, the Ukrainian official told Military Times, to help bolster the fight.
The Russian advance on Kyiv is stalled at the moment, a senior U.S. defense official told reporters Thursday morning, in part because of a stiff Ukrainian resistance. Military Times also reported that Ukrainian aircraft and other assets have struck a 40-mile long convoy about 25 kilometers north of Kyiv.
A number of veterans have reached out to Military Times, either saying they are planning to travel to Ukraine to fight or want to. Ukraine’s embassy in Washington, D.C. did not immediately respond to questions about how many U.S. veterans had signed up.
The call for volunteers has been met with enthusiasm on several online forums like Reddit and Discord.
One Reddit page for those volunteering to fight for Ukraine has more than 32,000 members according to the site.
While the forums do have people claiming to be combat veterans, many seem to be young people who have never seen combat or even picked up a gun, heading to Ukraine in search of adventure in the name of a good cause.
A former SEAL turned CIA officer who writes under the name Frumentarius offers his own advice about going.
Notify the U.S. State Department first, he urges. And he offers a note of caution to those who want to fight.
“You aren’t Rambo,” he writes in SANDBOXX.
“If you are determined to go, be professional, responsible, and realistic in your expectations,” Frumentarius writes. “Follow the Ukrainian government’s advice about how to officially register, and do not go there telling them where and how you want to participate in the fighting.
“They will place you in whatever capacity they need you, and wherever they need you most. You are not Rambo, there to single-handedly slay Russians and post your selfies. You will be part of a military machine that is under extreme stress, and you need to seamlessly integrate into that system to be an effective part of it.”
No volunteers will be allowed to bring their own weapons, said the Ukrainian official. Those who fight will be issued at least rifles, he added. He would not comment on whether they will be issued other types of weapons.
Ukraine officials stress to Military Times that they are looking for foreign volunteers with combat experience who require little training before being armed and sent to the front line.
The instructions for joining the legion require “documents confirming military service or work with law enforcement agencies and participation in combat.”
“We are asking for trained people to come,” said the official in Ukraine. “We don’t have time for training.”
The defense official in Washington said there are opportunities for help beyond combat.
“We do not want to send people who are not trained, but at the same time, people can provide medical help. Or some can analyze mass media if they do not wish to fight.”
The defense official, however, stressed all these efforts are voluntary.
“We are not hiring anyone,” he said.
https://www.militarytimes.com/flash...aine-but-the-untrained-should-stay-home/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/04/22 12:25 AM

Fire in Zaporizhzhya, Europe's largest nuclear power plant
In Zaporizhzhya, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, a fire rages in the night from Thursday to Friday. The mayor of nearby Energodar, in southeastern Ukraine, reports in a Facebook video that the fire started after an attack by Russian ground forces. The fire can be seen in unverified images on social media.

Russian troops have been trying to capture the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in recent days. The developments surrounding Energodar already led on Thursday to a response from the UN nuclear watchdog IAEA, which called on Russian and Ukrainian troops not to fight in the area around the nuclear power plant.
Posted By: DuesPaid

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/05/22 01:06 AM

For no country to put a stop to this , it just goes to show how corrupt all countries and politicians are.

it was so nice of Pelosi and all these other worthless politicians to back full sanctions after 5 days to get ahead of selling off their Euro stock interests.
Disgusting, all of them.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/05/22 10:23 AM

Italian authorities have seized a super yacht owned by Alexei Mordashov, Russia 's richest man.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/05/22 10:35 AM

Five Sky News journalists were shot at Monday while working near the Ukrainian capital Kiev, UK news channel chief Ukraine correspondent Stuart Ramsay reported Friday. Cameraman Richie Mockler is said to have received two bullets to his bulletproof vest and Ramsay himself was injured by a bullet in his lower back.
Posted By: MeyerLansky

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/06/22 02:28 AM

i wonder if putin will stop at ukraine or will keep going for the rest of europe
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/06/22 11:01 PM

Originally Posted by MeyerLansky
i wonder if putin will stop at ukraine or will keep going for the rest of europe


If he attacks NATO Russia will be destroyed, they have no chance. NATO 's budget is ten times as large and they have the best technologies/weapons.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/06/22 11:41 PM

Nearly 20,000 people from 52 countries have volunteered for the Ukrainian Foreign Legion. "The whole world is on our side today, not only in words, but also in deeds," said Kyiv Independent Foreign Minister Dmitro Koeleba, who announced the number on Sunday.
According to Koeleba, this concerns both veterans and people without military experience. He declined to say which countries the volunteers come from or how many of them are already in Ukraine.
Posted By: MeyerLansky

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/07/22 12:12 AM

Originally Posted by Hollander
Originally Posted by MeyerLansky
i wonder if putin will stop at ukraine or will keep going for the rest of europe


If he attacks NATO Russia will be destroyed, they have no chance. NATO 's budget is ten times as large and they have the best technologies/weapons.

the thing is that he might use nuclaer weapon
and then nato and all of the world will suffer a lot. even if they win the war.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/07/22 11:48 AM

Originally Posted by MeyerLansky
Originally Posted by Hollander
Originally Posted by MeyerLansky
i wonder if putin will stop at ukraine or will keep going for the rest of europe


If he attacks NATO Russia will be destroyed, they have no chance. NATO 's budget is ten times as large and they have the best technologies/weapons.

the thing is that he might use nuclaer weapon
and then nato and all of the world will suffer a lot. even if they win the war.


It's part of the Russian doctrine, but to actually do it is another thing. I don't think Putin want to destroy his own country NATO's nuclear umbrella is also essential for Europe's security.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/07/22 12:07 PM

Why Putin will regret launching this war

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/06/opinions/bergen-mike-repass-putin-invasion/index.html
Posted By: NYMafia

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/07/22 02:02 PM

I absolutely, positively, didn't want the U.S. and the Nato countries getting involved in this conflict. Now I'm not so sure anymore.

I think this Putin isn't going to stop until we stop em! He's pulling a Hitler here, in that he's trying to reestablish Mother Russia to its former glory from a half century ago as the USSR. It's never gonna happen but he's too psychotic and delusional to understand that fact.

If we allow him to take Ukraine, and he will. What's next? Latvia? Poland? He'll get more emboldened than he already is by the free world's apathy and push further to take more ground.

As much as I hate to say it, I think we gotta go kick this guy in the ass. It's like the bully in the schoolyard who threatens everyone and pushes his weight around. You just gotta walk up to him and punch him square in his face!

Nuclear Armament? Well we got that too! And so does other allied nations. We cannot allow him to use that against us as a scare tactic. Because it'll be never-ending bullying.
Posted By: Giacomo_Vacari

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/07/22 07:32 PM

Georgia will be his next target or Moldova. Belarus has a tight grip on the country and is a puppet of Russia. Russia loses, they lose any hope of controlling the Black Sea. Ukraine is blocking a lot of water from getting into Crimea, which has been upsetting the Russians for a few years. This also constrains supplies to Stevapol, which is Russia's most valuable Naval base as they can launch year round, where their northern ports are iced over for half a year, the Baltics have a lot of treaties, while the Pacific base is most of the times rough and close to North Korean, and Japan's water boundaries. Russia broke their promise to Ukraine. Anyone notice China's military movements up and during this conflict, especially after the sanctions and Russia economy being hit majorly hard. Yeah they are eyeing Taiwan but have pulled there forces back into mainland China, with its navy still monitoring Taiwan. There are more than 20,000 foreigners fight for Ukraine. The Chechens are fighting on both sides. Everyone says Putin has lost it, but he still has not attacked a NATO country, that should tell you something.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/07/22 08:26 PM

Gasoline price is going way up here € 2.41 EURO.
Posted By: olivant

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/07/22 08:35 PM

Originally Posted by Giacomo_Vacari
Georgia will be his next target or Moldova. Belarus has a tight grip on the country and is a puppet of Russia. Russia loses, they lose any hope of controlling the Black Sea. Ukraine is blocking a lot of water from getting into Crimea, which has been upsetting the Russians for a few years. This also constrains supplies to Stevapol, which is Russia's most valuable Naval base as they can launch year round, where their northern ports are iced over for half a year, the Baltics have a lot of treaties, while the Pacific base is most of the times rough and close to North Korean, and Japan's water boundaries. Russia broke their promise to Ukraine. Anyone notice China's military movements up and during this conflict, especially after the sanctions and Russia economy being hit majorly hard. Yeah they are eyeing Taiwan but have pulled there forces back into mainland China, with its navy still monitoring Taiwan. There are more than 20,000 foreigners fight for Ukraine. The Chechens are fighting on both sides. Everyone says Putin has lost it, but he still has not attacked a NATO country, that should tell you something.


Good analysis.

If Poland becomes the transfer terminal for fighter jets to Ukraine, will Putin move against her? If so, then the rest of NATO has to respond.

Keep in mind that the reason that the US buys Russian oil is due to the restrictions codified in the Jones Act which prohibits any ships except US ships from transporting oil between US ports. Since that is so expensive to do, US oil companies on those coasts buy Russian oil.
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/07/22 09:33 PM

Originally Posted by Hollander
If he attacks NATO Russia will be destroyed, they have no chance.


And you think the world has a chance if that happens?
Posted By: DuesPaid

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/07/22 10:49 PM

If Putins Nukes are in the same shape as his military we should move quickly.

The probably don’t even fire.

We must save these people, its wrong not to help more.
Posted By: ralphie_cifaretto

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/07/22 10:53 PM

Originally Posted by Giacalone
Originally Posted by Hollander
If he attacks NATO Russia will be destroyed, they have no chance.


And you think the world has a chance if that happens?


He probably thinks Russia keeps it's entire nuclear arsenal in Russia lol

Stockpile alone, Russia is the largest nuclear power in the world. The majority of the ones that are ready to go are at sea. Their subs are strategically placed all over the globe. If something were to happen to Russia it's fucking lights out for all of us LOLL
Posted By: ralphie_cifaretto

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/07/22 10:55 PM

Originally Posted by DuesPaid
We must save these people, its wrong not to help more.


We are always helping. How about we help Americans in America? Putin isn't Hitler. At this point its about saving face for him. He'll take Ukraine but he knows he can't do anything else
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/08/22 01:00 AM

Originally Posted by DuesPaid
We must save these people, its wrong not to help more.


As long as that help doesn't include warfare I'm all for it haha
Posted By: MeyerLansky

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/08/22 01:55 AM

at this point i don't think anyone can help ukraine.
with 200K russian soldiers in ukraine (that's what they reported in the news) then it's over for them.
but if finland or sweden are next then someone's got to do something to stop them !
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/08/22 07:45 AM

He's not going into Finland or Sweden. Like Ralphie said, this is about saving face right now. I would be astounded if he tried to go into Moldova or any of the other old Soviet nations
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/08/22 09:58 AM

Posted By: ralphie_cifaretto

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/09/22 10:14 AM

Is anyone worried that the Ukrainians are doing too well against the Russians' ? That nuclear trigger is gonna get more and more tempting for baldie. Heard they had six Mig 31s flying into Kaliningrad. They can carry a warhead of about 500 kilotons which is over 30 times the power of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima
Posted By: NYMafia

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/09/22 01:08 PM

Putin could definitely go ahead and push some buttons if he so chooses....and shortly thereafter he and Russia would get their asses vaporized as well!

He may be crazy and a bully, but he's not stupid for himself and his loved ones. Believe that! (in order words, at the end of the day he ain't making THAT move because he knows if he does Mother Russia and everything he loves will be a memory). And IMO he loves himself way too much for that!
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/09/22 11:09 PM

A Scottish grandfather, Rab Grady (centre), announced he was fighting alongside the Ukrainians on a video he posted online

[Linked Image]
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/10/22 11:07 AM

Massive news: Roman Abramovich sanctioned. All UK assets frozen. Chelsea can still operate under a special licence but sale now on hold. Club will not be allowed to sell any more tickets - only season ticket holders can go to games for the foreseeable future.
Posted By: NYMafia

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/10/22 07:13 PM

I no Rooty, for Vladimir Putty!.....because this Russkie snooty is targeting the innocent people of Ukraine where he's taking his doody!
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/11/22 12:02 AM

Saw an interview with the Klitschko brothers with Dutch TV. Very impressive they would die for their country.
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/11/22 06:45 AM

Originally Posted by Hollander
Saw an interview with the Klitschko brothers with Dutch TV. Very impressive they would die for their country.


Wow. You think their boxing skills would come in handy?
Posted By: NYMafia

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/11/22 08:59 PM

Originally Posted by Giacalone
Originally Posted by Hollander
Saw an interview with the Klitschko brothers with Dutch TV. Very impressive they would die for their country.


Wow. You think their boxing skills would come in handy?


Against a Kalashnikov rifle or machine-gun from 30 yards out?

Definitely!...especially that long jab of theirs.
Posted By: ralphie_cifaretto

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/12/22 05:43 PM

Originally Posted by Giacalone
Originally Posted by Hollander
Saw an interview with the Klitschko brothers with Dutch TV. Very impressive they would die for their country.


Wow. You think their boxing skills would come in handy?


HAHAHAHAHAHHAH I hope this is a fucking joke. They might be able to knock out a couple of soldiers but that's it. They were good but not that good
Posted By: ralphie_cifaretto

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/12/22 05:46 PM

They did have an incredible jab yes lol. You know what, I take everything I said back. I think they could do it
Posted By: Turnbull

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/14/22 03:27 AM

NATO, looking through rose-colored glasses, sees Putin losing: He started out by trying to weaken or intimidate NATO, but NATO (and much of the rest of the world) united against him. Brave and capable Ukranians have tarnished his armed forces' lofty reputation; sanctions are wrecking his economy, and his people are demonstrating in Moscow's streets against him.

Take off rose-colored glasses: Putin is winning. He will stop at nothing to crush Ukraine, no matter how much destruction he causes, and no matter how many Ukrainians--and Russian soldiers--die. The oligarchs and the common folks in Russia aren't going to unite to force him out--Russian "democracy" is a millimeter thin, and Russians love "strongmen"--they loved Stalin, they love him. Sanctions took their best shot against Putin, and he's still standing. And, Putin is defining how NATO responds to him: no "No Fly" zone, no Polish MIGs for Ukraine-- for fear of "provoking" him--as if he's not provoked now. He's not worried about a war of attrition because, as Napoleon said, "God is on the side of the big battalions."

There's a grim reality: NATO is weak, and can't afford a war against Russia. Only Britain and Germany have capable armed forces; the other NATO "partners" have spent so little on national defense that they can't even combat domestic terrorism. Putin knows that, NATO knows that. Ukraine is not a NATO member, If war broke out, the US would have to send American soldiers to fight, bleed and die on foreign soil--again.
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/14/22 07:23 PM

US officials say China is helping Russia with their invasion. Chinese officials deny this.
Posted By: NYMafia

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/15/22 10:11 AM

Originally Posted by Turnbull
NATO, looking through rose-colored glasses, sees Putin losing: He started out by trying to weaken or intimidate NATO, but NATO (and much of the rest of the world) united against him. Brave and capable Ukranians have tarnished his armed forces' lofty reputation; sanctions are wrecking his economy, and his people are demonstrating in Moscow's streets against him.

Take off rose-colored glasses: Putin is winning. He will stop at nothing to crush Ukraine, no matter how much destruction he causes, and no matter how many Ukrainians--and Russian soldiers--die. The oligarchs and the common folks in Russia aren't going to unite to force him out--Russian "democracy" is a millimeter thin, and Russians love "strongmen"--they loved Stalin, they love him. Sanctions took their best shot against Putin, and he's still standing. And, Putin is defining how NATO responds to him: no "No Fly" zone, no Polish MIGs for Ukraine-- for fear of "provoking" him--as if he's not provoked now. He's not worried about a war of attrition because, as Napoleon said, "God is on the side of the big battalions."

There's a grim reality: NATO is weak, and can't afford a war against Russia. Only Britain and Germany have capable armed forces; the other NATO "partners" have spent so little on national defense that they can't even combat domestic terrorism. Putin knows that, NATO knows that. Ukraine is not a NATO member, If war broke out, the US would have to send American soldiers to fight, bleed and die on foreign soil--again.


This situation is definitely a major problem for Nato and the U.S. If he keeps pushing, and Putin will, at some point we're gonna have to kick him in the ass. (and you damn well know who's boot its gonna have to be right?).
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/15/22 09:13 PM

Kick him in the ass how? Drop a nuke on him? Russia has already been decimated economically. His support is dropping by the second and he knows he can't do anything. Ukraine isn't worth it. Let him have it lol
Posted By: NYMafia

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/16/22 01:35 AM

If he takes Ukraine. Do you think he will stop there? I doubt it. Soon he'll be looking to push up on Bosnia or Moldova, or Poland, etc. If he takes that, then what?

It'll be like Hitler in 1939 where looking back the U.S. says we "shoulda," we "coulda," stopped that whacky fuck at Munich in 39'

I agree not to go to war yet. But I don't think this scumbag will allow us that pleasure. If he stops and gracefully backs off, or they reach an "accord," then fine. But honestly I don't see it happening.

Believe me I don't wanna see us involved because I got 2 sons both of whom are of age to be drafted and fight. I hope not!

Posted By: Turnbull

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/16/22 03:01 AM

The only beneficiaries of this ugly, horrible war are the world's intelligence services. You can bet that every spy satellite is watching the Russian Army's tactics, order of battle and overall performance. They will crank what they learn into their own armed forces' plans. I hope the Ukrainians are removing the electronic brains from Russian planes, tanks and other advanced equipment--and turning them over to us.
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/16/22 07:04 PM

Don't forget arms producers. They always benefit during wartime. Lockheed, General Dynamics, Boeing, BAE all make a fortune..
Posted By: NYMafia

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/18/22 09:38 AM

Originally Posted by Giacalone
Don't forget arms producers. They always benefit during wartime. Lockheed, General Dynamics, Boeing, BAE all make a fortune..


Without a friggin doubt!
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/19/22 11:38 AM

Russia reports deployment of hypersonic missiles, dozens dead in Mykolaiv
Russia has used hypersonic missiles to destroy military targets in Ukraine, Russia's defense ministry reported, according to state news agency Interfax . Dozens of people were killed in rocket attacks in the southern city of Mykolaiv on Friday night, BBC News reported .

The British broadcaster relies on statements by a Ukrainian parliamentarian. It would be an air raid on a Ukrainian barracks.

In addition to the dead, there were also dozens of injured. The Belgian war journalist Robin Ramaekers, who is present in the city, even reports eighty deaths. Claims about the death toll in the city have not yet been verified by independent media.

"Our troops continue to defend the city. The Russians cannot break the fierce resistance, so they also shoot at civilians," said the Ukrainian parliamentarian.
Posted By: NYMafia

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/19/22 01:26 PM

"The Russian Mafia"....led by "Kapo" Vladimir Putin, aka; "Vlad the Puttana"
Posted By: olivant

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/19/22 04:49 PM

Some of you may already be aware of these broadcasters on Youtube. But, if not, look up some of them such as Sherrirae, Mel K, and Judy Byington. There are many more.

Why listen to them? They are completely on the side of Putin (and off their rocker). These are Americans backing Putin. They maintain that Putin is wiping out Ukranian Nazis who are allied to Biden et al and are running a huge world-wide child trafficking network.

They are the same people who maintain that Trump is still President operating in the background, that many prominent Americans such as Tom Hanks, Oprah, and even Biden were arrested and tried by the military, and executed and that when you see videos of them, that's all CGI. They also maintain that JFK, Jr. is still alive and is actually Trump's VP. They maintain that thousands more have been arrested by the military and executed, that Washington, DC is empty, that the White House is surrounded by a high fence and the military, and that the federal buildings there are vacant. They also maintain that any recent bad weather we've experienced is the result of CIA control.

This is just a sample of their rantings: really and truly, you need to listen to them.
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/19/22 07:21 PM

I'm good olivant. I draw the line at CNN
Posted By: Turnbull

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/20/22 03:07 AM

Wall Street Journal over the past several days has articles on weakness of Russian armed forces. The fact that four (now five) Russian generals have been killed i fighting shows, that their chain of combat command below general officer level is weak and unreliable. Equipment is breaking down at a high rate, logistics and supply are awful, morale and discipline among troops is poor, with many looting stores because they aren't being fed. And, they never anticipated the courageous and capable resistance of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians

All of this, if true, is good news for the civilized world. But, I worry that it will cause Putin to take desperate measures, like chemical, biological and nuclear warfare. Nothing stops his brutality and paranoia.
Posted By: olivant

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/20/22 05:39 PM

I agree TB that Putin may become desperate. His attacking civilian targets is evidence of that.

Have you listened to any of the alt-right youtube podcasts I referenced above?
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/20/22 07:15 PM

Russia may think it's a superpower, but even Italy's economy is much bigger.
Posted By: Turnbull

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/20/22 07:40 PM

Originally Posted by olivant
I agree TB that Putin may become desperate. His attacking civilian targets is evidence of that.

Have you listened to any of the alt-right youtube podcasts I referenced above?

I tried Mel K for all of seven minutes.
crazy
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/20/22 08:59 PM

At least 80 billion euros in Russian assets are parked in the Netherlands. Of this, 45 billion euros would belong to organizations and persons on the European sanctions list, according to research by the FD. The amounts are in stark contrast to the amount that has been frozen in the Netherlands under the sanctions against Russia, according to De Nederlandsche Bank: 200 million euros.
Posted By: jace

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/21/22 03:22 PM

The worse it goes for Russia, the more dangerous Putin might become. I wonder if any major powers will see this as an opportunity to line up with Putin. If China ever backs him, things get even more dangerous. Tons of credit to the Ukraine for how well they have fought and the invasion.
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/21/22 03:52 PM

Originally Posted by Hollander
Russia may think it's a superpower, but even Italy's economy is much bigger.


That has to be one of the dumbest things I've heard in a good while. Determining the world's most powerful countries is a much more complex process than simply by looking at a country's GDP. Does this mean you think Canada is a bigger superpower than Russia?
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/25/22 12:08 PM

BBC Newsroom: Russia-Ukraine war

Analysis, reports and reaction to Russia's military assault on Ukraine

https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0bqz7j7
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/03/22 12:04 PM

The nuclear facts behind Putin’s first-use threat

Charts and Diagrams

https://asiatimes.com/2022/04/the-nuclear-facts-behind-putins-first-use-threat/
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/08/22 03:36 AM

Hundreds of American tanks and armored cars arrive in Vlissingen

https://www.europereloaded.com/thou...and-armored-cars-arriving-in-vlissingen/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/08/22 04:28 PM

Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/15/22 10:53 AM

The guided-missile cruiser Moskva, named for the Russian capital, sank while being towed to port after suffering heavy damage.

The Moskva had the capacity to carry 16 long-range cruise missiles.

If Ukraine hit the Moskva with missiles, the cruiser likely represents the largest warship to be sunk in combat since the 1982 Falklands War, which saw a similar-sized cruiser called the ARA General Belgrano torpedoed by a British submarine, killing over 300 sailors on board.

https://apnews.com/article/russia-u...ack-sea-22d7279f32c15d4a7037a2195113fb57
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/26/22 05:25 AM

Russia-Ukraine War LIVE: Russia warns of nuclear war

https://www.hindustantimes.com/worl...on-april-26-tuesday-101650931010873.html
Posted By: MeyerLansky

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/26/22 09:05 AM

Originally Posted by U talkin' da me ??
Russia-Ukraine War LIVE: Russia warns of nuclear war

https://www.hindustantimes.com/worl...on-april-26-tuesday-101650931010873.html

this is starting to get uglier
i won't be surprised if russia will try to prevent the west weapons supply to ukraine by force...
which will end up in a huge direct war between the west and russia
Posted By: afsaneh77

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/26/22 04:03 PM

Originally Posted by olivant
They maintain that Putin is wiping out Ukranian Nazis who are allied to Biden et al and are running a huge world-wide child trafficking network.


I don't think Putin is a good guy, doing such things. However Ukraine has had a Nazi problem and we didn't get to see Maxwell's list of clients as to who was part of the child trafficking network. However we get to see Johnny Depp's trial case in detail. All these from the MSM that has lied on every single issue of the so called pandemic for two years, now instead of being accountable, they start on another distraction for the masses. What's next? Alien invasion? Famine? Another pandemic where WHO is in charge? They extinguish crisis with crisis. I don't follow the news anymore, from neither side. This documentary was interesting. Didn't watch all of it. However it does address the Nazi problem in Ukraine.

https://rumble.com/vwxxi8-ukraine-on-fire.html
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/27/22 12:11 AM

Even Germany has agreed to deliver anti-aircraft tanks to Ukraine, the German Defense Ministry announced on Tuesday.
It's very sensitive because of the communist history of eastern Germany.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/27/22 03:53 AM

US urges more arms for Ukraine amid fears of expanding war

The U.S. pressed its allies Tuesday to move “heaven and earth” to keep Kyiv well-supplied with weapons as Russian forces rained fire on eastern and southern Ukraine amid growing new fears the war could spill over the country’s borders.

https://apnews.com/article/russia-u...ss-nato-9198d40f605385550c02e82c6366ccca
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/01/22 10:12 PM

Vladimir Putin's war effort has been left in ruins after his top commander - Valeriy Gerasimov - was reportedly wounded and forced to flee the country after a Ukrainian ambush attack. The devastating attack is a huge blow to the Kremlin after President Putin had personally sent General Gerasimov to rescue the stalled war ahead of the May 9 Victory Day parade. General Gerasimov, who is the chief of staff of the Russian army, had been sent to the region to take personal control of the all-out assault on the Donbas region.
Posted By: jace

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/02/22 03:25 AM

Nancy Peloisi showed up there today with a congressional delegation. That can only mean one thing: the situation will get worse.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/02/22 02:16 PM

Russia’s Putin To Hand Over Keys To War While He Has Cancer Surgery

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/worl...-he-has-cancer-surgery-report/ar-AAWN94M
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/02/22 02:17 PM

Ukraine admits ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ fighter pilot is a myth

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-europe-media-social-cc6e278ae22f37476eb95e5133541047
Posted By: MeyerLansky

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/02/22 05:03 PM

there are still rumors about moldova being russia next target
Posted By: NYMafia

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/02/22 05:59 PM

Originally Posted by U talkin' da me ??
Russia’s Putin To Hand Over Keys To War While He Has Cancer Surgery

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/worl...-he-has-cancer-surgery-report/ar-AAWN94M



I just read that also, in the NYPost. We'll see. If it's true, hopefully he croaks right on the table. It could potentially save millions of lives.
Posted By: Turnbull

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/03/22 05:42 AM

It would be an ideal opportunity for Putin's foes to have him killed and blame it on medical circumstances, It'd be rough justice, too, considering all the foes Putin had murdered by poison.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/07/22 11:53 AM

Italy Freezes Scheherazade Superyacht Linked To Vladimir Putin

https://www.forbes.com/sites/giacom...inked-to-vladimir-putin/?sh=49dd3c1111e8
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/12/22 11:08 AM

Finland’s NATO membership: Finland's leaders announced in a joint statement on Thursday that they are in favor of applying for NATO membership, moving the Nordic nation closer to joining the alliance. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, public support for joining NATO in Finland, which shares an 800-mile border with Russia, has leaped from around 30% to nearly 80% in some polls.

Sweden could be next: It is also expected that Sweden, Finland’s neighbor to the west, will soon announce its intention to join NATO. Sweden's foreign minister said Thursday that the country will "take Finland’s assessments into account." Russia has warned both countries against joining the alliance, saying there would be consequences.

Support for Finland: NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg said Finland would be "warmly welcomed" into the alliance. Meanwhile, NATO members Denmark and Estonia said they would support Finland’s membership, with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen saying it "will strengthen NATO and our common security."

Moscow's reaction: Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Thursday that Russia would see Finland's accession to the NATO as a threat and the move would not contribute to more security. Russia will analyze the situation with Finland's entry to NATO and will work out the necessary measures to ensure its own security, he added.
Posted By: MeyerLansky

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/12/22 12:38 PM

things are getting serious...
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/15/22 11:35 PM

Coup to remove cancer-stricken Putin underway in Russia, Ukrainian intelligence chief says

https://fortune.com/2022/05/14/does-putin-have-cancer-coup-underway-blood-cancer-ukraine-war/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/17/22 07:55 PM

Moscow – Rare realism from a military analyst on Russian state television. "We are in complete geopolitical isolation and the whole world is against us." Discharged Colonel Mikhail Chodaryonok warned before Putin's raid that the operation would not go smoothly and now he is right. "As much as we hate to admit that, we have to get out of this situation."
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/17/22 09:11 PM

...

Attached picture Finland Putin.jpg
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/21/22 06:27 PM

Protester painted in Ukraine colors ejected from Cannes red carpet

https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...rs-ejected-cannes-red-carpet-2022-05-20/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fb2V7yTRtg
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/23/22 05:29 PM

Russia is studying an Italian peace plan for UKraine, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko said Monday, according to Interfax.
"Moscow is studying Italy's plan to resolve the situation in Ukraine," Rudenko was reported as saying.
Italy's four-stage plan would feature a ceasefire, talks on Ukraine's 'international status', i.e. whether it is neutral, a bilateral agreement between Kyiv and Moscow on the contested areas of Crimea and Donbass, and a multilateral agreement on peace and security in Europe.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/29/22 12:19 AM

The European police organization Europol is concerned about the large amount of weapons being delivered to Ukraine. When the war is over, they could fall into the wrong hands.

That says Europol chief Catherine De Bolle in conversation with the German newspaper Die Welt am Sonntag. De Bolle is especially afraid of a repeat of the end of the wars in the Balkans.

Weapons from those wars are used by criminal gangs thirty years later, says De Bolle. She fears that the weapons from Ukraine will continue to roam.
Posted By: jace

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/30/22 03:22 AM

I am glad to see this war updated on here. The American news media could not cover it enough a few weeks ago, now coverage of it is sparse. Most people thought it would be over by now, but sadly it seems like this war is going to drag on, and eventually draw others into it. If Putin is really sick, I wonder if his successor (if Putin dies) will try to end the war or escalate things.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/30/22 05:41 AM

Ukrainians Wipe Out Russian Base Hidden In Trees

https://www.zenger.news/2022/05/27/ukrainians-wipe-out-russian-base-hidden-in-trees/

Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/30/22 06:06 PM

Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/08/22 06:56 AM

Ukrainian troops have slowed down their liberation of Russian-occupied territories as they lack fire-power and manpower, Zelenskiy said in an interview with the Financial Times, according to a transcript of his remarks provided by the president’s office.

Ukraine needs 10 times the amount of weapons and people to move forward with its counteroffensive, he said. Even so, Zelenskiy reiterated his country needs to defeat Russia on the battlefield. Having Russian troops pushed back to their Feb. 24 positions would only be a temporary victory as Ukraine has to regain control over all of its territories, he said.

========================
We have weapons, but, where are "the people" he speaks of going to come from??
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/08/22 09:37 PM

Moscow’s chief rabbi ‘in exile’ after resisting Kremlin pressure over war
Pinchas Goldschmidt left Russia just weeks after invasion of Ukraine, daughter-in-law says

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...fter-resisting-kremlin-pressure-over-war
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/09/22 09:06 AM

John Cena turns the dream of a Ukrainian refugee with Down syndrome into a reality

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.ne...th-down-syndrome-into-a-reality-20220608
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/25/22 11:47 AM

Vladimir Putin ally warns London ‘will be bombed first’ if World War 3 breaks out
June 25, 2022 by Admin
In this article, you will get all the information regarding Vladimir Putin ally warns London ‘will be bombed first’ if World War 3 breaks out
London will be the first strategic Nato target to be hit by Russian missiles should World War Three erupt, a close ally of presdient Vladimir Putin has claimed.

Speaking on Russian state TV Andrey Gurulyov, an MP sat on Moscow’s defence committee, described a full-scale invasion of Nato’s Baltic state members.

Gurulyov, a former military commander and member of the pro-Putin United Russia party, said: “We’ll destroy the entire group of enemy’s space satellites during the first air operation.

“No-one will care if they are American or British, we would see them all as NATO.

“Second, we’ll mitigate the entire system of anti-missile defence, everywhere and 100 per cent. Third, we certainly won’t start from Warsaw, Paris or Berlin. The first to be hit will be London.

“It’s crystal clear that the threat to the world comes from the Anglo-Saxons.”
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/26/22 08:53 PM

Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/27/22 07:42 PM

Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/27/22 08:17 PM

Russia and their Gold

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/30/22 01:54 AM

Welcome to NATO Sweden and Finland we become stronger again.
Posted By: MeyerLansky

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/30/22 04:07 PM

Originally Posted by Hollander
Welcome to NATO Sweden and Finland we become stronger again.

you do...
instead of getting weaker nato got stronger and more united
this is not what russia wanted from the beginning of the war
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/05/22 11:55 AM

Bank of England tells lenders to brace for economic storm

LONDON, July 5 (Reuters) - The Bank of England warned on Tuesday that the economic outlook for Britain and the world had darkened and told banks to ramp up capital buffers to ensure they can weather the storm.

"The economic outlook for the UK and globally has deteriorated materially," the BoE said as it published its latest Financial Stability Report, adding that developments around the war in Ukraine would be a key factor.

https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/bank-england-tells-lenders-brace-economic-storm-2022-07-05/
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/09/22 04:45 AM

Putin dares the West to fight, one day after top Moscow leader threatens to take back Alaska

https://justthenews.com/government/...er-top-moscow-leader-threatens-take-back

"Sarah Palin: "I can see Russian troops landing from my house." (Maybe)
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/13/22 03:50 AM

NYC getting prepared...

Posted By: Irishman12

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/13/22 11:30 PM

Originally Posted by U talkin' da me ??
NYC getting prepared...



lol Fear sells
Posted By: afsaneh77

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/14/22 08:37 AM

Originally Posted by Irishman12
lol Fear sells


Word! They have updated duck and go under the table with stay inside and watch TV. lol I thought it was time for alien invasion, but no. It's time for nuclear war that can be avoided by not going outside and following the media.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/20/22 02:59 AM

Russia doesn't tend to lose wars....so far....

Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/20/22 05:28 AM

Ukraine war: Russia plans to annex Ukrainian land

Russia plans to annex more Ukrainian territory using a similar "playbook" to its takeover of Crimea, the US says.

Citing US intelligence, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Russia is already laying the groundwork for annexation.

Occupied regions of Ukraine could hold "sham" referenda on joining Russia as soon as September, he said.

Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 after a referendum which was widely viewed as illegitimate.

"We want to make it plain to the American people," Mr Kirby told reporters. "Nobody is fooled by it. [Russian President Vladimir Putin] is dusting off the playbook from 2014."

He accused Russia of installing illegitimate pro-Russian officials to run occupied regions of Ukraine, with the aim of organising referenda on becoming part of Russia.

The results of the votes would be used by Russia "to try to claim annexation of sovereign Ukrainian territory", Mr Kirby said.

Russia has already installed its own regional and local officials in the parts of Ukraine it has occupied.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62231936
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/21/22 05:44 AM

Ukraine war: CIA chief says no intelligence that Putin is in bad health

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62246914
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/27/22 09:45 PM

Russia's departure from the International Space Station in 2024 will seriously affect the country's space sector, say experts.

Building its own space station could take at least a decade with "the most generous funding", says analyst Vitaly Yegorov

https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1552102616515379201

Russia to build Death Star near Earth ? ? ?

[Linked Image]
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/03/22 02:32 AM

The United States added sanctions on more Russian elites Tuesday in response to the invasion of Ukraine.

Among them: Vladimir Putin's purported girlfriend and Andrey Grigoryevich Guryev, who owns the 2nd largest estate in London after Buckingham Palace


https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1554605463295115264
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/06/22 10:28 PM

War 'about to enter new phase', UK intelligence warns
We’ve got more from the UK’s MoD.

On what Ukraine’s troops are focusing on, it adds:

Ukrainian forces are focusing their targeting on bridges, ammunition depots, and rail links with growing frequency in Ukraine’s southern regions.

Including the strategically important railroad spur that links Kherson to Russian-occupied Crimea, almost certainly using a combination of block, damage, degrade, deny, destroy, and disrupt effects to try to affect Russia’s ability to logistically resupply.

The MoD then adds it believes the war is about to enter a “new phase”.

Russia’s war on Ukraine is about to enter a new phase, with the heaviest fighting shifting to a roughly 350km frontline stretching south-west from near Zaporizhzhia to Kherson, paralleling the Dnieper River.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/10/22 06:37 PM

Russia sent Steven Seagal to occupied Ukraine to spread propaganda, part of his role as a Kremlin spokesman

https://www.businessinsider.nl/russ...part-of-his-role-as-a-kremlin-spokesman/
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/23/22 09:26 PM

Ukraine is not even a NATO member... I've had about enough of the "Cold War" spending... Americans need monetary help more than some corrupt Govt. in Africa, or Asia, or the Ukraine...

US to send $3 billion in aid to Ukraine as war hits 6 months

https://apnews.com/article/us-ukraine-3-billion-dollar-aid-package-363cdbeb670626eb410d72e81bd8068c
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/23/22 09:55 PM

The car bombing of Darya Dugina in Moscow is interesting her father was def the target!
Who was behind it FSB, Ukraine secret services, CIA??
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/25/22 10:20 AM

Maintenance work: New record: gas price rises to 315 euros per MWh
BUSINESSPlumley News about 2 hours ago
\
The gas price in Europe continues to soar. The futures contract TTF on the energy exchange in Amsterdam, which is trend-setting for European gas trading, continues to rise and reached the record value of 315 euros per megawatt hour on Thursday.

In the past week, natural gas was traded at a peak of just under 241 euros. Within a week, the price has risen by 23 percent. And compared to the previous year, the price of gas has increased almost twelvefold.

Maintenance work
On the market, the new surge in gas prices was explained by a renewed interruption in Russian gas supplies to Europe through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline. Russia has announced that it will suspend gas supplies via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in the Baltic Sea for three days at the end of August. The state-owned company Gazprom announced that no gas would flow from August 31 to September 2 due to maintenance work.

According to Russian information, after the maintenance work, 33 million cubic meters of natural gas will be delivered again every day. This corresponds to the 20 percent of the daily maximum output to which Russia reduced deliveries a few weeks ago.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/02/22 12:55 AM

The CEO of Lukoil Ravil Maganov "fell out of a window", about a dozen of oligarchs have died during the war under mysterious circumstances. Real mafia shit. One less constant critic for Vladimir Putin.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/11/22 09:53 PM

Russians are fleeing the second-largest city in Ukraine Kharkov now Putin faces second revolt as Russian Officials slam War, demand resignation.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/12/22 09:03 PM

Originally Posted by Hollander
The CEO of Lukoil Ravil Maganov "fell out of a window", about a dozen of oligarchs have died during the war under mysterious circumstances. Real mafia shit. One less constant critic for Vladimir Putin.


Russian energy exec falls from boat in latest mystery death

https://nypost.com/2022/09/12/russian-energy-exec-falls-to-his-death-from-boat/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/17/22 03:11 PM

China as well as India have growing concerns about how the war is going. During a meeting with India's Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the Uzbekistan security summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin said he wanted to end the Ukraine conflict "as soon as possible," without saying how.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/21/22 04:27 PM

Exclusive: NATO chief calls Putin's nuclear threat a 'dangerous' escalation

https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...scalation-dangerous-reckless-2022-09-21/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/22/22 10:40 AM

Russians researched how to break their own arms and hurriedly bought one-way plane tickets out of the country to avoid war call-up.
Russian conscripts would be 'cannon fodder' 90% of these reservists have not received any form of training.
Posted By: Turnbull

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/22/22 06:54 PM

Yes, I think conscription is going to backfire on Putin. Russia today is not like the USSR of the Afghanistan war era. Russia doesn't have an antiwar movement like America's during the Vietnam War era. But, young Russian men are just as likely to resist being conscripted into fighting a war they don't want as were their US counterparts years ago.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/22/22 08:53 PM

Originally Posted by Turnbull
Yes, I think conscription is going to backfire on Putin. Russia today is not like the USSR of the Afghanistan war era. Russia doesn't have an antiwar movement like America's during the Vietnam War era. But, young Russian men are just as likely to resist being conscripted into fighting a war they don't want as were their US counterparts years ago.


Yeah now young people in Moscow and Saint Petersburg have to go to fight a war against their brothers and most of them will die the western weapons the Ukranians have are superior.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/24/22 10:36 AM

Ukraine war: Putin not bluffing about nuclear weapons, EU says

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63016675
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/25/22 02:26 PM

Complaints about Russia's chaotic mobilization grow

https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...tic-mobilisation-grow-louder-2022-09-24/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/25/22 11:02 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/27/22 08:54 PM

Europe investigates 'attacks' on Russian gas pipelines to Europe

https://www.reuters.com/business/en...ndersea-gas-pipelines-europe-2022-09-27/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/30/22 08:05 PM

Vladimir Putin heightens World War tensions with rant about the West on big day in Russia and Ukraine war
Putin's lengthy diatribe today culminated with the signing of documents that, from Russia's perspective, has made four Ukrainian regions part of the Russian Federation.

https://www.irishmirror.ie/news/world-news/vladimir-putin-heightens-world-war-28124224
Posted By: Turnbull

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/30/22 08:28 PM

You can take Russia out of the Soviet Union, but you can't take the Soviet Union out of Russia. Stalin is dead; long live Stalin.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/30/22 09:03 PM

Originally Posted by Turnbull
You can take Russia out of the Soviet Union, but you can't take the Soviet Union out of Russia. Stalin is dead; long live Stalin.


100% that's why Putin denied today seeking to revive the Soviet Union. However communism has been replaced by nationalism and imperialism.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/30/22 10:52 PM

I do think China, India and Kazachstan could press Putin not to escalate further. China doesn't want a war with the West.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/30/22 11:58 PM

His speech was pretty scary!

Putin portrayed the annexation as a holy war against the West, using startling rhetoric.

"They [the West] are moving toward open Satanism," he said in a speech broadcast to millions online.

Western elites were teaching "sexual deviation" to children who changed their gender, he said. "We're fighting for historical Russia, to protect our children and grandchildren from this experiment to change their souls," he added.

Putin invoked Jesus by name to bear witness to his "truth" and portrayed himself in messianic terms.

"I believe in the spiritual power of the Russian people and my spirit is its spirit, the suffering of the people is my suffering," he said.

"The destruction of the Western hegemony is irreversible," Putin added, as he neared the climax of his oration.
Posted By: blueracing347

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/01/22 12:10 AM

He's pulling a Hitler. Unfortunately, the U.S. can't be the war machine we once were. If it wasn't for our ability to aid the world in WW2, Europe would've collapsed. Our industry is outsourced, kids are pussies, and all of our comrades are fighting an imaginary war.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/01/22 12:21 AM

Originally Posted by blueracing347
He's pulling a Hitler. Unfortunately, the U.S. can't be the war machine we once were. If it wasn't for our ability to aid the world in WW2, Europe would've collapsed. Our industry is outsourced, kids are pussies, and all of our comrades are fighting an imaginary war.


Europe still can't carry their own weight they are now waiting what the US will do.
Posted By: blueracing347

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/01/22 12:49 AM

Wait until winter comes. We've dipped into our oil reserves. Our president can't even ride a bike. Hopefully his cabinet can play chess.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/01/22 01:16 AM

Originally Posted by blueracing347
Wait until winter comes. We've dipped into our oil reserves. Our president can't even ride a bike. Hopefully his cabinet can play chess.


Blinken is a smart guy, but I agree Biden often looks lost and confused lol.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/01/22 06:11 AM

Russian natural gas lines... some go through Ukraine, others don't, but the ramifications to Germany cannot be understated...

Germany's Catastrophic Gas Problem

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/01/22 03:56 PM

Russia said on Saturday its troops had abandoned their bastion of Lyman in Ukraine's east for fear of encirclement and the leader of Chechnya, a close Kremlin ally, said Moscow should consider using a low-yield nuclear weapon in response.

The fall of the town is a major setback for Moscow after President Vladimir Putin proclaimed the annexation of the Donetsk region, along with three other regions, at a ceremony on Friday that was condemned by Kyiv and the West as a farce.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...nd-lyman-stronghold-military-2022-10-01/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/01/22 10:19 PM

Originally Posted by U talkin' da me ??
Russian natural gas lines... some go through Ukraine, others don't, but the ramifications to Germany cannot be understated...

Germany's Catastrophic Gas Problem





Prices here are still going up it's crazy and we still didn't reach the peak. The third economy of Europe is now also hit hard.

The Russian state gas group Gazprom no longer supplies natural gas to Italy. This is reported by the Italian oil and gas company Eni. Eni says it has been informed by Gazprom that it is not possible to supply gas to Italy from Austria due to a transport problem.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/04/22 02:56 AM

There are growing doubts over whether Russia can actually win this war. This raises the question of whether the Russian elites are prepared to stick with Putin until the bitter end, particularly amid growing threats to use nuclear weapons.

The idea that Russia will inevitably prevail has started to be overshadowed by doubt over what price Russia is prepared to pay in order to bring Ukraine to heel. The longer the conflict rages and the more resources the Russian regime throws into the furnace of war, the more divided Russia’s elites may become, and the more serious those divides.

There are no signs that the Russian elite sees Ukraine as an existential problem for Russia. For Putin, it is an extremely emotional and personal topic. He is fixated on ideas of historical justice, Russian ancestral lands, and the desire to “liberate” the fraternal Ukrainian people from anti-Russian “occupiers” sponsored by the West. But this viewpoint is not shared even by many hawks, never mind the technocrats.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/04/22 04:54 AM

The Ukranian forces are making big progress in all four Russian-occupied territories.
Posted By: Turnbull

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/04/22 06:21 AM

One of the reasons senior military people in big nations don't want to get involved in a shooting war is that the purpose of having a strong military is to deter wars they don't want. Once their nation starts shooting, it's proof that their deterrent failed. Then they run the risk of losing, or failing to win decisively, which is the same as losing, for a big nation. Another reason is that their strategies, tactics and equipment are exposed to enemies and any other observers with spy satellites, which means just about every other nation on earth. NATO is pricking up priceless information on Russia's order of battle, capabilities, armaments and support infrastructure--and they're cranking what they learn into their own strategies and plans. It's a two-way street: even as they're being beaten, the Russians are learning about NATO's strengths and equipment as they're being used by NATO's proxy, Ukraine.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/05/22 11:09 PM

Russia warns US of direct military clash risk

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63140098
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/06/22 02:04 AM

Russia’s Putin makes Chechnya’s Kadyrov an army general
Moscow
AFP
Published: 05 October ,2022: 07:28 PM GST

Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, an ally of President Vladimir Putin, said Wednesday he was granted a top rank in Russia’s army, just as Moscow’s forces suffer a series of defeats in Ukraine.

The 46-year-old Chechen leader – one of the most outspoken voices in Russia backing Putin’s Ukraine offensive – said it was a “huge honor” for him.

Kadyrov, a former warlord, said Putin had “personally” informed him of the decision.

“The President of Russia awarded me the rank of colonel general,” Kadyrov said on Telegram. “This is a promotion for me.”

The rank of colonel general is the third highest command rank in the Russian military hierarchy.

Kadyrov’s appointment to the rank came as the Ukrainian army pushed back Moscow’s forces in areas that the Kremlin proclaimed to be “Russian forever.”

The Chechen leader said he would do “everything to end the special military operation quickly” – using the Kremlin’s term for its Ukraine campaign.

Chechen units – including Kadyrov’s own militia with a sinister reputation, the “Kadyrovtsi” – are fighting alongside regular Russian forces in Ukraine.

Kadyrov has thrown his full backing behind Putin’s campaign, regularly calling for the most drastic tactics to be used in Ukraine.

This week he called on Moscow to use low-yield nuclear weapons in Ukraine after Russian troops were forced to retreat from the town of Lyman.

He then said he was sending three of his teenage sons – aged 14,15 and 16 – to the front.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/07/22 08:41 PM

Russian President Putin celebrated his 70th birthday on Friday. Only a handful of world leaders congratulated him, but a few even gave him a real gift. Also on the Ukrainian side, the birthday of the Russian president does not pass without a struggle.

To celebrate his 70th birthday, Putin held "an informal meeting" with some former Soviet leaders, including Armenia, Uzbekistan, Belarus and Tajikistan, in St. Petersburg on Friday. The last two also brought presents. For example, Putin received a voucher for a tractor from Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan gave him a mountain of watermelons and pumpkins. The Russian leader also received calls from Cuba, Turkey, South Africa, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, among others. And even Kim Jong-un of North Korea sent Putin birthday wishes.

Domestically, the president was praised by state media, schools celebrated and Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church called for prayers to mark Putin's birthday. "God has placed you at the helm of power so that you can render a very important and responsible service to the future of the country and people entrusted to you," the head of the Russian Church said in a congratulatory telegram to the president.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/08/22 03:14 AM

We now see economic warfare on a full scale western sancties but also opec cuts oil production.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/08/22 03:11 PM

The UK Daily Mail coverage with lots of pictures and backstory...

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/br...bridge-linking-Crimea-Putins-Russia.html

Attached picture Kerch Bridge 10.8.22.jpg
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/08/22 08:32 PM

Russia appoints notorious general to lead Ukraine offensive

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...torious-general-sergei-surovikin-ukraine
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/09/22 07:56 PM

https://twitter.com/Breaking911/status/1579166216366985217

12:45pm CDT 10.9.22

Breaking911 (@Breaking911)

JUST IN: Putin blames Ukraine secret services for Crimea bridge blast, denounces 'terrorist act' - AFP

Putin denounces Kerch Bridge attack "a terrorist act" by Kyiv

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...t-kerch-bridge-linking-crimea-and-russia
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/09/22 08:22 PM

A coup wouldn't suprise me, A coup d'état or putsch is the illegal overthrow of a government, usually by a small group of an existing state institution - usually by the military - to replace the deposed government with another institution.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/09/22 11:42 PM

Most of President Putin's Kremlin elite oppose the Ukraine war.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/10/22 06:17 AM

N. Korea confirms nuke missiles tests to ‘wipe out’ enemies

https://apnews.com/article/business...s-north-6ce0a8da47f8eb9228d4b33223ebfa3b

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea’s recent barrage of missile launches were tests of its tactical nuclear weapons to “hit and wipe out” potential South Korean and U.S. targets, state media reported Monday, as its leader Kim Jong Un signaled he would conduct more provocative tests.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/10/22 08:41 AM

Russia fired missiles at cities across Ukraine on Monday morning, including the capital Kyiv, where at least five people were killed, according to officials. Strikes against "critical infrastructure" including power facilities were also reported in Kharkiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/11/22 07:23 AM

https://t.me/beholdisraelchannel/11732

Amir Tsarfati

Air raid sirens are all across Ukraine:
Flights of cruise missiles are recorded in different regions.
Rocket launches from the Caspian in the direction of the Dnipropetrovsk region were recorded.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/11/22 11:55 AM

Russia is running out of weapons for its war in Ukraine and the costs to the Kremlin are "staggering" in terms of soldiers killed and equipment lost, a UK spy chief will say.

Sir Jeremy Fleming, the head of GCHQ, will use a rare, public speech today to say the Ukrainian armed forces are "turning the tide" on the physical battlefield as well as in cyberspace.

He will say Beijing is seeking to exploit technologies in space and online in ways that could pose a "huge threat to us all".

https://news.sky.com/story/russia-r...rs-of-casualties-spy-chief-says-12717702
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/11/22 08:55 PM

Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar observed a "common understanding" regarding the need for a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire in a phone call with his Russian counterpart Sergei Shoigu on Tuesday, Akar's ministry said in a statement.

Akar emphasized the importance of an immediate ceasefire to stop loss of life and establish peace and stability in the region, according to a readout following the call between the two ministers.

"The importance of declaring a ceasefire urgently in order to prevent further loss of lives and to re-establish peace and stability in the region was emphasized, and it was gladly observed that there was a common understand?ng regarding the ceasefire," the Turkish defence ministry said.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/12/22 12:14 AM

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) will go ahead with its annual routine nuclear deterrent exercises as cancelling it now would send the wrong signal to Moscow, NATO head Jens Stoltenberg told a news conference on Tuesday.

Stoltenberg said NATO's military strength was the best way to prevent any escalation of tensions with Russia, which has made veiled threats of using nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which it invaded on Feb 24th.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/12/22 06:31 AM

Russians shelled the city with thermite incendiary and white phosphorus cluster munitions.

https://t.me/beholdisraelchannel/11745
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/15/22 02:12 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/15/22 08:58 PM

Defense Russia: 11 dead in 'terrorist attack' on training ground
At least 11 people were killed and 15 injured in an attack on a Russian army training ground in Belgorod, near the border with Ukraine. The Russian Defense Ministry speaks of an act of terrorism. A statement from the ministry states that the attackers are two citizens from a former member state of the Soviet Union.

According to news agency RIA Novosti, the attack was on a training ground where 'volunteers' for the war in Ukraine receive shooting training, among other things. The perpetrators were shot dead.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/16/22 02:54 AM

It's strange we are in a war we send weapons but the Ukraine has to fight.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/16/22 11:08 PM

China India asking their citizens to leave Ukraine, Serbia close embassay in Kiev. CIS countries telling citizens to leave.

https://t.me/beholdisraelchannel/11811

Some counties can read the map very well. They know Putin better than the western world does .

https://t.me/beholdisraelchannel/11812

North Korea is about to conduct a nuclear test in the next 24 hours

https://t.me/beholdisraelchannel/11818
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/16/22 11:36 PM


Ukraine offers $100,000 bounty for Russian war criminal Igor Girkin
The Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate announced the reward on Oct. 16. Girkin, also known as Igor Strelkov, is a former Russian FSB agent and a key figure in the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine when he helped seize Sloviansk, Donetsk Oblast, in 2014. Girkin has also been found guilty of participating in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine, which killed 283 people. He has since been critical of Russian President Vladimir Putin, accusing him of mishandling Russia’s war effort.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/18/22 11:54 PM

Quote
The US says it agrees with Western allies that Iran's supply of explosive drones to Russia violates UN sanctions.

Kyiv was struck by so-called "kamikaze" drones on Monday, unleashed by Russia but believed to be Iranian-made.

The US agrees with the French and British assessment that the drones violate UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the US State Department said.


Ukraine use Turkish drones.
If they get the US drones they can take out anyone like they do with ISIS/Al Qaeda.
It's def becoming a drones and also a cyber war.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/21/22 04:53 AM

Fail of the day. A Russian defence ministry expert doesn't realise he is already on air and says: "Just don't ask too much about these Iranian drones. We all know they are Iranian, but the authorities don't want to admit it".

https://twitter.com/TadeuszGiczan/status/1583042663426584578
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/25/22 09:16 PM

The battle of Kherson could be very bloody.

The first city to fall to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was in turmoil on Monday as its Moscow-appointed officials began fleeing across a river to safer territory, while Russian soldiers appeared to be digging in for a fight against advancing Ukrainian forces.

Government offices in Kherson have been emptied of essential equipment. Civilians have been told by proxy officials loyal to the Kremlin to take “documents, money, valuables and clothes” and evacuate, according to Ukrainian officials, videos on social media and accounts from Ukrainian activists who have spoken to residents.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/24/world/europe/russia-ukraine-kherson-war.html
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/25/22 09:22 PM

What are dirty bombs and why is Russia talking about them?
Russia is taking highly disputed claims that Ukraine plans to use a dirty bomb on its own soil to the UN security council

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/25/what-are-dirty-bombs-russia-ukraine
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/26/22 11:35 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/26/22 11:44 PM

Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/29/22 08:28 PM

Russia suspends participation in Ukraine grain export deal

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...by-deploying-new-nuclear-bombs-in-europe
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/01/22 01:14 PM

Flamboyant Russian entrepreneur Oleg Tinkov tears up his Russian passport and denounces 'fascism' under President Putin.

The founder of the online Tinkoff Bank, one of the largest Russian banks with about 20 million customers, is lashing out at the Kremlin regime on Instagram.

“I can no longer and do not want to be associated with a fascist country that starts a war against a peaceful neighbor,” said Tinkov, who, unlike many other rich Russians, dares to take a public position against Putin. He previously called the Russian armed forces a 'shit army'.

An independent Russian news outlet tweeted a certificate confirming that Tinkov is no longer Russian, according to the BBC. Sota Vision also posted Tinkov's statement on Instagram on social media. However, the statement now appears to have been removed from Tinkov's account.

According to the BBC, Tinkov is currently living in London. Like many wealthy Russians, he would be hit hard by sanctions. “I hope that more prominent Russians follow my example, so that Putin's regime weakens and he eventually falls. I hate Putin's Russia, but I love all the Russians who turn against this foolish war."
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/02/22 12:14 AM

Don’t let Russia win, NATO chief warns US
With Ukraine-skeptical Republicans poised for election gains, Jens Stoltenberg tells POLITICO a Russian victory would ‘send a message to authoritarian leaders — not only Putin but also China.’

Stoltenberg warned that Kyiv’s recent battlefield gains would not have been possible without NATO allies’ support. And he appealed to the more strident anti-China sentiment that runs through both major U.S. political parties.

A victorious Russia, he said, would “be bad for all of us in Europe and North America, in the whole of NATO, because that will send a message to authoritarian leaders — not only Putin but also China — that by the use of brutal military force they can achieve their goals.”
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/02/22 09:30 PM

Spain to send new military aid package to Ukraine
Ukraine will receive a new military aid package from Spain, including air defence systems, the Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba has said.

In a statement on Twitter, Mr Kuleba said he had assured Spain's foreign minister Jos Manuel Albares that Ukraine would "always remember that Spain stood with us during the most difficult time" following the new aid package.

It comes after the US said it would provide $275 million in additional military assistance to Ukraine, including arms, munitions and equipment.

Last week, US secretary of state Antony Blinken said: "We are also working to provide Ukraine with the air defence capabilities it needs with the two initial US -provided NASAMS ready for delivery to Ukraine next month and we are working with allies and partners to enable delivery of their own air defence systems to Ukraine."
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/02/22 09:32 PM

Russia says five nuclear powers teetering on 'brink of direct armed conflict'
Russia's foreign ministry has said it fears the five declared nuclear powers were teetering "on the brink of a direct armed conflict".

In a statement, the ministry added that the West must stop "encouraging provocations with weapons of mass destruction, which can lead to catastrophic consequences".

Western capitals have said Moscow is behind a ramping up of nuclear rhetoric since Russia invaded Ukraine in February - most recently by repeatedly accusing Kyiv of planning to use a radioactive "dirty bomb" without offering evidence.

Kyiv has denied having any such plan.

Moscow said it stood by a joint declaration issued together with the US, China, Britain and France in January affirming their joint responsibility for avoiding a nuclear war.

Vladimir Putin has appeared on several occasions to threaten a nuclear strike in connection with the war in Ukraine, and Moscow has repeatedly said its military doctrine permits the use of nuclear weapons if Russia's territorial integrity is under threat.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/02/22 09:34 PM

White House: North Korea covertly shipping 'significant number' of artillery shells to Russia
The White House says North Korea is covertly shipping a "significant number" of artillery shells to Russia to support Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.

National Security Council spokesman John Kirby North Korea "is covertly supplying" the ammunition to Russia, but added that"we're still monitoring this to determine whether the shipments are actually received."

He said the US believes North Korea is "trying to make it appear as though they're being sent to countries in the Middle East or North Africa".

He did not provide a specific estimate on the quantity of ammunition being sent.

Mr Kirby insisted that North Korean shipments are "not going to change the course of the war".

The White House would not specify the mode of transportation or whether the US or other nations would attempt to interdict the shipments to Russia.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/06/22 10:18 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/07/22 11:18 PM

Like I said it's becoming a drone and cyber war modern warfare. It's still shrouded in mystery, but reports have emerged of the use of drone boats in a recent attack on the Russian Black Sea fleet.

Ukraine war: What are Iranian kamikaze drones and will the US send the deadly MQ-9 Reaper?

https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-...-us-send-the-deadly-mq-9-reaper-12737283
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/09/22 08:46 PM

And the Academy Award for Best Actor in a Leading Role goes to --- Volodymyr Zelenskyy ! ! ! (video)

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1590089376138416128
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/10/22 03:14 AM

Zelensky is doing great things for his country Putin underestimated him he thought he was a clown.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/10/22 05:28 AM

Putin will not attend G20 summit in person, Russian embassy says

https://apnews.com/article/putin-bi...donesia-5f6fd062f8f49f384f7b72e2f6245800

Russian President Vladimir Putin will not attend the Group of 20 summit in Indonesia next week, an Indonesian government official said Thursday, avoiding a possible confrontation with the United States and its allies over his war in Ukraine.

U.S. President Joe Biden, Chinese President Xi Jinping and other world leaders are to attend the two-day summit in Bali that starts Nov. 15.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/13/22 03:55 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/15/22 02:19 AM

Originally Posted by U talkin' da me ??
Putin will not attend G20 summit in person, Russian embassy says

https://apnews.com/article/putin-bi...donesia-5f6fd062f8f49f384f7b72e2f6245800

Russian President Vladimir Putin will not attend the Group of 20 summit in Indonesia next week, an Indonesian government official said Thursday, avoiding a possible confrontation with the United States and its allies over his war in Ukraine.

U.S. President Joe Biden, Chinese President Xi Jinping and other world leaders are to attend the two-day summit in Bali that starts Nov. 15.


Several people suggested that Putin feared he would be killed.
Xi and Biden did a good job today it's a first step the 2 most powerful countries have to keep talking.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/15/22 09:53 PM

Poland Calls a Crisis Meeting After Grain Plant Explosion

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/14/world/europe/poland-explosion-ukraine-missile-strike.html
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/15/22 10:24 PM

And so it begins. Pray for the world lol
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/15/22 11:30 PM

Originally Posted by Giacalone
And so it begins. Pray for the world lol


Atmosphere of crisis in Poland after deaths by 'Russian missiles', NATO holds emergency session
The specter of NATO being pulled even further into the war between Ukraine and Russia has moved one step closer now that two Russian missiles reportedly landed in the Polish village of Przewodów on Tuesday evening. Two people were killed in the process. NATO will hold an emergency session on Wednesday.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/16/22 07:22 AM

US officials now admit blast in Poland caused by stray missile fired by Ukraine

https://twitter.com/JackPosobiec/status/1592774546364727296
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/16/22 11:28 PM

Originally Posted by U talkin' da me ??
US officials now admit blast in Poland caused by stray missile fired by Ukraine

https://twitter.com/JackPosobiec/status/1592774546364727296


Zelensky denies it, it's possible NATO allies want to down play the incident. Anyhow it's still a serious matter when rockets hit EU territory.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/17/22 03:24 PM

MH17: Three guilty as court finds Russia-controlled group downed airliner

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63637625.amp
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/18/22 06:12 PM

Iran protesters set fire to Ayatollah Khomeini's ancestral home

https://www.france24.com/en/middle-...e-to-ayatollah-khomeini-s-ancestral-home
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/19/22 02:31 PM

Poland Says It Will Not Allow Russian Delegation At OSCE Talks

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.rferl.org/amp/poland-osce-talks-russia-delegation/32137323.html
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/21/22 05:56 PM

Zelensky asks NATO to protect nuclear power plants from Russian 'sabotage'

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...a-nuclear-plant-after-madness-of-attacks
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/22/22 12:59 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/22/22 04:47 AM

Weapons shortages spark tough choices for Ukraine’s allies

https://www.defensenews.com/pentago...spark-tough-choices-for-ukraines-allies/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/23/22 02:03 AM

On both sides already 100.000 deaths and wounded and this terrible war will continue for a long time, the west can't stop and Putin idem ditto.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/23/22 02:27 AM

Originally Posted by U talkin' da me ??
Iran protesters set fire to Ayatollah Khomeini's ancestral home

https://www.france24.com/en/middle-...e-to-ayatollah-khomeini-s-ancestral-home


That's pretty big I can imagine the west is helping the protesters.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/27/22 12:56 AM

It’s becoming increasingly clear that Crimea is the main strategic prize in this war, for both sides, for who holds it controls the Black Sea and the entrance to the Sea of Azov. And the cherry on the icing that is Crimea is Sevastopol, the main naval port.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/29/22 02:25 PM

NATO commits to future Ukraine membership, drums up aid

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-nato-europe-romania-4b073dd620cad097f22106e6a29c859c
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/04/22 02:29 AM

The Western countries should give Ukraine Patriot missiles to defend themselves. The weapon system can disable helicopters, manned and unmanned aerial vehicles, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/06/22 03:51 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/21/22 01:50 AM

300 days of war now Zelensky likely makes a visit to Washington DC today.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/21/22 01:37 PM

NewsWorldEurope
Putin claims ‘Satan II’ hypersonic missile will be ready for deployment soon in speech to military chiefs
Leader says no financial limits on military spending, as he complains Nato is was using its full capabilities against Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-speech-today-russia-ukraine-b2249292.html%3famp
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/26/22 07:23 AM

Close friend of Putin lashes out at wealthy 'easygoing' Russians at war
A powerful Russian, owner of Wagner's private army Yevgeny Prigozhin, has lashed out at wealthy compatriots for their lack of commitment to Russia's war against Ukraine. In a television interview, President Vladimir Putin's closest confidant portrayed the so-called oligarchs (influential business people) and other wealthy as easy-going faint-hearted.

"They all want to dive into a heated pool in the evening and have fun," Prigozhin complained in an interview with Russian state television RT. The government should take everything away from these Russians as soon as possible. Then they would also be willing to contribute to the battle and to support the troops at the front, the Wagner boss reasoned. "At some point you have to realize that you have to give up everything you have, from the world of temptations, the restaurants, spas, dachas, swimming pools."

Prigozhin's interview is remarkable. For a long time, the Putin accomplice did not even appear in front of cameras. On Saturday he was already at a funeral of a Wagner mercenary who died in Ukraine. The American Institute for War Studies sees his presence at the funeral and the interview as attempts to gain respect and influence in Russian society.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/27/22 03:56 AM

Haha Lavrov has lost so much credibility the last months, he once was considered a moderate and intelligent diplomat.

Russia's Lavrov: Either Ukraine fulfils Moscow's proposals or our army will decide

Dec 27 (Reuters) - Moscow's proposals for settlement in Ukraine are well known to Kyiv and either Ukraine fulfils them for their own good or the Russian army will decide the issue, TASS agency quoted Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as saying.

"Our proposals for the demilitarization and denazification of the territories controlled by the regime, the elimination of threats to Russia's security emanating from there, including our new lands, are well known to the enemy," the state news agency quoted Lavrov as saying late on Monday.

"The point is simple: Fulfil them for your own good. Otherwise, the issue will be decided by the Russian army."

Moscow has been calling its invasion in Ukraine a "special military operation" to "demilitarise" and "denazify" its neighbour. Kyiv and its Western allies call it an imperial-style aggression to grab land.

In September, Moscow proclaimed it had annexed four provinces of Ukraine - Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson - after holding so-called referendums that were rejected as bogus and illegal by Kyiv and its allies.

On Sunday, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Moscow was open to negotiations and blamed Kyiv and its Western backers for a lack of talks, a stance Washington has previously dismissed as posturing amid persistent Russian attacks.

Lavrov told TASS that when it comes to how long the conflict will last, "the ball is in the regime's court and Washington behind it."

There is no end in sight to the war, which has entered its 11th month and which has killed thousands, displaced millions and turned cities into rubble.

Kyiv has ruled out conceding any land to Russia in return for peace, and publicly demands Russia relinquish all territory. Moscow has insisted it is pursing "demilitarisation" and "denazification" but in reality its aims have not been fully defined.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/27/22 11:23 PM

Putin bans Russian oil exports to countries that implement price cap

https://www.reuters.com/business/en...hat-imposed-price-cap-decree-2022-12-27/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/27/22 11:36 PM

Italy pledges continued support for Ukraine - and why it matters
Italy has pledged its continued support for Kyiv and reiterated its commitment to achieving a "just peace" for Ukraine.

There has been much talk in recent months that Vladimir Putin is hoping that, in time, those supporting Ukraine militarily and financially will grow weary with the cost.

Support for Ukraine has been a contentious topic within Italy's ruling coalition, which includes Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy, Matteo Salvini's League and Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia parties.

Ms Meloni is a staunch supporter of Kyiv, while her allies Mr Salvini and Mr Berlusconi have been much more ambiguous due to their historical ties with Russia and President Putin.

But in a statement following a phone call between Ms Meloni and President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, the Italian government said: "Meloni renewed the Italian government's full support for Kyiv in the political, military, economic and humanitarian fields, to repair energy infrastructure and (to work) for the future reconstruction of Ukraine."
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/31/22 02:32 AM

Xi has to be careful China doesn't want to get dragged into the conflict by Putin they need Europe for business.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/02/23 12:50 PM

The Ukrainian Army and a growing number of posts on pro-Russian social media have suggested that hundreds of recently mobilized Russian troops died in a New Year's attack on a makeshift barracks in a suburb of the occupied city of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine.

If such a scale of casualties is confirmed, it could represent one of the deadliest single incidents for the Russian side since the all-out invasion began 10 months ago and another potential rallying point for Ukraine and its international supporters in the conflict.

RFE/RL is unable to corroborate battlefield accounts in areas of the heaviest fighting, and there was no confirmation from Russian officials of the alleged incident.

But expressions of shock and anger by Russians online about the incident and the apparent failure of the Russian military to guard an occupied vocational school where the purported recruits were gathered suggested that even normally pro-Kremlin Telegram groups were acknowledging a setback.

Some of the Russian groups suggested the shelling was the result of an attack by Ukraine with a high-precision HIMARS rocket.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/02/23 10:55 PM

#HIMARSoCLOCK visit on school 19 in #Makiivka, Donetsk region official number is " 63 " dead and + 250 wounded so the reality is 630 dead

https://twitter.com/Htx_fella_osint/status/1610012103133347843
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/03/23 01:58 AM

Police: 25 torture chambers discovered in liberated areas of Kharkiv Oblast
by The Kyiv Independent news desk
January 2, 2023 6:33 pm

Investigators have discovered 25 torture chambers in the liberated areas of the northeastern Kharkiv Oblast, head of the regional police Volodymyr Tymoshko reported on Jan. 2.

Tymoshko described detention conditions of civilians as “inhumane,” reporting that Russian troops allegedly used electric shocks for torture and broken people’s fingers.

According to him, 920 bodies of civilians allegedly killed by Russian troops, including 25 children, were found since Sept. 7, and 656 bodies were identified.

In total, 1,699 civilians, including 74 children, were killed, and 2,596 were injured in Kharkiv Oblast since the start of the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, the official said, adding that 9,617 buildings were damaged or destroyed in the oblast due to Russia’s attacks.

As of Jan. 2, the Ukrainian military liberated 340 settlements in the oblast.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/03/23 02:15 AM

After many years of major cuts in defense Netherlands and most NATO countries now heavily invest in the army. Here we have 4 army units: the Royal Army, the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Marechaussee.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/03/23 02:28 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/03/23 02:35 AM

NATO has become so powerful with 30 countries, although Australia is not a member, it has cooperated with NATO forces.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/06/23 11:36 PM

Zelensky is begging for more tanks, The U.S. and the Netherlands are financing upgrades to nearly 100 older tanks destined for the Ukrainian army. Germany is thinking about sending Leopards that would be big one of the best.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/10/23 03:18 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/11/23 12:42 AM


Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/11/23 12:57 AM

I'm sure Ukraine gets Leopard and Challenger tanks soon, Europe knows it has to!
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/11/23 11:46 PM

The Russian army has - not for the first time since the invasion of Ukraine - the necessary changes of the guard at the top of defense this week. Sergei Soerovikin, who has been in charge of the offensive in Ukraine since October 2022, has to stand still. The current Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valeri Gerasimov will take over his duties, the Ministry of Defense reports.

In the statement, the Russian ministry says that Gerasimov has been appointed "commander of joint forces" in Ukraine to replace Soerovikin. The latter took office in October, but will now be the vice commander. According to Reuters, the ministry points to the "broadening of assignments", "the need for closer interaction" between the various army units and "improvement of the quality and effectiveness of the management of the Russian army" as an explanation for the replacement.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/12/23 12:58 AM

Putin's discontent with the regular army top has also to do with the Wagner group his favorites.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/12/23 02:33 AM

Wow the US army unloaded 1,275 tanks and other military equipment in the port of Vlissingen, Netherlands on Wednesday.
Not for Ukraine but to protect the Eastern border of Europe what a powerplay!
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/18/23 01:24 AM

High-ranking Wagner Group member seeks asylum in Norway

https://apnews.com/article/russia-government-norway-asylum-6a427312ad96ad5398c8a4a03fd7b128
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/19/23 04:47 AM

Patriots will be send and British tanks the coming months will be a big battle.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/21/23 04:06 AM

Russian oligarchs already lost 89 billion euros on sanctions against Russia, and Roman Abramovich is the biggest loser

The sharply diminished wealth of the richest oligarchs has everything to do with the harsh sanctions imposed on them by the West since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24. Converted, those oligarchs have lost 308 million euros a day since the start of the war.

The biggest loser is Roman Abramovich, former owner of the London football club Chelsea. He saw more than half of his fortune, 57 percent, go up in smoke. He now owns 'only' 7.8 billion dollars.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/25/23 12:21 AM


Under intense pressure, Germany decides to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, The United States is likely to announce today that it will supply Ukraine with M1 Abrams tanks, the Wall Street Journal reported .
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/26/23 02:15 AM

Ukraine will now push for F-16 fighter jets, government adviser says

https://thehill.com/homenews/383029...16-fighter-jets-government-adviser-says/

Now that Ukraine is finally getting the tanks it wants, it’s already looking for the next big thing — fighter jets

https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/now-th...ing-for-the-next-big-thing-fighter-jets/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/26/23 07:09 AM

Western intelligence is def supporting them.

Russian saboteurs seek to hamper Putin’s war machine
Anti-Putin activists try to slow down Russia’s war in Ukraine and say they are willing to step up their violence.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/25/russian-saboteurs-seek-to-hamper-putins-war-machine
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/27/23 02:30 PM

The websites of German airports have been hit by cyberattacks instigated by a Russian “hacker group”, authorities said Thursday.

https://airlive.net/breaking-a-cyberattack-is-targeting-several-websites-of-german-airports/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/29/23 03:30 AM

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Friday repeated a claim that neo-Nazis were committing crimes in Ukraine as the world marked the Holocaust.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/31/23 01:27 AM

Macron says will not rule out France sending fighter jets to Ukraine

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...rson-kyiv-calls-for-faster-arms-supplies
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/31/23 06:21 PM

INTERNATIONAL
Former Putin aide: Coup a ‘real possibility’

https://www.google.com/amp/s/thehil...-putin-aide-coup-a-real-possibility/amp/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/01/23 09:21 AM

Reuters: US may send long-range missiles to Ukraine
By ANP/upday
February 1, 2023, 7:16 AM

The United States is preparing new military aid for Ukraine that is expected to include long-range missiles for the first time, Reuters news agency reports based on talks with two senior US government officials. The package, worth more than 2 billion dollars (1.84 billion euros), will also include ammunition and other weapons.

The military aid is expected to be announced later this week, the officials said. It also supposedly contains "support material" for Patriot air defense systems, precision-guided munitions and Javelin anti-tank weapons.

A significant portion of the package, more than $1.7 billion (1.56 billion euros), would come from a fund known as the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). This allows the government to order the weapons from the arms industry instead of obtaining them from existing US arms stockpiles.

The money from the USAI would be used to purchase a new weapon, the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB), with a range of 150 kilometers. The US has rejected requests from, among others, arms manufacturer Boeing to send the so-called ATACMS missile, with a range of 297 kilometers, to Ukraine.

Other assistance would include mine-resistant vehicles (MRAPs), guided multiple missile systems (GMLRS) and munitions.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/02/23 03:49 AM

Has the Russian Offensive Begun?
Ukraine is bracing for a major escalation in the Donbas.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/01/briefing/russia-ukraine-war-trade.html



Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/02/23 05:08 AM

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Monday that Russia is preparing to mobilize more than 200,000 troops, while the UK ministry of defense said in December that Putin had been presented with plans to expand Russia's military by around 30%, to 1.5 million active personnel.

Russian students, people without combat experience, the elderly, and those with health issues were among those who had been called up to fight.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/02/23 05:20 AM

The symbol of Wagner Group reminds us of the "Totenkopf" of the SS.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/03/23 02:14 AM

Russia is planning a major offensive against Kyiv by the one-year anniversary of its invasion of Ukraine.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/03/23 02:57 AM

China unsettled by Russia's 'poor performance', the Chinese are getting more worried.

CIA Director William Burns said on Thursday the intelligence agency assesses that the next six months will be "critical" for Ukraine in its fight against Russia's invasion.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/03/23 04:38 PM

Ukraine's Zelensky vows to hasten EU membership after Kyiv summit

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...-on-bloc-membership-new-russia-sanctions
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/04/23 11:13 AM

Here we go!

Now that the Dutch armed forces are struggling with a screaming shortage of personnel, it is time to reintroduce conscription. That says Christen Democrat leader Wopke Hoekstra. He argues for compulsory military service, whereby 18-year-olds can choose to join the army or do social service.

Hoekstra makes his remarkable proposal today at the CDA party congress, one and a half months before the provincial elections. He wants about 200,000 young people to join the armed forces or opt for social service every year.

According to the CDA Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, the war in Ukraine 'has forced us to face the facts'. “Security, democracy and a strong society are not free, that is a hard lesson,” says Hoekstra.

It is not the first time that the CDA advocates compulsory service. But because of the war in Ukraine and the 'lack of solidarity in the Netherlands', Hoekstra believes it is now necessary to take 'a step further'.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/08/23 03:00 PM

Zelensky On Tour...

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...ault-as-ukraine-braces-for-new-offensive

Britain's King Charles will hold an audience with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during his trip to the United Kingdom on Wednesday, Buckingham Palace said.

Zelensky is scheduled to meet Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and address Britain's parliament, as well as visit King Charles at his London residence.

Zelensky's trip to Britain will be his second foreign visit since Russia invaded Ukraine nearly a year ago, and comes at a time when Kyiv is urging the West for more military support.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will arrive in Paris on Wednesday evening following his visit to London, the Élysée Palace told AFP, confirming previous media reports.

Zelensky is then expected to head to Brussels for a European Union summit on Thursday.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/09/23 02:09 AM

WAR CRIMINAL

Posted By: olivant

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/09/23 02:36 AM

The UK is seriously considering sending fighter jets to the Ukraine.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/09/23 03:31 AM

Originally Posted by olivant
The UK is seriously considering sending fighter jets to the Ukraine.


The western allies will do that.
Ukraine need them to protect the airspace Eurofighter's, F-16's and MIG's.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/09/23 12:55 PM

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...travel-together-to-eu-summit-in-brussels

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Thursday that his country has intercepted plans by Russian secret services to destroy Moldova.

Speaking to European Union leaders in Brussels, Zelensky said he recently told Moldovan President Maia Sandu about the alleged scheme. “I have informed her that we have intercepted the plan of the destruction of Moldova by the Russian intelligence," Zelensky said through a translator.

The Ukrainian president said the documents showed “who, when and how" the plan would "break the democracy of Moldova and establish control over Moldova". Zelensky said the plan was very similar to the one devised by Russia to take over Ukraine.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/09/23 05:26 PM

Fury in Ukraine as Elon Musk’s SpaceX limits Starlink use for drones

A senior Ukrainian presidential aide has reacted with anger after Elon Musk’s SpaceX said it had taken steps to prevent its Starlink satellite communications service from controlling drones, which are critical to Kyiv’s forces in fighting off the Russian invasion.

Gwynne Shotwell, SpaceX’s chief operating officer, said at a conference in the US that the surprise decision had been taken because it had never been the company’s intention to allow Starlink to be used “for offensive purposes”.

That prompted an immediate complaint on Thursday morning from Mykhailo Podolyak, a senior adviser to Ukraine’s president, Volodymr Zelenskiy, who argued that Musk’s business had failed to recognise Ukraine’s right to self-defence.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/11/23 04:06 AM

Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/11/23 06:04 AM

When will get the Ukraine version of "MiG Alley"???

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MiG_Alley
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/11/23 07:48 AM

Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Poland has been living with the consequences: 8 million Ukrainians have crossed the border into Polish territory since last February and the majority of NATO assistance is delivered through Poland, which shares a 535-kilometre-long border with Ukraine. With the prospect of a new Russian spring offensive in Ukraine on everyone’s mind, Poland is acting as if it is preparing for a war.

If Poland’s support for Ukraine has been seemingly limitless, it comes from a deeply rooted belief that if Russia is not defeated, Poland itself will become a target. Security concerns have led Poland to modernize its army and boost its defence spending to up to 4 percent of its GDP this year, the highest percentage among all NATO countries, according to Prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki.

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...cerns-drive-poland-s-support-for-ukraine
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/13/23 09:47 PM

United States tells citizens: Leave Russia immediately
Reuters
MOSCOW, Feb 13 (Reuters) - The United States has told its citizens to leave Russia immediately due to the war in Ukraine and the risk of arbitrary arrest or harassment by Russian law enforcement agencies.

"U.S. citizens residing or travelling in Russia should depart immediately," the U.S. embassy in Moscow said. "Exercise increased caution due to the risk of wrongful detentions."

"Do not travel to Russia," it added.

"Russian security services have arrested U.S. citizens on spurious charges, singled out U.S. citizens in Russia for detention and harassment, denied them fair and transparent treatment, and convicted them in secret trials or without presenting credible evidence," the embassy said.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ukrainian soldiers train on Leopard tanks in Poland
Ukrainian soldiers who have arrived at a Polish military base straight from the front line have praised the Leopard battle tanks whose ins and outs they have been learning under the watchful eye of allied instructors.

“As of today, I can say that the machine is very high quality, very good,” Ukrainian army Major Vadym Khodak told reporters attending the training showcase in the southwestern village of Swietoszow.

“And what I like is that our soldiers like it very much,” he said of the 105 Ukrainian soldiers who are receiving tank training from Polish, Canadian and Norwegian instructors.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Norway says Russia poses main security threat to Europe
Norway’s intelligence agencies see Russia as posing the main security threat to the country and to the remainder of Europe, the Nordic nation’s defence minister says.

“Russia today poses the biggest threat to Norwegian and European security, and the confrontation with the West will be long-lasting,” Bjorn Arild Gram predicted.

Gram made the remarks after Norway’s government received annual threat assessments from the country’s three security services: the domestic and foreign intelligence agencies and the Norwegian National Security Authority, or NSM.

The deputy head of the foreign Norwegian Intelligence Service, Lars Nordrum, said Norway’s oil and gas installations could be targeted by Russian sabotage. NSM head Sofie Nystrøm warned that “all of Europe will suffer” if Norwegian gas and oil installations were hit.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/14/23 01:32 AM

Dutch F-35s intercept three Russian military aircraft over Poland - Netherlands' defence ministry
Reuters
Feb 14 (Reuters) - Two Dutch F-35 fighters intercepted a formation of three Russian military aircraft over Poland and escorted them out, the Netherlands' defence ministry said in a statement late on Monday.

"The then unknown aircraft approached the Polish NATO area of responsibility from Kaliningrad," according to Reuters' translation of the ministry's statement.

Kaliningrad is a Russian Baltic coast enclave located between NATO and European Union members Poland and Lithuania.

"After identification, it turned out to be three aircraft: a Russian IL-20M Coot-A that was escorted by two Su-27 Flankers. The Dutch F-35s escorted the formation from a distance and handed over the escort to NATO partners."

The Il-20M Coot-A is NATO's reporting name for the Russian Ilyushin Il-20M reconnaissance aircraft while the Su-27 Flankers are NATO's reporting name for the Sukhoi Su-28 fighter aircraft.

Russia's defence ministry did not immediately respond to Reuters' request for a comment.

The Netherlands' defence ministry said that eight Dutch F-35s are stationed in Poland for February and March.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/17/23 10:49 PM

The 155th Marine Brigade destroyed at Voehledar
Vladimir Putin suffered one of his most humiliating losses in Ukraine recently . An elite Russian brigade was decimated near Voehledar, a mining town in Donetsk.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/19/23 12:45 AM

Rishi Sunak pushes for Ukraine charter and long-range missiles for Kyiv

The Prime Minister said he hoped the coming Nato summit in Vilnius would build long-term assurances. "Our aim should be to forge a new charter in Vilnius to help protect Ukraine from future Russian aggression," he said.

Mr Sunak said Ukraine's forces had reached an inflection point in the battle against Russian troops and called on fellow leaders at the summit to “double down” on military support for President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

https://www.thenationalnews.com/wor...-standard-capabilities-rishi-sunak-says/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/19/23 01:55 AM

The west has backed Ukraine to a degree Vladimir Putin, and the west itself, never expected, it's a terrible brutal war with trences like WWI. One year now and still no end in sight.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/19/23 03:30 AM

Zelensky knows the west may get tired now we are not used to this kind of warfare in Europe anymore.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/19/23 10:56 PM

US: China considering military aid to Russia
The United States has information that China is 'seriously considering' providing military aid to Russia. That said US Secretary of State Antony Blinken after a meeting with China's top diplomat Wang Yi in Munich. The US warns China that this will create a "serious problem" in their relations.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/20/23 01:29 PM

Biden planned to meet for extended discussions with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other officials, he said in a statement.

Biden's also plans to meet in Poland with leaders of the Bucharest Nine, a group of eastern NATO allies formed in 2015 in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea.

https://abcnews.go.com/Internationa...t-signalling-strong-us/story?id=97328622

[Linked Image]
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/20/23 05:26 PM

It's a historic visit and a big signal to Russia and China.

What does Biden's visit to Ukraine mean - and how will Russia spin it?
Sky's experts assess US president's trip to Kyiv

https://news.sky.com/story/what-doe...sess-us-presidents-trip-to-kyiv-12815934
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/21/23 08:22 PM

Fresh from a surprise visit to Kyiv, US President Joe Biden rallied NATO allies in Poland on Tuesday to stress that the United States is squarely behind Ukraine and committed to bolstering the alliance's eastern flank. Earlier, Russia's Vladimir Putin said Moscow would suspend its participation in the last remaining arms control treaty with Washington as part of an anti-Western speech delivered days before the anniversary of his Ukraine offensive.

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...lling-speeches-one-year-into-ukraine-war

[Linked Image]
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/21/23 09:51 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/22/23 12:49 AM

Chinese top diplomat visits Russia

Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang says he is very concerned that the conflict in Ukraine could escalate "out of control". “We call on certain countries to immediately stop pouring oil on the fire,” Qin said in a speech.

Qin's statements come in the same week that top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi, who until recently was foreign minister, is in Moscow. According to the Kremlin, there is much to discuss with the Chinese guest. The top Chinese diplomat would talk about the possibilities of ending the war with Ukraine through negotiations and a peace agreement. Beijing and Moscow entered into a "borderless" friendship last year and maintain close ties. China has not condemned the invasion.

During a stopover in Hungary on Monday, Wang called for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The Chinese top diplomat is expected to explore the possibilities of a peace agreement in Moscow. On Friday, exactly one year after the invasion, President Xi Jinping was due to deliver a "peace speech".
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/23/23 01:09 AM

China is eyeing the doubling of Japan's defense budget with suspicion
China and Japan will hold security talks today and tomorrow for the first time in four years.
After 2019, things went quiet between Beijing and Tokyo. The corona pandemic was in between, but in the meantime tensions were also rising. About the disputed islands in the East China Sea, about defense exercises, and also about the war in Ukraine.
'It will never work out politically, but they need each other economically.' Every year, USD 300 billion is exchanged between the two countries.
Even when it comes to the war in Ukraine, the two are diametrically opposed. China's top foreign representative, Wang Yi, was in Moscow this week with Russian President Vladimir Putin. While Japan announced that it would support Ukraine with the enormous amount of 5.5 billion euros.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/26/23 03:02 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/28/23 12:37 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/04/23 11:53 AM

Lavrov’s statement has crowd burst into laughter in India.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/05/23 12:52 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/08/23 12:14 AM

It's not going well for Putin. Russia is believed to have suffered tens of thousands of casualties during its latest wave of assaults in Ukraine. Hundreds of Russians are fighting on the side of Ukraine in the battle for Bakhmut, The New York Times reported.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/11/23 04:44 AM


Russian mercenary Wagner group’s chief Yevgeny Prigozhin has accused Vladimir Putin of cutting him off over his call for resupplying arms and ammunition in the grinding battle in eastern Ukraine.

“To get me to stop asking for ammunition, all the hotlines to offices, to departments etc have been cut off from me. But the real humdinger is that they’ve also blocked agencies from making decisions [related to Wagner],” the private Russian military’s leader said on Telegram.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/17/23 04:10 PM

ICC judges issue arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin over alleged war crimes
Arrest warrants issued for Russian leader and his children’s rights commissioner for ‘unlawful deportation’ of Ukrainian children

https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.th...-putin-arrest-warrant-ukraine-war-crimes
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Russia attacks US Drone . . . - 03/17/23 08:08 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: Russia attacks US Drone . . . - 03/28/23 11:25 PM

China need to step up they should play a leading role in bringing peace with Iran, Syria, North Korea, Russia they could make a difference.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: Russia attacks US Drone . . . - 03/29/23 09:55 PM

Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Moscow helped both give the impression of a united front, but there are underlying tensions, for example Russian concerns around Chinese economic influence and interests not only in Kazakhstan but across Central Asia.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/06/23 12:55 AM

The Partisans will never give up.

Partisan groups began to be organized in mid-2022. These groups have been involved in intelligence-gathering, sabotage, and assassinations.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/11/23 02:23 AM

Finland has become a Nato member it has a huge border with Russia.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/14/23 11:01 PM

Putin signs law enabling digital mobilization
Updated 1 min ago
8 min ago
ABROAD _Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on Friday that allows mobilization orders to be sent digitally.

Russian media report this. According to the new law, a reservist can now be mobilized electronically, via the Russian version of what we call DigiD. Until now, mobilization orders have been hand-delivered, but many Russians chose to ignore the call, move or flee the country.

A citizen who refuses to receive the call or cannot be reached is in violation. Russian law imposes severe penalties on those who evade mobilization.

Earlier this week, the State Duma also gave the green light to the new law.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/18/23 06:02 AM

https://apnews.com/article/japan-group-of-seven-foreign-ministers-7153e446eef75936b8ec731950eedb8c

The G-7 envoys from Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, Italy and the European Union have underlined that their meeting in Karuizawa, Japan marks a crucial moment in the world’s response to Russian and Chinese aggression, two crises that are seen as challenges to the post-World War II rules-based international order. Global efforts to confront the matters at the United Nations have been stymied by Chinese and Russian intransigence on the Security Council.

“There can be no impunity for war crimes and other atrocities such as Russia’s attacks against civilians and critical civilian infrastructure,” the ministers said.

“We remain committed to intensifying sanctions against Russia, coordinating and fully enforcing them,” the communique said, and would support “for as long as it takes” Ukraine as it defends itself.

The foreign ministers’ document was prepared as a template for global leaders to use at a G-7 summit that will be held in Hiroshima next month, and included language about Iran, Myanmar, Afghanistan, nuclear proliferation and other “grave threats.”
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/18/23 10:47 PM

It's all about Geopolitics Putin, Xi, Biden, Macron, Scholz. We get a new world order.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/30/23 01:31 PM

The war in Ukraine seems to be entering a new phase. According to experts, the Russian spring offensive has failed. Meanwhile, Ukraine is preparing for a counter-offensive. The head of Russia’s Wagner mercenary force threatens to withdraw his troops from the key battle for Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine as casualty rates mount. Ukraine’s military authorities say Russian forces have been unable to cut their supply routes to the front-line city.

Andriy Yusov, a Ukrainian military intelligence official speaking to RBC Ukraine, says more than 10 tanks of oil products with capacity of around 40,000 tonnes were destroyed in an explosion on the Russian-occupied port of Sevastopol on Saturday,

Speaking to RBC Ukraine, Yusov did not claim Kyiv was responsible for the explosion, instead describing the blast as “God’s punishment” for a Russian strike on a Ukrainian city on Friday.

Chinese role in mediation ‘not unrealistic’
Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy Melnyk says the Chinese are “pursuing their own interests, but a peaceful solution and end of hostilities are more in line with Beijing’s interests than this huge never-ending earthquake for the entire world order”.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/03/23 12:50 PM

Russia
Russia accuses Ukraine of trying to kill Vladimir Putin with Kremlin drone strike
Kremlin says two drones used in alleged attack were disabled by Russian defences

https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.th...vladimir-putin-with-kremlin-drone-strike
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/03/23 09:07 PM

Russian ex-president Medvedev calls for "physical elimination of Zelensky and his clique"
Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has called on Telegram to eliminate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He did so in response to the emergence of footage showing several drones exploding over the Moscow Kremlin .

According to Russia, the images were taken last night and involved an "attempted assassination of President Putin" that must be retaliated "at an appropriate time and place". Ukraine, however, denies any involvement.

The chairman of the State Duma of Russia - Vyacheslav Volodin - has also used strong words to condemn the attack. He called it an "attack on Russia" on Telegram and called for the use of weapons "capable of stopping and destroying the terrorist regime in Kiev". He also said there can be no negotiations with Zelensky "after the attack".

Russian state media, meanwhile, are reporting on the incident, telling the same story as the Kremlin. Margarita Simonyan, the head of the Russian state channel RT, among others, quickly added fuel to the fire after the images emerged: "Maybe it will really start now," she tweeted.

Simonyan makes no secret of her hatred of the West. For example, she already warned that Russia would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons against opponents or unleash a worldwide famine. She has said several times that the war in Ukraine will end in a "frightening way".
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/05/23 02:51 AM

If it's up to Putin Poland, east Germany and the other eastern countries will also come under influence of Russia.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/05/23 11:20 AM

Prigozhin is furious his Wagner Group has been slaughtered they will leave Bakhmut next week, Top Russian defense officials to blame.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/07/23 02:39 AM

Russia will put nuclear weapons in Belarus. It's cold war all over again.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/08/23 06:27 PM

Will Russia be the next to surrender?

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/09/23 03:34 AM

UK and USA will again give a huge amount of long distance weapons worth billions.
This will really hurt the Russians.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/18/23 11:14 PM

Zelensky, in private, plots bold attacks inside Russia, leak shows
THE DISCORD LEAKS | U.S. intercepts reveal the Ukrainian’s leader’s aggressive instincts, a marked contrast to his public-facing image as the stoic statesman weathering Russia’s brutal onslaught

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/13/zelensky-ukraine-war-leaked-documents/
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/19/23 10:01 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/19/23 11:48 PM

Zelensky is no softie today he was at the Arab League looking for support.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/21/23 01:59 AM


Russia claimed on Saturday to have fully captured the smashed eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, which would mark an end to the longest and bloodiest battle of the 15-month war.

The assault on the largely levelled city was led by troops from the Wagner Group of mercenaries, whose leader Yevgeny Prigozhin said earlier in the day that his troops had finally pushed the Ukrainians out of the last built-up area inside the city.

Taking Bakhmut - which Russia refers to by its Soviet-era name of Artyomovsk - would represent Moscow's first big victory in the conflict in more than 10 months.

"As a result of offensive actions by Wagner assault units, supported by artillery and aviation of the Southern Group of Forces, the liberation of Artyomovsk has been completed," the Russian defence ministry said in a one-line statement.

Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated troops on capturing the city and said those who had distinguished themselves would be given awards, domestic Russian news agencies reported.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/30/23 11:38 PM

Drones have attacked Moscow again second time first was on the Kremlin this one on a wealthy neighbourhood where Putin also has a huge house. Ukraine denies involvement, but I don't believe that Ukrainian secret services are not involved. Don't forget those guys were also trained in soviet times and should not be underestimated. It shows they can hit the Russians in the heart of their empire.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/06/23 06:16 PM

EU says attack on dam in southern Ukraine ‘war crime’
European Council president vows to hold perpetrators accountable, send more aid to those affected by flood

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukr...m-in-southern-ukraine-war-crime-/2915364
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/06/23 06:19 PM

US had intelligence of Ukrainian plan to attack Nord Stream pipelines: Report
Washington received information from close ally that Ukrainian military planned attack 3 months before it happened: Washington Post

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukr...ack-nord-stream-pipelines-report/2915933
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/07/23 09:55 PM

Nato members may send troops to Ukraine, warns former alliance chief
Security guarantees and membership path needed at Nato summit to avoid escalation, says Anders Rasmussen

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...s-to-ukraine-warns-former-alliance-chief
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/07/23 11:51 PM

Originally Posted by Hollander
Drones have attacked Moscow again second time first was on the Kremlin this one on a wealthy neighbourhood where Putin also has a huge house. Ukraine denies involvement, but I don't believe that Ukrainian secret services are not involved. Don't forget those guys were also trained in soviet times and should not be underestimated. It shows they can hit the Russians in the heart of their empire.


Ukraine has cultivated a network of agents and sympathizers inside Russia, US officials believe they have developed sabotage cells made up of a mix of pro-Ukrainian sympathizers and operatives well-trained in this kind of warfare. Ukraine is believed to have provided them with Ukrainian-made drones.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/09/23 12:26 AM

This is a true test.

Ukrainian forces mounted a major attack early Thursday in the southern region of Zaporizhzhia, as Ukraine’s Army went on the offensive on multiple fronts in an operation that carries high stakes for Kyiv and its Western allies.

A senior U.S. official said that Thursday’s attack appeared to be a main thrust of a much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive. For months, Kyiv officials have been mobilizing new units, gathering advanced weapons and training for what its leaders have billed as a major attack aimed at pushing Russian forces back and retaking occupied territory.

The advancing Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhzhia included German Leopard 2 tanks and American Bradley fighting vehicles, a strong indication that the counteroffensive was underway in several locations, according to the official, who requested anonymity to discuss confidential briefings on operational details.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/09/23 10:35 PM

LOL

Vladimir Putin was never the Soviet super spy he'd like us to believe. He was merely a KGB 'errand boy,' report says
Nathan Rennolds
Mon, June 5, 2023 at 1:47 AM GMT+2·2 min read
\\
Russian President Vladimir Putin has been portrayed as an elite KGB intelligence officer in the 1980s.

But a new report from Der Spiegel suggests he was never the super spy he was thought to be.

His role involved mainly "banal" administrative tasks such as sorting through travel applications.

Russian President Vladimir Putin was likely never the elite Soviet spy that the world has been led to believe, an investigaton by the German news outlet Der Spiegel has revealed.

Stories of Putin's exploits as an intelligence officer during the 1980s vary, and it is an era somewhat shrouded in mystery, as he has never commented on the period himself.

But many stories have painted him as a heroic figure, who, among other things, single-handedly defended the KGB's offices from looters and carried out top-secret secret missions such as meeting with members of the Red Army Faction, a terrorist group that wreaked havoc in West Germany and committed a series of kidnappings and assassinations.

But according to Der Spiegel's report, the majority of Putin's work was actually limited to "banal" administrative tasks.

Citing one of Putin's former colleagues at the KGB's Dresden office, it says his "work consisted primarily of endlessly reviewing applications for West German relatives' visits or searching for potential informants among foreign students at Dresden University."

The report says that Putin is rarely mentioned in Stasi — the name of the East German secret police — records. In those that do reference him, it is only in regards to things like his birthday or administrative tasks, none provide evidence to back up the stories mentioned previously.

Horst Jehmlich, a former Stasi officer who also worked in Dresden, told Der Spiegel that Putin was nothing more than an "errand boy."

Putin worked for the KGB, the Soviet Union's intelligence service, for nearly two decades. He moved to Dresden, in East Germany, in 1985 — a time when the country was on its last legs.

Just four years later, the Berlin Wall fell, marking the beginning of the end of the Cold War and taking a big step towards the reunification of Germany in 1990.

Officially he retired from active KGB service with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

But Oleg Kalugin, a former high-ranking KGB officer and fierce critic of Putin, told an interview with RFE/RL in 2015 that the would-be leader of Russia had lied and was "just a major."
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/10/23 10:10 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/11/23 02:21 AM

Scholz plans to speak to Putin 'soon'
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that he plans to speak with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Scholz made the comments while speaking at the German Protestant Church Congress.
The chancellor said that he already spoke with Putin before the start of the war and intended "to do so again soon."
Scholz reiterated Berlin's position that the withdrawal of Russian troops would be a precondition for negotiations with Moscow, saying that this would be the only way to ensure a "fair peace."
"It's not reasonable to force Ukraine to approve and accept the raid that Putin has perpetrated and that parts of Ukraine become Russian just like that," Scholz added.
The chancellor said that he considered that Berlin had made the right decision in acting "in a coordinated manner" with its partners on Ukraine. He added that Germany felt committed to this principle since the start of the war early last year.
Responding to shouts from the crowd urging the chancellor to "negotiate," Scholz said: "Negotiating is OK. The question is: who negotiates with whom and about what?"

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/13/23 04:04 PM


Dutch intelligence tipped CIA on alleged Ukraine plan to attack Nord Stream -NOS
Reuters
June 13, 20234:42 PM GMT+2Updated an hour ago

The logo of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project is seen on a pipe at the Chelyabinsk pipe rolling plant in Chelyabinsk, Russia, February 26, 2020. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov/File Photo

AMSTERDAM, June 13 (Reuters) - A Dutch intelligence agency tipped off the CIA about an alleged Ukrainian plan in June 2022 to blow up the Nord Stream pipeline, Dutch national broadcaster NOS reported on Tuesday.

The NOS report, which was compiled with help from leading German media outlets, did not identify its sources.

It said that the Dutch military intelligence agency MIVD had warned the CIA of the existence of such a plan, leading to a warning from Washington to Kyiv not to attack the pipeline.

Advertisement · Scroll to continue
Unexplained explosions ruptured both Nord Stream 1 and the newly built Nord Stream 2 pipelines, carrying gas from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea, in September.

The blasts occurred in the economic zones of Sweden and Denmark. Both countries said the explosions were deliberate, but have yet to determine who was responsible. Those countries and Germany are investigating.

Washington and NATO called the incident "an act of sabotage". Moscow accused investigators of dragging their feet and trying to conceal who was behind the attack. Ukraine denies responsibility.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/14/23 11:30 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/14/23 11:41 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/17/23 09:06 PM


How military control of Ukraine has changed

https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/976/c..._control_quad_13_06_23_2x640-nc.png.webp
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/18/23 01:58 AM

NATO and USA shouldn't fuck around fuck those Russians we could end this war in a few weeks lol.
Bomb the shit.
Posted By: MeyerLansky

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/18/23 03:08 AM

Originally Posted by Hollander
NATO and USA shouldn't fuck around fuck those Russians we could end this war in a few weeks lol.
Bomb the shit.

bomb that shit ?!
if the west will take action then you risk iran and china getting involved too
which may results in III World War.
it's not a game.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/18/23 11:14 AM

Originally Posted by MeyerLansky
Originally Posted by Hollander
NATO and USA shouldn't fuck around fuck those Russians we could end this war in a few weeks lol.
Bomb the shit.

bomb that shit ?!
if the west will take action then you risk iran and china getting involved too
which may results in III World War.
it's not a game.



Just kidding Meyer but that sort of talk you hear on the Russian side like bombing the port of Rotterdam.
Posted By: MeyerLansky

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/19/23 01:13 AM

Originally Posted by Hollander
Originally Posted by MeyerLansky
Originally Posted by Hollander
NATO and USA shouldn't fuck around fuck those Russians we could end this war in a few weeks lol.
Bomb the shit.

bomb that shit ?!
if the west will take action then you risk iran and china getting involved too
which may results in III World War.
it's not a game.



Just kidding Meyer but that sort of talk you hear on the Russian side like bombing the port of Rotterdam.

they just don't know how to take the humiliation of this defeat.
russia being exposed as the biggest bullshit it's hard for them to take....
the longer the war continues the better it is for the world
because russia will slowly get worse by all means.
they are just a country with nuclear weapon that's all.

iran and china are the biggest concern to the west.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/19/23 10:12 PM

Originally Posted by MeyerLansky
Originally Posted by Hollander
Originally Posted by MeyerLansky
Originally Posted by Hollander
NATO and USA shouldn't fuck around fuck those Russians we could end this war in a few weeks lol.
Bomb the shit.

bomb that shit ?!
if the west will take action then you risk iran and china getting involved too
which may results in III World War.
it's not a game.



Just kidding Meyer but that sort of talk you hear on the Russian side like bombing the port of Rotterdam.

they just don't know how to take the humiliation of this defeat.
russia being exposed as the biggest bullshit it's hard for them to take....
the longer the war continues the better it is for the world
because russia will slowly get worse by all means.
they are just a country with nuclear weapon that's all.

iran and china are the biggest concern to the west.


I agree, China wants world influence but doesn't want a big conflict with the West. European investments in China are gigantic and Chinese interests in Europe ever growing, a whopping 71 percent of German companies plan to expand their investments in China. Volkswagen, for example has more than 40 factories in the country.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/20/23 12:07 AM

China doesn't even have a single nuclear aircraft carrier. They have no oil, they get most of their oil from the middle east through the Straits of Malacca, which the US could shut down at will. The United States ensured, after WWII, that we would remain the premier power on the planet for a long time. Saudi Arabia is protected by US Patriot missile batteries, despite all this bluster about BRICS, the Saudis know exactly who affords them the protection for then to sleep at night. China is watching the Ukrainian conflict, and is taking notice of the superiority of the Wests arsenal and the likely cost of invading Taiwan.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/21/23 06:40 AM

Daily update on the War in Ukraine.
Russian ntrenchements hamper progress in the south, Reports of the nuclear reactor in Zaporizhzhia cooling system being mined for demolition by the same Russian commander who ordered dam destroyed, 2 weeks ago.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/21/23 10:19 PM

What a coalition has Zelensky build even Pakistan, Cambodia and Sudan are helping.

List of military aid to Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_aid_to_Ukraine_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/23/23 10:35 AM

Daily update on the War in Ukraine. Ukraine launches cruise mussile to blow hole in Daryivskiy bridge to Crimea resulting in a 130 Km diversion in the logistics supply train to the Russian occupied region of Dnipro. Meanwhile, Prighozian continues to bemoan the lack of adequate supplies of munitions as he continues to attempt to build support in Moscow.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/23/23 08:22 PM

Investigation for Prigozhin mutiny

The Russian security service FSB starts a criminal investigation against the boss of the mercenary army
Wagner, Prigozhin. He is accused of calling for mutiny. Prigozhin has been raging for months against the top
bosses in the Russian military, including Defense Minister Shoigu. He says they are incompetent.

Just today, Prigozhin said that Ukraine and NATO posed no threat to Russia at all and that the war
was started under false pretenses.

Prigozhin, who started out as Putin's cook, has not personally attacked the president in any of his outbursts .
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/23/23 08:41 PM

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...o-public-about-ukraine-yevgeny-prigozhin
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 12:16 AM

Russia on edge after threats from Wagner boss Prigozhin: military vehicles ready in Moscow
Updated 3 min ago
44 minutes ago

Russia is on high alert following news that Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin is being prosecuted for mutiny. The army command in Moscow calls on the notorious mercenaries to comply with President Vladimir Putin's orders, as can also be seen on Russian state television. Kiev is undoubtedly watching the chaotic situation in the neighboring country, where soldiers are stationed at government buildings.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 12:24 AM

Russian TV interrupts regular programming
Earlier, Russia's state-run Channel 1 interrupted regular programming to broadcast an "emergency news bulletin".

The announcement recapped earlier official statements about Prigozhin and Wagner and said that Prigozhin's video of the alleged strike was fake and that the defence ministry denied attacking Wagner.

The emergency announcement also said that FSB - Russia's domestic intelligence agency - had launched a criminal case against Prigozhin and that President Putin was being kept informed.

What is the Wagner boss claiming?
Lets recap what Prigozhin has been saying.

He posted a series of furious recordings online on Friday, accusing Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu of ordering a rocket strike on Wagner’s camps in Ukraine on Friday.

"Today they carried out a rocket strike on our rear camps, and a huge number of our comrades got killed," he said.

“They have treacherously cheated us,” he added.

The Russian defence ministry denied carrying out a rocket attack on Wagner forces.

Prigozhin then said his troops would oust Shoigu, and called on the Russian army to stand aside.

“This is not a military coup, but a march of justice,” he said.

Prigozhin also claimed that Shoigu had personally directed the purported strike and then fled.

“The evil embodied by the country’s military leadership must be stopped,” he shouted.

He has since claimed his forces have crossed from Ukraine into Russia, without providing evidence.

Earlier he released a video saying Russia had had no reason to invade Ukraine and the war had been a disaster.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 12:39 AM

In the audio, Prigozhin said, without providing evidence, that Russia’s military leadership was responsible for the deaths of 2,000 fighters. He pledged to hold them to account.

Within hours, Prigozhin said in another message that he and his fighters had turned their backs on Ukraine and crossed back into Russia. He warned that “if something stands in our way, we will destroy everything that will try to stop us.”
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 09:50 AM

Russia on the brink of Civil War as Wagner Forces seize control of Rostov on Don and Voronezh with about 25,000 troops and heavy weapons. Russian military carrying out necessary measures in the region according to the governor of Voronezh as troops in the southern command seem to be rallying towards Prighozhin and the Wagner forces. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are said to be massing in preparation for their counter offensive while they observe developments across the border.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 10:18 AM

Wow this is first time Putin faces a serious internal crisis.

What's been happening in Russia?
Things have been developing quickly in Russia.

Here's what has happened in the past few hours.

President Putin made a televised speech calling the challenge by the Wagner mercenary force "high treason" and a "stab in the back". He appealed for unity and said authorities were acting quickly to contain the situation
Rebelling Wagner mercenaries say they have taken control of the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, a key military site.
BBC sources also say Wagner forces have now seized military facilities in a second city - Voronezh, which is halfway between Rostov-on-Don and Moscow.
Prigozhin has said he will march on the capital if top military figures don't meet with him.
Prigozhin appears to have responded to Putin in an audio message, saying his troops were not committing treason, but rather were "patriots" fighting for the future of the Motherland - calling out "corruption, lies and bureaucracy"
And the international community is starting to respond. Some countries that border Russia are building up security, while NATO says it is monitoring the situation closely.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 10:48 AM

Russia: A bunch of dump trucks full of sand are being placed at all entrances into Moscow.

More and more private jets with no declared destination or Turkey as destination appear over Moscow.
They are making a run for it

The Russian regime army has started to target random civilian cars in Voronezh. It is hell.

Girkin: "The rebels successfully bypassed Voronezh and are moving through the territory of the Lipetsk region. They boast that they shot down the forward outposts of the "Rosgvardia" and took trophies."

Strelkov says that Wagner forces passed through Voronezh and have entered Lipetsk Oblast, moving towards Moscow on the M4 highway.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 11:00 AM

Putin is at risk of losing his iron grip on power. The next 24 hours are critical

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/24/europe/russia-putin-wagner-prigozhin-analysis-intl/index.html
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 02:33 PM

Wagner mercenaries enter Lipetsk region en route to Moscow

The governor of Russia's Lipetsk province said Saturday afternoon that Wagner Group mercenaries had entered the region, some 400 kilometres (250 miles) from Moscow. Earlier in the day, Russian President Vladimir Putin accused Wagner mercenaries of "treason" in a live address to the nation after the group's chief Yevgeny Prigozhin called for an armed uprising to oust the defense minister on Friday.

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...f-mutiny-he-says-his-forces-enter-russia
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 03:39 PM

Haha what an insane turn of events
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 06:11 PM

LIVE Wagner chief says mercenaries turning back to 'avoid bloodshed'
Wagner Forces 'Halt Advance' on Moscow BBC News

Posted at 20:0420:04
What was in the agreement and how was Belarus involved?
Abdujalil Abdurasulov

Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine

Belarus strongman Aleksander Lukashenko has conducted talks with Evgeniy Prigozhin.

As a result of the negotiations that lasted for the whole day, Prigozhin has agreed to de-escalate.

Lukashenko’s press service reports the negotiations took place with Vladimir Putin’s agreement.

“Prigozhin has agreed to stop the march towards Moscow and take further steps to de-escalate the situation,” the statement says.

As part of the agreement, Wagner fighters get security guarantees.

What else was offered to Prigozhin and mercenaries is not clear.

Russia has been using the territory of Belarus to launch attacks on Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion, effectively erasing Belarus’ sovereignty.

And any signs showing that Putin’s grip on power is weaking threatens the regime in Minsk that is heavily dependent on Moscow.

Earlier today, Svitlana Tikhanovskaya, the opposition leader who challenged Lukashenko in 2020 presidential elections, said the Wagner’s rebellion “is the best chance to kick the Russian military out from [Belarus]”.

“If we miss this chance,” she said in her video appeal, “Russia will do to us exactly what they did to Ukraine.”
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 06:53 PM

Zelensky claims Putin left Moscow, Lukashenko is reported to be in Turkey.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 09:13 PM


Wagner boss to leave for Belarus and charges to be dropped - state media
Russian state media have just reported that Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin will leave for Belarus.

The reports say charges against him and his Wagner forces will be dropped by Russian authorities to avoid "bloodshed".

What could this mean for the Ukraine war?
James Nixey, head of the Russia-Eurasia programme at Chatham House, says Ukraine will profit from the crisis in Russia.

Speaking with the BBC, Nixey says Ukraine is likely to continue to "needle Russia" to try to create implosions within the country.

Nixey says today marked the worst day for Vladimir Putin in all his years of presidency.

"He's losing this [Ukraine] war," Nixey says.

"That's not to say Ukraine is finding it very easy to win... but this is not what Vladimir Putin expected so far into his presidency."
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/24/23 11:01 PM

Prigozhin still has ties to some generals and the GRU/Spetsnaz, he knows if he gives up he's a dead man. The elite has never been more divided and finally see the lies about the war and how bad it's going. Chinese are also shaking their heads..

There is no way back for Prigozhin.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/25/23 11:05 PM

Moscow has stepped back from civil war with Wagner. But the danger’s not over, experts warn

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/25/...on-belarus-explainer-intl-hnk/index.html
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/26/23 09:04 AM

What many people call a coup attempt was actually an attempt by Prighozhin to wrest control of the Russian military from Defense Minister Zhoigu and head of Russian General command Gerasimov. In a a deal allegedly brokered by President Lukachenko, Prighozhin has been afforded safe haven in Belarus
Meanwhile, Ukranian troops advance in the Kherson region and Donbas region with gains near Bahkmut.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/26/23 09:21 PM

I watched both statements, interesting but this is far from over without Wagner the war effort takes a big hit Prigozhin just spoke of the sentiment of thousands of ordinary soldiers not just Wagner that the war is going really bad.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/27/23 08:42 PM

Belarus at risk.

According to state media, Lukashenko urged Putin not to "waste" Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Lukashenko said Wagner mercenary chief had landed in Belarus.
Wagner mercenaries might settle in Belarus, join its military!

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/28/23 07:23 PM

Prighozhin is in Minsk, Belarus according to Belarus President Lukashenko yesterday, some Wagner personnel are said to be joining him as well.
Meanwhile slow progress along the Zaporizhzhian Front as Ukranian units continue probing attacks with the bridgehead at Oleshky near Lherson holding strong though fog of war limits intel.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/29/23 12:55 AM

WOW Sergei Surovikin aka "General Armageddon", who apparently supported the rebellion, has been arrested.

Putin is flexing his muscles lol. Gangster style

[Linked Image]!
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 06/29/23 04:15 PM

'Purge': Top Russian generals Gerasimov and Surovikin are reportedly missing following Wagner mutiny
Russian generals Sergei Surovikin and Valery Gerasimov have not been seen in public since Wagner Group mercenaries attempted to oust Russia's military command

https://www.foxnews.com/world/purge...portedly-missing-following-wagner-mutiny
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/01/23 02:21 AM

I also believed he used a body double when he shook all those hands in a big crowd he never would be close to that many people that's too dangerous for him.


'No question' that Putin is using a body double after Wagner revolt - analyst
Experts argue that the stark deviation from Putin's usual behavior and security protocols points to the involvement of a body double.

https://www.jpost.com/international/article-748344
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/01/23 02:50 AM

Wagner officers in Syria have been arrested by the Russian authority.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/02/23 02:47 AM

Small gains along the Zaporizhzhian Front, however heavy casualties were suffered at the Oleshky bridgehead after heavy artillery strikes and Iskander missile strikes. Strong, in depth, entrenchments hamper the Ukranian offensive and it looks to be a long hard fought summer for both sides. Prighozhin visited Moscow, St. Petersburg and is in Minsk, Belarus. The Wagner camp in Belarus continues to grow and can manage 9,000 troops currently.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/04/23 04:22 PM

I found this video informative:

The Real Reason China Can't Invade Taiwan

China's reason for not supplying Russia with arms explained.

[video:youtube]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qwdht3h4xjg [/video]
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/05/23 01:11 AM

China has been quit lately, some experts say Xi is worried about Putin he's losing control and that could also happen in China.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/05/23 04:25 PM

Italy has frozen 2 bn in Russia yachts, villas, funds
Bank of Italy's UIF reports on actions linked to sanctions

(ANSA) - ROME, JUL 4 - Italy has frozen luxury villas, yachts, cars and liquid assets worth around two billion euros belonging to Russian and Belarusian individuals subjected to sanctions following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, the Director of the Bank of Italy's Financial Information Unit (UIF) Enzo Serata said in his annal report on Tuesday.
Serata added that, by the end of June, 170 "financial relationships" in the name of 80 individuals and worth over 330 million euros had been frozen.
The impounded assets include a 52-metre yacht belonging to Russian energy and infrastructure oligarch Gennady Timchenko and the villa near Lucca of businessman and politician Oleg Savchenko. (ANSA).
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/05/23 10:52 PM

It's seems the Kremlin wants direct control over the gold, diamonds and oil: Wagner is making fortunes all over the world. In Africa more and more leaders are paying them.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/07/23 04:59 AM

Awkward: Russian And Ukrainian Soldiers Arrive At Same Nuclear Power Plant To Blow It Up And Blame On Each Other

https://babylonbee.com/news/awkward...nt-to-blow-it-up-and-blame-on-each-other
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/07/23 03:00 PM

Originally Posted by U talkin' da me ??
I found this video informative:

The Real Reason China Can't Invade Taiwan

China's reason for not supplying Russia with arms explained.

[video:youtube]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qwdht3h4xjg [/video]

Interesting and informative, many of it's points are solid and factual. I think the new agreement with Phillipines to allow 4 bases to be built in the S. China Sea, further jeopardize China's fragile supply lines. China's biggest threat is loss of Himalayan glacier water, which if global warming continues to accelerate, can occur as soon as the end of the century.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/07/23 03:02 PM

Interesting and fun to watch, Cinese invasion of Taiwan simulation.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/07/23 03:13 PM

Action in the Donbas as Ukranian forces progress around the Klishiivka high ground overlooking Bahkmut from the south. HIMAR barrage at Donestsk and Bahkmut resulted in the destruction of munitions and oil depots in Donetsk.
Bahkmut faces encirclement by Ukranian forces as they overan an extensive trenchline system in Klishiivka .
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/08/23 04:34 AM

Military TV Channel

What Are Mk 20 Rockeye II Cluster Bombs and Why Does Ukraine Want Them

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3K1U_jLBfoc
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/08/23 02:44 PM

What could happen if Russia blows up the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant?

https://abcnews.go.com/US/happen-russia-blows-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant/story?id=100846888
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/09/23 06:44 AM

President Volodymyr Zelensky brought home from Turkey on Saturday five former commanders of Ukraine’s garrison in Mariupol, a highly symbolic achievement that Russia said violated a prisoner exchange deal engineered last year.

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230709-%F0%9F%94%B4live-zelensky-enrages-russia-by-bringing-home-azovstal-commanders-from-turkey
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/09/23 12:38 PM

Germany blocks Ukraine from joining NATO !
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/10/23 03:04 PM

]Wagner Group leader and ex-convict Prigozhin has lost the respect of Russian prisoners who now think he's a 'traitor,' activist says.
Russian prisoners, the primary source of conscript recruits for Prigozhin's Wagner Military Group, have labeled the mercenary group leader a traitor after supporting his short lived mutiny. Russians don't like losers and that the word "wool" is being used in reference to him, which is slang for "traitors" who collaborate with the authorities.
https://www.businessinsider.com/rus...-wagner-boss-ex-convict-prigozhin-2023-7
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/10/23 11:23 PM

The Turkish government will submit Sweden's NATO membership to its parliament, says NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg. Now that Turkey has dropped its objections, Sweden is expected to join NATO soon.

The NATO summit starts in Vilnius on Tuesday.

A few days after the Wagner uprising, Prigozhin sat at the table with Putin, says Kremlin

President Putin spent hours talking late last month with Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder and leader of the Wagner mercenary army, about his June 29 uprising. Five days earlier, on June 24, Wagner's armed militiamen occupied military targets in the city of Rostov-on-Don. Prigozhin advanced on Moscow, demanding the resignation of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu and Supreme Army Commander Valery Gerasimov.

Suddenly, Prigozhin's mercenary army halted its advance. Why exactly has not yet been clarified. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov did confirm today a report from the French newspaper Libération about Putin's conversation with Prigozhin. At the meeting on the 29th, according to Peskov, there were 35 people, including Wagner's commanders. "All we can say is that the president gave his take on Wagner's performance in Ukraine, and on the events of June 24," Peskov told reporters.

Prigozhin has long been openly critical of Russia's fight in Ukraine. His Wagner troops eventually fought and succeeded in taking the city of Bachmoet. The 'march for justice' on Moscow stopped after mediation by President Lukashenko of Belarus, after which Progzhin is said to have flown to Minsk. Last week, Lukashenko said that Prigozhin is in Russia. No evidence of this has yet surfaced.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/11/23 07:37 PM

What in the World is Happening? A Fireside Chat with a Geopolitics Expert, Peter Zeihan
Ukraine & Russia & Europe are discussed.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISk9ZpKM9so

Good until the very end when TDS kicks in... lol
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/11/23 11:15 PM

Jimmy Dore's Take on sending cluster bombs to Ukraine...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0DvKKTHl_D0
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/12/23 07:59 AM

Soviet Menace | From The First Russian Bombers, To The Nuclear Tupolev Tu-95 Bear | Documentary

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KPHNmN9BaBw
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/12/23 11:51 PM

Britain’s defence secretary and the US national security adviser have suggested Ukraine ought to show more gratitude for the help it has received from the west.

I agree Ukraine also has to do more about corruption and organized crime to join NATO or EU.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/13/23 09:42 AM

Wagner Turns Over 2,000 Heavy Weapons Including Tanks, SAM Systems
In the wake of his aborted mutiny last month, Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner Private Military Company turned over more than 2,000 weapons and pieces of equipment more than 2,500 tons of ammunition and over 20,000 small arms, the Russian Defense Ministry (MoD) said on its Telegram channel Wednesday. A video showing turned over Wagner tanks and other armor, artillery pieces, land mines and boxes apparently full of munitions has also been distributed.
This list of equipment provided by the Russian MoD includes "hundreds of heavy weapons like T-90, T-80, T-72B3 tanks, Grad and Uragan multiple-launch rocket systems, Pantsir surface-to-air missile systems, 2S1 Gvozdika 122 mm self-propelled artillery systems, 2S3 Akatsiya 152 mm, 2S5 Giatsint 152 mm, 2S4 Tulpan 240 mm, howitzers and anti-tank guns, mortar systems, multipurpose armored tractors, armored personnel carriers, as well as motor vehicles."

Among other items, the video released by the Russian MoD shows:

MT-LB light armored vehicles
2B9 Vasilek semi-automatic 82mm gun-mortars
TM-62 anti-tank land mines
120mm 2S9 Nona self-propelled gun-mortars
152mm D-1 towed howitzers
152mm 2S5 Giatsint-S self-propelled field guns
152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B towed field guns
trucks with 57mm S-60 anti-aircraft guns
towed anti-tank guns
AK-series rifles
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...eavy-weapons-including-tanks-sam-systems
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/13/23 10:58 PM

Funny thing the Wagner group is called after Richard Wagner.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/14/23 08:25 AM

Originally Posted by Hollander
Funny thing the Wagner group is called after Richard Wagner.

"I love the smell of napalm in the morning, it's like, victory."
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/14/23 08:24 PM

Why not send some of these to Ukraine???

U.S. Marines Has a New Ship-Killing Weapon Can Destroy a Warship 100 Miles Away

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ef8sQhKiYzs
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/14/23 10:45 PM

It is not known exactly where Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin is at the moment. But the smear campaign against him is in full swing. A photo of Prigozhin in his underpants is currently circulating on the internet.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F0_J63jXwAEWmyY?format=jpg&name=medium
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/14/23 11:16 PM

New mysterious death in Moscow
Putin supporter's daughter found dead in her apartment
Updated Yesterday, 20:25
Yesterday, 6:30 PM
MOSCOW - Once again there is a mysterious death among the Russian elite. Natalia Bochkareva, 44, the daughter of the late Russian politician Vasily Bochkaryov, was recently found dead in her Moscow apartment.
The woman would have felt bad the day before. The woman's body was found by the janitor, who called the police after the woman stopped opening her door. According to the Daily Mail, initial reports indicate that the death was not a violent one.
According to sources, the woman had a heart problem. Still, her death is suspicious. She is not the first of the Russian elite to die suddenly.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many generals, politicians or oligarchs have died under mysterious circumstances.

[Linked Image]
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/15/23 10:27 PM

21:20 Yesterday
The Russian intelligence service FSB has arrested seven people suspected of trying to kill two prominent journalists. The five minors and two adult men allegedly planned to kill Margarita Simonyan, the editor-in-chief of Russian state television RT, and Ksenia Sobchak, a well-known TV presenter.

Russia says Ukraine is behind the assassination plot . Interfax, Russia's state news agency, claims those arrested admitted to the FSB that the order for the killings came from Kyiv and that they would receive 1.5 million Russian rubles (just under $15,000) per murder.

A court in Moscow has given permission to detain the seven at least until September 14. They are suspected of 'attempted murder motivated by nationalistic hatred'.

It would not be the first time that Russian media figures have been targeted . Earlier, a well-known journalist and a blogger were killed in bomb attacks. Both openly supported the invasion of Ukraine. A nationalist writer narrowly survived an attack on his car.

Moscow repeatedly blamed Ukraine. Kyiv denies any involvement, saying the incidents are a result of internal settlements in Russia. The Ukrainian authorities have not yet responded to these arrests.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/16/23 03:23 PM


Update from the Institute for the Study of War
Russian sources reported on July 15 that the Russian military command dismissed 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov.[
Russian sources stated that the reason for Seliverstov’s dismissal is currently unknown but speculated that it could be associated with Seliverstov’s reputation for speaking up on behalf of his soldiers.

Seliverstov’s dismissal may be a part of an ongoing purge of insubordinate commanders by the Russian military command and may suggest that the corrosion of the Russian chain of command in Ukraine is accelerating
The Russian military command recently dismissed 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) Commander Major General Ivan Popov after he reportedly attempted to bypass Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and bring his complaints about the situation in western Zaporizhia Oblast directly to Putin.

The Russian military leadership is likely attempting to dissuade commanders from emulating recent cases of insubordination by punishing those involved in leaking Popov’s message of complaints.
Shoigu is also likely attempting to mitigate the aftermath of Popov’s leaked audio recording within the Russian government and punish Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev for the leak.
Growing insubordination will likely exacerbate existing factional divides within the Russian military and the wider Russian security sphere.
A Russian source claimed that Dyumin unsuccessfully attempted to intercede to prevent Seliverstov’s dismissal in a trip to Moscow on July 14.
Polyakov’s arrest suggests that different factions within the Kremlin and Russian security entities are exploiting the Russian information space and secret information to advance their political and financial objectives against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

If Polyakov’s affiliation with numerous insider Telegram channels is true, then it is evident that Russian officials see the Russian information space as an important source of authority that allows them to promote their interests and discredit their opponents in the eyes of their constituencies.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 15 and reportedly made limited gains.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces made limited gains south of Bakhmut near Andriivka (10km south of Bakhmut) and crossed the Siverskyi Donetsk Canal in the area.

Key Takeaways:
Russian sources reported on July 15 that the Russian military command dismissed 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov.
Seliverstov’s dismissal may be a part of an ongoing purge of insubordinate commanders by the Russian military command and may suggest that the corrosion of the Russian chain of command in Ukraine is accelerating.
The Russian military leadership is likely attempting to dissuade commanders from emulating recent cases of insubordination by punishing those involved in leaking Popov’s message of complaints.
Growing insubordination will likely exacerbate existing factional divides within the Russian military and the wider Russian security sphere.
Factions within the Russian security forces and the Kremlin appear to be fighting for control over the Russian insider information space.
Polyakov’s arrest suggests that different factions within the Kremlin and Russian security entities are exploiting the Russian information space and secret information to advance their political and financial objectives against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 15 and reportedly made limited gains.
The New York Times (NYT) reported that the Ukrainian military has adjusted its strategy to minimize Ukrainian casualties while continuing to attrit Russian forces, supporting ISW’s previous assessments.
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that it developed a plan for Wagner Group personnel to train Belarusian forces as Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusian sources continue to report that Wagner forces are moving to Belarus.
Russian authorities likely continue to forcibly integrate Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) dioceses into the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as part of a wider religious persecution campaign in occupied Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations and made limited territorial gains near Svatove.
Ukrainian forces reportedly made limited territorial gains on Bakhmut’s southern flank, while Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made limited advances on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka line but did not make any territorial gains.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border and reportedly made limited gains.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and reportedly made limited advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the completion of Russia’s spring 2023 conscription cycle on July 15.
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Kremlin launched a program to recruit young adults in Russia for service in occupation administrations in Ukraine
.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/18/23 01:35 AM

F-16's and other european jets in a few months Ukraine will get them.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/18/23 01:48 AM

Ukraine war latest: Putin control hit as attack sends 'shockwaves' across Russia
A couple has been killed and their daughter injured after explosions were reported on the bridge linking Crimea and Russia. Ukraine attacked the bridge overnight using unmanned drones on the water surface, Russia's Anti-Terrorist Committee claims.

This is a severe blow for Putin he must react relentless.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/18/23 07:17 PM

[/b]Update from The Institute for the Study of War.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 17, 2023
Jul 17, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF










Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 17, 2023

Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 17, 2023, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:30pm ET on July 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.


[b]The July 17 attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge will likely have continuing ramifications on Russian logistics in southern Ukraine. [/b
Russian authorities accused Ukrainian special services of conducting an unmanned surface vehicle strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge between Russia and occupied Crimea on the morning of July 17.[1] Footage of the aftermath shows that one Kerch Strait Bridge road span had collapsed and another span suffered damage but remains intact.[2] The Russian Ministry of Transport claimed that the strikes did not damage the rail bridge or supports of the road bridge, and rail traffic across the Kerch Strait Bridge resumed several hours after the strike.[3] Russian occupation authorities rerouted heavy civilian traffic from occupied Crimea to Russia through occupied southern Ukraine, and Russian sources reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoy Raion and occupied Kherson Oblast towards Melitopol.[
[b]The Russian government’s continued failure to put Russian society on a war-time footing will have significant impacts on Russian logistics as traffic from Russian tourism to occupied Crimea jams Russian logistics to southern Ukraine in the midst of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south.

The Kerch Strait Bridge is along one of two ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supporting Russia’s southern force grouping, with the other route passing through occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
Russian logistics to southern Ukraine will likely suffer in the short and medium-term, likely exacerbating recent and significant complaints about inadequate Russian supplies in southern Ukraine.

Former Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) Commander Major General Ivan Popov’s recent complaints about the Russian military command’s mistreatment of Russian forces defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine sparked great ire in the Russian information space.
Russian and occupation authorities appear to be consumed with mitigating the consequences of the attack rather than leveraging the incident to levy heavy informational attacks with rhetorical inflections.
Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting instructing Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin to lead a headquarters and develop solutions to mitigate traffic issues across the bridge.
The Russian milblogger response to the Kerch Strait Bridge attack largely criticized Russian authorities for failing to secure the bridge.
Some milbloggers, including former Russian officer and critical pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, offered the critique that Russian authorities have focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security, thereby allowing the most recent attack on the bridge to occur.[
The Wagner Group continues to prepare to establish a permanent presence in Belarus.
Independent Belarusian monitoring group “The Hajun Project” reported on July 17 that another Wagner vehicle convoy traveled towards the Tsel village tent camp near Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast, Belarus, and that two other Wagner columns had traveled along this same route between July 11 and July 17.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front over the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 17.
Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces have launched active offensive operations and advanced in the Kupyansk area (between northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and northwestern Luhansk Oblast) in the past several days.

Key Takeaways:

The July 17 attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge will likely have significant and sustained impacts on Russian logistics as traffic from tourism to occupied Crimea jams Russian logistics to southern Ukraine in the midst of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south.
Russian and occupation authorities appear to be consumed with mitigating the consequences of the attack rather than leveraging the incident to levy heavy informational attacks with rhetorical inflections.
The Russian milblogger response to the Kerch Strait Bridge attack largely criticized Russian authorities for failing to secure the bridge.
The Wagner Group continues to prepare to establish a permanent presence in Belarus.
Russia continues efforts to reorganize its domestic security apparatus in the wake of the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front over the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 17.
Russian forces conducted active offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and have likely made marginal tactical gains in this direction.
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks southwest and south of Kreminna, around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area and advanced near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia administrative border.
Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued unsuccessful ground attacks in the Orikhiv area in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported that Russian authorities have removed at least eight Russian military commanders without reappointing them to new positions since the start of the war, which is largely consistent with ISW’s previous assessments.
Russian occupation authorities continue to artificially increase the number of Russian citizens in occupied Ukraine ahead of the September regional elections.


Follow the link to observe terrain maps
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/19/23 01:55 AM

Ukraine will never give up Odesa !

Odesa port infrastructure damaged in Russian air strikes

Russia launched missile and drone strikes on southern and eastern Ukraine overnight that damaged infrastructure in the Black Sea port of Odesa, Ukrainian officials said on Tuesday.

The attack on Odesa, one of Ukraine's main ports for exporting grain, followed a pledge of retaliation by Russia after a blast on a bridge linking Russia to the Crimean Peninsula on Monday that Moscow blamed on Ukraine.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/19/23 06:28 PM

Where in the world is Yevgeny Prigozhin.
In a video segment appearing online Wednesday from a Wagner related source shows the Wagner Commander welcoming Wagner troops to their training camp in Belarus.
"The decision is made to stay here in Belarus for some time. During this this time, I'm sure we will make the Belarusian Army the second army in the world and we will stand up for them if necessary." He is heard shouting to the cheers of the Wagner mercenaries, promising a new beginning not in Ukraine but in Africa.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/21/23 10:56 AM

Poland moves troops to border with Belarus over Wagner's presence

Poland moves military troops from the west to the east of the country. Poland sees a possible threat due to the presence of Wagner's mercenary army on the border with Belarus. The country speaks of a provocation. It is still unclear how many troops are involved.

Wagner's mercenaries have begun exercises on the Polish border and will move with the army there, the Belarusian defense ministry said. They would be only a few miles from the border, training close to NATO territory.

Last week, more than 2,000 Wagner mercenaries arrived in Belarus. In all, some 10,000 mercenaries should be given refuge in Belarus, a Wagner commander said.

It was unclear for a long time whether the mercenaries would leave for Belarus in the wake of their leader Prigozhin, who had already left Russia. After the mutiny of the Wagner boss, it was agreed with President Putin that he will move to Belarus, where ally Lukashenko has been in power for 30 years.

For a while it was a mystery where Prigozhin was and whether he was actually in Belarus. The day before yesterday, a video surfaced in which the leader can be heard addressing his troops, but in which he is difficult to see.

In the video, the leader can be heard welcoming his mercenaries to the country and declaring that they will no longer be part of the war in Ukraine. He also says he wants to make the Belarusian army the second strongest in the world and to defend the country if it were attacked.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/21/23 11:59 AM

'MH17 perpetrator Igor Girkin arrested by Russian services'
Modified: 14 min ago 30 minutes ago
abroad _

MOSCOW - Igor Girkin has been arrested by the Russian authorities, according to his wife. This is confirmed by his lawyer. It is still unclear why he would be detained. Girkin, also known as Igor Strelkov, was involved in the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the subsequent uprising in eastern Ukraine and the downing of flight MH17. Lately he has been critical of the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The former intelligence officer is wanted internationally for involvement in the downing of MH17. He was sentenced to life in prison in November for the murder of 298 people on the plane. The judge considered him ultimately responsible as the highest-ranking soldier there.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/21/23 12:15 PM

Girkin was arrested by Russian authorities on charges of extremism.

Unlike the liberal and pro-democracy opposition to Vladimir Putin and independent journalists who are persecuted for criticizing the war in Ukraine or Putin, ultra-nationalists and pro-war activists like Girkin are considered untouchable because they are protected by high-ranking members of the military and intelligence services.

After large Ukrainian conteroffensives in September 2022, he predicted a complete defeat for Russian troops in Ukraine.[142] He said that full mobilization in Russia was the "last chance" for victory.[143] On 12 September, he called the Russian attacks on Ukrainian power plants "very useful".[144] He also said that Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu should be executed by firing squad and called for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in order "to drive 20 million refugees to Europe."[137]
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/22/23 01:41 AM

Putin knows he has been lied to by many people he wants to get out of this mess.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/22/23 11:12 AM

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 21, 2023

Click here to read the full report.

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 21, 2023, 8:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on July 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.



The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served. The Russian Investigative Committee arrested Girkin on July 21, and Girkin will be held until September 18 on extremism changes.
Girkin’s arrest follows other criminal charges against ultranationalists with past ties to Russian security services and indicates that unknown Russian officials may be targeting prominent ultranationalists who routinely reveal insider information about the Kremlin. ISW has consistently assessed that Girkin likely has the backing of an unknown silovik – possibly within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) – who promoted their interests by using Girkin as a conduit to reveal select information to Russia’s online ultranationalist community.
Wagner’s rebellion likely shifted the balance of power in the Kremlin, potentially depriving some patrons – including Girkin’s patron – of Putin’s favor and, therefore, of some of their power.
Girkin claimed on July 12 that Prigozhin’s rebellion shifted the balance of power within the Kremlin in favor of the group that reportedly includes Kiriyenko.
Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against southern Ukraine for a fourth night on July 21 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two of three Kaliber missiles, three of four Iskander missiles, and 13 of 19 Shahed UAVs launched at areas in southern Ukraine and that Russian forces also launched one Kh-22, one S-300 surface-to-air, and six Onyx missiles.
The Kremlin appears to be attempting to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense's July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets. Russian Deputy Foreign Ministry Sergei Vershinin stated on July 21 that the Russian MoD’s July 19 announcement that the Russian military will consider all ships en route to Ukrainian ports as potential military cargo vessels meant that Russian forces will inspect the ships.Russia is maneuvering to retain the option of modifying the current agreement rather than negotiating an entirely new one as it seeks to extract extensive concessions from the West.
Vershinin also argued that the July 22, 2022 memorandum underpinning the Black Sea Grain Initiative remains valid because neither Russia nor the United Nations (UN) gave notification about the termination of the memorandum that the UN, Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine signed.
Putin continued efforts to sow intra-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO divisions likely aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s Black Sea Grain Initiative effort and undermining long-term Western support for Ukraine. Putin’s rhetoric heavily drew upon historical parallels meant to evoke fear and distrust between European countries and the United States as well as between Ukraine and Poland. Putin’s rhetoric is consistent with prior rhetoric from Russian senior officials meant to sow distrust between Ukraine and its allies, undermine ongoing Western security assistance to Ukraine, and encourage Western states to push Ukraine prematurely into negotiations with Russia.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 21 and made gains in some areas. Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces made gains northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and closer to Pryyutne (12km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).
Pro-Wagner Group sources continue to express loyalty to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin’s role in the organization remains unclear. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger released an interview with an alleged unnamed Wagner platoon commander on July 21. The platoon commander claimed that none of the Wagner personnel he knows signed contracts with the Russian MoD except for fighters whom Wagner fired for drunkenness and looting and a Wagner commander with the surname Troshev (callsign “Seda”).
French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonne was likely referring to dual-use technology and non-lethal aid when speaking about Chinese supplied equipment to Russia on July 21. Bonn told a CNN journalist at the Aspen Security Forum on July 21 that China is supplying “massively [sic] military capabilities to Russia.”[44] CNN later quoted unspecified French officials as clarifying Bonne’s intent to speak of non-lethal aid, however.
A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that recent speculations about the dismissal of 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev are false. The milblogger amplified footage of alleged personnel of the 7th VDV division denying Kornev’s dismissal as well as speculations that Russian authorities may intend to arrest VDV commander Mikhail Teplinsky.[47] ISW cannot confirm Kornev’s dismissal.


Key Takeaways:



The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.
Russian insider sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest is part of the Russian Presidential Administration’s efforts to crack down on select high-profile Russian ultranationalists following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24.
Girkin’s arrest follows other criminal charges against ultranationalists with past ties to Russian security services and indicates that unknown Russian officials may be targeting prominent ultranationalists who routinely reveal insider information about the Kremlin.
Wagner’s rebellion likely shifted the balance of power in the Kremlin, potentially depriving some patrons – including Girkin’s patron – of Putin’s favor and, therefore, of some of their power.
Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against southern Ukraine for a fourth night on July 21 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
The Kremlin appears to be attempting to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense's July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets.
Russia is maneuvering to retain the option of modifying the current agreement rather than negotiating an entirely new one as it seeks to extract extensive concessions from the West.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to sow intra-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO divisions likely aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s Black Sea Grain Initiative effort and undermining long-term Western support for Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 21 and made gains in some areas.
Pro-Wagner Group sources continue to express loyalty to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin’s role in the organization remains unclear.
French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonne was likely referring to dual-use technology and non-lethal aid when speaking about Chinese supplied equipment to Russia on July 21.
A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that recent speculations about the dismissal of 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev are false.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Kreminna, Bakhmut areas, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and reportedly advanced in the Kupyansk and Kreminna areas.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna and Avdiivka Donetsk City lines, and advanced in the Bakhmut area.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast, the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area, and south of Orikhiv, and reportedly advanced south of Orikhiv.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made gains in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area.
Russian officials announced that they will amend a Russian State Duma bill originally aimed at incrementally raising the conscription age so that there is an immediate increase of the upper age limit for the spring 2024 conscription cycle.
Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
A Wagner-linked source reported that Wagner temporarily relocated its headquarters from Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to Belarus and that Wagner’s work to transfer combat experience to the Belarusian military is in full swing.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/22/23 11:28 PM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/24/23 12:47 PM

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 23, 2023
Jul 23, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 23, 2023

George Barros, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Thomas Bergeron, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 23, 2023, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed his continuing concern over the potential threats that the Wagner Group and Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose to him through symbolism and posturing during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in St. Petersburg, Russia.
Putin made several significant symbolic gestures during his July 23 meeting with Lukashenko, suggesting that Putin sought to project power and confidence in his own supremacy over the Prigozhin-aligned St. Petersburg-based faction. Putin took Lukashenko to visit Kronstadt in St. Petersburg – the historically significant island fortress where Russian soldiers and sailors conducted a famous unsuccessful anti-Bolshevik insurrection in early 1921 that the Soviet government ultimately suppressed.

Lukashenko told Putin that the Wagner Group in Belarus will remain in central Belarus likely subtly reminding Putin of the threat the Wagner military organization still poses to him and underlining Lukashenko’s control over that power. Lukashenko’s statements were likely meant to make Putin reflect on the uncomfortable (for Putin) fact that Wagner’s new garrison in Belarus puts its forces half as far from Moscow as Wagner’s previous base in southern Russia. The Wagner Group’s previous base in Krasnodar Krai was about 1,370 km from Moscow, whereas its new base in Belarus is about 720 km along an excellent military highway.

Putin and Lukashenko also amplified information operations targeting the West. The leaders amplified their false claims that Ukraine’s counteroffensive has failed.[6] Senior Western and Ukrainian leaders--and ISW--continue to assess that it is too early to evaluate Ukraine’s counteroffensive since Ukraine still has significant uncommitted prepared forces and retains the ability to launch decisive operations at times and places of its choosing.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told CNN on July 23 that Ukrainian forces have liberated approximately 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces captured since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. This figure is largely consistent with ISW’s current assessment of control of terrain. Analysts can employ several methods to calculate control of terrain with varying results depending on the cartographical projection used and other factors. An estimate using ISW’s control of terrain data and the Mercator projection indicates that Ukrainian forces liberated about 53 percent of the land that Russian forces captured since February 2022. Estimates made using different data sources, measurement methods, or projections will generate different numbers. Factors, such as higher confidence about unconfirmed Russian claimed territorial gains, can impact such estimations as well. ISW appreciates and closely studies government officials’ statements about control of terrain geometry to cross-reference, confirm, and where necessary correct assessments.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front line and advanced on July 23. Geolocated footage published on July 22 shows that Ukrainian forces made some advances in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced near Pryyutne (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).

Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes against port infrastructure and the city center in Odesa City overnight on July 22 to 23, severely damaging civilian areas. General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 19 missiles, including five Onyx, five Iskander-K, four Kalibr, two Kh-22, and two Iskander-M missiles, and that Ukrainian forces shot down four Kalibr and five Iskander-K missiles.

Further speculation about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest and the public posturing of Girkin’s affiliates suggests that a limited section of the pro-war community may have been contemplating political action in opposition to the Kremlin. Angry Patriots Club member and leader of the “Civil Solidarity” movement Georgy Fedorov claimed on July 22 that the Club developed a strategy and specific action plan for a campaign to defend Girkin and will be reaching out to grassroots supporters for help.

Angry Patriots members likely view Girkin’s arrest as an existential threat to the segment of the ultranationalist community he represents and will likely intensify their campaign to cast Girkin as an opposition figure. Angry Patriots Club member Yevgeny Mikhailov continued to criticize the Kremlin, calling Girkin’s arrest a ”gross mistake” and highlighting the double standards that Russian authorities use for prominent Russian officials who have criticized Russian forces’ conduct in the war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin may be attempting to censor an isolated segment of the Russian ultranationalist community that is consistently vocally hostile to the Kremlin. Russian news outlet Kommersant reported on July 21 that Russian law enforcement is investigating Angry Patriots Club Chair Pavel Gubarev for extremism because of his Telegram posts.

The head of one of the largest suppliers of surveillance equipment to Russian special services died on July 22. Russian law enforcement found “IKS Holding” Head Anton Cherepennikov dead in his office on July 22 and later claimed that Cherepennikov suffocated during a xenon gas therapy session.


Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed his continuing concern over the potential threats that the Wagner Group and Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose to him through symbolism and posturing during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in St. Petersburg, Russia.
Lukashenko told Putin that the Wagner Group in Belarus will remain in central Belarus likely subtly reminding Putin of the threat the Wagner military organization still poses to him and underlining Lukashenko’s control over that power.
Putin and Lukashenko also amplified information operations targeting the West.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told CNN on July 23 that Ukrainian forces have liberated approximately 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces captured since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front line and advanced on July 23.
Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes against port infrastructure and the city center in Odesa City overnight on July 22 to 23, severely damaging civilian areas.
Further speculation about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest and the public posturing of Girkin’s affiliates suggests that a limited section of the pro-war community may have been contemplating political action in opposition to the Kremlin.
Angry Patriots members likely view Girkin’s arrest as an existential threat to the segment of the ultranationalist community he represents and will likely intensify their campaign to cast Girkin as an opposition figure.
The Kremlin may be attempting to censor an isolated segment of the Russian ultranationalist community that is consistently vocally hostile to the Kremlin.
The head of one of the largest suppliers of surveillance equipment to Russian special services died on July 22.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and reportedly made tactically significant gains.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut area, and reportedly made gains near Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas but did not advance.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to recruit prisoners to fight in Ukraine.
Russian occupation authorities are bringing foreign citizens to occupied Ukraine to artificially alter demographics.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/26/23 09:50 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 25, 2023

Click here to read the full report

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 25, 2023, 7:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to manifest concern over potential threats that the Wagner Group and its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose during an impromptu two-day extension of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to St. Petersburg.
BBC’s Russian Service reported on July 25 that Putin told Lukashenko at the beginning of their July 23 meeting that Putin was ready to adjust his schedule to prolong Lukashenko’s visit and “discuss important topics in more detail.”[1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reported on July 25 that Putin and Lukashenko intended to “’synchronize watches’ and exchange views” but not sign any agreements during their prolonged meeting.[2] Peskov also reported that Putin and Lukashenko discussed the Wagner Group, the Union State, and external threats on the borders of Russia and Belarus.[3] Putin’s decision to prolong his meeting with Lukashenko likely shows Putin’s continued concerns about Wagner, which it appears that Lukashenko did not allay.

Lukashenko likely seeks to leverage his power over the Wagner Group to gain concessions from Putin. A Russian insider source claimed that the Wagner Group was the most important topic during the Putin-Lukashenko meeting, and that Lukashenko sought more economic assistance to Belarus through Union State programs.[4] The insider source also claimed that Putin wanted Belarus to be more involved in the war in Ukraine and rejected Lukashenko’s compromise offer to have Belarusian forces conduct a show of force on Belarus’ border with Ukraine.[5] Lukashenko was likely trying to leverage Putin’s concern over the Wagner Group throughout the entire visit to Russia to gain favorable conditions in Belarusian-Russian relations while deflecting Putin’s demands for closer integration into the Union State and support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Russian leadership is attempting to mitigate the security vacuum left by the Wagner Group’s departure by creating formalized but decentralized military “enterprises” on the basis of federal subjects (regions). The Russian State Duma adopted the second and third readings of amendments to the federal law regulating the circulation of weapons in constituent entities of the Russian Federation on July 25 that will allow heads of Russian federal subjects to create specialized state unitary enterprises.[6] Russian opposition media noted that certain intricacies in the amendments allow regional heads to create regionally based militarized state enterprises that are analogous to private military companies (PMCs) during a period of mobilization under martial law.[7] The amendments notably require regional and local budgets to finance the special enterprises, which will be equipped with small arms by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and will assist the Russian State Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and other military authorities in ensuring public order and border security.[8] The amendments would allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to create the enterprises on a temporary basis and later abolish them, after which these enterprises would have to transfer all small arms and other weapons back to the Russian MoD within a month.The Kremlin is likely trying to balance two competing security requirements—the need for combat capable formations that can fulfill roles left by the Wagner Group following their armed rebellion and relocation to Belarus and the desire not to recreate the systemic threats to the Russian state that Wagner’s independence posed. The creation of formal militarized state enterprises that will fulfill border security and domestic law enforcement tasks is likely intended in part to remedy the gap left by Wagner. However, the fact that these enterprises are so heavily decentralized and will operate under the auspices of internal security organs on the basis and expense of regional and local governments suggests that the Russian military leadership is very alive to the risk of recreating a powerful Wagner analogue and is therefore trying to limit the scale and power each individual enterprise can obtain. These state enterprises also appear to be a renewed iteration of the failed volunteer battalion model that Russian regions employed throughout the summer of 2022, but these enterprises will operate under formalized and consolidated domestic security organs such as the FSB, likely to mitigate many of the weaknesses in the old volunteer battalion system.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced on July 25. Geolocated footage published on July 25 shows that Ukrainian forces have made tactically significant gains south of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast), and Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area) directions.[12] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 750 meters in the direction of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and Russian sources claimed Ukrainian forces made marginal advances west of Orikhiv.[13] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are dying at a rate eight times higher than Ukrainian forces in the Bakhmut area and 5.3 times higher in the Berdyansk and Melitopol directions.[14] ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations aim to create an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment.

Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes on rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 24-25. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on July 25 that Ukrainian forces recorded the launch of about 10 Shahed drones, five of which Ukrainian forces destroyed.[16] Ukrainian military sources reported drones over Kyiv City and Cherkasy, Sumy, Poltava, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[17] The Kyiv City Military Administration noted that this was the sixth drone strike on the capital city in July alone.[18] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that the strikes targeted Ukrainian concentration areas, Western-provided military equipment and other military infrastructure, but Ukrainian sources noted that many of the drones struck open fields and empty hangars.

The Angry Patriots Club continues efforts to cast former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) as an opposition figure and may be attempting to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin through rhetoric about the illegality of Girkin’s arrest. The Angry Patriots Club, known in the Russian information space for its virulent pro-war, ultranationalist rhetoric and willingness to criticize the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Kremlin, and even Putin himself, has unexpectedly postured itself as an organization concerned about the rule of law following Girkin’s arrest.[20] The organization is attempting to cast Girkin as an opposition figure in Russian politics by arguing that his arrest is unlawful and by launching the social media campaign “#FreedomtoStrelkov.”[21] The Angry Patriots Club may be employing rhetoric about the illegality of Girkin’s arrest as an appeal to Putin, who has historically (and ironically) portrayed himself as a defender of Russian democracy and has seemingly been hesitant to abandon the veil of legitimacy that Russia’s democratic institutions provide his authoritarian and corrupt rule.[22] The Angry Patriots Club may believe that the veneer of legality in Russia is personally important to Putin and that Putin might feel compelled to intervene if he believes Girkin’s arrest and detention is illegal. It is a further irony that Girkin’s statements seem straightforwardly to violate Russia’s repressive laws prohibiting criticism of the war and its leaders.[23] Russian opposition figures Alexei Navalny and Mikhail Khodorkovsky amplified the Angry Patriots Club’s framing of Girkin as a political prisoner and his arrest as illegal, though it is unclear how Navalny and Khodorkovsky intend for their support to affect Girkin’s detention and eventual sentencing.

Putin and the Kremlin reportedly failed to respond promptly to the Wagner Group’s June 24 rebellion, leaving local Russian officials to make decisions concerning the group’s drive on Moscow. The Washington Post reported on July 25 that Ukrainian and European security officials stated that Putin did not issue orders for most of June 24 despite warnings from Russian security services about the likelihood of the rebellion at least two or three days beforehand.[25] Russian security services reportedly increased security at several strategic locations, including the Kremlin, in the days before the rebellion but took no other actions.[26] Regional Russian officials reportedly had to decide how to respond to the rebellion, and regional military and security officials were reportedly the ones that decided not to try to stop Wagner convoys by force.[27] The Kremlin’s and Putin’s alleged lack of response indicates that the Russian security apparatus had likely not prepared for a direct challenge to the Russian military leadership and likely did not have the capacity to quickly bring the rebellion to an end. The Kremlin is likely aware that its paralysis highlighted a degree of regime instability and appears to be consolidating Russia’s internal security apparatus in the Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) to prepare for further internal threats and to signal resolve.[28] Putin’s failure to act quickly also suggests that he is uncertain about his ability to rally the Russian elite around him and may indicate how factional internal Kremlin politics have become. A senior NATO official reportedly stated that unspecified senior Russian political figures in Moscow appeared ready to rally behind Prigozhin in the event that Wagner’s rebellion succeeded.[29] The Kremlin is likely trying to identify Russian elites who may have been prepared to side with Prigozhin and likely views regional officials’ decisions not to stop Wagner's advance as an indicator of disloyalty. Tula Oblast Governor and former head of Russia’s Special Operations Forces Alexei Dyumin has likely drawn further suspicion due to his previous affiliations with Prigozhin and his role in the negotiations that ended the rebellion.


Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to manifest concern over potential threats that the Wagner Group and its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose during an impromptu two-day extension of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to St. Petersburg. Lukashenko likely seeks to leverage his power over the Wagner Group to gain concessions from Putin.
Russian leadership is attempting to mitigate the security vacuum left by the Wagner Group’s departure by creating formalized but decentralized military “enterprises” on the basis of federal subjects (regions).
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced on July 25.
Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes on rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 24-25.
The Angry Patriots Club continues efforts to cast former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) as an opposition figure and may be attempting to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin through rhetoric about the illegality of Girkin’s arrest.
Putin and the Kremlin reportedly failed to respond promptly to the Wagner Group’s June 24 rebellion, leaving local Russian officials to make decisions concerning the group’s drive on Moscow.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Svatove, Kreminna, the Bakhmut area, the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, and the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area and made claimed advances near Svatove, Kreminna, and Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Kreminna, the Bakhmut area, the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in the Bakhmut area, in some areas along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and west of Orikhiv.
US intelligence officials warned on July 25 that Russia’s drone supply will dramatically increase as a result of continued bilateral Russo-Iranian cooperation.
Russian officials continue efforts to deconflict legal discrepancies as part of the incorporation of occupied territories.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/26/23 10:00 AM

Update from the Russian advance in the Luhansk Oblast.
A concentration of up to 100,000 Russian troops in the Luhansk Oblast has been able to create a salient into Ukrainian territory capturing three Ukrainian villages and penetrating eight kilometers up to the Kharkiv Oblast border.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/27/23 02:15 AM

Ukraine has thousands of new soldiers now in the south trained by the best in the West, Russians still have the numbers but, without Wagner, those soldiers are no match.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/28/23 06:37 AM

Russia downs Ukrainian drone in Moscow region, says defence ministry

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230728-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-russia-downs-ukrainian-drone-in-moscow-region-says-defence-ministry

I wonder how long it will be until Moscow is reporting downing F-16s in the Moscow region??
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/28/23 09:40 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 27, 2023

Click here to read the full report.

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 27, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on July 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and made gains in some areas, although Ukrainian forces appear not to have continued significant mechanized assaults south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast
. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky posted footage on July 27 showing that Ukrainian forces liberated Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in western Donetsk Oblast following heavy fighting in the area.[1] Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces also made marginal advances north of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[2] Geolocated footage published on July 26 suggests that Ukrainian forces made additional advances east of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) during offensive operations on July 26.[3] Ukrainian Director of the Department of Application Planning at the Main Command of the National Guard Mykola Urshalovych stated on July 27 that Ukrainian forces achieved tactical victories in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[4] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults at a lower tempo and with far less manpower near Robotyne on July 27 after Ukrainian forces launched an intense mechanized frontal assault that broke through Russian defensive positions northeast of the settlement on July 26.[5] Geolocated footage published on July 27 suggests that Ukrainian forces may be operating in areas well forward of where ISW assesses Ukrainian advances to be as a result of ISW’s intentionally conservative assessments about control of terrain (covered in more detail in Southern Axis text).[6]

The Kremlin and the wider Russian information space are intensifying efforts to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated to a reporter on July 27 that in recent days Russian forces destroyed 39 armored vehicles out of 50 that Ukrainian forces committed to intensified assaults in the Zaporizhia direction.[7] Putin claimed that Russian forces also killed 60 percent of the Ukrainian personnel that conducted these assaults as well as 40 percent of Ukrainian combat aviation pilots in the area.[8] Putin has previously claimed that Russian forces have destroyed an implausible amount of Ukrainian equipment during Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, although his figures concerning Ukrainian assaults in recent days indicate an inflection in his exaggeration of likely Ukrainian losses.[9] Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Russian forces destroyed dozens of Ukrainian armored vehicles and celebrated the alleged losses as proof that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is stalling.[10] The Kremlin’s and the Russian information space’s framing of the Ukrainian counteroffensive notably violates a reported Kremlin manual instructing Russian media not to downplay the potential for successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[11] The intensifying portrayal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort suggests that the Kremlin’s policy on the coverage of the war is to bolster efforts to promote itself as an effective manager of the war effort.

Russian President Vladimir Putin used the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum in St. Petersburg on July 27 to continue efforts to posture Russia as a more attractive ally to African partner states than the collective West. Putin met with several African leaders at the forum, including Ugandan President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Zimbabwe Emmerson Dambuzo Mnangagwa, President of the Republic of Burundi Evariste Ndayishimiye, President of Mozambique Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, and President of Comoros Azali Assoumani.[16] During his speech at the plenary session of the forum, Putin emphasized the importance of expanding Russian–African cooperation and Russia’s investment in the development of African nations, notably accusing Ukraine and the West of interfering with Russia’s supply of grain and fertilizers to the African continent and claiming that Russia will provide between 25 and 50 thousand tons of grain free of charge to Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somali, Central African Republic, and Eritrea over the coming months.[17] Putin announced that Russia is helping to develop over 30 energy infrastructure projects in 16 African states and called for an expansion of cultural and social integration between Russia and the African continent, stating that Russia plans to open branches of Russian universities in Africa and increase enrollment of African students in Russian educational institutions.[18]

Beyond the typical diplomatic platitudes and promises of continued cooperation and development, Putin’s rhetoric during the Russia-Africa forum does not represent a major inflection in the Kremlin’s policy toward the African continent. Putin previously signed an article published on July 24 to posture Russia’s commitment to African development and mitigate damage done to Russia’s position in Africa and his personal reputation with African leaders.[19] Putin’s and the Russian government’s reputations likely suffered due to a number of recent factors: Russia’s recent withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure (both of which were critical for grain exports to various African countries) and his inability to attend the upcoming BRICS summit because of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant against him.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin was also present in St. Petersburg on July 27 and took the opportunity to informally meet with an unknown number of African leaders, suggesting that the Wagner Group intends to remain a significant player in Africa. Russian milbloggers amplified photos of Prigozhin shaking hands with a Central African Republic official and the “director of Afrique media.”[20] A Russian insider source claimed that Prigozhin held private, informal meetings with representatives of an unknown number of African governments in a hotel close to the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum but did not attend the summit itself.[21] Prigozhin's continued efforts to meet with and message to African leaders are likely part of Wagner's efforts to maintain its profitable military and mining contracts in Africa. An unnamed Wagner commander who recently returned from CAR claimed on July 26 that Wagner is working on increasing its operations in Africa to fund its presence in Belarus.[22] Prigozhin additionally used the backdrop of the Russia-Africa summit to position Wagner as a viable anti-Western partner for post-coup Niger. Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels began circulating an audio recording reportedly of Prigozhin on July 27 wherein Prigozhin praised the Nigerien military’s removal of Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum and lauded it as an act of “gaining independence,” while accusing Western nations of deliberately destabilizing the situation in Africa and supporting terrorist organizations.[23] Prigozhin suggested that a “thousand fighters” from Wagner would be able to restore order, presumably in post-coup Niger.[24] Several Russian milbloggers responded to Prigozhin’s purported audio recording and suggested that Niger will need “help” from Wagner similar to what Mali needed following its coup in May 2021.[25] Prigozhin is posturing Wagner as a viable security partner for Niger, which is largely consistent with ISW’s and the Critical Threats Project’s (CTP) previous assessment that Wagner is likely to maintain and even expand its presence in the African continent following its July 24 armed rebellion.

The Kremlin reportedly distributed a manual to Russian state media on framing the anniversary of the Baptism of Rus on July 28, likely as part of continued information operations and propaganda narratives to advance Russian military objectives. Russian opposition news outlet Meduza reported on July 27 that it obtained the manual but did not publish the manual itself, which reportedly directs Russian state media to frame the Baptism of Rus as “a key turning point in Russian history” and “the point of formation of statehood.”[27] The manual reportedly emphasized that a “common faith” allowed the “East Slavic tribes” to unify as “one people.”[28] The manual reportedly instructs state media to paint Russian President Vladimir Putin as the one who “brought the mission of defending the Orthodox faith back to Russia” and reportedly labels the Ukrainian government an “apostate regime” and a “satanic regime” that is trying to “destroy” Orthodoxy in Ukraine and “the spiritual ties of the fraternal peoples.”[29] These Kremlin-dictated religion-based narratives come as Russia is itself committing systematic religious repressions and persecutions throughout Ukraine, including against Orthodox Christians, in an effort to destroy Ukrainian cultural and national identity.[30] The Kremlin reportedly issued a similar manual to state media in May aimed at controlling the narratives about a potential upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive, and the distribution of these manuals demonstrates the Kremlin’s use of various information operations to spread propaganda messages and discredit Ukraine in the international arena.

Russia conducted another strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 26–27. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched two Kalibr cruise missiles that damaged port infrastructure in Odesa City.[32] Ukrainian military sources also reported that Russian forces launched eight Shahed drones and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all eight.

US President Joe Biden has reportedly ordered the US government in recent days to share evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague. This will be the first time the US will share evidence with the ICC as part of a criminal investigation into a country that is not a part of the ICC.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and made gains in some areas, although Ukrainian forces appear not to have continued significant mechanized assaults south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
A US official expressed caution about assessing that the July 26 uptick in Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast is part of the Ukrainian main effort, tempering July 26 statements to the contrary.
Russian President Vladimir Putin used the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum in St. Petersburg on July 27 to continue efforts to posture Russia as a more attractive ally to African partner states than the collective West.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin was also present in St. Petersburg on July 27 and took the opportunity to informally meet with an unknown number of African leaders, suggesting that the Wagner Group intends to remain a significant player in Africa.
Prigozhin additionally used the backdrop of the Russia-Africa summit to position Wagner as a viable anti-Western partner for post-coup Niger.
The Kremlin reportedly distributed a manual to Russian state media on framing the anniversary of the Baptism of Rus on July 28, likely as part of continued information operations and propaganda narratives to advance Russian military objectives.
Russia conducted another strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 26–27.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 27 and did not make any confirmed advances.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and have advanced south of Bakhmut, in the ZaporizhiaDonetsk Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Russian State Duma approved measures on July 27 aimed at clarifying confusion surrounding the recently updated laws regarding conscripts and reservists.
Russian authorities are discriminating against Ukrainian refugees in Belgorod Oblast, Russia.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/28/23 10:09 AM

Significant progress along the Zaporizhzhian Front when Ukranian forces were able to advance to, and liberate Staomaiorske. This sets the stage for advancement to the next objective, Staromlynivka, headquarters for the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army. This promises to be a larger scale engagement which, if successful, opens the way to the Russian main defense lines and open path to the Black Sea and the ports of Yalta or Berdiansk.
Further advances near Robotyne by Ukrranian mechanized units supported by infantry were able to penetrate up to the Russian main defense lines which were unmanned, only lack of trench filling machines hampered advancement past fixed dragon teeth emplacements near Verbove.
Ukrainian forces were able push back the Russian salient in the Luhansk Oblast several kilometers, liberating one of the villages captured by Russian Federation forces yesterday.
.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/28/23 07:08 PM

African Union not only wants Russian grain, but also a ceasefire in Ukraine

Proposals made by President Putin about grain deliveries to Africa are not satisfactory, a ceasefire in Ukraine is needed. African Union President Azali Assoumani said this in a closing statement at the two-day Russia-Africa summit in Saint Petersburg.

On Thursday, Putin reiterated earlier claims that Russia can supply grain to Africa, now that Ukraine can no longer export because the grain deal has ended . He also offered six African countries free grain .

"Yes, this is important, but maybe it's not enough. We need to reach a ceasefire," Assoumani said. African leaders called on the Russian president in St. Petersburg to end the war and presented him with a peace plan.

"This war must stop. And it can only stop on the basis of justice and reason," said African Union Secretariat Chairman Moussa Faki Mahamat. Putin said he respects the proposal and will "study it carefully."

Negotiate
Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso believes that the African initiative should not be underestimated. "We call again urgently for the restoration of peace in Europe." Last month, African leaders also called on Russia to begin peace negotiations .

Putin repeated earlier statements that Russia is ready to negotiate, but that Ukraine is not willing. According to Putin, talks should take into account "new realities on the ground", referring to the Russian-occupied part of Ukraine.

The adviser to Ukrainian President Zelensky, Mychajlo Podoljak, called Putin's remarks "negotiation whimsy." African Union president Assoumani said that Putin had shown willingness to negotiate with Ukraine, and now "the other side" had to be convinced.

Extend grain deal
The African Union is also urging Putin to extend the grain deal, which recently expired as Russia suspended its cooperation . According to Faki Mahamat, an extension would "benefit all the peoples of the world, especially Africans".

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, grain exports from that country had come to an almost complete standstill. Global food prices rose sharply. The grain deal allowed Ukraine to export nearly 33 million tons of corn, wheat and other grains last year .

After the deal was closed, prices fell, but after its recent expiry, they rose again sharply. It is feared that the Russian decision will lead to more food insecurity and hunger in African countries.

Putin praised Africa's role in the emerging "multipolar world order." According to him, the era of US dominance is over. He said Russia has plans for increased trade and investment in African countries.

He also wants to strengthen military ties with African countries by training their armies and supplying more military equipment, some of which is free of charge.

Furthermore, Russia and African countries agreed to cooperate on colonialism-caused damage and to strive for the return of cultural artifacts.

The summit was attended by 49 African delegations, 17 of which came with heads of state. At the first Russia-Africa summit in 2019, there were still 43 African heads of state.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/30/23 07:22 AM

Russia downs three Ukrainian drones over Moscow, defence ministry says

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...drones-over-moscow-defence-ministry-says

Russia’s defence ministry said that three Ukrainian drones attacked Moscow early on Sunday, the TASS news agency reported. One drone was destroyed in the air and two others crashed in Moscow, the ministry said. The attack damaged two buildings and temporarily suspended flights at Vnukovo airport.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/30/23 10:19 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 29, 2023

Click here to read the full report.

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 29, 2023, 3:40pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 11:30am ET on July 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Segments of the Russian pro-war ultranationalist information space appear to be coalescing around the Kremlin’s narrative effort to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failure, increasingly overstating Ukrainian losses and writing less about Russia's losses and challenges than they had been.
Prominent Russian milbloggers have been increasingly presenting Ukrainian counteroffensive operations inaccurately as a series of failed Ukrainian assaults along the entire line of contact.[1] Russian milbloggers widely amplified footage on July 29 claiming that it showed a single Russian tank defeating an entire Ukrainian company with armored vehicles as if the event had occurred recently, but the footage is actually from June 7 and shows Russian artillery units striking the Ukrainian column.[2] Russian sources have previously recirculated old footage to support claims that Ukrainian forces are suffering significant armored vehicle losses, and the amplification of the footage on July 29 indicates that Russian sources are deliberately amplifying old footage to support the Kremlin narrative.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently claimed that Ukrainian forces lost 39 armored vehicles in a few days of fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast, a notable inflection in his exaggeration of Ukrainian losses during the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[4] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely shifting its policy about the coverage of the war to downplay the possibilities of a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive and to promote itself as an effective manager of the war effort.[5] Russian milbloggers continue to report on localized Ukrainian advances and some issues with Russian defensive operations, but the pro-war Russian information space’s wider operational framing of the Ukrainian counteroffensive aligns with the likely shift in the Kremlin’s portrayal of the counteroffensive.

Select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their depiction of the wider Ukrainian counteroffensive for fear of Kremlin punishment following the arrest of prominent pro-war critic Igor Girkin. A Russian insider source claimed on July 28 that sources within the presidential administration stated that the Kremlin recently encouraged Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers to reduce their coverage of the war in Ukraine in general and to post more positive content on topics of nationalistic pride.[7] ISW has not observed Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers reducing their coverage of the war, although Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers have begun to argue more emphatically that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is a failure.[8] The arrest of notable critics of the Russian war effort in Ukraine such as Girkin along with ongoing Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space may be prompting select milbloggers to align their portrayal of the war with the Kremlin’s more than they have normally done.

The Kremlin’s ability to establish a more cohesive narrative about the war within the Russian information space remains uncertain, and subsequent Russian failures or significant Ukrainian successes could disrupt the Kremlin’s progress in this effort. Segments of the Russian information space do continue to complain about systemic issues within the Russian war effort in Ukraine, and many Russian milbloggers would likely reverse course on their portrayal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the event of significant Ukrainian gains. The milblogger community continues to be highly reactive and motivated by salient topics of outrage, and many milbloggers would likely abandon efforts to align themselves with the Kremlin’s messaging about the war in the event that a controversy about Russian failure prompts renewed intense ire towards the Russian military leadership.[10] A cohesively amplified and unchallenged Kremlin narrative concerning the tactical and operational situation in Ukraine would make accurate coverage of battlefield realities more challenging, particularly in the absence of more detailed reporting from the Ukrainian side.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on July 29. Geolocated footage published on July 28 confirms that Ukrainian forces have advanced close to the northwestern outskirts of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[11] Geolocated footage published on July 29 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced to positions near the northern outskirts of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[12] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Klishchiivka, Kurdyumivka, and Andriivka south of Bakhmut.[13] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[14] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Rivnopil, Staromayorske, and Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[15] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and one milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured a forest northeast of Robotyne.[16] A Russian milblogger stated that Russian defensive fortifications will not matter if Ukrainian forces inflict heavy losses on Russian forces to the point that there are not enough Russian personnel to man the fortifications.[17] The milblogger also stated that the depth of Ukrainian advances into Russian defensive lines matters less than the degree to which the balance of forces has shifted to favor Ukraine during the course of the counteroffensive.

Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Crimea on July 28 and 29. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Chonhar bridge between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast on the morning of July 29.[18] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed Ukrainian forces launched 12 Storm Shadow missiles at the Chonhar rail bridge, but claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted all 12 missiles.[19] Some social media sources stated that locals reported explosions in the Chonhar area, but there is currently no visual evidence of the strike or claims about the consequences of the strike at the time of this publication.[20] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that saboteurs set explosives against a Russian ammunition depot in Kozacha Bay near Sevastopol, Crimea on July 28 and that locals reported primary and secondary detonations.[21] Sevastopol occupation head Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on July 28 that any explosions in the Kozacha Bay area were due to Russian military exercises.

Russian forces conducted a missile strike on Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the evening of July 28. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces struck a residential building and a Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) building in Dnipro City with two Iskander cruise missiles.

Key Takeaways:

Segments of the Russian pro-war ultranationalist information space appear to be coalescing around a Kremlin narrative effort to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failure, increasingly overstating Ukrainian losses and writing less about Russia's losses and challenges than they had been.
Select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their depiction of the wider Ukrainian counteroffensive for fear of Kremlin punishment following the arrest of prominent pro-war critic Igor Girkin.
The Kremlin’s ability to establish a more cohesive narrative about the war within the Russian information space remains uncertain, and subsequent Russian failures or significant Ukrainian successes could disrupt the Kremlin’s progress in this effort.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on July 29.
Ukrainian forces likely targeted Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Crimea on July 28 and 29.
Russian forces conducted a missile strike on Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the evening of July 28.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made claimed advances along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and advanced around Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and south of Orikhiv and advanced along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and south of Orikhiv but did not make confirmed or claimed advances.
A Ukrainian report indicates that Russian occupation authorities continue crypto-mobilization efforts in occupied Ukraine to replenish losses from combat casualties.
Russian authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia under the guise of rest and rehabilitation programs.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/30/23 08:56 PM

Originally Posted by U talkin' da me ??
Russia downs three Ukrainian drones over Moscow, defence ministry says

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...drones-over-moscow-defence-ministry-says

Russia’s defence ministry said that three Ukrainian drones attacked Moscow early on Sunday, the TASS news agency reported. One drone was destroyed in the air and two others crashed in Moscow, the ministry said. The attack damaged two buildings and temporarily suspended flights at Vnukovo airport.



Does someone knows which drones they use to penetrate so deep they probably have men on the ground no?
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/31/23 01:56 AM

Originally Posted by Hollander
Originally Posted by U talkin' da me ??
Russia downs three Ukrainian drones over Moscow, defence ministry says

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...drones-over-moscow-defence-ministry-says

Russia’s defence ministry said that three Ukrainian drones attacked Moscow early on Sunday, the TASS news agency reported. One drone was destroyed in the air and two others crashed in Moscow, the ministry said. The attack damaged two buildings and temporarily suspended flights at Vnukovo airport.



Does someone knows which drones they use to penetrate so deep they probably have men on the ground no?






Yes, more than likely they were Ukrainian made UJ-22 drones or perhaps the longer ranged R18, which Ukraine's Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov recently boasted of a Ukrainian drone called the R18 that "can fly from Kyiv to Moscow and back".
"Although Ukraine has not confirmed that its armed forces carried out the attacks [on Moscow], I think that the pre-emptive raids we have seen last year prove that Ukraine has the capability to launch long range attacks of that kind from within Ukrainian territory," says David Cenciotti, editor of the Aviationist blog.

Drone specialist Steve Wright also said it was possible that a drone could hit the Kremlin having been launched from within Ukraine.

But he added: "My guess is that the drone was launched from far closer in than that, as this would avoid it having to run the gauntlet of much of Moscow's defences."
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65475333
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 07/31/23 12:27 PM

Thanks another attack on Zelensky's hometown, clearly a personal message.

Dead and people under rubble after Russian missile attack on Kryvyi Rih
By our news editors
Jul 31, 2023 at 10:29 am
Update: an hour ago

[Linked Image]

At least four people, including a 10-year-old girl, were killed in a Russian missile attack on Ukraine on Monday morning. At least thirty others were injured. Several people are still under the rubble.
Russia fired two missiles at Kryvyi Rih, a town in the Dnipropetrovsk region, on Monday morning. The Ukrainian Interior Minister confirms that there have been several deaths.

The death toll could rise further as people are still trapped under the rubble. Rescue workers search for victims.

One of the buildings had four floors. An educational institution was located there. The other building was a nine-story residential tower.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/01/23 12:49 AM

XI is a smart guy.

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/01/23 09:31 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 31, 2023
Jul 31, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 31, 2023

Karolina Hird, George Barros, Grace Mappes, and Mason Clark

July 31, 2023, 5:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on July 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Wagner Group may be supplanting the Russian military as the Belarusian military’s key training partner.
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 30 that Wagner personnel conducted company-level training with unspecified elements of multiple Belarusian mechanized brigades.[1] The training included tactical maneuver for dismounted infantry and focused on force concealment from enemy UAVs and coordination between companies, platoons, and squads.[2] The training also reportedly featured Belarusian infantry conducting a combined arms assault with tank and artillery support.[3] The Wagner Group’s new role in Belarusian company-level training is notable. The Belarusian military typically conducts such exercises with Russian trainers and relies on Russian planners for any multi-brigade exercises, which ISW has not yet observed Wagner Group participating in. ISW previously observed Wagner personnel training with a Belarusian airborne brigade that historically trains with the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division and forecasted that the Wagner Group may seek to supplant legacy Russian–Belarusian unit relationships.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely succeeded in recruiting an unknown number of Wagner personnel following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion, though Prigozhin reportedly ordered remaining Wagner fighters to assemble in Belarus by August 5. Prigozhin announced on July 30 that “unfortunately a few [Wagner personnel] agreed to transfer from the Wagner Group” and joined other unspecified Russian security services — likely the Russian MoD).[5] Prigozhin thanked former Wagner personnel for their service, stated that neither he nor Wagner’s Council of Commanders banned Wagner personnel from joining different Russian “security structures,” and expressed hope that the departed Wagner members would “keep in touch” so that they can rejoin Wagner should there ever arrive a time when the Wagner Group must reform a force.[6] Prigozhin also reiterated known details about how the Wagner Group will continue to train Belarusian forces and operate in Africa.[7] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also noted on July 31 that Prigozhin ordered all Wagner personnel currently on rest and recuperation to arrive at Wagner’s field camps in Belarus no later than August 5 to attend unspecified events that Prigozhin will personally lead on August 5.[8] Prigozhin stated that most Wagner fighters are on “vacation” as of July 30. Prigozhin stated that the Wagner Group stopped recruiting in Russia and claimed that the Wagner Group does not need to recruit more personnel and has sufficient reserves.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian state as adequately supporting long-term force-generation efforts and meeting Russian weapons demand through domestic production and international cooperation.[13 Shoigu claimed that over 15,000 students enrolled at Russian military universities for the coming school year, 10 percent of whom have combat experience fighting in Ukraine. Shoigu announced the resumption of instruction at the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School in occupied Donetsk, one of the combined arms academies the Russian military requires officers to attend before commanding at the brigade or regiment level. Shoigu also reiterated positive rhetoric about the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and actively seeking international military-technical cooperation to support the war effort. Shoigu stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will sign contracts worth over 433 billion rubles (roughly $4.7 billion) with defense enterprises at the Army-2023 international military-technical forum. The claimed overall value of these contracts is at least 13.4 percent less than the over 500 billion ruble (roughly $5.45 billion) value of contracts the MoD signed at the Army-2022 and 2021 forums but a substantial increase over the 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, and 2016 forums, the overall contract values of which were roughly 1.16 trillion rubles ($17.4 billion), 1.03 trillion ($10.9 billion), 130 billion ($1.4 billion), 170 billion ($1.8 billion), and 130 billion, respectively.[14] Shoigu stated that Russia invited the heads of over 108 defense departments to attend the Army-2023 forum.

Imagery posted on July 30 and 31 visually confirms damage to the Chonhar Bridge following a Ukrainian strike on July 29. Satellite imagery posted on July 30 reportedly shows damage to the Chonhar railway bridge.[16] Social media sources additionally circulated an image taken by someone standing on the bridge itself reportedly showing damage to the railway bridge.[17] One source speculated that the pictures taken from the bridge do not match the location of the damage as shown on available satellite imagery, which suggests that the full extent of the damage to the bridge is still unclear.[18] Russian milbloggers maintained their silence on damage to the Chonhar Bridge on July 31, possibly supporting ISW’s previous assessment that the Kremlin may have directed Russian commentators to refrain from covering the strike in an effort to exert greater control of the information space.

Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova confirmed on July 31 that Russia has transferred 4.8 million Ukrainians, including over 700,000 children, to the Russian Federation since the beginning of the war. In a report on the activities “authorized by the President of the Russian Federation for children’s rights” in 2022, Lvova-Belova claimed that Russia has “received” 4.8 million Ukrainians since February 2022 and noted that the vast majority of the 700,000 children who arrived to Russia did not have parental or guardian supervision.[21] The report carefully frames these activities as humanitarian gestures of goodwill. International humanitarian law, however, defines the forced transfer of civilians to the territory of an occupying power as “deportation.” And the circumstances of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the situation in occupied territories are likely sufficiently coercive to mean that most “transfers” of Ukrainian civilians to Russia meet the threshold of forced deportation, which is prohibited under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, regardless of Russia’s claimed motive.[22] ISW continues to assess that Russian authorities are conducting a large-scale campaign to deport Ukrainians to the Russian Federation.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 31. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking northwest and southwest of Bakhmut, in the western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[24] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that over the past week, Ukrainian forces liberated an additional 2 square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut area and 12.6 square kilometers in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.


Iran and Belarus are deepening bilateral cooperation over the backdrop of their mutual support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin arrived in Iran on July 31 and met with his counterpart, Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding and a bilateral military cooperation plan for 2023.[26] Ashtiani is primarily responsible for negotiating military acquisitions and sales in his role as Iranian Defense Minister, so Khrenin and Ashtiani likely discussed arms deals during their meeting. Belarus may have also been seeking to secure an agreement on Iranian production of Shahed drones on the territory of Belarus following initial reports that Iran was seeking to convert a plant in Belarus’ Gomel Oblast into a Shahed production plant.

Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated on July 30 that Kyiv and Washington will begin consultations on providing Ukraine “security guarantees” as soon as the week of August 6 – 13. Yermak stated that the security guarantees for Ukraine — including “concrete and long-term commitments that will ensure Ukraine's ability to win now and deter Russian aggression in the future” — will cover the period before Ukraine acquires NATO membership.[28] Yermak described the security guarantees as an “important prerequisite” for Ukraine’s recovery and noted that the security guarantees include financial support for Ukraine and sanctions and punitive measures against Russia.


Key Takeaways:

The Wagner Group may be supplanting the Russian military as the Belarusian military’s key training partner.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely succeeded in recruiting an unknown number of Wagner personnel following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion, though Prigozhin ordered remaining Wagner fighters to assemble in Belarus by August 5.
Prigozhin stated that the Wagner Group stopped recruiting in Russia and claimed that the Wagner Group does not need to recruit more personnel and has sufficient reserves.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian state as adequately supporting long-term force-generation efforts and meeting Russian weapons demand through domestic production and international cooperation.
Imagery posted on July 30 and 31 visually confirms damage to the Chonhar Bridge following a Ukrainian strike on July 29.
Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova confirmed on July 31 that Russia has transferred 4.8 million Ukrainians, including over 700,000 children, to the Russian Federation since the beginning of the war, very likely violating the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 31.
Iran and Belarus are deepening bilateral cooperation over the backdrop of their mutual support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated on July 30 that Kyiv and Washington will begin consultations on providing Ukraine “security guarantees” as soon as the week of August 6 – 13.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna and Avdiivka-Donetsk City lines and made claimed gains in Luhansk Oblast.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian President Vladimir Putin ratified a law on July 31 increasing the fine for mobilized personnel’s or conscripts' failure to arrive at a military registration office after being summoned.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/01/23 09:41 AM

More Wagner Fighters Move Closer to Polish Border, Poland Says

WARSAW
- About 100 soldiers from the Russian Wagner group have moved closer to the Belarusian city of Grodno near the Polish border, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said Saturday.

Poland, a former Warsaw Pact member that has been a full member of the U.S.-led NATO military alliance since 1999, has been concerned about the possibility that the war could spill over onto its territory since Russian invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

Earlier this month, Poland began moving more than 1,000 troops to the east of the country amid rising concerns that the presence of Wagner fighters in Belarus could lead to increased tension on its border.

"The situation is getting increasingly dangerous. ... Most likely they (the Wagner personnel) will be disguised as the Belarusian border guard and help illegal migrants get to the Polish territory (and) destabilize Poland," Morawiecki said at a press conference in Gliwice, western Poland.

"They will most likely try to enter Poland pretending to be illegal migrants and this poses additional threats," Morawiecki said.

However, he did not disclose the source of his information on the Wagner movements, and Anton Motolko, founder of the Belarusian opposition Hajun project, which monitors military activity in the country, told Reuters his group had not seen any evidence of the Wagner group moving closer to Grodno.

The city has a potentially significant position because it is near the Suwalki Gap, a strategic strip of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border that divides Belarus, Russia's ally, from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.

Earlier in July, Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin was shown in a video welcoming his fighters to Belarus, telling them they would take no further part in the Ukraine war for now but ordering them to gather their strength for Africa, where they are involved in a number of conflicts, while they train the Belarusian army.

The following day, some Wagner fighters arrived at the training ground of the 38th airborne assault brigade outside the city of Brest, just a few miles from the Polish border.

Wagner's move to Belarus was part of a deal that ended the group's mutiny attempt in June, when they took control of a Russian military headquarters, marched on Moscow and threatened to tip Russia into civil war, President Vladimir Putin has said.
https://www.voanews.com/a/more-wagn...-polish-border-poland-says-/7203775.html
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/03/23 08:58 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 1, 2023
Aug 1, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 1, 2023

Karolina Hird, George Barros, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Annika Ganzeveld, and Mason Clark

August 1, 2023, 6:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:00pm ET on August 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of attempting to attack two Black Sea Fleet patrol boats with unmanned semi-submersibles on August 1.
The Russian MoD initially claimed that Ukraine launched three unmanned boats at the “Sergey Kotov” and “Vasily Bykov” Project 22160 large patrol ships in the southwestern part of the Black Sea, about 340km southwest of Sevastopol.[1] The Russian MoD later clarified that the patrol ships were escorting Russian civilian transport ships en route to the Bosphorus Strait via the Black Sea and claimed that the patrol ships detected and destroyed all three semi-submersibles.[2] Russian authorities may be amplifying claims of Ukrainian attacks to frame Ukraine as irresponsibly threatening civilian ships in the Black Sea, thereby setting conditions to further escalate naval activity and consolidate control in the Black Sea, though there is no indication that Ukrainian attacks on Russian military targets have threatened civilian vessels.[3] Geolocated images posted on July 31 show the installation of anti-naval drone barriers in Sevastopol Bay, likely as part of the overall Russian effort to increase naval and defensive posturing in the Black Sea.


Ukrainian actors likely conducted another drone strike on Moscow City in the early hours of August 1. Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin claimed that Russian air defense downed several drones flying towards Moscow, and geolocated footage shows that one drone struck the 21st floor of the IQ-Kvartal Tower in central Moscow City.[5] Russian media reported that the target of the strike was the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, located on the IQ-Kvartal Tower’s 21st floor.[6] Russian sources claimed that drones previously struck the IQ-Kvartal Tower on the night of July 29 to 30.[7] Social media footage from August 1 additionally shows a drone flying over Moscow suburbs in the Odintsovo district.[8] Several sources suggested that the drones were Ukrainian-made.[9] One Russian commentator accused Sobyanin of neglecting to secure Moscow against such continued drone attacks.[10] Russian authorities will likely struggle to balance the need to quell domestic concern over continuing drone attacks deep within the Russian rear with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued refusal to fully mobilize Russian society for the war and its corresponding consequences.

The Russian MoD continues to posture Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov as an effective and involved overall theater commander in Ukraine. The Russian MoD posted footage of Gerasimov on August 1 reportedly inspecting a forward command post in western Zaporizhia Oblast and receiving a briefing on Ukrainian operations and Russian defenses in the area.[11] This footage is one of Gerasimov’s first public appearances since Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion and indicates that the MoD continues to publicize Gerasimov’s role as theater commander.[12] Some Russian sources previously claimed that rumored deputy theater commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky replaced Gerasimov as overall theater commander in Ukraine following Wagner’s rebellion, but ISW was unable to verify these rumors and assessed that Gerasimov will likely nominally retain his position in the Russian military.[13] The MoD’s footage notably portrays Gerasimov as the architect of Russian defensive operations in one sector of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south, a role that the Russian information space previously attributed to both former deputy commander of the joint grouping of forces in Ukraine Army General Sergei Surovikin and former 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) Commander Major General Ivan Popov prior to their likely dismissals on June 28 and July 15, respectively, for challenging Gerasimov and the traditional MoD hierarchy.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may have signaled his intent to use the Wagner Group to create a foundation for an unspecified Belarusian “contract army.” Lukashenko stated on August 1 that he seeks to retain the Wagner Group within the Belarusian Armed Forces by using experienced Wagner fighters to “more actively create a contract army.”[15] Lukashenko did not provide details on the “contract army’s” organizational structure, planned end strength, or formation timeline, but noted that the Wagner Group currently includes over 30,000 fighters.[16]

Belarus currently does not have a “contract army” or a structure resembling a “contract army,” which in this context likely refers to the Russian term of “kontraktniki,” professional volunteer soldiers rather than conscripts. The Belarusian military does not field any formations above the brigade level and Belarus’ main combat units are six separate brigades (three mechanized, two airborne, and one spetsnaz) primarily staffed by 18-month conscripts and some contract servicemen.[17] The creation of a “contract army” would likely require the creation of a new formation or a significant reorganization of Belarus’ existing brigades and an overhaul of Belarusian training to create a force of long-serving professional soldiers, as Russia previously (and unsuccessfully) attempted to do in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Then-Belarusian Defense Minister Andrei Ravkov previously stated in 2016 that Belarus should not and does not plan to transition away from the traditional staff and cadre system to have a fully contract army.

Two Belarusian helicopters reportedly violated Polish airspace on August 1. Polish officials reported that two Belarusian helicopters entered Polish airspace on August 1 and that Poland will increase its troop presence at the Polish-Belarusian border in response.[19] Lukashenko also dismissed the Polish government for overreacting to news that the Wagner Group deployed a 100-person element closer to the Belarusian-Polish border and claimed that Wagner forces are in Grodno and Brest, rather than near the international border.[20] ISW continues to assess that Wagner forces in Belarus pose no military threat to Poland (or Ukraine, for that matter) until and unless they are re-equipped with mechanized equipment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 1. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued gradually advancing near Bakhmut, and a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces captured an unspecified height south of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka.[21] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on August 1 that in the past week, Ukrainian forces captured two square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut direction and 12 square kilometers in southern Ukraine.[22] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks against Russian forces along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and Urozhaine and in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne.[23] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) in western Zaporizhia Oblast likely struggles with severe fatigue and that elements of the 5th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) south of Velyka Novosilka likely face a high level of pressure to defend the area and feel that the Russian military command should rotate them from the front line.[24] The UK MoD also reported that Russian commanders in southern Ukraine largely struggle with artillery ammunition shortages, a lack of reserves, and challenges with securing the flanks of defending units.

Russian companies not under Western sanctions continue to recruit volunteers to fight in the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that unsanctioned Russian companies Rusal, Novatek, PIK, and Mospromstroy that are affiliated with Russian oligarchs, including Oleg Deripaska, Leonid Mikhelson, Sergei Gordeev, and Mikhail Gutseriev, recruit Russian volunteers to fight in the war in Ukraine.[25] Vazhnye Istorii reported that both the Russian MoD and Russian “military industrial complex companies” pay recruits’ salaries, who then serve in the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) and the “Sokol” Volunteer Battalion of the 108th Air Assault Regiment (7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division).[26] ISW and Vazhnye Istorii previously reported that Russian state-owned companies such as Gazprom, Russian Railways, and Roscosmos have contributed to recruitment efforts.[27] Gazprom and Russian Railways are under Western sanctions, however.

Iran is pursuing the construction of drone factories in Belarus and Russia, which will help Russia acquire Iranian drones more readily and provide Iran with numerous economic and military benefits. (NOTE: This text also appeared in the Critical Threats Project (CTP)’s August 1 Iran Update) Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri called for greater defense industry cooperation between Iran and Belarus during a meeting with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin in Tehran on August 1.[29] Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani signed a military cooperation agreement with Khrenin on July 31.[30] CTP assessed that Ashtiani and Khrenin may have discussed establishing Shahed kamikaze drone factories in Belarus to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[31] Ukraine claimed in May 2023 that Iranian engineers are exploring how to convert factories in Gomel, Belarus into drone production facilities.[32] The Biden administration revealed in June that Iran is helping Russia build a drone manufacturing factory in Yelabuga, Tatarstan, Russia.[33] Iran opened an Ababil-2 drone factory in Dushanbe, Tajikistan in May 2022. Bagheri notably attended the opening ceremony of this factory.[34] The production of Iranian drones in Belarus and Russia will benefit both Russia and Iran:

Russia will benefit by acquiring Iranian drones for its invasion of Ukraine more readily. Israeli and Ukrainian media have noted that the construction of an Iranian drone factory in Belarus would alleviate the “logistical problems” Russia faces in transporting Iranian drones from Iran to Russia via the Middle East.[35] The Biden administration published a map in June showing Iranian drone transfers from Iran to Russia through the Caspian Sea.[36]
Iran will benefit by receiving revenue for the Iranian economy. The British Secret Intelligence Service revealed in July that Iran seeks to acquire cash from Russia in return for Iranian drones.[37] Iran is currently facing critical economic conditions, with the value of the rial surpassing 500,000 rials to one US dollar on August 1.[38] The Iran Statistical Center reported on July 25 that Iran’s inflation rate is approximately 47.5 percent.[39]
Russia can also benefit Iran's military. Western media speculated in late 2022 that Iran might receive Russian Su-35 fighter jets in return for supplying Russia with drones.[40] Iranian military officials have increasingly expressed skepticism at receiving Su-35s in recent months, however.[41] Western media reported in March that Russia provided Iran with advanced surveillance software and cyber weapons in exchange for drones.[42] A high-ranking Israeli military official separately expressed concern in June that Russia is providing Iran with Western weapons captured in Ukraine.[43]
Iran’s close cooperation with Belarus and Russia may stem, in part, because Iran has signed long-term strategic agreements with these countries. The graphic below depicts which countries Iran has signed or is pursuing cooperation agreements with.

Key Takeaways:

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of attempting to attack two Black Sea Fleet patrol boats with unmanned semi-submersibles on August 1.
Likely Ukrainian actors conducted another drone strike on Moscow City in the early hours of August 1.
The Russian MoD continues to posture Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov as an effective and involved overall theater commander in Ukraine.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may have signaled his intent to use the Wagner Group to create a foundation for an unspecified Belarusian “contract army.”
Two Belarusian helicopters reportedly violated Polish airspace on August 1.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 1.
Russian companies not under Western sanctions continue to recruit volunteers to fight in the war in Ukraine.
Iran is pursuing the construction of drone factories in Belarus and Russia, which will help Russia acquire Iranian drones more readily and provide Iran with numerous economic and military benefits.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 1 and made advances in certain areas.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 1 and advanced near Kreminna and Bakhmut.
The Russian Cabinet of Ministers granted Russian volunteer fighters and Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR and LNR) militia fighters (opolcheniye) veteran status on August 1.
Russian occupation authorities continue to deport children from occupied regions of Ukraine to Russia under the guise of education and rehabilitation programs.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/03/23 09:11 AM

206 Shahed strike UAVs, 39 Kalibr cruise missiles, 37 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles and 2 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles: Ukrainian air defence system destroyed more than 70% of Russian air targets in July
By: Myroslav Trinko | yesterday, 10:29


Monitoring group @war_monitor shared statistics of Russian shelling of Ukraine for July 2023.

Here's What We Know
From 01.07 to 31.07, 415 means of destruction were launched on the territory of Ukraine, including 150 missiles and 265 Shahed kamikaze strike drones. In total, the Ukrainian air defence system destroyed 206 UAVs (77.74%), as well as 39 out of 54 Kalibr cruise missiles (72.22%), 37 out of 41 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles (90.24%) and 2 out of 4 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles (50%). In addition, Russia fired 20 Onyx supersonic missiles and 17 Kh-22 hypersonic missiles at Ukraine. Unfortunately, none of them were shot down.

The overall success rate of the Ukrainian air defence forces is over 70%. The decrease in performance is affected by the use of Onyx, Kh-22, Kinzhal and Kalibr supersonic missiles. They are launched from submarines.

Source: https://t.me/war_monitor/9253

https://gagadget.com/en/289102-206-...2-kinzhal-hypersonic-missiles-ukrainian/
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/05/23 03:22 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 4, 2023
Aug 4, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 4, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark

August 4, 2023, 6:05 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:00pm ET on August 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of aerial and naval drone strikes against Russian logistics and port infrastructure in occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai (a key Russian naval base) on the night of August 3 to 4.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare units downed up to 13 Ukrainian drones targeting Crimea.[1] Geolocated footage published on August 4 shows Ukrainian drones striking areas near an oil depot in Feodosia, Crimea, although it is unclear whether the drone strikes damaged Russian targets.[2] Geolocated footage published on August 3 and 4 shows Russian forces firing on Ukrainian naval drones near a Russian naval base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and one of the naval drones striking the Russian Olenegorsky Gornyak Ropucha-class landing ship.[3] The Russian MoD stated that Russian naval artillery fire destroyed two Ukrainian naval drones near the base in Novorossisyk.[4] Geolocated footage posted later on August 4 shows the Olenegorsky Gornyak listing and a Russian support vessel towing the landing ship to the Novorossisyk port.[5] Geolocated footage does not indicate the full extent of the damage to the Olenegorsky Gornyak, and Russian sources claimed that the damage was not critical and that the ship would be operational after an unspecified time of repair.[6] Russian sources claimed that the Russian navy used the landing ship to transport civilian vehicles across the Kerch Strait amidst widespread disruptions to traffic across the Kerch Strait bridge.

Russian milbloggers characteristically lambasted the Russian MoD for lying about the naval drone strikes and called on the Russian military to escalate activities in the Black Sea. Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian MoD for originally claiming that the Russian forces had intercepted all drone strikes instead of admitting that the strikes damaged the Olenegorsky Gornyak landing ship.[8] Russian milbloggers criticized the MoD for previously lying about destroying the Ukrainian drone assembly facilities and claimed that Russian forces must cut Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea in order to prevent naval drone attacks from civilian ships.[9] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russia needs to create a full-fledged monitoring system for the Black Sea to detect Ukrainian boats, as other tactics like striking Ukrainian port infrastructure have not prevented attacks in the sea.[10] Some Russian milbloggers argued that the Russian MoD lacks a cohesive information policy, which creates conditions for public outcry in the Russian information space after every Russian military failure.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[12] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces continue to advance on the southern flank of Bakhmut.[13] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitskyi stated that the most important elements of the Ukrainian counteroffensive are unexpectedness and accuracy, not speed.[14] Skibitskyi noted that Ukrainian actions are aimed at cutting off Russian supply routes, destroying Russian stores of weapons and military equipment, and winning counterbattery battles.[15] Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brigadier General Pat Ryder stated that Ukraine independently decides when and where to employ its significant combat capabilities.

The Kremlin continues to express its unwillingness to return to the Black Sea Grain Initiative in the absence of extensive concessions from the West. The Kremlin released a joint statement on August 4 following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s July 28 meeting with African leaders regarding their newly formally named African Peace Initiative.[17] The document stated that the African leaders called for concrete steps to remove obstacles to the export of Russian grain and fertilizers, and the release and delivery of 200,000 tons of Russian fertilizer stuck in European ports to African countries. These calls suggest that the African leaders support Russia’s conditions for revitalizing the Black Sea Grain Initiative.[18] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on August 4 that the United States would continue to do “whatever is necessary” to ensure that Russia can freely export food on the global market if Russia would be willing to revive the Black Sea Grain Initiative and allow Ukraine to export grain safely through the Black Sea.[19] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Blinken’s statement by claiming that as soon as the United States fulfills Russia’s conditions, “the deal will immediately be resumed.”[20] These statements give no clear indication that Russia intends to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative and seeks to coerce the West to end limitations on its own exports.

Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin reportedly facilitated the reinstatement of the commander of the Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division, Major General Vladimir Seliverstov, after meeting Putin’s Chief of Staff Anton Vaino on July 21.[21] Russian sources previously claimed on July 14 that the Russian military command dismissed Seliverstov for unknown reasons, but speculated that his removal could have been due to his reputation for speaking up on behalf of his forces.[22] ISW assessed on July 15 that Seliverstov’s claimed dismissal may have been a part of an ongoing purge of insubordinate commanders.[23] An unnamed source told a Russian Telegram channel (reportedly affiliated with the Russian security forces) that Dyumin bypassed the Russian MoD to reinstate Seliverstov via Vaino and the Russian Presidential Administration.[24] The source added that Dyumin’s decision to bypass the military chain of command has already sparked conflicts between the Russian Presidential Administration and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, and that Dyumin is attempting to displace Shoigu from his position. Dyumin reportedly attempted to intervene in Seliverstov’s firing during his visit to Moscow on July 14 but was unsuccessful in reversing the dismissal at that time.


While ISW cannot independently confirm these reports, if true, Dyumin likely advocated for Seliverstov in opposition to Shoigu or Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov or may have simply supported Seliverstov because the 106th VDV Division is headquartered in Tula Oblast. Vaino holds one of the most influential positions within Russian President Vladimir Putin’s circle and has reportedly served as an intermediatory between Putin and figures such as Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.[26] Dyumin’s successful meeting with Vaino, if true, indicates that select members of the Russian Presidential Administration are able to overrule and undermine decisions made by the MoD. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s chronic disregard for the Russian chain of command is likely hindering Shoigu and Gerasimov in their attempts to suppress insubordination and establish full control over the Russian military in Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of aerial and naval drone strikes against Russian logistics and port infrastructure in occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai (a key Russian naval base) on the night of August 3 to 4.
Russian milbloggers characteristically lambasted the Russian MoD for lying about the naval drone strikes and called on the Russian military to escalate activities in the Black Sea.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 4.
The Kremlin continues to express its unwillingness to return to the Black Sea Grain Initiative in the absence of extensive concessions from the West.
Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin reportedly facilitated the reinstatement of the commander of the Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division, Major General Vladimir Seliverstov, after meeting Putin’s Chief of Staff Anton Vaino on July 21.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 4.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 4 and made advances in certain areas.
A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that China’s “temporary” export restrictions on drones may severely impact the ability of Russian volunteers to supply drones to Russian servicemen fighting in Ukraine.
Russian authorities are continuing to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of summer camps.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/05/23 03:35 AM

CSIS
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Ukraine’s Offensive Operations: Shifting the Offense-Defense Balance




The Issue
Russian fortifications in Ukraine are the most extensive defensive works in Europe since World War II, according to new CSIS analysis. The Russian military has constructed trenches, minefields, dragon’s teeth, and other barriers to slow Ukrainian forces during offensive operations. But as a review of previous wars shows, fortifications and other measures do not guarantee that the defender has the advantage. The Ukrainian military could effectively use a combination of strategy, technology, geography, and other factors to retake territory illegally seized by Russia.


Introduction

Russia has constructed formidable defensive fortifications in eastern and southern Ukraine. These defenses consist of an extensive network of trenches, antipersonnel and anti-vehicle mines, razor wire, earthen berms, and dragon’s teeth—truncated pyramids made of reinforced concrete used to impede the mobility of main battle tanks and mechanized infantry. As one UK defense intelligence report concluded, “Russia has constructed some of the most extensive systems of military defensive works seen anywhere in the world for many decades. These defences are not just near the current front lines but have also been dug deep inside areas Russia currently controls.”[1]

Russia’s goals in building these defenses are to solidify its territorial gains in Ukraine and to prevent Ukrainian forces from liberating additional territory. Despite Russian efforts, however, it is unclear whether the defender has the advantage in Ukraine (as the Russians hope) or the Ukrainians can shift the advantage to the offense.





Ukraine’s Offensive Operations: Shifting the Offense-Defense Balance
Figure 7: Multilayered Defenses North of Mykhailivka, Ukraine
Photo: Copyright © 2023 by Planet


Table of Contents
Introduction
The Offense-Defense Balance
How Are Russia’s Defenses Organized?
What Obstacles Could a Ukrainian Offensive Face?
Lessons for Ukraine: Shifting the Advantage to the Offense
Next Steps

Brief by Seth G. Jones , Alexander Palmer , and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Published June 9, 2023

Available Downloads
Download the Brief
8775kb
The Issue
Russian fortifications in Ukraine are the most extensive defensive works in Europe since World War II, according to new CSIS analysis. The Russian military has constructed trenches, minefields, dragon’s teeth, and other barriers to slow Ukrainian forces during offensive operations. But as a review of previous wars shows, fortifications and other measures do not guarantee that the defender has the advantage. The Ukrainian military could effectively use a combination of strategy, technology, geography, and other factors to retake territory illegally seized by Russia.



Introduction
Russia has constructed formidable defensive fortifications in eastern and southern Ukraine. These defenses consist of an extensive network of trenches, antipersonnel and anti-vehicle mines, razor wire, earthen berms, and dragon’s teeth—truncated pyramids made of reinforced concrete used to impede the mobility of main battle tanks and mechanized infantry. As one UK defense intelligence report concluded, “Russia has constructed some of the most extensive systems of military defensive works seen anywhere in the world for many decades. These defences are not just near the current front lines but have also been dug deep inside areas Russia currently controls.”[1]

Russia’s goals in building these defenses are to solidify its territorial gains in Ukraine and to prevent Ukrainian forces from liberating additional territory. Despite Russian efforts, however, it is unclear whether the defender has the advantage in Ukraine (as the Russians hope) or the Ukrainians can shift the advantage to the offense.

To assess the impact of Russia’s fortifications, this analysis asks several questions. How is the Russian military attempting to strengthen its defenses in Ukraine? How are these efforts likely to impact the offense-defense balance? What are Ukrainian options to shift the advantage to the offense? To answer these questions, this analysis utilizes several sources of information. It analyzes open-source data on Russian fortifications and assesses satellite imagery of Russian fortifications in eastern and southern Ukraine. It is also informed by extensive interviews with senior Ukrainian, U.S., and European military officials in Eastern Europe in May 2023. Finally, this analysis leverages an extensive literature on the offense-defense balance, including lessons from previous wars.

The rest of this assessment is divided into four sections. The first provides an overview of the offense-defense balance. The second section examines Russian defensive efforts in eastern and southern Ukraine based on CSIS analysis of open-source data and satellite imagery. The third explores the obstacles a Ukrainian offensive could face. The fourth section examines implications for Ukraine and its Western supporters.

Chapter One-published tomorrow
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy, An Oral History - 08/05/23 09:10 PM

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy, An Oral History explores the origins of United States strategic nuclear policy and how it evolved. The documentary looks at this topic through the oral history of key participants including Robert McNamara, Edward Teller, James Schlesinger, Andrew Goodpaster, Harold Brown, Richard Garwin and William Kaufmann.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qz0Dg5gIjhw
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/06/23 03:08 AM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/06/23 10:19 PM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 5, 2023
Aug 5, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 5, 2023, 6:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00 pm ET on August 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil tanker on August 4 with a naval drone in the second attack on Russian ships in the Black Sea in two consecutive days.
The Moscow Times identified the tanker as the chemical tanker SIG, which is currently under US sanctions for supplying jet fuel to Russian forces in Syria.[1] Sources within the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) confirmed to the Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the SBU and the Ukrainian Navy struck the ship near the Kerch Strait Bridge using a naval drone.[2] The Russian Federal Agency for Sea and Inland Water Transport (Rosmorrechflot) reported that the strike on the SIG occurred 27 kilometers south of the Kerch Strait Bridge, and Russian milbloggers claimed that the attack caused Russian authorities to suspend traffic on the bridge.[3] Russian news aggregator Baza reported that the naval drone punched a two-by-one meter hole in the SIG’s engine room, and state Russian outlets claimed that the incident did not result in an oil spill.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Ukrainian naval drone intentionally targeted the SIG’s engine room because targeting the stern creates the least likelihood of an oil spill and is where the most expensive and difficult-to-repair equipment is located.[5] The nature and location on the ship of the attack suggest that Ukrainian forces intended to disable the ship without generating significant ecological consequences. Ukrainian forces have long targeted the Kerch Strait Bridge in order to degrade Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine, and the attack on the SIG is likely part of a wider effort to disable ships involved in supplying Russian military forces and the location of the attack near the bridge suggests that it was part of a larger effort to disrupt Russian logistics along a key Russian ground line of communication (GLOC).

Ukrainian officials issued a notice to mariners that Ukraine may strike vessels near Russia’s Black Sea ports – a measured response to continued Russian strikes against Odesa – Ukraine's main port – since July 17. The Ukrainian State Hydrographic Service at the State Service of Maritime and River Transport posted a notice to mariners on August 4 announcing a “military threat” in the vicinity of the internal and external roadsteads at the ports of Taman, Anapa, Novorossiysk, Gelendzhik, Tuapse, and Sochi, until further notice.[8] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense also cryptically tweeted ”Two can play that game,” without further context on August 5 - likely a reference to the Russian military’s continued strikes against Odesa’s port infrastructure since July 17.[9] This Ukrainian warning may deter merchant activity and international commercial shipping to and from Russia in the Black Sea.

Ukrainian naval strikes are likely part of a deliberate interdiction campaign aimed at setting favorable conditions for larger counteroffensive operations. A Ukrainian naval drone struck the Russian Olenegorsky Gornyak Ropucha-class landing ship on the night of August 3 to 4.[10] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov stated on August 5 that the damage to the Olenegorsky Gornyak is very significant and suggested that the ship will not be operational for some time.[11] The UK Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that images of the ship show it listing at 30 to 40 degrees, which suggests either that several watertight compartments were breached by the drone strike or that the crew’s efforts to control the damage were ineffective.[12] UK MoD reported that the Olenegorsky Gornyak is typically assigned to Russia’s Northern Fleet but has lately been ferrying military and civilian traffic between Russia and occupied Crimea following traffic disruptions to the Kerch Strait Bridge caused by previous Ukrainian strikes.[13] Previous Ukrainian interdiction efforts have mainly focused on Russian military targets on land, but it seems that Ukrainian forces are now expanding their efforts to include naval targets as part of these efforts. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly stated their commitment to a deliberate interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in order to degrade Russian logistics and defensive capabilities to set favorable conditions for future Ukrainian counteroffensive activity. Ukrainian forces are thus continuing to set conditions for future decisive operations via an interdiction campaign as they did before and during counteroffensive operations in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts in 2022, now striking much deeper into Russian rear areas and incorporating maritime targets.

Ukrainian forces continue to draw Russian forces to the Bakhmut area and fix them there despite a slower tempo of Ukrainian operations there. Ukrainian offensive operations on Bakhmut’s southern and northern flanks have slowed in recent days, and Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report any Ukrainian ground attacks in the area on August 5.[15] The rate of Ukrainian advances in the Bakhmut area has also slowed in recent weeks. Ukrainian operations around Bakhmut have drawn additional Russian units and formations to the Bakhmut area and have kept Russian forces in the area, which was likely one of their primary objectives. Russian forces have deployed elite formations and units to support defensive operations around Bakhmut, including elements of the 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division, the 11th VDV Brigade, the 106th VDV Division, and the 364th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate).[16] ISW has also observed speculation that elements of the 31st VDV Brigade are now defending Bakhmut’s southern flank and inconclusive footage suggesting that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Guards Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) recently arrived in the Bakhmut direction.[17] The arrival of these units and formations in the Bakhmut area represents the commitment of a sizable amount of combat power that Russian forces could otherwise have used to support offensive operations in Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts or to reinforce Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine.

Ukrainian counteroffensive operations also appear to be successfully fixing Russian forces in this area, as ISW has yet to observe elements of these forces deploying to other parts of Ukraine. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on August 4 that Russian forces are continuing to commit a large number of forces in the Bakhmut direction in hopes of recapturing recently lost dominant heights north of Bakhmut City.

Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in southern Ukraine on August 5, part of a continuing pattern of limited Ukrainian ground attacks accompanying Ukrainian efforts to interdict Russian logistics and headquarters in rear areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia) directions. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in both areas and are advancing near Orikhiv.[19] Russian sources have routinely characterized Ukrainian attacks in southern Ukraine as up to a company in size with minimal armored vehicle or tank support.[20] These small Ukrainian ground attacks indicate that Ukrainian forces are continuing to conserve uncommitted reserves for larger mechanized attacks. Limited Ukrainian ground attacks can set conditions for larger mechanized attacks when the Ukrainian deep interdiction campaign has generated effects on the battlefield and can also support Ukrainian efforts to achieve an asymmetrical attrition gradient. Larger Ukrainian mechanized offensive operations have been sporadic since the start of the counteroffensive in early June, and ISW did not observe visual evidence or other observable signatures indicating a large assault near Orikhiv that Russian sources claimed occurred on July 26.[21] Russian sources may have exaggerated the Ukrainian attack in order to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive operations as a failure. The New York Times reported that two anonymous Pentagon officials said on July 26 the ”main thrust” of the counteroffensive had begun, although it was not clear if those officials were referring to the July 26 attack, and other unnamed US officials subsequently walked those comments back.[22] Ukrainian forces are clearly not committing to large, massed mechanized counteroffensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction as their interdiction campaign proceeds, although they continue to conduct a series of variously-sized but relatively small attacks across the front line that are having the effects of fixing Russian forces in place, tiring them, and attriting them, as ISW has previously observed.

Senior officials from reportedly 40 countries, including the US, China, and India, began talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5 aimed at drafting a set of key principles to guide the future settlement of the war in Ukraine. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated on August 3 that the White House does not expect any “tangible deliverables” from the talks in Saudi Arabia and that the talks are a continuation of the process to promote a peace formula proposed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil tanker on August 4 with a naval drone in the second attack on Russian ships in the Black Sea in two consecutive days.
Ukrainian officials issued a notice to mariners that Ukraine may strike vessels near Russia’s Black Sea ports – a measured response to continued Russian strikes against Odesa – Ukraine's main port – since July 17.
Ukrainian naval strikes are likely part of a deliberate interdiction campaign aimed at setting favorable conditions for larger counteroffensive operations.
Ukrainian forces continue to draw Russian forces to the Bakhmut area and fix them there despite a slower tempo of Ukrainian operations there.
Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in southern Ukraine on August 5, part of a continuing pattern of limited Ukrainian ground attacks accompanying Ukrainian efforts to interdict Russian logistics and headquarters in rear areas.
Senior officials from reportedly 40 countries, including the US, China, and India, began talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5 aimed at drafting a set of key principles to guide the future settlement of the war in Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced along the Svatove-Kreminna line and the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced along the Svatove-Kremmina line.
Pardoned Wagner Group convict fighters continue to increase recidivism rates in Russia.
Russian officials continue to transport Ukrainian children from occupied regions to Russia under the guise of summer vacations.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/06/23 10:36 PM

Ukraine’s Offensive Operations: Shifting the Offense-Defense Balance
Figure 7: Multilayered Defenses North of Mykhailivka, Ukraine
Photo: Copyright © 2023 by Planet


Table of Contents
Introduction
The Offense-Defense Balance
How Are Russia’s Defenses Organized?
What Obstacles Could a Ukrainian Offensive Face?
Lessons for Ukraine: Shifting the Advantage to the Offense
Next Steps:


Chapter One-
The Offense-Defense Balance

The Offense-Defense Balance
The offense-defense balance is the relative strength between the offense and the defense in warfare. The core idea behind the offense-defense balance is that there are several factors, such as technology and geography, that can influence the relative benefits and costs of attacking versus defending.[2] These factors impact whether the offense or defense has the advantage.[3] As political scientist Robert Jervis wrote in one of the most influential works on the topic: “When we say that the offense has the advantage, we simply mean that it is easier to destroy the other’s army and take its territory than it is to defend one’s own. When the defense has the advantage, it is easier to protect and to hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and take.”[4] The offense has the advantage if the expected benefits of attacking outweigh its costs by more than the expected benefits of defending outweigh its costs.

Several factors relevant to the current war in Ukraine impact the offense-defense balance. The first is technology. Innovations that can help a military to conduct maneuver warfare and swiftly advance into enemy-controlled territory may favor the offense. For example, advances in military mobility—such as tanks, fighter aircraft, chariots, horse cavalry, or even earlier critical components (such as the stirrup)—have sometimes favored the offense.[5] These technologies—and how militaries employ them—have increased the possibility that forces can punch through opponents’ lines and exploit their breakthroughs.

Conversely, advances that decrease mobility—such as moats, land mines, trenches, and barbed wire—have sometimes favored the defense. Firepower such as machine guns, fast-firing rifles, infantry anti-tank weapons, and air defense systems have also favored the defense.[6] The high lethality of these weapons increases the need for cover and concealment, allowing the defender to fight from prepared positions while the attacker must advance over relatively open ground.

A second factor that impacts the offense-defense balance is geography. Terrain that includes flat plains, open fields, and deserts can favor the offense because these features offer good visibility, ample room for maneuver, and fewer natural obstacles. Open terrain generally allows for easier mobility, flanking maneuvers, and the potential to rapidly concentrate forces at critical points.

Terrain that slows movement or makes it difficult to provide logistics—such as thick forests, dense jungles, swamps, mountainous terrain with few passes, and rivers and other bodies of water with few or no bridges—often strengthens the defense. Such geographic barriers can force attacks into the few roads, bridges, or passes that are available, thus reducing the defender’s intelligence difficulties as well as shortening the length of the front requiring defense. During the Cold War, for instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s plans for defending West Germany focused on the North German plain and the Fulda Gap, a pair of lowland corridors near the border between East and West Germany, because these were two places where major mechanized offensives against West Germany seemed feasible.

Distance also often favors the defense. If the attacker must travel a considerable distance just to reach the defender’s territory, the amount of force it can project is reduced by the costs of transporting and supplying the projected force, as well as the costs of defending long lines of communication.[8] In addition, the offense-defense balance depends, in part, on how much territory the attacker is trying to take. More ambitious offensive missions, including those designed to take more territory, tend to be more difficult than less ambitious ones.

Weather can further impact the offense-defense balance.[10] In cold weather climates, frozen ground can support the offensive movement of mechanized forces in winter. As the Soviet army discovered during its invasion of Finland in November 1939, however, winter fighting can also mean operating in conditions of biting cold and deep snow. In the spring in some parts of the world, including Ukraine, mechanized forces have to deal with the Rasputitsa, or thaw, during which the ground turns to mud and the advantage may shift to the defense. During the summer in Ukraine, however, the steppes dry out and allow for better movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles.

There are other factors that can impact the offense-defense balance, such as clever strategies, force employment, leadership, and combat motivation.[11] Today, the challenge for the Ukrainian military and its Western supporters is to leverage technology, geography, strategy, force employment, leadership, combat motivation, and other factors to increase the relative benefits and reduce the costs of offensive operations. Conversely, the task for Russia is to build strong enough defenses (such as trenches and berms), layer these defenses with sufficient weapons systems (such as surface-to-air missiles and artillery), and utilize favorable terrain to blunt successful Ukrainian counterattacks.
Chapter Two to be published tomorrow: How Are Russia’s Defenses Organized?

https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-offensive-operations-shifting-offense-defense-balance




Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/07/23 03:35 AM

Drive a Lada, Putin tells Russian business chiefs
Russian leader tells top officials they should all switch to using domestic cars.
BY CLAUDIA CHIAPPA
AUGUST 3, 2023 4:43 PM CET
1 MINUTE READ
Foreign cars are out; Russian motors are in.

That was the message from Russian President Vladimir Putin to officials Thursday during a meeting with the heads of manufacturing businesses, reported state-run news agency TASS.

"Ministries, agencies, and the administration of affairs have asked to continue [purchases], to emphasize, in fact, foreign-made cars, to continue this practise," Putin said. "I said that this should be absolutely excluded and all officials of the country should drive domestic cars."

Russia’s car market has suffered in recent years, hurt under the weight of sanctions and international companies pulling out of the market. Carmakers such as Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz and Nissan have all suspended work in Russia because of the Kremlin's war on Ukraine, leaving more space in the market for Russian brands.

Moving to driving domestic cars will be “more modest than before,” Putin admitted, but he said that it’s a good thing.

“All of our officials are wonderful, but they should realize that we should strive to develop domestic brands of cars and other domestic products,” Putin said.

Lada is Russia's most iconic car brand — though Putin himself has been spotted in the more luxurious Russian brand, Aurus.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/08/23 05:02 AM

The Crimean Peninsula is both a playground and a battleground, coveted by Ukraine and Russia

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-crimea-peninsula-dff3484da824e11afc92c83ecf19f71b

Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Russia to launch new lunar mission - 08/08/23 10:00 AM

Moscow (AFP) – Russia said Monday it plans to launch a lunar lander this week after multiple delays, hoping to return to the Moon for the first time in nearly fifty years.

https://www.france24.com/en/live-ne...-mission-friday-first-in-nearly-50-years

"The Luna-25 will have to practise soft landing, take and analyse soil samples and conduct long-term scientific research," Roscosmos said in a statement.

The four-legged lander, which weighs around 800 kilograms (1,750 pounds), is expected to touch down in the region of the lunar south pole. By contrast, most previous Moon landings have occurred near the lunar equator.

The spacecraft is expected to reach the Moon around five days after launch.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/08/23 11:36 PM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 7, 2023
Aug 7, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 7, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark

August 7, 2023, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 7[
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that fighting is ongoing south of Bakhmut and that eastern Ukraine has been the epicenter of hostilities in the past week.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged in an interview published on August 6 with Argentine news outlet La Nacion that the tempo of counteroffensive operations is slower than expected and stated that patience is necessary in order for Ukraine to win.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces are in the offensive phase of operations and continue to hold the initiative.

Russian forces and occupation administrators continue to seek to mitigate the impact of recent Ukrainian strikes on logistics nodes along key Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea with occupied Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk noted that Ukrainian strikes on the Chonhar and Henichesk bridges were intended to specifically target Russian plans and strategies and inhibit the ability of Russian forces to bring supplies and personnel to the front.[5] Humenyuk also emphasized that Russian forces must now route supplies and personnel through Armyansk, directly on the border between Kherson Oblast and Crimea and within 80km of the frontline.[6] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo reported that his administration has temporarily changed the logistics and vehicle crossing routes between occupied Kherson and Crimea due to damage to the Chonhar Bridge, including the suspension of bus traffic between Simferopol, Crimea and Henichesk, Kherson Oblast.[7] Russian milbloggers notably did not comment on the aftermath of the strikes on August 7, further supporting ISW’s previous assessment that Russian officials may have directed Russian correspondents to not offer commentary on Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics nodes in Crimea to avoid generating panic within the information space.

Russian opposition media outlet Verstka suggested that the Russian Investigative Committee and its head, Alexander Bastrykin, are directly involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and the forced placement of Ukrainian children into Russian military training programs.[9] Verstka reported that the Russian Investigative Committee “took patronage” over Ukrainian children living in children‘s homes throughout Russia, and sent its employees to 10 such homes with toys, clothes, and school supplies in order to coerce the children to enter the Russian cadet corps. Verstka reported that Bastrykin personally visited Ukrainian children in Russia and told them that Russian victory depend on the children and that the Russian Investigative Committee is there to support them. Verstka reported that the Investigative Committee previously advertised the cadet corps to Ukrainian children from Donbas and stated that 78 Ukrainian children entered educational institutions, including the cadet corps and academies affiliated with the Investigative Committee, between February 2022 and March 2023. Verstka reported that Bastrykin ordered the cadet corps in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Volgograd to prepare to receive Ukrainian children from occupied Donbas as early as February 25, 2022. Verstka highlighted statements from Ukrainian children who said they felt compelled to participate in the Russian cadet corps due to the educational opportunity. The coercion of Ukrainian children, who are legally unable to consent to their deportations and participation in such military-patriotic re-education programs, is likely part of an ongoing Russian campaign to eradicate the Ukrainian national identity and militarize youth who have been forcibly deported to Russia.

China's increasing misalignment with Russia on any settlement to end the war in Ukraine was reportedly evident at the talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5-6. The Financial Times reported that the Chinese representatives at the meeting were “constructive” and “keen to show that [China] is not Russia.”[10] The Financial Times quoted one European diplomat present at the talks as saying that the “mere presence of China shows Russia is more and more isolated.”[11] The Chinese delegation reportedly indicated its willingness to attend the next meeting of a similar format that will likely also exclude Russia.[12] A Russian insider source alleged that Russia has rejected China's 12-point peace plan for the war in Ukraine from February 2023 (which the Chinese delegation re-introduced during the talks in Saudi Arabia) and that some Chinese elites are secretly expressing their dissatisfaction with the actions of the Russian leadership regarding a peaceful settlement of the war in Ukraine.[13] These reports from the talks in Saudi Arabia and insider allegations, if true, align with ISW’s previous assessments that China is not fully aligned with Russia on the issue of Ukraine and that Russia and China’s relationship is not a “no limits partnership” as the Kremlin desires.

The Ukrainian delegation at the talks in Saudi Arabia presented a 10-point peace plan that reportedly included calls for global food security, nuclear safety, environmental security, humanitarian aid, and prisoner releases. Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff reported that all of the members of BRICS besides Russia – Brazil, India, China, and South Africa – attended the talks.[16] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova predictably responded to the Ukrainian peace plan, calling it a “meaningless ultimatum, which is aimed at protracting hostilities.”[17] Zakharova thereby repeated a longstanding Russian information operation that absurdly claims that Russia, unlike Ukraine, “has always been and will remain open to a diplomatic solution” to the war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted a prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on August 7. Ukrainian officials reported that 22 Ukrainian soldiers returned to Ukraine and did not state how many Russian POWs returned to Russia.[19] Official Russian sources have not reported on the POW exchange and Russian milbloggers have notably not commented on it either. Russian milbloggers have often criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) when POW exchanges are not carried out on a one-to-one ratio between Ukrainian and Russian personnel.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 7.
Russian forces and occupation administrators continue to seek to mitigate the impact of recent Ukrainian strikes on logistics nodes along key Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea with occupied Kherson Oblast.
Russian opposition media outlet Verstka suggested that the Russian Investigative Committee and its head, Alexander Bastrykin, are directly involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and the forced placement of Ukrainian children into Russian military training programs.
China's increasing misalignment with Russia on any settlement to end the war in Ukraine was reportedly evident at the talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5-6.
The Ukrainian delegation at the talks in Saudi Arabia presented a 10-point peace plan that reportedly included calls for global food security, nuclear safety, environmental security, humanitarian aid, and prisoner releases.
Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted a prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on August 7.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7 and made advances in certain areas.
The Kremlin continues efforts to portray itself as adequately mobilizing the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war effort.

Russian occupation authorities continue to use maternity capital benefits to coerce Ukrainian civilians in occupied territories to accept Russian citizenship and increase social control in occupied areas.[/b]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2023
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/08/23 11:53 PM

Just wait until the US gives Ukraine ICBMs ! ! ! cool

Ukraine's foreign minister asks U.S. for long-range missiles

https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...s-atacms-long-range-missiles-2023-08-07/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/09/23 01:07 AM

Affected people and statistics
By Reuters · Updated: 1 day ago

Deaths
At least 62,295 people

Non-fatal injuries
At least 61,000 people

Missing
At least 15,000 people

Expelled
About 17 million people

Destroyed buildings
At least 140,000

Material damage
About US$411 billion.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/10/23 01:19 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 9, 2023
Aug 9, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 9, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 9, 2023, 6:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Speculations about the Wagner Group’s withdrawal from Belarus suggest that aspects of the deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24 have collapsed
. A Russian insider source claimed on August 8 that Wagner forces are conducting their first stage of withdrawal from Belarus by bussing groups of 500 to 600 personnel from Belarus to Krasnodar Krai and Voronezh and Rostov oblasts and that the second stage will begin after August 13.[1] The insider source and a Wagner-affiliated source speculated that Wagner forces may be leaving Belarus because Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko refused to finance Wagner when he discovered that Russia would not be paying for Wagner as he had evidently expected.[2] Putin and Lukashenko allowed Wagner forces and Prigozhin to continue to operate in Belarus after the armed rebellion.[3] The insider source claimed that a small group of Wagner instructors would remain in Belarus to train Belarusian forces.[4] ISW has not observed visual evidence of Wagner forces moving out of Belarus, however. The insider source claimed on August 6 that Wagner forces that did not deploy to Libya “urgently” went on leave in Russia, and that Wagner's command called on their fighters to keep in touch because new orders could come at any time.[5] Wagner-affiliated sources claimed that the main Wagner forces will “activate” at the end of August but did not elaborate on the statement.[6] Claims that Wagner forces are moving out of Belarus — a relatively safe haven for Wagner and Prigozhin — back to Russia, Wagner command’s mentions of new orders, and claims of the future “activation” of Wagner forces at the end of August likely suggest that aspects of the deal that allowed Wagner to move to Belarus and continue operations there and in Africa have collapsed.

The validity of these claims and the future of the Wagner Group remain unclear at the time of publication. ISW offers the following assessments and hypotheses for the potential implications of these claims, if true, on the Russian power composition, Putin’s regime, and the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) efforts to integrate Wagner personnel into conventional Russian formations. ISW will continue to monitor and report on indicators and counter-indicators that support, undermine, or inform these hypotheses and assessments.

Putin is likely still concerned about the threat that Prigozhin poses to his long-term goals and continues to focus on definitively separating Prigozhin from Wagner. Putin has previously attempted to present Prigozhin as corrupt and a liar to destroy his reputation among Wagner personnel and within Russian society and to rhetorically separate Prigozhin from Wagner.[7] ISW assessed on June 27 that the Kremlin would likely continue to attack Prigozhin’s character to break Prigozhin’s popular support, discourage Wagner personnel from following him to Belarus, and destroy his financial power.[8] Putin’s June 29 meeting with Prigozhin and 35 Wagner commanders further indicated that Putin intends to maintain the Wagner Group as a cohesive fighting force rather than breaking it up while also seeking to separate Prigozhin from Wagner leadership and forces.[9] Prigozhin’s presence at a Wagner base near Asipovichy, Belarus, on July 18 and on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg on July 27 suggests that Prigozhin has maintained his position as the effective leader of the Wagner Group and that Putin has thus far failed to separate Prigozhin from Wagner.[10] A Russian insider source claimed on August 9 that the Kremlin’s rhetorical attacks against Prigozhin decreased dramatically after Putin’s meeting with Wagner leadership on June 29, but began to increase again in early August.[11] An increase in Kremlin attacks on Prigozhin, if true, could indicate that Putin has recommitted to his original goal of destroying Prigozhin and creating a clear separation between Prigozhin and Wagner.

Putin’s prioritization of separating Prigozhin from Wagner and attempting to maintain a reconstituted Wagner fighting element appears to be at odds with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s objectives. A Russian insider source claimed that Shoigu has taken over Russia’s relationships with African countries from Prigozhin, angering the Wagner leadership and personnel and depriving Wagner of opportunities in Africa.[12] If true, Shoigu’s ambitions in Africa are likely to create issues for Putin’s greater goals with Wagner by angering the very people Putin is trying to woo. Putin’s and Shoigu’s priorities have become periodically misaligned throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, often when Putin prioritizes balancing competing groups and interests while Shoigu attempts to establish full control over the Russian military in Ukraine.

Alternatively, Putin may intend for Wagner's forces to return to Russia in order to facilitate the destruction or restructuring of Wagner. Putin appealed to Wagner commanders in a speech on July 26 seeking to persuade them to continue to fight in Ukraine by joining the Russian military.[14] Putin’s appeal may have suggested that the Kremlin intended to organize Wagner forces into the Russian MoD. This appeal appears not to have been successful as many Wagner personnel deployed to Belarus and individual Wagner commanders and personnel continued to express loyalty to Wagner and Prigozhin.[15] The Kremlin has also reportedly attempted to control Wagner’s operations in the Middle East and subordinate Wagner's operations there to the Russian MoD following the rebellion on June 24.[16] Wagner commanders released a statement on August 9 claiming that Wagner fighters have been receiving calls advertising opportunities to work with other private military companies (PMCs) in Africa.[17] The calls may suggest that the Russian government seeks to lure Wagner personnel away from Wagner with new work opportunities. Putin may intend for Wagner's forces to return to Russia so that he can more easily facilitate Wagner’s subordination to the Russian MoD or disband the organization entirely.

There are other possible outcomes that would see Wagner reconstitute as a unitary fighting force reminiscent of its operations in Ukraine, although ISW has observed no indicators for these outcomes, which appear unlikely based on available information. The Kremlin’s likeliest courses of action vis-à-vis Wagner will likely lead to an overall decrease in the combat power that Wagner could offer the Russian military, as either approach will likely dissuade some elements of Wagner from continuing to serve, whether in a Wagner without Prigozhin or in some type of entity completely subordinated to the MoD.

The likely collapse of aspects of the Wagner-Putin-Lukashenko deal indicates that Putin has failed to decisively resolve issues posed by Prigozhin and Wagner following Wagner’s June 24 rebellion. Putin is unlikely to resolve the Wagner problem as long as tensions remain between Putin’s own aim of separating Prigozhin from Wagner and Shoigu’s aims to secure full MoD control over Wagner and the other armed forces fighting for Russia. Speculations about Shoigu taking over Russian military operations in Africa from Wagner, if true, will likely only exacerbate tensions between the MoD and Wagner personnel returning from Belarus or Africa to Russia rather than persuading the Wagner personnel to join conventional Russian military formations in accord with the prior deal.[18] Pro-Wagner sources have historically coalesced around Prigozhin because of anger at the MoD and likely retain the ability to rally the support of Wagner rank-and-file and supporters regardless of Prigozhin‘s actual participation in current rhetoric.[19] Angering Wagner personnel further while bringing them back to Russia poses challenges if Putin seeks to eliminate the Wagner threat. Putin’s decision to allow Shoigu to undermine this aspect of the prior deal, if true, then threatens to undermine the careful façade of internal security that Putin has extensively attempted to project following the June 24 rebellion.[20] This situation is evolving dynamically in an increasingly complicated information environment marked by the absence of direct commentary from Prigozhin or other Wagner leaders. ISW will continue to evaluate these and other hypotheses and assessments as more information becomes available.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attempted to justify the recreation of the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts by reamplifying boilerplate rhetoric posturing NATO as an existential threat to Russia. Shoigu opened a meeting of the Russian MoD Collegium on August 9, focusing on issues related to the creation of the two military districts but primarily commented on Western support for Ukraine and NATO’s expansion.[21] Shoigu stated that the NATO countries’ attempts to help Ukraine win are creating serious risks for further escalation and that Finland’s accession and Sweden’s planned accession to NATO are “a serious destabilizing factor.”[22] Shoigu stated that it is likely that NATO will deploy military contingents and strike weapons on Finnish territory that can strike critical targets in Russia, and Shoigu accused NATO of intentionally militarizing Poland as part of America’s alleged anti-Russia policy.[23] Shoigu stated that Eastern European militaries have a combined manpower of 360,000 personnel with 8,000 armored vehicles, 6,000 artillery systems, and 650 aviation units deployed to the immediate vicinity of the borders of the Union State.[24] Shoigu suggested that the Russian MoD is strengthening the Russian grouping of forces along Russia’s western borders to respond to these alleged threats.[25] Shoigu announced on January 17, 2023, that the MoD will reestablish the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts as part of long-term goals to significantly increase the size of the Russian military.[26] Shoigu is likely framing the recreation of these military districts as a necessary response to alleged Western aggression towards Russia in order to justify the cost of resources, time, and institutional capacity required for their recreation.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on August 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut, Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area), and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[27] Geolocated footage published on August 9 suggests that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but the duration and extent of these advances are currently unclear.[28] Ukrainian Tavriisk Operational and Strategic Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhii Kuzmin stated on August 8 that Ukrainian forces reached the Russian first line of defense in an unspecified area in the Melitopol or Berdyansk directions.[29] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on August 9 that Ukrainian forces were partially successful south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Pryyutne and southeast of Orikhiv near Verbove.[30] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced into Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and suggested that Ukrainian forces may have captured some Russian positions south of Bakhmut.[31] Malyar stated that the Ukrainian forces are conducting the counteroffensive as expected and are successfully degrading Russian offensive potential as Ukrainian forces did during the summer-autumn 2022 interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast.

The Russian veteran community may be attempting to rehabilitate the nominal Russian deputy theater commander in Ukraine, Army General Sergei Surovikin, following scrutiny over his affiliation with the Wagner Group. Surovikin’s former commander, Colonel General Valeriy Marchenkov, told state affiliated URA.ru outlet that Surovikin did not and could not ever renege on his oath and praised Surovikin for pioneering a defensive strategy that is slowing down Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine.[33] Marchenkov claimed that Surovikin successfully reduced the frontline length and strategically redistributed Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast. Marchenkov also defended Surovikin’s decision to withdraw Russian troops from the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast in November 2022, stating that this decision allowed Russian forces to construct the current defensive lines in Kherson Oblast and prevent military and civilian deaths. Marchenkov also attributed the creation of the Russian military police to Surovikin and boasted about Surovikin’s efforts to suppress the August 1991 coup in Moscow. Russian veterans communities were instrumental in rehabilitating and promoting Surovikin’s claimed affiliate, Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, in March-April 2023.[34] Russian VDV veterans appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin on behalf of Teplinsky, after which Teplinsky returned to the frontlines ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[35] Former Commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army Major General Ivan Popov has also rallied veteran and army groups, sparking a discussion around his removal from command in mid-July.

Marchenkov’s interview may suggest that Surovikin and the anti-Gerasimov faction believe there is a chance for Surovikin to return to the frontlines. Marchenkov’s public defense of Surovikin is in line with previous veteran efforts to secure the reinstatement of commanders who oppose Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov. Marchenkov notably did not publicly disclose Surovikin’s whereabouts. One Russian insider source claimed that the Kremlin’s agreements with Wagner began to “sag,” a claim that accords with ISW’s assessments as noted above, which the source claimed can explain the lack of a new appointment for Surovikin.[37] ISW assessed on April 30 that Putin fails to decisively dismiss commanders and instead demotes them in order to encourage them to seek to regain his favor and to retain options for future appointments.[38] Surovikin’s return to command will likely depend on his ability to convince Putin of his loyalty and usefulness on the battlefield – both narratives presented in Marchenkov’s interview.

Russian sources claimed that poor safety regulations led to an explosion near the Zagorsk Optical Mechanical Plant in Moscow on August 9, and notably, most Russian sources did not suggest that Ukrainian actors may have been responsible for the incident.[39] The explosion caused widespread damage to the plant and surrounding areas, injured at least 60 people, and killed at least one person.[40] The explosion reportedly occurred at a facility at the plant leased by Russian pyrotechnics company PiroRoss, and the Russian authorities have reportedly opened a criminal case against PiroRoss for the violation of industrial safety requirements.[41] Russian sources also claimed that Russian authorities have detained PiroRoss Director Sergei Chanakev in connection with the explosion.[42] Shvabe Holding Company, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, owns the Zagorsk Optical Mechanical Plant, and the plant produces pyrotechnics and precision optical equipment for the military.[43] Russian media outlet Agentstvo reported that the Zagorsk Optical Mechanical Plant has also been participating in the development of a next-generation strategic stealth bomber “Poslannik” since 2019.


Key Takeaways:

Speculations about the Wagner Group’s withdrawal from Belarus suggest that aspects of the deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24 have collapsed.
Putin is likely still concerned about the threat that Prigozhin poses to his long-term goals and continues to focus on definitively separating Prigozhin from Wagner.
Alternatively, Putin may intend for Wagner's forces to return to Russia in order to facilitate the destruction or restructuring of Wagner.
The likely collapse of aspects of the Wagner-Putin-Lukashenko deal indicates that Putin has failed to decisively resolve issues posed by Prigozhin and Wagner following Wagner’s June 24 rebellion.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attempted to justify the recreation of the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts by reamplifying boilerplate rhetoric posturing NATO as an existential threat to Russia.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on August 9.
The Russian veteran community may be attempting to rehabilitate the nominal Russian deputy theater commander in Ukraine, Army General Sergei Surovikin, following scrutiny over his affiliation with the Wagner Group.
Marchenkov’s interview may suggest that Surovikin and the anti-Gerasimov faction believe there is a chance for Surovikin to return to the frontlines.
Russian sources claimed that poor safety regulations led to an explosion near the Zagorsk Optical Mechanical Plant in Moscow on August 9, and notably most Russian sources did not suggest that Ukrainian actors may have been responsible for the incident.
Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced on the Svatove-Kreminna line, north of Bakhmut, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on August 9.
Footage published on August 9 further supports ISW’s assessments that the Ukrainian incursion near Kozachi Laheri in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on August 8 was likely a limited raid.
Russian forces may be moving military equipment through Kazakhstan to Russia, but ISW has observed no geolocated footage confirming these reports.
Russian officials appear to be setting conditions to justify the possible need to cancel or postpone regional elections in the occupied territories in case of Ukrainian counteroffensive successes.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/10/23 01:57 AM

CSIS
Center for Strategic and International Studies


Ukraine’s Offensive Operations: Shifting the Offense-Defense Balance
Figure 7: Multilayered Defenses North of Mykhailivka, Ukraine
Photo: Copyright © 2023 by Planet


Table of Contents
Introduction
The Offense-Defense Balance
How Are Russia’s Defenses Organized?
What Obstacles Could a Ukrainian Offensive Face?
Lessons for Ukraine: Shifting the Advantage to the Offense
Next Steps:

Chapter Two
How Are Russia’s Defenses Organized?
To shift the offense-defense balance in its favor, Russia has designed one of the largest defensive systems in Europe since World War II. It has constructed a line of fortifications roughly 2,000 kilometers long, running from Russia’s border with Belarus to the Dnipro Delta.[12] Approximately 1,000 kilometers of these defenses are located in Ukraine itself, where essentially all conventional warfare between Russia and Ukraine has taken place. Russia’s fieldworks include four semi-independent defensive systems, each of which roughly corresponds to a Ukrainian oblast.

The area that has been most extensively fortified since the 2022 invasion is Zaporizhzhia Oblast, followed by Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts, as highlighted in Figure 1.[13] Although the defensive systems in each oblast are generally built from the same components—ditches, dragon’s teeth, trenches, and artillery positions—each has unique characteristics that represent particular challenges to a Ukrainian offensive.

Overall, Russian defenses are designed to slow a Ukrainian offensive and to channel it into areas advantageous to Russian forces. The Russian fortifications visible in satellite imagery confront Ukrainian military planners with difficult trade-offs. The first dilemma is whether to commit forces against the densely defended approaches to Crimea, the urban areas that dominate Donetsk Oblast, or the more sparsely fortified but less strategically important areas in Luhansk. A Ukrainian offensive against the oblasts bordering Crimea carries further hard choices, forcing commanders to fight through layers of defensive positions more than 10 kilometers deep in Zaporizhzhia or to cross the Dnipro River, a difficult operation that carries the subsequent challenge of defending a beachhead from a counterattack. No matter what their commanders choose, Ukrainian forces will also be subject to repeated counterattacks from multiple directions seeking to isolate combat units from the support they need to sustain the offensive.

Zaporizhzhia: A System of Systems
The Zaporizhzhia defensive system consists of roughly three subsystems, as illustrated in Figure 2. The first is an approximately 150-kilometer frontline system that stretches from the town of Vasylivka on the southeastern edge of the Kakhovka Reservoir to the town of Novopetrykivka on the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk border. This system consists of multiple layers of counter-mobility barriers and infantry trenches in the frontline area supported by prepared artillery positions less than 30 kilometers to the rear, just ahead of the second subsystem of prepared defenses. This longer line also contains another set of defenses around the town of Vasylivka, making the westernmost edge of the line particularly densely fortified.

The second subsystem stretches more than 130 kilometers from the town of Orlyanske to just north of Bilmak. Its makeup differs little from the frontline system, and it could serve Russia well were it to establish a new front line following a successful Ukrainian offensive. The withdrawal of Russian forces to this second line of defenses could also serve as a prelude to Russian counterattacks against the flanks of the Ukrainian advance.

The third subsystem is a constellation of disconnected fortifications surrounding larger towns close to the front line, most of which occupy commanding positions on major railways or roads, and smaller fieldworks along important roadways. None of these fortifications would be sufficient to rapidly establish a new front line in the case of a Russian collapse, but they could slow a Ukrainian breakthrough, enable Russian counterattacks, and prevent the total collapse of the Russian front.

The distance between these subsystems varies, but the territory between them should not be seen as undefended space. Russian doctrine emphasizes both positional and mobile defenses.[14] Russia would likely seek to engage Ukrainian vehicles in these areas using a combination of indirect fire—potentially including airstrikes—and its own fighting vehicles. A Ukrainian breakthrough would likely trigger a rush of Russian armored reserves to the area, where they would seek to engage Ukrainian forces in open terrain while the second and third subsystems underwent final preparations for combat.

The cumulative effect of these systems would be to array Russia’s strongest resistance against Ukrainian efforts to break through to Melitopol or Berdiansk cities. These preparations reflect the high military and political value Russia attaches to control of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. A Russian collapse like the one seen in Kharkiv in 2022 that allowed Ukraine to approach or liberate these cities would pose a serious threat to Russia’s operations in Ukraine. A Ukrainian push through the second defensive line would allow Ukraine to hold Russia’s supply lines in the country at risk, effectively splitting its military effort between two theaters. It would also threaten to reverse the forcible creation of a land bridge to occupied Crimea. Such a breakthrough approaches a worst-case scenario for Russia and therefore incentivizes the construction of a defensive system of the depth and density seen in Zaporizhzhia.

Kherson: Behind a Wall of Water
Kherson’s defensive system is also arrayed around defending approaches to Crimea, but it is less dependent on multiple layers of fortifications because of the oblast’s terrain, which favors the defender. Russia has constructed a set of defenses along the Dnipro Delta across from the city of Kherson and at wide intervals along the Dnipro River. These spans of water are wide enough that they would require amphibious assaults, one of the most complex and demanding operations a military can attempt.

Any such assault would be contested by Russian forces in that first line of defenses, and even the most successful crossings of the river would not lead to a dramatic exploitation of Russian rear areas. The logistics involved in supporting such an exploitation across a large body of water are far more complicated than those involved in a ground offensive without such an obstacle. Russia has also constructed a large number of fieldworks to make such an advance even more difficult. Trenches stud the roads in Kherson every few kilometers, which would slow any effort to reach major logistics hubs and trigger the collapse of the Kherson front.

On June 6, 2023, a major dam and power station on the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine were destroyed, causing a significant outflow of water. The flooding prompted evacuations in areas downriver from the Kakhovka dam, including in some parts of the city of Kherson.

Donetsk: Fighting Block by Block
The Donetsk front is characterized by a combination of new and old defensive fortifications and complex urban terrain. These factors coupled with the front line’s proximity to Russia itself make a Ukrainian breakthrough in the region unlikely to result in significant exploitation.

Russian units in Donetsk may be able to benefit from defensive positions dug before the 2022 invasion, unlike their counterparts in other parts of Ukraine. The oblast was the site of combat between Ukraine and Russian proxies for almost eight years before the 2022 invasion. As visible in Figure 4, pre-2022 fortifications outnumber post-2022 fortifications approximately three-to-one.

The benefits of these fortifications to Russian fighters will likely be uneven. The quality and readiness of these fortifications are extremely difficult to assess.[16] Some have likely been in disuse so long that they will not give Russian soldiers the full benefits of a recently prepared defensive position, and some are Ukrainian defensive positions that are oriented to defend against an attack moving away from Russia rather than toward it.

The defensive system in Donetsk incorporates two layers of defenses around the town of Olhynka, where several roads meet, but otherwise appears to rely more on the three cities of Donetsk, Makiivka, and Horlivka, as illustrated in Figure 5. A Ukrainian attempt to push through either of these cities is extremely unlikely for an excellent reason: if Ukraine attempted to assault these cities directly, its offensive would become bogged down in urban combat.

Bakhmut has recently become emblematic of the difficulty of fighting in built-up areas, but any combat in these cities would be on another order of magnitude. Horlivka, the smallest of the three frontline cities, had a pre-invasion population of about 240,000 and has an area of more than 400 square kilometers. In comparison, Bakhmut had a pre-war population of about 70,000 and an area of about 40 square kilometers. Any attempt to overrun either of these cities would make the battle of Bakhmut seem like a skirmish in comparison.

Ukraine could conceivably try to bypass either of the cities, but Russia has constructed fortifications between them. Where the cities are closest together, a single line of fieldworks may be sufficient, as a successful Ukrainian breakthrough passing close to either city would find its supply lines exposed to counterattack from city-based Russian forces. In areas further afield, Russia has constructed multiple layers of defenses somewhat comparable to those in Zaporizhzhia, but much closer together—about 5 kilometers in Donetsk compared with 30 kilometers in Zaporizhzhia. This is unlikely to spell failure for Russia. The centrality of the cities and the proximity of the front line to Russia mean that Russian reserves will be able to move into position in Donetsk far more quickly than in Zaporizhzhia and that Ukrainian logistics will face a greater threat in the event of a breakthrough.

Luhansk: Forests and Front Lines
The construction of Luhansk’s defensive system is less clear from satellite imagery than those of the other three oblasts. It appears to be broken into a southern and a northern system, with the southern system arrayed primarily around the city of Severodonetsk, and the northern system consisting of a long line of defenses reaching toward the northern border with Russia, as highlighted in Figure 6. The southern system looks a great deal like the defenses around Donetsk Oblast’s three cities and includes the front line in Bakhmut and the forests around Kreminna, where heavy fighting has been ongoing for months with few territorial gains for either side.

The areas north of Kreminna look different. Russian fortifications north of the forest appear in satellite imagery as a defensive line running from Kreminna to the Russian border, split into forward and rear subsystems (as in Zaporizhzhia) in the northernmost parts of the oblast. Many of the fortifications visible in satellite imagery may actually represent a secondary system rather than an intended front line. These fortifications lie just a few kilometers behind a string of towns that hug the eastern bank of the Krasna River. The houses in these towns would provide ready-made fortifications from which the Russians could fight, while Ukraine would be slowed by the need to conduct bridging operations. As a result, Russia might place their first echelon of defenders in these towns, using the fortifications visible in satellite imagery to contain any Ukrainian units that break through beyond the towns.

North of Preobrazhenne, where the river passes to the east of the towns, Russia once again has constructed two major lines of field fortifications, although they appear less complete than other defensive lines. For example, there is an apparent gap between the towns of Pershotravneve, Mykolaivka, and Arapivka: a potential opening less than 30 kilometers by road from Kupiansk, a city in which Ukraine could conceivably mass forces. As is the case in Zaporizhzhia, areas without fieldworks are not necessarily undefended. Russia would still seek to conduct mobile warfare in these areas north of Preobrazhenne, which have already seen tank battles in the past year. A Ukrainian offensive this far north would also create novel vulnerabilities, extending Ukraine’s flank along the Russian border, where political constraints give Russia a degree of safe haven from which to conduct a counteroffensive or strike Ukrainian forces, logistics, and civilians with standoff weapons.
Chapter Three published 8/11/2023
https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-offensive-operations-shifting-offense-defense-balance
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/11/23 02:40 AM

Reports are circulating - not yet visually confirmed, but plausible - that the Wagner Group is being expelled from Belarus. It's unclear where the gang of misery settles next, maybe Russia or Africa.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/12/23 01:10 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 11, 2023
Aug 11, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 11, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark

August 11, 2023, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces made tactically significant advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 11.
Geolocated footage published on August 11 confirms that Ukrainian forces reached the northern outskirts of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast, though the permanence and extent of these positions are currently unclear.[1] Ukrainian forces have conducted regular ground attacks towards Robotyne for weeks as part of their operations aimed at degrading Russian defenses. The Ukrainian forces’ ability to advance to the outskirts of Robotyne — which Russian forces have dedicated significant effort, time, and resources to defend — remains significant even if Ukrainian gains are limited at this time. Geolocated footage published on August 11 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced into Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces back into the settlement on August 10 and 11.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut, Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area), and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.

Ukrainian counteroffensive operations appear to be forcing the Russian military to laterally redeploy Russian forces defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast, indicating that the Ukrainian effort there may be significantly degrading Russian defenses. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 11 that elements of the 7th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division are involved in heavy fighting near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on August 10 that elements of the “Vostok Akhmat” Battalion are now defending near Robotyne.[4] Elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army’s 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (Southern Military District) have been the primary Russian formation defending immediately south of Orikhiv since the start of the counteroffensive, with elements of the 22nd and 45th Separate Guards Spetsnaz (Russian General Staff Main Directorate) brigades and the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) supporting Russian defensive operations in the area.[5] The arrival of the 7th VDV Division and the Akhmat elements to the Robotyne area represents the first explicit commitment of new Russian formations and units to the area.

Kadyrov has consistently deployed Akhmat elements to perceived critical sectors of the frontline in order to earn favor from Russian President Vladimir Putin, and most recently deployed Akhmat Spetsnaz elements to the Klishchiivka area south of Bakhmut in response to Ukrainian advances in the area.[6] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 7th VDV deployed from east (left) bank Kherson Oblast to the Zaporizhia direction following the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station (KHPP) dam on June 6, and ISW later observed elements of the division defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Staromayorske area along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts in July.

The 7th VDV Division is now split across at least two and possibly three axes of the front. Russian milbloggers offered diverging accounts on whether elements of the 7th VDV Division withdrew entirely from the Staromayorske area after Ukrainian forces captured the settlement on July 27.[8] Elements of the division have remained in Kherson Oblast to defend against Ukrainian activity on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[9] Elements of the 7th VDV division may have arrived in western Zaporizhia Oblast at an earlier date, although this is the first time that Russian sources have claimed that Russian command has committed these elements to fight in the area. Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division continue to defend near Robotyne and ISW has not observed any elements of the division withdrawing from the area, indicating that the arrival of the 7th VDV Division and Akhmat elements likely does not portend a rotation for the main Russian fighting force in the Orikhiv direction.[10] These likely lateral redeployments suggest that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations have significantly degraded existing defending Russian forces in the area and prompted the Russian command to send these elements to shore up Russian defenses in this critical sector of the frontline. The lack of Russian operational reserves means that the Russian command will have to conduct more lateral redeployments if they wish to reinforce certain sectors of the front in the future.

Russia’s practice of conducting lateral redeployments to key sectors of the front will likely further weaken Russian defensive lines in aggregate, as both Russian and Ukrainian operations are fixing Russian units to certain sectors of the front. These lateral reinforcements will likely disrupt Russian offensive and defensive operations in the sectors from which they are drawn and threaten to rapidly degrade the forces that the Russian military is using as reinforcements.[12] Russia currently does not appear to possess significant available forces that it could draw on for reinforcements without endangering other sectors of the front. Ukrainian counteroffensive operations drew elite Russian formations and units to the Bakhmut area and continue to fix them there.[13] Russian forces have also committed a significant number of forces to localized offensives operations in the Kupyansk and Svatove areas, which aim to similarly draw Ukrainian forces away from areas of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[14] Even if the Russian command determines to end localized offensive pushes in these areas it would likely take some time for Russian forces to lower the tempo of their operations and withdraw forces for lateral redeployments without opening up areas of the front to successful Ukrainian counterattacks. The limited Russian lateral redeployment of elements of the 7th VDV Division from the left bank of Kherson Oblast in June appears to have set conditions that allowed Ukrainian forces to more freely operate in the area, and Ukrainian forces will likely similarly exploit weakened Russian groupings in other areas of the front where they are actively conducting offensive operations in the event of further Russian movements.

Ukrainian forces on the other hand maintain reserves that allow them to rotate units instead of relying on redeploying units conducting defensive and offensive operations to other sectors of the line without rest.[16] Ukrainian forces likely therefore can maintain the necessary combat potential needed to continue degrading Russian forces defending southern Ukraine and the Bakhmut area while constraining Russian advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Russian lateral redeployments will likely increase the likelihood that Russian forces would have to fall back to prepared defensive positions without significant support in the case of a Ukrainian breakthrough.[17] The further degradation of defending Russian forces thus creates opportunities for any Ukrainian breakthrough to be potentially decisive.[18]

Russian forces appear to be intensifying offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk, likely to draw Ukrainian forces away from more operationally significant areas of the front. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 10 that Russian offensives along the front line in the Kupyansk area forced Ukrainian forces to flee to Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and claimed that Russian forces are threatening to collapse Ukrainian defenses in the area.[19] The milblogger predicted that Russian forces will take Petropavlivka in the next two days and continue advancing toward Kupyansk.[20] The milblogger claimed on August 11 that Russian forces have recently captured 30 Ukrainian ”strongholds” in the Kupyansk direction along a wide front from Kupyansk to Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[21] Another Russian milblogger claimed on August 10 that Russian forces entered the outskirts of Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk) and are less than 10km away from Ukraine’s advanced defensive lines.[22] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian claims of advances northeast of Kupyansk. Russian milbloggers have repeatedly made claims of extensive Russian advances southwest of Svatove and ISW has additionally not observed visual confirmation of those claims, despite those claims now being weeks old.[23] Russian forces may have increased offensive activity on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line to take advantage of Ukraine’s operational focus elsewhere and to draw Ukrainian units away from more critical areas of the front. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Force Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces have significantly strengthened defenses in the Kupyansk direction in recent days, indicating that Russian forces may have been successful in drawing additional Ukrainian forces to the area.[24] Ukrainian officials also announced mandatory evacuations for civilians in 53 settlements near Kupyansk on August 9 due to intensified Russian shelling and airstrikes posing increased risk for civilians, though the evacuations do not necessarily indicate that Ukrainian forces expect Russian forces to make significant advances.

Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes in Ukraine on August 11 and targeted a Ukrainian airfield for the second time in the last week. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched four Kinzhal missiles and that Ukrainian air defenses intercepted one missile over Kyiv Oblast.[26] The Ukrainian Air Force claimed that the other Kinzhal missiles struck near the Kolomyia airfield in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces targeted the Starokostyantyniv airfield in Khmelnytskyi Oblast on August 6 because Ukrainian forces store foreign-supplied missiles including Storm Shadow cruise missiles at warehouses on the base.[28] Russia’s targeting of the Starokostyantyniv and Kolomyia airfields in the past week suggests that Russian forces are increasingly concerned about Ukraine’s interdiction campaign.

Russian sources claimed that the Wagner Group appears to be maintaining a presence at its facilities in Belarus, though the status of its rumored withdrawal to Russian remains unclear. A Russian milblogger posted satellite imagery captured on August 3 claiming to show that an additional 930 Wagner vehicles and 18 additional low-bed semi-trailers were present at the Wagner camp in Tsel, Asipovichy, Belarus compared to imagery from July 17.[29] The milblogger claimed that the imagery from August 3 shows that 40 shipping containers arrived and that unspecified construction is occurring at the camp.[30] The milblogger also claimed that the number of tents at the Wagner camp has not changed and that the number of cars present at the camp indicates that it is likely fully staffed.[31] Russian rumors about Wagner’s withdrawal from Belarus surfaced on August 8, so this additional satellite footage from August 3 does not completely refute those claims.[32] The footage does suggest that Wagner intended to expand its presence in Belarus and believed that elements of the deal ensuring its operations in the country were still in place as of August 3.

The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) is struggling with significant personnel shortages, especially in occupied territories in Ukraine, amid a broader power shift between other Russian internal security organs. Russian Internal Affairs Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev stated on August 10 that the MVD is struggling with a critical personnel shortage and that over 5,000 MVD personnel have left various MVD bodies within the past month.[34] Kolokoltsev stated in October 2022 that the MVD needs 52,000 police officers to adequately staff newly occupied territories in Ukraine by 2026, and stated in November 2022 that the current MVD shortage was 90,000 personnel.[35] Russian insider sources speculated that MVD employees are leaving due to corruption, poor payment, and performing as gendarmerie (military forces acting as civilian law enforcement).

The Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are likely attempting to deflect blame for Ukrainian shelling in Russian border areas onto mid-level officers. A Moscow court will consider a criminal case against two Russian officers accused of failing to prevent a surprise attack on the Russian Federation, which violates Article 340 of the Russian Criminal Code.[37] Russian authorities have accused the officers of failing to prevent Ukrainian forces from shelling their units and military equipment in Belgorod Oblast in April 2022.[38] This will be the first time that a Russian court will consider such a case since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces made tactically significant advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reached the outskirts of Robotyne amid continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 11.
Ukrainian counteroffensive operations appear to be forcing the Russian military to laterally redeploy Russian forces defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast, indicating that the Ukrainian effort there may be significantly degrading Russian defenses.
Russia’s necessary practice of conducting lateral redeployments to key sectors of the front will likely further weaken Russian defensive lines in aggregate, as both Russian and Ukrainian operations are fixing Russian units to certain sectors of the front.
The further degradation of defending Russian forces creates opportunities for any Ukrainian breakthrough to be potentially decisive.
Russian forces appear to be intensifying offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk, likely to draw Ukrainian forces away from more operationally significant areas of the front.
Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes in Ukraine on August 11 and targeted a Ukrainian airfield for the second time in the last week.
Russian sources claimed that the Wagner Group appears to be maintaining a presence at its facilities in Belarus, though the status of its rumored withdrawal to Russian remains unclear.
The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) is struggling with significant personnel shortages, especially in occupied territories in Ukraine, amid a broader power shift between other Russian internal security organs.
The Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are likely attempting to deflect blame for Ukrainian shelling in Russian border areas onto mid-level officers.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast area on August 11 and advanced in some areas.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 11 and advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) has begun producing “Geran-2” drones, a modified version of the Iranian-produced Shahed-131/136 drone that will likely enable Russia‘s ability to maintain or potentially increase the frequency of Russia’s drone strikes on Ukraine.
Russian occupation authorities are taking steps to make the upcoming regional elections in the Russian occupied territories appear to be fair and competitive.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/12/23 01:26 AM

CSIS
Center for Strategic and International Studies


Ukraine’s Offensive Operations: Shifting the Offense-Defense Balance
Figure 7: Multilayered Defenses North of Mykhailivka, Ukraine
Photo: Copyright © 2023 by Planet


Table of Contents
Introduction
The Offense-Defense Balance
How Are Russia’s Defenses Organized?
What Obstacles Could a Ukrainian Offensive Face?
Lessons for Ukraine: Shifting the Advantage to the Offense
Next Steps:

Chapter Three: What Obstacles Could a Ukrainian Offensive Face?
The Russian defensive system consists of multiple types of anti-vehicle barriers, infantry trenches, and prepared firing positions for artillery and fighting vehicles. These fieldworks are arranged in layers to form defensive positions 1 to 2 kilometers deep. Russian doctrine suggests that these systems are intended to be held by motorized rifle battalions, which are assigned to defend areas 3 to 5 kilometers wide and 2 to 2.5 kilometers deep, and motorized rifle companies, which are assigned to defend areas up to 1.5 kilometers wide and 1 kilometer deep.[17]

A defensive system outside of the occupied town of Mykhailivka is representative. It consists of four layers of defenses. First, about 2 kilometers from the town itself, Russia has constructed a trench to disrupt the movement of Ukrainian vehicles toward the front line. Approximately 500 meters behind that ditch is a barrier of “dragon’s teeth.” These concrete barriers are densely packed into three rows and serve as a second barrier to any Ukrainian vehicles that cross the ditch to the north.

Roughly 250 meters behind the dragon’s teeth is an infantry trench system. Soldiers in this trench would be able to engage vehicles attempting to approach or bypass the barriers with recoilless rifles, rocket propelled grenades, or anti-tank guided missiles; fire on accompanying infantry and engineers with small arms; and use indirect fire to target Ukrainians north of the ditch. Russian doctrine dictates that tactical commanders would have created integrated fire plans for their areas of responsibility.[18] These plans would in theory increase the defensive advantage by maximizing the defenders’ familiarity with the terrain, creating zones in which the defenders will concentrate fire, and allowing for planned maneuvers during combat including both withdrawals and counterattacks.

Behind the trench is a second set of counter-mobility barriers: an anti-vehicle ditch and another set of dragon’s teeth. These are supported by a smaller set of trenches and vehicle emplacements located on the two roads leading into the town from the north. These smaller fieldworks can provide command positions from which the wider defensive effort would be led. These positions can also be used for direct and indirect fire on Ukrainian forces north of the first anti-vehicle ditch, as well as covering fire for any effort to withdraw into the town or further south.

These defenses are part of a longer defensive line that stretches from the town of Yasna to the Molochna River, covering a defensive front of approximately 30 kilometers. The northernmost line of dragon’s teeth stretches for more than 6 kilometers to the east, where it meets another set of multilayered defenses near the town of Trudovyk. The southernmost line wraps around the town of Mykhailivka and measures approximately 45 kilometers.

Similar layered defenses are visible across the span of the front line. Another example is visible near the town of Verbove. These fortifications are less extensive, although they have been the location of more recent construction. East of the road leading into the town, the defenses consist of three layers, as illustrated in Figure 10. An anti-vehicle ditch sits north of a set of dragon’s teeth, which is itself north of a trench system with two layers. West of the road, the ditch has been extended since the initial image was taken, but satellite imagery available at the time of writing is not sufficiently clear to determine whether the line of dragon’s teeth has been extended.

Farther west, Russian fieldworks serve as a reminder that these defenses are not intended to be static, but rather that they are part of a larger system incorporating mobile and positional defense. Figure 11 shows a trench leading to an opening in the dragon’s teeth barrier. This construction is relatively unusual. Trenches are usually placed parallel to counter-mobility barriers in order to maximize firepower onto forces trying to cross or breach those barriers, something these trenches would not allow the soldiers manning them to do. What they could do, however, is provide cover to forces withdrawing through the gap in the dragon’s teeth just north of the trench or provide interlocking fire onto an attempt to advance down the road less than 800 meters to the east. These trenches are therefore likely part of a tactical commander’s prepared system of fire and maneuver.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-offensive-operations-shifting-offense-defense-balance
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/13/23 01:38 AM

8/12, 10:43 PM (Source: TeleTrader)
Zelensky thanks Germany, Netherlands for aid
EPA-EFE/SERGEY DOLZHENKO

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked on Saturday the German government following the delivery of two more Patriot launchers, which were sent on Wednesday. He also thanked the Netherlands for the mobile medical support complexes it provided for the Ukrainian border guards. "The Netherlands is among the leaders in defense and political cooperation with Ukraine," he said. Zelensky added that Azerbaijan is ready to provide a new package of humanitarian support, including demining equipment. He insisted that Ukraine should establish a domestic production...

Zelensky added that Azerbaijan is ready to provide a new package of humanitarian support, including demining equipment. He insisted that Ukraine should establish a domestic production base for demining equipment, and that "this task should be completed not in decades, but in years."

Baha Breaking News (BBN) / DJ
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/13/23 10:23 PM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 13, 2023
Aug 13, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2023

Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark

August 13, 2023, 3:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 13 and reportedly advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions and achieved partial success near Robotyne (western Zaporizhia Oblast, 13km south of Orikhiv).[1] Several Russian sources claimed on August 12 that Russian forces withdrew from Urozhaine (in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast area), although many Russian sources refuted those claims on August 13 and claimed instead that Russian forces still occupy the southern part of Urozhaine, that fighting is ongoing, and that areas of Urozhaine are contested.[2] ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces have completely withdrawn from Urozhaine and Russian forces likely currently maintain positions in at least the southern part of the settlement.

The Russian information space is seizing on Ukrainian gains in Urozhaine (in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) to highlight poor Russian morale and command challenges in the area. A Russian milblogger complained on August 12 that the Russian 37th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) failed to dedicate tank units to support its infantry in Urozhaine and prematurely withdrew from Urozhaine on August 10, claiming they lacked reinforcements when in reality the unit’s personnel were drunk in the rear areas.[3] The milblogger complained that the entire 36th Combined Arms Army (CAA) is unwilling to defend the settlement while the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Kaskad” Operational Tactical Combat Formation and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) defend Urozhaine.[4] These complaints generated a multitude of responses in the Russian information space, including attempts to deescalate tensions between the implicated Russian formations, doubling down on complaints against the 37th Brigade and 36th CAA, and accusing the initial milblogger who reported a Russian withdrawal from Urozhaine of attempting to inflate the reputation of other defending units at the expense of the 36th CAA’s reputation.[5] One milblogger blamed the current situation on the front on the Russian military command’s removal of Major General Ivan Popov as commander of the 58th CAA in early July 2023.[6] The milbloggers notably targeted their complaints at the personnel of these units rather than the unit or theater commanders, suggesting that Popov’s removal and other rumored command purges may have removed mid-level Russian military commanders as a readily available scapegoat for Russian military failures.[7] Alexander Khodakovsky, commander of the “Vostok” battalion defending near Urozhaine, referenced Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky as saying that Russia cannot win in defense, and Khodakovsky complained that Russia expended its resources too early in the war and now needs to pause to accumulate resources for a new operation, indicating recognition that the Russian elastic defense in this area has its limitations.[8] Teplinsky is reportedly responsible for planning the Russian defense of the Velyka Novosilka area.


A Russian warship forcibly stopped and searched a civilian cargo ship en route to the Izmail port in Odesa Oblast, likely as part of a Kremlin effort to curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports without committing naval assets to fully enforce a blockade. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the Russian Vasily Bykov patrol ship forcibly stopped and searched a dry cargo ship sailing under the flag of Palau after it did not respond to the Vasily Bykov’s demand for inspection.[10] The Russian MoD stated that the Russian forces conducted small arms warning fire near the civilian ship before a Ka-29 helicopter landed on the vessel with a group of Russian personnel.[11] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian personnel conducted an inspection and then allowed the civilian vessel to continue along its route to the Izmail port.

The Russian MoD announced on July 19 that it would consider all ships en route to Ukrainian ports as potential military cargo carriers and the flag countries of such vessels as “involved in the Ukrainian conflict on the side of the Kyiv regime.”[13] Russian forces did not stop three civilian ships which openly advertised their destination as Ukraine over their ships‘ automatic identification system (AIS) on July 30.[14] The reports of the three civilian ships sailing to Ukraine unhindered suggested that Russian forces may be unable or unwilling to forcibly stop and search neutral vessels, and Russian forces likely conducted their first forced inspection to reimpose the threat of escalation against civilian vessels en route to Ukraine.[15] Russian forces also likely conducted the forced stop and inspection to undermine confidence in temporary trading corridors through the Black Sea to Ukrainian ports, which Ukrainian officials announced on August 10.[16] The Russian naval posturing in the Black Sea is likely intentionally ambiguous and seeks to create a chilling effect on civilian maritime traffic to Ukraine without requiring Russian forces to commit Black Sea Fleet assets to the enforcement of a naval blockade.[17] The Russian military is likely less willing to commit the Black Sea Fleet to such a blockade than it was in July following notable Ukrainian strikes on Russian naval targets in the Black Sea and the Novorossiysk naval base in Krasnodar Krai in early August.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 13 and reportedly advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces have completely withdrawn from Urozhaine and Russian forces likely currently maintain positions in at least the southern part of the settlement.
The Russian information space is seizing on Ukrainian gains in Urozhaine (in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) to highlight poor Russian morale and command challenges in the area.
A Russian warship forcibly stopped and searched a civilian cargo ship en route to the Izmail port in Odesa Oblast, likely as part of a Kremlin effort to curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports without committing naval assets to fully enforce a blockade.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and attempted to regain lost positions near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and reportedly advanced in some areas.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Kreminna, near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and reportedly advanced in several areas.
The Wagner Group is likely downsizing and reconfiguring to adapt to financial pressure following the June 24 Wagner rebellion.
Ukrainian partisans claimed to have attacked a Russian military base in occupied Mariupol on August 13.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/13/23 11:14 PM

CSIS
Center for Strategic and International Studies


Ukraine’s Offensive Operations: Shifting the Offense-Defense Balance
Figure 7: Multilayered Defenses North of Mykhailivka, Ukraine
Photo: Copyright © 2023 by Planet


Table of Contents
Introduction
The Offense-Defense Balance
How Are Russia’s Defenses Organized?
What Obstacles Could a Ukrainian Offensive Face?
Lessons for Ukraine: Shifting the Advantage to the Offense
Next Steps:
Chapter Four
- Shifting the Advantage to the Offense
While Russia’s defensive fortifications are impressive in their size and scale—at least in some respects—they are likely insufficient to prevent Ukrainian forces from breaking through Russian lines and retaking territory illegally seized by Russia. In short, Russian defensive actions do not guarantee that the defense has the advantage. Several steps could shift the advantage to the offense.

Weakness of Defensive Forces

Fortifications are only as good as the forces defending them. In the 1930s, France constructed the Maginot Line, which included concrete fortifications, machine guns, anti-tank emplacements, and even underground railways. The Maginot Line had state-of-the-art living conditions for specialist units of infantry, artillery, and engineers—even including air conditioning. But the French military was relatively weak. It had a debilitated air force and a large army that was unprepared for offensive operations, though it had a reasonably strong navy.[19] Germany exploited these French weaknesses during its invasion of France in 1940.

The Russian military—especially the army—has been battered over the past year. Following its February 2022 invasion, Russia failed to achieve many of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor combined arms operations; ineffective joint operations, such as close air support to Russian ground forces; problematic intelligence, including faulty Federal Security Service planning and analysis; significant logistical problems; and low morale. These factors were vital for Ukraine’s lightning offensive in Kharkiv Oblast in 2022, where Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise, broke through Russian lines, and captured a key logistical hub to trigger a collapse among Russian ground forces and the liberation of more than 12,000 square kilometers of territory.[20]

The deployment of Wagner Group private military contractors to the front lines in eastern Ukraine in 2023 has further highlighted the poor performance of Russian ground forces, as well as the political risks of a full-scale Russian mobilization. Consequently, a partially bruised and demoralized Russian army sits behind the extensive fortifications, which may present opportunities for Ukraine.

Furthermore, the Russian military likely does not have enough high-quality forces to defend all parts of the line. The 70 combat regiments and brigades Russia has in Ukraine will likely not be sufficient to form a large mobile reserve, even if Russia commands enough soldiers to adequately staff its fortifications.[21] The lack of a strong mobile reserve means that Russia will be hard-pressed to surge forces to fill gaps in its lines, station forces in second-echelon defensive positions, and conduct counterattacks according to its defensive doctrine.[22]

Expansive Front Line

Ukraine can use the extensive front line to its advantage. Territory can be important, particularly the size of a front and the territory an attacker is attempting to seize. While the Maginot Line in France covered approximately 450 kilometers, it did not cover every inch of French territory or key parts of France’s border with Belgium and Luxembourg. Germany invaded the Netherlands and Belgium in May 1940. Later that month, German forces penetrated the Maginot Line at a weak part along the Belgian frontier, where France’s defenses had few forces that were of relatively low quality. On May 15, 1940, Heinz Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps broke through the French line and headed west into open country, sealing France’s fate.[23]

One historical lesson for Ukraine and its Western supporters is to continue assessing weak spots in the Russian lines where there are opportunities for penetration, where Russian defenses are poorly constructed or of insufficient depth, and where Russian forces are understaffed or of particularly poor quality.[24] Ukrainian forces know this terrain well, since it is land many of their soldiers grew up on.


The formidable appearance of Russia’s defensive fortifications may also obscure as much as it reveals. Russia has used contractors to dig trenches, many of whom likely lack significant military engineering experience.[25] There have also been reports of Russian mistreatment of these contractors.[26] Lack of expertise or low morale could lead to the fortifications being less effective than they appear in satellite imagery.

Variation in the quality of Russia’s dragon’s teeth is notable, despite the media attention they have generated as a symbol of Russia’s defenses in Ukraine. These obstacles are most effective when connected to one another by concrete linkages underground and partially buried. Some images appear to show dragon’s teeth without underground connections. Other images appear to show dragon’s teeth sitting on top of the earth rather than partially under it. One image posted on several Russian websites also appears to show that some of the dragon’s teeth used by Russia are not entirely made of concrete and are already suffering environmental damage in Ukraine.[27] It is impossible to draw sweeping conclusions about the overall quality of Russia’s defenses from these images, but they are enough to suggest that there are variations in the quality of defenses across the line that can be exploited by Ukraine with good intelligence.

The Ukrainian front covers roughly 1,000 kilometers—more than double the size of the Maginot Line—as it zigzags from the grassy slopes of the northeast, hugs the Dnipro River, and extends to the Black Sea.[28] This large front is likely a major vulnerability for the Russians. As one assessment of the offense-defense balance concludes, “If the attacker is faced with a defender who is protecting a narrow front, the probability that the blitzkrieg will succeed is much less than if the attacker can strike at a defender deployed across a broad front.”[29] This challenge is often called the force-to-space ratio.[30] Russia likely lacks the force-to-space ratio to defend such an expansive territory.

The May 2023 clashes between Russian security forces and fighters in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, near the Ukrainian border, likely worsened Russia’s deployment problems by forcing the Russian military to move troops to its internationally recognized border with Ukraine.[31] These types of attacks could increase Russia’s force-to-space ratio problems by thinning out its defensive positions in some areas.

Technology and Military Innovation

Technology can impact the offense-defense balance. The offense generally requires mobility.[32] The attacker must first achieve a breakthrough by defeating or destroying a section of the defender’s front, and then it must exploit this breakthrough to advance into the defender’s rear.[33] As noted earlier in this analysis, advances in military mobility have sometimes shifted the balance in favor of the offense.[34]

The Ukrainian military has thus far been innovative in its development and use of technology.[35] Military innovation involves a change in the conduct of warfare intended to improve the ability of a military to generate combat power. A change in the conduct of warfare does not necessarily require a change in military doctrine, but it does involve change at the operational level of war.[36]

The challenge for Ukraine will be to innovatively utilize technology and adapt its conduct of warfare in ways that maximize mobility to exploit Russian vulnerabilities. For example, Ukrainian forces could use a combination of advanced technology and UASs or loitering munitions—including those supplied by the West—to conduct UAS “swarms” against Russian defensive positions. As interviews with Ukrainian military officials indicate, Ukraine is investing significant time and resources into innovations such as swarming tactics designed to maximize target saturation and overwhelm Russian defenses.[39] UASs could also be employed to probe for gaps in Russian lines, locate Russian reserves or artillery systems, or provide artillery-like effects in support of high-mobility units exploiting a breakthrough.

An important technological obstacle to Ukraine’s efforts is Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities. Russia has effectively used electronic warfare to combat Ukrainian UASs.[40] The ability of the Ukrainian military to find and destroy Russian electronic warfare systems, which are now organic to units at multiple levels, will be a key enabler of offensive success.

Strategy, Force Employment, Will to Fight, and Other Intangibles

Attackers can make up for a tough defense with clever strategies, effective force employment, leadership, nationalism, will to fight, combat motivation, morale, and other factors. Force employment, for example, includes how militaries use force on the battlefield—a combination of cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit independent maneuver, and combined arms operations.[41] Some also call this “military skill,” which describes a country’s ability to effectively employ military technology, including designing military strategy and assessing adversaries’ forces and strategy.[42]

Will to fight and nationalism can influence the offense-defense balance, and neither have been in short supply among Ukrainians. To the extent that soldiers are motivated by nationalism, they frequently become willing to fight harder for territory that they understand to be part of their national homeland.[43] The Ukrainian military and civilians have shown an extraordinary will to fight since the start of the war.

The reverse is also true: soldiers who are not imbued with a nationalist consciousness may be less willing to fight for territory. Confederate soldiers deserted the Army of Northern Virginia at the Potomac in 1862 because “they felt that they were fighting to defend Virginia’s soil, not to invade the North.”[44] In addition, Hitler was unwilling to risk imposing full war mobilization on Germany until the failure of Operation Barbarossa opened the possibility that Germany’s own homeland security might be threatened.[45]

Despite President Vladimir Putin’s insistence that Ukraine is part of the Russian empire, it is unclear how much this argument has convinced Russian soldiers and contractors. Recent research on absent without leave (AWOL) cases in Russian military courts suggests that an increasing number of Russian military personnel are not convinced. AWOL cases in the first four months of 2023 already surpassed the total number of cases in 2022.[46] It is impossible to say definitively that the rise indicates that Russians in Ukraine have a low will to fight, but it is hardly an indicator of a strongly motivated military.

A clever strategy is also important. Between 1919 and 1945, an evolving offensive doctrine (blitzkrieg) and motorized armor shifted the advantage to the offense and overrode machine guns, trenches, railroads, and barbed wire.[47] As B.H. Liddell Hart explained in analyzing German General Heinz Guderian’s blitzkrieg into France in May 1940:

"It is clear that Guderian and his tankmen pulled the German Army along after them, and thereby produced the most sweeping victory in modern history.
The issue turned on the time factor at stage after stage. French countermovements were repeatedly thrown out of gear because their timing was too slow to catch up with changing situations, and that was due to the fact that the German van kept on moving faster than the German high command had contemplated."

In the 1967 Six Day War, Israel Defense Forces heavily relied on armor and air forces to destroy significant components of the Egyptian and Syrian air forces. Within three days, the Israelis captured the Gaza Strip and all of the Sinai Peninsula up to the east bank of the Suez Canal. Israeli forces then drove Jordanian troops out of East Jerusalem and most of the West Bank and seized the Golan Heights from Syria. Israel developed an effective blitzkrieg strategy that relied on armor to inflict a decisive defeat against its Arab adversaries. As Moshe Dayan explained to Israel’s Ministerial Defense Committee before the war, “If we opened the attack and effected an armored breakthrough into Sinai, the enemy would be forced to fight according to the moves we made.”[49

For Ukraine today, maneuver warfare demands a flexible command structure with soldiers capable of exercising initiative in combat situations. It is not based on a rigid plan that commanders need to follow closely.[50] Ukrainian soldiers at the platoon, company, and battalion levels have already shown a proclivity to taking the initiative. In World War II, the German military developed a doctrine of Auftragstaktik, which dictated that commanders be given a battlefield objective rather than lengthy orders that micromanaged how they do it.[51] This doctrine helped enable implementation of blitzkrieg, which requires lower-level commanders to act quickly and decisively in order to exploit breakthroughs and maintain the momentum required to avoid enemy counterattack.

A clever Ukrainian strategy that penetrates Russian lines could have significant follow-on effects. For example, a major breakthrough in Zaporizhzhia could severely threaten the viability of Russia’s land bridge linking Russia’s Rostov region with Crimea. Even a breakthrough in the less-densely defended Luhansk Oblast could provide significant benefits by proving that Western support for Ukraine continues to bear fruit, removing Russian units from the battlefield, and sowing further dissent within Russia itself.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-offensive-operations-shifting-offense-defense-balance
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/15/23 11:44 PM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 15, 2023
Aug 15, 2023 - Press ISW









Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 15, 2023

Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark

August 15, 2023, 5:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12pm ET on August 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 15 and reportedly advanced in Luhansk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut, Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast), and Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[1] Coordinates published by a Russian milblogger on August 15 indicate that Ukrainian forces have advanced south of Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[2] Geolocated footage posted on August 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced into Robotyne, and further Russian and Ukrainian reporting published on August 15 suggests that Ukrainian forces have committed additional counteroffensive brigades to the western Zaporizhia oblast area.[3] Ukrainian Colonel Petro Chernyk stated that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is advancing slowly in southern Ukraine because Ukrainian forces must overcome a three-echeloned Russian defensive line.[4] Chernyk stated that the Russian line of defense includes a first line of minefields stretching several kilometers wide; a second line with artillery, equipment, and personnel concentrations; and a third line of rear positions meant to preserve resources.[5] Chernyk noted that Ukrainian counterbattery measures are especially important in order to prevent Russian artillery from targeting Ukrainian mine-clearing equipment.[6] Chernyk’s statements are in line with ISW’s previous assessments that Russia’s doctrinally sound elastic defense is slowing Ukrainian forces’ advances in southern Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile strike against targets mainly in Ukrainian rear areas on the night of August 14-15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 28 missiles, including four Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, 20 Kh-101/555 air-based cruise missiles, and four Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles, at targets throughout Ukraine on the night of August 14-15 and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 16 Kh-101/555 and Kalibr missiles.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces launched eight S-300/400 missiles in ground attack mode at targets in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia Oblasts.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the missile strikes targeted key enterprises in Ukraine’s defense-industrial base.[10] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian missiles targeted various rear areas of Ukraine, including industrial areas in Dnipropetrovsk, Volyn, Lviv, Cherkassy and Donetsk oblasts.[11] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck the Starokostyantyniv airfield in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, although Ukrainian sources did not confirm this strike.[12] Russian sources may be inflating claims of the strike on Khmelnytskyi Oblast in order to frame Russia as effectively targeting Ukrainian assets associated with Ukraine’s counteroffensive capabilities.

The Kremlin is using the Army-2023 forum in Moscow (August 14-20) to foster bilateral military and political relations with other states and posture itself as a reliable and technologically advanced partner. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that over 77,000 representatives from over 1,500 Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises are presenting over 28,500 defensive and technical developments at the forum, and that representatives from over 82 countries are in attendance.[14] The MoD claimed that Russia conducted 14 bilateral meetings on the first day of the forum.[15] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin met with officials from Myanmar, Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, and Djibouti to discuss bilateral defense relations.[16] The Russian MoD also posted photographs of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu viewing Iranian, Chinese, and Indian exhibitions.[17] Chinese Defense Minister Colonel General Li Shangfu spoke at the forum to celebrate Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation and to signal Chinese readiness for further cooperation.[18] The Russian MoD featured multiple Iranian drones at the forum.[19] The Russian MoD also postured itself as a viable long-term defense partner and weapons producer by hosting conversations on long term Russian military training, the intended integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into Russian weapons and control systems, the utilization of three-dimensional printing for Russian naval repairs, and the modernization of domestic rescue and underwater equipment.[

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian government as effectively meeting Russian force generation efforts, portraying Western and Ukrainian resources as limited, and promoting international cooperation against the West.Shoigu claimed on August 15 at the Moscow International Security Conference that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) has produced various weapons, tanks, armored vehicles, and drones in an amount of time and alleged that Russian and Soviet equipment capabilities surpass Western equipment capabilities.[21] Shoigu claimed that Western sanctions on Russia have helped to increase domestic military equipment production through import substitution at DIB enterprises, part of a longstanding (and inaccurate) Kremlin narrative since 2014 claiming that international sanctions strengthen Russia.[22] Shoigu claimed that in contrast, Ukrainian resources and Western military arsenals are almost completely depleted.[23] ISW continues to assess that Russia has failed to mobilize its DIB to adequately support the war effort, however.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated unsubstantiated claims on August 15 at the Moscow International Security Conference that the West is responsible for "igniting the conflict” in Ukraine.[25] Shoigu and Putin reiterated rhetoric accusing the West of creating instability in Africa, Latin America, and Asia and advocated for deepening Russian defense relations with those countries and the creation of a “multipolar world order.”[26] Shoigu also alleged that the West escalated international conflicts including "the situation around Taiwan.”[27] Shoigu’s reference to Taiwan likely indicates Russia’s continued efforts to create a “no limits” partnership between Beijing and Moscow despite China’s reservations.

Wagner Group-affiliated sources are undermining private military companies (PMCs) affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Several Russian and Belarusian insider sources claimed on August 15 that rumors currently circulating about the alleged transfer of Wagner commanders to the Russian MoD’s “Redut” PMC are false.”[28] The insider sources called the rumors a ”dream” of the Russian MoD and denied that any Wagner commanders are transferring to ”Redut” and are instead continuing to fulfill tasks as part of Wagner leadership.[29] Wagner affiliated sources and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin previously harshly criticized ”Redut” and its constituent units over the backdrop of Wagner’s tensions with the Russian MoD during the Battle of Bakhmut.[30] The acerbic responses of many Wagner-affiliated channels to the allegation that some Wagner commanders may be transferring to ”Redut” suggests that Wagner sources have a continued interest in undermining various MoD-associated organs. As ISW reported on August 14, the Russian MoD appears to be struggling to consolidate control of other PMCs associated with Russian businessmen and enterprises, and likely hopes to maintain a grasp on “Redut” despite rhetorical attacks by Wagner affiliated channels.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to comment on Wagner issues on the African continent to remain active in the information space, but is notably refraining from commenting on the war in Ukraine A Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel posted an audio recording of Prigozhin on August 15 wherein Prigozhin commented on the alleged arrests of protesters wearing Wagner shirts in Ghana and claimed that the incident proves that Wagner has continued support around the world and in Africa.[32] Wagner channels previously posted an audio clip of Prigozhin discussing the coup in Niger and Wagner's presence in Africa on August 8.[33] Prigozhin appears to be using his limited public addresses to focus on platforming Wagner’s interests in Africa as opposed to commenting on the situation in Ukraine or reports of Wagner activity in Russia and Belarus, possibly indicating he is following imposed limitations on his involvement - even rhetorically - with the war in Ukraine.

Russian news outlet Kommersant reported that Russian authorities are developing a mechanism to fully control and shut off civilian mobile telecommunications networks in the event of a declared emergency, possibly related to pro-Ukrainian cross border raids. Kommersant reported on August 15 that Russian authorities are considering amendments to the Russian development strategy for the communications industry that would create a mechanism for law enforcement agencies and civilian communication operators to share frequencies and allow law enforcement agencies to take complete control over jointly used frequencies in the event of a declared emergency.[34] Kommersant reported that experts say it is possible that sharing frequencies could also improve the quality of mobile communications ”in peacetime” because operators will have access to previously restricted frequencies currently only used by Russian authorities.[35] Russian authorities may hope to institute such mechanisms to exert greater control of communications networks and the wider information space in the wake of recent events such as limited pro-Ukrainian cross-border incursions, wherein civilian communications greatly contributed to panic spreading and undermining the official Russian line of the incidents.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 15 and reportedly advanced in Luhansk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile strike against targets mainly in Ukrainian rear areas on the night of August 14-15.
The Kremlin is using the Army-2023 forum in Moscow (August 14-20) to foster bilateral military and political relations with other states and posture itself as a reliable and technologically advanced partner.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian government as effectively meeting Russian force generation efforts, portraying Western and Ukrainian resources as limited, and promoting international cooperation against the West.
Wagner Group affiliated sources are undermining private military companies (PMCs) affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to comment on Wagner issues on the African continent to remain active in the information space but is notably refraining from commenting on the war in Ukraine.
Russian news outlet Kommersant reported that Russian authorities are developing a mechanism to fully control and shut off civilian mobile telecommunications networks in the event of a declared emergency, possibly related to pro-Ukrainian cross border raids.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and reportedly advanced near Svatove and Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 15 and reportedly advanced in Luhansk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Russian “Vostok” Battalion, which is notably fighting near Urozhaine claimed on August 15 that Russian forces have entirely lost Urozhaine and blamed a lack of infantry and equipment for the loss of the settlement, but ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have completely withdrawn from the town.
The Russian federal subject “Bashkortostan Regiment” volunteer formation has reportedly deployed to Ukraine.
Russian authorities continue to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories into the Russian cultural and educational sphere.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/15/23 11:48 PM

CSIS
Center for Strategic and International Studies


Ukraine’s Offensive Operations: Shifting the Offense-Defense Balance
Figure 7: Multilayered Defenses North of Mykhailivka, Ukraine
Photo: Copyright © 2023 by Planet


Table of Contents
Introduction
The Offense-Defense Balance
How Are Russia’s Defenses Organized?
What Obstacles Could a Ukrainian Offensive Face?
Lessons for Ukraine: Shifting the Advantage to the Offense
Next Steps

Chapter Five-Next Steps
The next phase of the war will hinge, in part, on the ability of Ukrainian forces to retake territory by moving from attrition to maneuver warfare and to shift the offense-defense balance in favor of the offense. As Napoleon wrote, “The strength of an army, like power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying the mass by the velocity.”[52] A Ukrainian maneuver strategy places a premium on the second factor—velocity. Russian forces have attempted to shift the advantage to the defense and retain the territory they have conquered in Ukraine by constructing a formidable system of fortifications. But Russia faces several challenges in holding this territory, including weak ground forces that have not performed well on the battlefield, the need to defend a massive amount of territory, and variable construction of the fortifications.

This war is far from over. Western aid—including weapons systems, technology, training, intelligence, and financial support—will be critical over the long run to help Ukraine retake its territory and prevent Russia from invading again in the foreseeable future. The future trajectory of the war will also depend on whether Ukraine can exploit Russian vulnerabilities and effectively integrate technology, a clever strategy, force employment, nationalism, and other factors to turn the tide.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-offensive-operations-shifting-offense-defense-balance
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/18/23 01:34 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 17, 2023
Aug 17, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 17, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 17, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

“Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky suggested that Russia freeze the war in Ukraine along the current frontlines, reintroducing a narrative that had been largely dormant since Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion.
Khodakovsky stated that Russia will not be able to topple Ukraine militarily in the near term and that Russian forces are unlikely to easily occupy additional Ukrainian cities, echoing comments Prigozhin had made in April 2023.[1] Khodakovsky concluded that Russia will likely have to come to a “truce” and that Russia may enter a phase “of neither peace nor war” with Ukraine.[2] Khodakovsky suggested that Ukraine would be sufficiently weakened in this state of frozen conflict and that Russia would be able to exert more influence over Ukraine in such a situation than it currently can during the ”Special Military Operation.”[3] Prigozhin’s April 14 essay suggested that Russia freeze the war in Ukraine to set conditions for a future victory without negotiations.[4] Russian sources have periodically claimed that a Kremlin faction is interested in freezing the war along the current frontlines for similar reasons as well as over concerns about domestic political stability and the economic fallout from the war.[5] Discussion of this narrative has waned with Prigozhin’s relative silence following Wagner’s June 24 rebellion and the arrest of ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin, who routinely called on the Kremlin to resist the faction that aims to freeze the war.[6] Khodakovsky may be reintroducing the narrative into the Russian information space on behalf of the faction allegedly interested in freezing the war, although Khodakovsky likely has limited influence on the Russian leadership itself. ISW continues to assess that a temporary ceasefire in Ukraine and protraction of the war will only benefit Russia by allowing Russian forces to reconstitute and letting Russia wear down Western support for Ukraine.


Khodakovsky commands forces defending in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and his comments about freezing the war follow the Ukrainian liberation of Urozhaine on August 16, suggesting that recent Ukrainian advances may be significantly weakening confidence in the Russian defense along the wider front in southern Ukraine. Khodakovsky has previously highlighted concerns about the Russian defense in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, specifically relating to poor Russian counterbattery capabilities, heavy Russian losses, exhausted Russian forces, and a lack of reserves.[8] Khodakovsky previously called for an operational pause on August 13 so that Russian forces could accumulate resources for a new operation.[9] Khodakovsky’s escalation from calling for an operational pause to suggesting that Russia freeze the conflict is likely associated with his firsthand experience of recent tactically significant Ukrainian advances and the degradation of defending Russian forces in Urozhaine.

Recent Ukrainian advances near small settlements in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast are likely tactically significant because of the structure of Russian defensive lines. Ukrainian Colonel Petro Chernyk stated on August 15 that the three-echeloned Russian defensive line in southern Ukraine is comprised of a first line of minefields stretching several kilometers deep; a second line with artillery, equipment, and personnel concentrations; and a third line of rear positions meant to preserve resources.[10] Recent Ukrainian advances north and northeast of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia may allow Ukrainian forces to begin operating in the areas past the densest minefields.[11] If the areas around the second Russian line of defense are less heavily mined, then they would likely be more conducive to more rapid Ukrainian gains. ISW has no ability to assess the density or depth of Russian minefields, however.

Russian forces have dedicated significant effort, resources, and personnel to hold settlements such as Robotyne and Urozhaine, and recent Ukrainian advances in these areas are therefore likely reflective of a wider degradation of defending Russian forces. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces lack significant operational reserves, and the intense Russian effort to hold these settlements instead of withdrawing their forces means that Ukrainian forces have likely had to thoroughly degrade Russian units before advancing.[12] ISW recently observed Russian forces conduct lateral redeployments of elements of the 7th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division from Kherson Oblast and possibly from the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area to the Robotyne area, further suggesting that recent Ukrainian advances have significantly degraded the Russian forces that have been defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast without rotation since the start of the counteroffensive.[13] The lack of Russian operational reserves means that Russian forces will have to reinforce certain areas of the front at the expense of others, likely weakening Russian defensive lines in aggregate and offering Ukrainian forces opportunities for exploitation.[14] Khodakovsky’s recent complaint that the Russian command failed to send reinforcements to secure exhausted Russian forces defending Urozhaine may indicate that the Russian command is already making difficult choices about what sectors to prioritize as Ukrainian forces advance.[15] Russian forces increasingly appear likely to have to withdraw to secondary prepared defensive positions without significant support in the case of a Ukrainian breakthrough, and the further degradation of Russian forces creates opportunities for any Ukrainian breakthrough to be potentially operationally significant.[16] Khodakovsky’s apparent waning confidence in the Russian defense in southern Ukraine may indicate that he believes that recent advances have made a Ukrainian breakthrough more likely.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 17 and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area), and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[17] Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces made marginal gains in southern Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[18] Additional geolocated footage published on August 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest of Novopokrovka (16km southeast of Orikhiv).[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two Russian Ka-52 attack helicopters on August 17.[20] Ukrainian military sources and geolocated footage posted on August 17 indicate that Ukrainian forces downed a Russian Ka-52 helicopter near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[21] Ukrainian Air Force Commander Mykola Oleshchuk stated that Ukrainian air defense units downed another Russian Ka-52 helicopter in the Bakhmut direction, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of a downed Russian Ka-52 helicopter in this direction.[22] The destruction of two Russian Ka-52 helicopters in the same day could indicate that protracted Russian aviation operations without rest may be degrading Russia’s limited cadre of pilots, although it would be premature to draw firm conclusions from two instances.

Russian efforts to ramp up the domestic production of Iranian Shahed-136/-131 drones indicates that Russia aims to develop the long-term capability to conduct large strike series in Ukraine. The Washington Post reported that a drone production facility in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone aims to build 6,000 Iranian Shahed drones domestically by 2025.[23] The Washington Post cited leaked documents from a disillusioned Alabuga facility worker that state that Russia aims to develop a drone manufacturing capability that exceeds Iran’s production capacity and aims to improve on existing capabilities of the Iranian Shahed-131 and -136 drones. The report noted that Russia is focused on producing and improving the Shahed-136 variant, which has a payload 10 times larger than the Shahed-131. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuri Ihnat stated on August 17 that Russian forces are producing many missiles, helicopters, and aircraft but are unable to sustain this production.[24] Ihnat recently assessed that Russian forces will rely on strike drones because they are cheaper and easier to manufacture than precision missiles.[25] Ihnat stated that Russian forces are largely launching precision missiles that Russia recently produced, which indicates that Russian forces are prioritizing targeting Ukraine with precision missiles over restoring their stockpiles.[26] Russian forces currently use Shahed drones in Ukraine primarily as decoys so that high precision missiles have better chances of hitting their targets. The Russian command may believe that a large number of strike drones will allow Russian forces to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, although Shahed drones remain Russia’s high precision weapon system most vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses.[27] Shahed drones do not carry sufficient payloads to significantly damage most critical military targets, and Russian forces are likely to continue using the drones to target soft and civilian targets in Ukraine.

The Washington Post report indicates that Russia is struggling to produce its own variants of the Shahed drones at the pace and quality it desires. The Washington Post cited experts who assessed from the leaked documents that the Alabuga drone production facility has only manufactured the external components for 300 drones and is about one month behind schedule.[29] The leaked documents indicate that the Alabuga facility has struggled to fill specialist positions and that workers, including the one who leaked the documents, struggle with morale issues and that the plant has had to implement incentives such as increased pay and coercive measures such as seizing passports to retain workers. The documents also indicate that the Alabuga facility is struggling to obtain necessary drone components from foreign sources, as Russia only produces four of the 130 necessary internal components, and recent US blanket sanctions have further hindered Russia’s ability to acquire some electrical components.

Russia is likely dissatisfied with the quality of Shahed-131- and -136 drones it sources from Iran but likely seeks to retain Iran as a long-term strategic defense partner. The Washington Post’s leaked documents indicate that Iran has consistently held an advantage over Russia with the provision of the Shahed drones on Iranian rather than Russian terms.[30] The documents state that Iran leveraged negotiations to provide the smaller Shahed-131 drone to Russia despite Russia’s strong preference for the larger Shahed-136. The Washington Post reported that an estimated 25 percent of Iranian-provided drones arrive damaged, many even inoperable. Russia has continued to posture itself as supporting or partnering with Iran in other strategic initiatives, including promoting Iranian weapons at the ongoing Army-2023 development forum, continuing bilateral defense cooperation discussions, and seeking to expel US forces from Syria, however.

Russian reports about the state of the Chonhar Bridge in occupied Kherson Oblast indicate that Ukrainian strikes disrupted a major Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) to Crimea for 11 days. Crimean occupation Transport Minister Anatoly Tsurkin claimed on August 16 that traffic resumed on the Chonhar road bridge connecting Crimea with occupied Kherson Oblast after a Ukrainian strike on August 6 damaged the bridge and forced authorities to reroute civilian and likely military traffic.[32] The road bridge is part of a critical Russian GLOC, and the resumption of traffic on the bridge 11 days following the strike indicates that the Ukrainian interdiction campaign against Russian deep rear areas in southern Ukraine is able to temporarily disrupt Russian logistics supporting the Russian defense of critical sectors of the front during the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[33] The status of rail activity on the Chonhar railway bridge is unknown at this time, as is the status of the damaged road bridge across the Henichesk Strait.

Russian authorities are likely targeting individuals associated with the “Golos” Movement for Defense of Voters’ Rights, including its Co-Chairperson Grigory Melkonyants, to suppress meaningful electoral opposition in preparation for the 2024 presidential election. Russian opposition news outlets reported that Russian authorities searched the premises of 14 associates of Melkonyants in eight oblasts in connection with the case against Melkonyants.[34] Russian authorities also reportedly arrested “Golos” Movement Coordinator Vladimir Yegorov on charges of disobeying the police and searched Yegorov‘s home in connection to the case against Melkonyants.[35] “Golos” Movement Co-Chairperson Stanislav Andreychuk stated that the case against Melkonyants is connected to the upcoming regional elections in Russia and claimed that Russian authorities have made it difficult for ”Golos” to cover Russian elections over the past year.[36] The “Golos” Movement had remained the main independent election observation organization in Russia until recently.

Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers reportedly detained the lawyer of arrested former FSB officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin on August 17. Russian sources claimed that FSB officers detained Girkin’s lawyer, Alexander Molokhov, in Yalta on suspicion of extortion after he was invited to the city by a developer in an arbitration case and offered money.[38] Russian sources claimed that the FSB officers held Molokhov for 10 hours before releasing him but did not initiate a criminal case.


An imprisoned former Russian Federal Protection Service (FSO) general with alleged knowledge of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s private Black Sea residence died suspiciously on August 16. Gennady Lopyrev, a former lieutenant general in the Russian Federal Protection Service (FSO), who was serving a sentence for bribery in a penal colony in Ryazan Oblast, Russia, died on August 16.[40] The chairman of the Public Monitoring Commission of Ryazan Oblast, Viktor Boborykin, did not provide the cause of Lopyrev’s death, but a Russian insider source claimed that Lopyrev was “unexpectedly” diagnosed with leukemia on August 14 after suddenly complaining of shortness of breath despite normal health indicators.[41] The insider source claimed Lopyrev was “the keeper of secrets” related to the construction of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Black Sea residence in Gelendzhik, often referred to as “Putin’s Palace.”


Key Takeaways:

“Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky suggested that Russia freeze the war in Ukraine along the current frontlines, reintroducing a narrative that had been largely dormant since Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion.
Khodakovsky commands forces defending in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and his comments about freezing the war follow the Ukrainian liberation of Urozhaine on August 16, suggesting that recent Ukrainian advances may be significantly weakening confidence in the Russian defense along the wider front in southern Ukraine.
Recent Ukrainian advances near small settlements in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast are likely tactically significant because of the structure of Russian defensive lines.
Russian forces have dedicated significant effort, resources, and personnel to hold settlements such as Robotyne and Urozhaine, and recent Ukrainian advances in these areas are therefore likely reflective of a wider degradation of defending Russian forces.
Russian efforts to ramp up the domestic production of Iranian Shahed-136/-131 drones indicates that Russia aims to develop the long-term capability to conduct large strike series in Ukraine.
Russian reports about the state of the Chonhar Bridge in occupied Kherson Oblast indicate that Ukrainian strikes disrupted a major Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) to Crimea for 11 days.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 17 and advanced in certain areas.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 17 and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/20/23 02:08 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 19, 2023
Aug 19, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 19, 2023, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on August 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces launched a missile strike during the day on August 19 targeting Chernihiv City center after carrying out a series of Shahed drone strikes overnight
. Russian forces struck Taras Shevchenko Theater in Chernihiv City, killing seven people and injuring 117.[1] Chernihiv Oblast Administration Head Vyacheslav Chaus reported that Russian forces “probably” launched a “ballistic missile” at the theater, and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces used an Iskander-M ballistic missile during the strike.[2] The theater reportedly hosted a drone exposition called “Lyuti Ptashky” (Angry Birds), which had previously occurred in other Ukrainian cities.[3] The event organizer, Maria Berlinska, stated that organizers only shared the location of the event with individuals who registered and were screened before attending the event.[4] The event reportedly ended shortly after an air raid warning, and organizers advised people to hide in a shelter.[5] Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian forces are targeting public events to emotionally affect Ukrainians and noted that Russian forces have previously struck public events even without prior public announcements of such events.[6] Many Russian milbloggers originally claimed that Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) building, before most indicated that Russian forces struck the drone exhibition.

Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces also carried out 17 Shahed drone strikes overnight on August 19 and that Ukrainian forces shot down 15 drones.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff later reported that Russian forces also carried out five missile strikes.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, and Ukrainian regional officials reported that Russian attacks overnight on unspecified targets wounded eight people.[10] The Zhytomyr Oblast Administration reported that a Russian loitering munition targeted unspecified infrastructure in the oblast and that debris from the shot down drone sparked a localized fire.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike on Soltsy airbase in Novgorod Oblast and reportedly damaged strategic aircraft on August 19.[12] Geolocated images published on August 19 show smoke rising from the Soltsy airbase.[13] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces shot down a Ukrainian drone using small arms and that a fire damaged one aircraft.[14] A Russian insider source claimed that the fire damaged at least two aircraft and that the Soltsy airbase housed an unspecified number of Tu-22M3 (NATO reporting name Backfire-C) long-range supersonic bombers.[15] The source also claimed that Russian forces moved the undamaged aircraft to Olenya air base, Murmask Oblast.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 19, and advanced along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[17] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain the initiative in the Bakhmut direction.[18] Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently made limited advances east of Nevelske (directly west of Donetsk City).[19] Additional geolocated footage published on August 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[20] CBS News reported on August 18 that anonymous US officials stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing in the direction of Tokmak (a major Russian stronghold in western Zaporizhia Oblast) and have cleared a Russian minefield north of Tokmak.[21] US officials are likely referring to recent Ukrainian advances north and east of Robotyne (about 23km northeast of Tokmak). ISW previously assessed that recent Ukrainian advances near small settlements in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia are likely tactically significant because of the structure of Russian defensive lines.[22] These advances may allow Ukrainian forces to begin operating in less heavily mined areas of the Russian line of defense that are likely more conducive to more rapid Ukrainian gains.

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and senior officers at the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on August 19.[24] This was reportedly Putin’s first visit to Rostov-on-Don since the Wagner Group took control of the SMD headquarters on June 23-24.[25] Putin rarely visits areas associated with the war in Ukraine; in April he visited Kherson and Luhansk oblasts and in March he visited Mariupol.[26] Putin’s visit to the SMD headquarters is likely a public gesture that he continues to side with Gerasimov and his group of commanders despite these commanders’ failure to stop Wagner’s rebellion or achieve the war aims Putin set for them. Putin’s visit occurred about two months after the rebellion, and he is likely attempting to portray himself as in control of his regime and military.

The Russian MoD is continuing to set conditions to possibly replace Wagner Group forces with MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs). A Wagner-affiliated source that there is an ongoing effort to recruit Wagner personnel to deploy to missions abroad as part of PMCs. The source claimed that unspecified Russian authorities – likely referring to Russian MoD – are forming the new “Rossiyskiy Ekpeditsionniy Korpus” (Russian Expeditionary Corps) PMC at the base of one of the advanced Spetsnaz brigades.[27] The source also claimed that the Russian MoD controls “Redut” PMC (also known as “Zvezda” PMC), which is currently recruiting personnel for missions in Africa instead of in Ukraine.[28] The source suggested that Redut PMC may have been attempting to recruit Wagner fighters to Redut’s operations in Africa, referring to a statement that Wagner commanders issued on August 9 warning fighters about calls from “second-rate” PMCs advertising jobs in Africa.[29] The Russian MoD may be attempting to lure Wagner personnel away from Wagner with new work opportunities at MoD-controlled PMCs as part of a wider effort to break up Wagner.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces launched a missile strike during the day on August 19 targeting Chernihiv City center after carrying out a series of Shahed drone strikes overnight.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike on Soltsy airbase in Novgorod Oblast and reportedly damaged strategic aircraft on August 19.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 19, and advanced along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and senior officers at the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on August 19.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is continuing to set conditions to possibly replace Wagner Group forces with MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs).
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and advanced in certain areas on August 19.
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on August 17 establishing the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely in an effort to further integrate proxy military formations in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
Russian officials continue to deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia
.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/20/23 03:16 AM


‘Shameful’ Nicolas Sarkozy under fire for defending Putin’s Ukraine invasion
The former French president criticises EU and US support for Kyiv in his latest memoirs

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...re-for-defending-putins-ukraine-invasion
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/20/23 11:53 PM

The Netherlands and Denmark said Sunday that they would donate up to 61 F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine, the first countries to do so. Biden gave his go ahead.








Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/21/23 01:19 PM

Dramatic video from a Ukrainian combat Go Pro.

[video:youtube]https://youtube.com/shorts/gHoNejua8Wg?feature=share[/video]
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/21/23 06:59 PM

Greece offers F-16 training to Ukrainian pilots, says Zelensky

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230821-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-ukraine-says-it-has-recaptured-more-ground-around-bakhmut

Greece will take part in training of Ukrainian air force pilots for F-16 jets, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky said on Monday. Greece has been a strong supporter of Ukraine since Russia's invasion, providing humanitarian aid and weapons including infantry fighting vehicles and Kalashnikov assault rifles. Zelensky's visit to Greece came after Kyiv announced advancements near the war-battered eastern town of Bakhmut over the weekend.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/22/23 02:15 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 21, 2023
Aug 21, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 21, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 21, 2023, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on August 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces made tactically significant gains in and east of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 20-21 while continuing counteroffensive operations on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border and in eastern Ukraine.
Geolocated footage published on August 20 and August 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces reached the central part of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and broke through some Russian defenses south of Mala Tokmachka (9km southeast of Orikhiv).[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces succeeded in the direction southeast of Robotyne and south of Mala Tokmachka, and that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked east of Robotyne.[2] Malyar and Russian sources stated that fighting is ongoing in Robotyne.[3] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured some positions in a part of the Russian forward defensive lines after intensifying attacks on the Robotyne-Verbove (21km southeast of Orikhiv) line.[4] Some Russian sources reported that Russian forces retreated from some positions near Verbove as part of their elastic defense, likely in response to a Ukrainian advance south of Mala Tokmachka.[5] ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian attacks on Robotyne are tactically significant because a Ukrainian advance in the area may allow Ukrainian forces to begin operating past the densest Russian minefields.[6] Ukrainian advances across fields in this area likely confirm this assessment. Persistent Ukrainian advances in the Robotyne area also likely aim to degrade Russian forces that have committed significant effort, resources, and personnel to hold positions around Robotyne.

Ukrainian forces also reportedly advanced in the Bakhmut and Kreminna directions over the past week and continue counteroffensive operations south and southeast of Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[7] Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces recaptured three square kilometers around Bakhmut over the past week and 43 square kilometers in total since Wagner Group forces captured Bakhmut in May 2023.[8] Ukrainian Severodonetsk City Administration Head Andriy Vlasenko reported that Ukrainian forces achieved some unspecified successes south of Kreminna while conducting active mobile defenses in the area.

Russian milbloggers continue to indicate that Russian forces lack equipment and suffer from low morale along the entire frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces – especially the 20th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) and 2nd Combined Arms Army (Central Military District), both operating in eastern Ukraine – lack light transportation vehicles, which inhibits them from using equipment and operating effectively and reduces their morale.[10] The milblogger claimed that Russian personnel must register their privately-owned vehicles with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), after which their vehicles disappear or get transferred elsewhere.[11] The milblogger claimed that Russian commanders regularly punish servicemen who keep their vehicles for minor administrative violations and that Russian personnel feel that they are “at war” with their commanders.[12] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 21 that Russian authorities have not provided Russian forces operating in the Kherson direction with boats and have ignored milbloggers’ ongoing appeals since July 2.[13] “Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky claimed that Russian forces continue to face problems with counterbattery operations after Russian forces began experiencing artillery systems shortages and claimed that Russian forces began to receive “outdated” D-20 towed gun-howitzers.[14] Khodakovsky claimed that the “outdated” D-20 howitzers are not suitable for counterbattery combat, possibly referring to barrel wear from constant use that makes tube artillery less accurate over time.[15] Multiple milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces lack adequate counterbattery capabilities, especially since Commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army Major General Ivan Popov’s dismissal in early July.[16] Another Russian milblogger, however, claimed that Russian forces are improving artillery tactics and that artillery units have become far more accurate than they were a year ago.[17] The milblogger may be suggesting that mobilized personnel who did not have prior military experience have learned to accurately strike targets. Ongoing complaints from Russian personnel suggest that the Russian MoD is unwilling or unable to address persistent equipment shortages and problems with low morale. Russian forces may be improving tactics and learning from previous mistakes as the war continues, however. The protraction of the conflict resulting in part from delays in the provision of Western aid to Ukraine gives Russian forces time to improve and to learn from their mistakes.

The Russian MoD is creating new military formations possibly to allow more combat effective units currently defending in Kherson Oblast to redeploy to more critical sectors of the front. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on August 21 that the Russian military is highly likely forming the new 18th Combined Arms Army (CAA) from other units currently operating in Kherson Oblast, including the 22nd Army Corps.[18] The UK MoD reported that the new army will consist mostly of mobilized personnel and will focus on defensive operations in southern Ukraine.[19] Russian authorities in Dalnegorsk, Primorsky Krai stated on June 5 that the newly created 25th CAA (Southern Military District), for which the Russian MoD has been recruiting volunteers from the Russian Far East since mid-May, will deploy to Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in December 2023.[20] The Russian MoD previously formed the 3rd Army Corps (Western Military District) in the summer of 2022 from mostly volunteer battalions which were then largely destroyed in Kharkiv Oblast and Bakhmut.[21] The formation and reported future deployment of the new 18th and 25th CAAs to southern Ukraine are likely meant to allow more effective standing formations such as the 49th CAA (Southern Military District) currently operating in Kherson Oblast to redeploy to more critical sectors of the front possibly to reinforce combat-weary Russian forces degraded defensive lines.

Russian insider sources indicated that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov may have decisively won Russian President Vladimir’s Putin favor following the June 24 Wagner Group rebellion. A Russian insider source claimed that Putin postponed a meeting with Alexey Dyumin, former Putin bodyguard and current Tula Oblast governor, and forced Dyumin to publicly escort Shoigu at the recent Army-2023 Forum in Moscow.[23] The insider source claimed that the Kremlin wants to portray Shoigu and Dyumin as having positive relations and to gauge public reactions.[24] The Kremlin, however, likely aimed to publicly subordinate Dyumin to Shoigu. Dyumin and Shoigu have notably had a tense relationship, and Russian milbloggers recently floated Dyumin as a replacement for Shoigu immediately after the Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24.[25] A Wagner-affiliated source claimed that the Russian General Staff now has “carte blanche” and has purged all proteges of Army General Sergey Surovikin, a former deputy theater commander and Wagner affiliate who was reportedly ousted and placed under house arrest.[26] The source also claimed that unspecified aspects of the Putin-Wagner deal collapsed for unknown reasons, which could indicate increased Putin favor for Shoigu and Gerasimov if true. Putin also recently publicly met with Gerasimov in Rostov-on-Don for the first time since the Wagner rebellion, which further indicates that Putin has fully aligned himself with Shoigu and Gerasimov despite their military failure and inability to stop the rebellion.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be attempting to re-establish Wagner in Africa, and some Russian sources are portraying this reported effort as necessary for Wagner’s survival. A Wagner-affiliated source claimed that Wagner representatives and possibly Prigozhin himself arrived in Mali on August 19 possibly to discuss the regional security situation or cooperation with Niger.[28] Another prominent Wagner-affiliated source published footage of Prigozhin on August 21 in which Prigozhin claims to be in Africa and claims that Wagner is increasing its presence in Africa.[29] A Russian insider source claimed that Prigozhin began a media campaign to portray Nigeriens as begging for Wagner’s intervention in order to help Wagner secure a contract with Niger and thereby save Wagner.[30] The source claimed that Wagner has struggled with significant personnel and financial issues from funding cuts following the June 24 rebellion and the recent claimed (but unconfirmed) withdrawal from Belarus.[31] Wagner likely has thousands of personnel to dedicate to operations in Africa if Wagner is able to both secure a contract and deploy personnel from Russia and Belarus, actions that Prigozhin may see as Wagner’s final option to maintain its independence from the Russian MoD.

Some Russian sources are likely running an information operation to exaggerate the degree to which Wagner is struggling to survive, possibly in support of the Russian MoD effort to destroy Prigozhin’s reputation and the whole Wagner Group. Russian insider sources are increasingly portraying Shoigu and Gerasimov as having Putin’s full support and ousting insubordinate commanders while painting Wagner as a private military company increasingly struggling to survive.[32] ISW has observed indicators that the Wagner Group is struggling to maintain coherence, including recent reports of conflict within the Wagner high-level representatives.[33] These Russian sources may be exaggerating the degree to which Wagner is struggling, however, especially if reports of Prigozhin’s travel to Africa are accurate and his reported efforts to secure contracts for Wagner are successful. Shoigu likely seeks to deal a final blow to Wagner but may struggle to make that blow decisive. A Russian milblogger noted that the Russian MoD may struggle to replace Wagner in Africa as Russian forces need time to train before deploying, have not established the connections with locals that Wagner has, and may destabilize conflicts rather than quell them.[34] If Wagner is able to secure contracts in Africa and deploy its personnel before the Russian MoD can deploy personnel, then Prigozhin and Wagner may retain at least some ability to operate independently in Africa contrary to the MoD’s efforts to eliminate Wagner.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces made tactically significant gains in and east of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 20-21 while continuing counteroffensive operations on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border and in eastern Ukraine.
Russian milbloggers continue to indicate that Russian forces lack equipment and suffer from low morale along the entire frontline.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is creating new military formations possibly to allow more combat effective units currently defending in Kherson Oblast to redeploy to more critical sectors of the front.
Russian insider sources indicated that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov may have decisively won Russian President Vladimir’s Putin favor following the June 24 Wagner Group rebellion.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be attempting to re-establish Wagner in Africa, and some Russian sources are portraying this reported effort as necessary for Wagner’s survival.
Some Russian sources are likely running an information operation to exaggerate the degree to which Wagner is struggling to survive, possibly in support of the Russian MoD effort to destroy Prigozhin’s reputation and the whole Wagner Group.
Russian sources made and walked back claims about significant Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction amid continued offensive actions on August 21.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kreminna, Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and advanced near Bakhmut.
The Russian government continues to introduce mandatory nationalistic and militaristic courses into high school curriculum to promote military service among Russian youth.
Belarusian authorities reportedly exposed forcibly deported Ukrainian children to pro-Kremlin propaganda in Belarus.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2023
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/22/23 07:33 AM

Russia on Tuesday said one of its jets it had “destroyed” a Ukrainian reconnaissance boat near a gas production facility in the Black Sea. Russia also said it had downed two attack drones near Moscow overnight, which makes it the fifth consecutive night the Russian capital has been targeted by such attacks.

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230822-%F0%9F%94%B4live-russia-claims-it-destroyed-ukrainian-reconnaissance-boat-in-black-sea
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/23/23 03:42 AM

- Russia's top general Sergei Soerovikin, who is said to have links with Yevgeny Prigozhin's Wagner group, has been removed from his position, according to Russian media . He hadn't been seen in public for months.

A supersonic Russian bomber is said to have been destroyed by Ukrainians. This is evident from various reports, reports the BBC. It would be Tupolev Tu-22, BBC Verify concludes after analyzing photos on Telegram.

- The Russian Defense Ministry says it has 'destroyed' a Ukrainian army reconnaissance ship early Tuesday morning in the Black Sea . That would have happened with a Russian fighter plane, the ministry says in a message on Telegram.

- Moscow's three largest airports suspended flights early Tuesday morning , according to the Russian news agency TASS. It concerns the three international airports Vnukovo, Sheremetyevo and Domodedovo. The last two have now resumed flights, Vnukovo remained closed.

- The Ukrainian city of Zaporizhia, in the southeast of the country, has again fallen victim to attacks by Shahed-type drones in the night from Monday to Tuesday, according to media reports.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/23/23 03:43 AM

The US government has approved the sale of 96 Apache attack helicopters to Poland . The State Department has reported this to Congress, which has the right to block the deal. However, no objections are expected.

Poland's decision to buy the Apaches stems from concern over neighboring Russia's invasion of Ukraine . The U.S. attack helicopters are to replace the aging Soviet-era helicopter fleet . The sale is worth around 12 billion dollars (more than 11 billion euros). The Apaches will be supplied by Boeing.

Poland announced in January that it plans to spend 4 percent of its gross domestic product on defense this year . That is well above the NATO target of 2 percent.

In June, the country received US Abrams tanks as part of a US$1.4 billion deal. These were combat vehicles previously used by the US Marine Corps. Last year, Poland also purchased 250 modern Abrams M1A2 tanks, which are expected to be delivered by the end of 2024. This makes Poland the first country outside the US to have those tanks.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/23/23 05:38 PM

Yevgeny Prigozhin listed among passengers in plane crash. All ten passengers are listed as dead, according to sources.
https://abcnews.go.com/Internationa...-passenger-list-plane/story?id=102497445
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/23/23 05:39 PM


Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin 'on board' crashed Russian plane
23 August 2023, 18:12 BST
Updated 6 minutes ago
Breaking News image
Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin was on the passenger list of a plane which crashed in Russia, killing all 10 on board.

He was believed to be on board the plane.

Earlier, a Wagner-linked Telegram channel Grey Zone reported that the jet was shot down by air defences in Tver region, north of Moscow.

Prigozhin led a failed mutiny against the Russian armed forces in June
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/23/23 05:55 PM

Image of crash site.

Attached picture Screenshot_20230823_135309_Chrome.jpg
Posted By: Strax

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/23/23 06:25 PM

Prigozhin was a dead man walking, it was just a matter of time.
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/23/23 07:54 PM

I always admired his exceptional optimism lol
Posted By: Strax

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/23/23 10:08 PM

Originally Posted by Giacalone
I always admired his exceptional optimism lol


I have no idea why he stopped the rebellion , held all the aces in his hand and then abruptly stopped midway hoping for mercy, he was in the 'inner' circle of Putin , he knew he was dead man walking and that KGB/FSB is coming for him.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/23/23 10:50 PM

This shows the civilized world Putin is a man without a conscience.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/24/23 02:35 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 23, 2023
Aug 23, 2023 - Press ISW









Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 23, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 23, 2023, 9:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3:30pm ET on August 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and founder Dmitry Utkin reportedly died after Russian forces shot down an aircraft transporting senior Wagner commanders over Tver Oblast.
The Russian Federal Aviation Agency (Rosaviatsiya) reported on August 23 that all the passengers – Yevgeny Prigozhin, Dmitry Utkin, Sergei Propustin, Yevgeny Makaryan, Alexander Totmin, Valery Chekalov, Nikolai Matyuseev – died in the crash along with all three crew members.[1] Russian opposition outlet Dossier reported that Chekalov, who is under US sanctions for transferring munitions to Russia and has acted on behalf of Prigozhin, oversaw Wagner transport logistics and “civilian” projects abroad.[2] A Russian insider source claimed that Chekalov also served as head of Wagner’s security services, though another source refuted this claim.[3] Dossier also reported that several other passengers joined Wagner between 2015 and 2017 and fought in Syria, although their current positions are unclear.[4] Russian sources amplified footage apparently showing a Russian missile striking an aircraft carrying Prigozhin, Utkin, and other Wagner commanders and the wreckage of the aircraft.[5] An insider source claimed that two S-300 missiles shot down the aircraft.[6] Flight tracking data for an Embraer Legacy 600 jet (registration number RA-02795) registered to the Wagner Group stopped after 6:11pm Moscow time while over Tver Oblast.[7] Russian sources claimed that a second Wagner Group-owned Embraer jet (registration number RA-02748) departed Moscow but turned around and landed at Ostafyevo airport in Moscow around the time of the strike.[8] Flight tracking data showed that this second aircraft arrived in St Petersburg at 6:27pm and flew back to Moscow 20 minutes later arriving at 8:02pm, however.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin have been destroying the Wagner private military company (PMC) and weakening Prigozhin’s authority since the rebellion – and the assassination of Wagner’s top leadership was likely the final step to eliminate Wagner as an independent organization. Wagner and Russian insider sources reported that the Russian MoD recently began forming new PMCs to replace Wagner in Africa and the Middle East and started recruiting Wagner personnel.[10] Wagner commanders indicated that two high-ranking Wagner officials joined the Russian MoD, and insider sources claimed that some Wagner personnel began to leave Belarus after Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko refused to finance Wagner when he discovered that Russia would not pay Wagner’s costs.[11] Prigozhin’s online persona has been largely silenced since the rebellion – possibly as part of the deal between Lukashenko, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Prigozhin – which may have negatively impacted Wagner’s ability to recruit new personnel amidst the Kremlin’s defamation campaign against Prigozhin. The Russian MoD and the Kremlin had effectively created conditions in which Prigozhin could no longer adequately support the Wagner contingent unless he was able to secure new funding and missions for Wagner personnel in the immediate term. Such conditions could have eventually led Wagner to slowly lose fighters and cause Prigozhin to lose his relevancy and influence.


Prigozhin was likely attempting to counter the Russian MoD’s and the Kremlin’s destruction of Wagner. A Russian insider source with reported ties to Russian security services claimed that Prigozhin’s “hasty” departure to and from Africa was in response to the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff’s (GRU) plans and measures to undermine Wagner’s presence in Africa.[12] The source claimed that GRU Deputy Head (Head of the Special Activities Service) Colonel General Andrei Averyanov led the effort to completely block Wagner from operating in Africa and that there were plans to create and train an army corps of more than 20,000 people as Wagner replacements. The source added that Prigozhin was deeply opposed to these efforts and “made every effort to prevent them.” ISW observed that Prigozhin and Wagner’s representatives intensified their efforts to reestablish Wagner in Africa and the Middle East in mid-August, and Prigozhin even published a video of himself in an unspecified African country on August 21 – one of the few published videos of Prigozhin since the rebellion.[13] This video appeared to have heavy recruitment undertones, and it is possible that Prigozhin had traveled to Africa in hopes of securing further missions for Wagner personnel independent of the Russian MoD and the Kremlin.[14] Averyanov has reportedly participated in other high-profile assassination attempts such as the poisoning of Sergei and Yuliya Skripal, and it is possible that Russian officials capitalized on Prigozhin’s panic and impulsivity to eliminate Wagner's top-most leadership.

Wagner PMC’s future without a leader remains uncertain. A Russian news aggregator claimed that the Wagner council of commanders is currently meeting at the time of this publication to prepare a joint statement and announce what will happen to Wagner in the near future.[15] The aggregator, citing an unnamed source, also claimed that Wagner had long developed a mechanism to mitigate the aftermath of Prigozhin’s and Utkin’s deaths.[16] The source, however, refused to disclose what such mitigations entail but noted that “in any scenario, [these mitigations] will be bad news.”[17] Wagner-affiliated channels urged Russian media to refrain from speculations about Prigozhin, Wagner’s fate, and the council of commanders.[18] A prominent Russian milblogger with reported connections to the Russian State Duma claimed that Wagner personnel are still “at their posts” in Belarus and Africa and denied the claims that Wagner personnel are being evacuated.[19] Prigozhin and Utkin were undeniably the faces of Wagner, and their assassinations will have dramatic impacts on Wagner’s command structure and the Wagner brand. Wagner commanders and fighters may begin to fear for their lives or become demoralized. The Russian MoD’s and Kremlin’s inroads into Wagner’s operations and the absence of Prigozhin – who would fight for new opportunities for Wagner personnel – may further lead to the degradation of the Wagner grouping.

Putin almost certainly ordered the Russian military command to shoot down Prigozhin’s plane. Elements of the Russian military, especially Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, would be extremely unlikely to execute Prigozhin without Putin’s order. The entirety of the Russian political and security sphere likely viewed Prigozhin’s continued survival following Wagner’s rebellion as at Putin’s discretion. ISW will make further assessments based on the assumption that Putin ordered Prigozhin’s assassination unless evidence to the contrary emerges. ISW’s previous standing assessment that Putin was unlikely to kill Prigozhin for fear of angering Wagner personnel has thus been invalidated.

Putin may have concluded that he had sufficiently separated Prigozhin from Wagner and could kill him without turning Prigozhin into a martyr for the remaining Wagner personnel. Some Wagner commanders recently appeared to betray Wagner for the Russian MoD-affiliated Redut PMC, suggesting that the Kremlin’s and Russian MoD’s efforts to separate Wagner elements from those loyal to Prigozhin were partially succeeding.[21] Increasing reports of Wagner’s financial issues and corresponding reports of Wagner personnel leaving the group due to decreased payments and opportunities to deploy may have resulted in Prigozhin losing favor among the Wagner rank-in-file.[22] The Russian MoD has been setting conditions to replace the Wagner Group with MoD-affiliated PMCs, and Russian sources have claimed that these PMCs are attempting to recruit current and former Wagner personnel.[23] Putin may have decided that Wagner personnel had reached a point where they were sufficiently more interested in payments and deployments with these new PMCS than their continued loyalty to Prigozhin and that he could safely kill Prigozhin.

Alternatively, Putin may have decided that Prigozhin had crossed a pre-established redline with his efforts to retain Wagner’s access to operations in Africa. Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko may have included an agreement in the deal that ended Wagner’s rebellion that required Prigozhin to limit his and Wagner's media presence and/or curtail Wagner's operations in Africa. Prigozhin’s August 21 video claiming that Wagner is expanding its presence in Africa and subsequent uptick in Wagner recruitment advertisements may have crossed a pre-established redline if Prigozhin had agreed to silence himself.[24] Prigozhin’s alleged repeated attempts to prevent the Russian MoD from completely replacing the Wagner contingent in Africa may have also crossed a pre-established redline restricting Wagner’s African operations. Putin may have decided that Prigozhin had violated enough aspects or all of the pre-established deal.

It is possible that Putin has intended to execute Prigozhin for some time and that the downing of Prigozhin’s plane on August 23 was coincidental timing, although this is unlikely. Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti reported on August 23 that Putin formally dismissed Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin as commander of Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) and replaced him with Colonel General Viktor Afzalov.[25] The official confirmation of Surovikin’s dismissal in Russian state media on the same day as Prigozhin’s assassination is likely no coincidence. The Kremlin likely intends for both publicized punishments to send a clear message that those who were involved in the June 24 rebellion have been dealt with and that Wagner’s challenge to the Russian leadership is a settled affair.


Putin’s almost certain order for the Russian MoD to shoot down Prigozhin’s plane is likely a public attempt to reassert his dominance and exact vengeance for the humiliation that the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24 caused Putin and the Russian MoD. Putin notably attended a publicly televised concert in honor of the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk around the time that Russian air defenses downed Prigozhin’s plane. Putin’s attendance at the televised concert echoed the memory of Soviet state television showing Swan Lake on television in August 1991 as the Soviet Union collapsed.[26] Russian sources noted that it has been exactly two months since the beginning of Wagner’s armed rebellion during which Wagner forces shot down several Russian helicopters and killed at least 13 Russian servicemen.[27] The decision to have Russian air defenses be the method for Prigozhin’s assassination allowed the Russian MoD to directly avenge what was one the deadliest days for Russian aviation since the start of the full-scale invasion. Putin had suffered significant humiliation for failing to stop Wagner’s rebellion, relying on Lukashenko to stop Prigozhin’s march, and failing to punish Wagner servicemen who were responsible for shooting down Russian aircraft on June 24.[28] Putin’s behavior during the rebellion reportedly concerned his inner circle about his ability to sustain his regime, and CIA Director William Burns reiterated similar observations about Putin’s judgments and detachment from events.[29] Burns also noted that “Putin is the ultimate apostle of payback,” and it is likely that Putin was waiting to set proper conditions to finally avenge himself on Prigozhin without appearing impulsive or overreacting.[30] Putin needed to exact ostentatious revenge against Prigozhin not only to prove that he is not a weak leader, but also to support his military – which in the eyes of many Russians did not see justice carried out for the events of June 24.

Specific individuals who may have planned to oppose Putin, the Kremlin, or the MoD have likely taken note of Prigozhin’s ultimate fate and other recent measures to reassert the Kremlin’s backing for the senior Russian military leadership. Putin notably sidelined Tula Oblast Governor Alexey Dyumin at the recent Army-2023 forum, publicly posturing him as subordinate to Shoigu following suggestions that Dyumin might replace Shoigu.[31] Putin and Gerasimov visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, which Wagner forces occupied during the rebellion, likely to publicly demonstrate the Kremlin’s backing of Gerasimov.[32] Prigozhin’s fate is also likely meant to serve as a deterrent to elements of the Russian military who may try to follow an existing precedent of insubordination that Prigozhin helped establish.[33] Lukashenko notably embarrassed Putin by directly negotiating with Prigozhin to end the rebellion, and Prigozhin’s assassination may signal to Lukashenko both a dramatic reduction of his negotiating space with the Kremlin and an implicit threat against his continued attempts to resist Union State integration efforts.

The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to deflect overt responsibility for Prigozhin’s assassination away from Putin and the Russian military. Rosaviatsiya created a special commission to investigate the technical condition of the crashed aircraft, the meteorological conditions on the flight route, and the dispatch services and ground radio equipment.[35] The Russian Investigative Committee has initiated a criminal case on the charge of violating the rules of traffic safety and operation of air transport.[36] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted that the Investigative Committee may choose the “erroneous” launch of air defense systems as the main version of the event given the claimed Ukrainian drone strikes on Moscow.[37] A Russian insider source claimed that the crash will likely be framed as a terrorist act that occurred onboard, and Russian State Duma Deputy Yevgeniy Popov already echoed this narrative in the Russian information space.[38] A Wagner-affiliated channel criticized Russian state TV channels for failing to mention the crash during the evening news cycle.

The wider Russian information space refrained from commenting on the reasons behind the crash, with only a few sources tying the incident to the Kremlin and/or the Russian MoD. Many sources observed that the crash occurred exactly two months after the start of Prigozhin’s rebellion.[40] Several insider sources claimed that the incident indicated that Putin “has something to be afraid of” and speculated that Putin’s system (likely referring to his regime) is undergoing a new wave of changes.[41] Some milbloggers claimed that Prigozhin’s assassination will have “catastrophic consequences” and that this incident is a lesson that one must always continue going until the end – implying that Prigozhin should have continued his march on Moscow.[42] Most milbloggers refused to comment on Prigozhin’s death, citing a lack of available official information.[43] ISW will resume its coverage of milblogger reactions on August 24.

Russian milbloggers will likely focus most of their coverage in the coming days on Prigozhin’s assassination and may report less on the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Russian milbloggers similarly shifted much of their reporting to cover Wagner’s rebellion on June 24 to developments within Russia and it took several days for them to return to their normal reporting on the frontlines in Ukraine.[44] The Kremlin may have decided to ostentatiously kill Prigozhin at this time in part to shift focus in the Russian information space away from the frontlines in Ukraine amidst notable Ukrainian advances. ISW’s coverage of kinetic activity on the frontlines in the coming days may be constrained if Russian reporting is limited.

Further tactically significant Ukrainian gains in and around Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast are widening the Ukrainian breach of Russian defensive lines in the area and threatening Russian secondary lines of defense. Geolocated footage published on August 22 and 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced further in Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and control most of the settlement and have made further gains west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified success in the direction of Novopokropivka (13km south of Orikhiv) and Novodanylivka (5km south of Orikhiv).[46] Russian forces had likely hoped to use their positions in and around Robotyne as a launching point for counterattacks against the western flank of the Ukrainian advance east of the settlement, where Ukrainian forces appear to be widening their penetration through Russian first lines of defense. The Ukrainian advance through Robotyne itself and the potential liberation of the settlement will deprive Russian forces of positions near the western flank of the Ukrainian breach and therefore give Ukrainian forces more maneuver space to launch offensive operations against the Russian secondary line of defense that runs south of Robotyne to the western outskirts of Verbove. A successful deep penetration of Russian defensive lines likely requires a widening of the initial penetration to prevent Russian forces from cutting off a too-narrow thrust.

Ukrainian advances have now brought Ukrainian forces within roughly two kilometers of the secondary lines of Russian defense, a relatively more continuous set of field fortifications consisting of anti-tank ditches and dragon's teeth anti-tank obstacles. The extent of minefields in the area is unclear, although areas in front of these secondary lines of defense may be less heavily mined to give Russian forces north of the lines the ability to retreat. ISW previously assessed that these secondary lines of defense may be relatively weaker than the first Russian defensive lines in the area due to a lack of uncommitted Russian forces in the area and further lateral deployments from other sectors of the front.

Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian S-400 air defense system in Crimea on August 23. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced and posted footage of a strike on a Russian S-400 long and medium-range anti-aircraft missile system near Olenivka, Crimea (116km northwest of Sevastopol and about 140km south of Kherson City).[48] GUR reported that the strike destroyed an air defense installation, an unspecified number of missiles, and killed nearby Russian military personnel, though the footage only shows part of the installation exploding.[49] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger suggested that Ukrainian forces likely used a Harpoon, Neptune, or Brimstone II missile to strike the air defense system.[50] Russian milbloggers expressed concern that Ukrainian forces were able to operate a drone and record footage of the strike roughly 120km behind the current frontline.[51] A Ukrainian strike on a Russian air defense installation deep within the Russian rear indicates a number of Russian tactical failures, particularly that Russian forces were seemingly unprepared to intercept the missiles with the air defense system or operate electronic warfare jamming to prevent Ukrainian forces from operating a drone in the area. These tactical failures, though surprising and serious, may not be indicative of wider systemic issues within Russian air defenses, however.

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Pentagon Spokesperson General Patrick Ryder notably pushed back on an alleged US intelligence assessment that the Ukrainian counteroffensive will fail to meet its objectives. Sullivan stated on August 22 that the United States does not assess that the war in Ukraine “is a stalemate.”[52] Sullivan stated that the United States continues to support Ukraine in its counteroffensive efforts and noted that Ukrainian forces continue to take territory.[53] Sullivan noted that the United States will continue to support Ukrainian forces as they operate according to their tactics and timetable and proceed according to the strategic and operational decisions of their commanders and leadership.[54] Ryder stated on August 23 that it is “inappropriate” to draw any conclusions about the Ukrainian counteroffensive while fighting continues across the frontline and that Ukrainian forces continue to advance.[55] Sullivan’s and Ryder’s statements are a notable response to the Washington Post’s August 18 report that the US intelligence community has assessed that Ukraine’s counteroffensive will fail to reach Melitopol in western Zaporizhia Oblast and will not achieve its principal objective of severing the Russian land bridge to Crimea.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes across Ukraine on the night of August 22 to 23 and destroyed grain infrastructure at the port in Izmail, Odesa Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched nine missiles and up to 20 Shahed-131/136 drones and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 11 drones, including nine over Odesa Oblast.[57] Ukrainian Minister for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development Oleksandr Kubrakov reported on August 23 that the Russian drone strike on the port of Izmail destroyed over 13,000 tons of grain intended for Egypt and Romania.[58] Kubrakov reported that Russian strikes have destroyed 270,000 tons of grain since Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17.[59] The Russian destruction of additional Ukrainian grain infrastructure comes less than a day after Putin attempted to mitigate dissatisfaction from African countries at Russia’s withdrawal from the grain deal during the BRICS Business Forum in South Africa.


Key Takeaways:

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and founder Dmitry Utkin reportedly died after Russian forces shot down an aircraft transporting senior Wagner commanders over Tver Oblast.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin have been destroying the Wagner private military company (PMC) and weakening Prigozhin’s authority since the rebellion – and the assassination of Wagner’s top leadership was likely the final step to eliminate Wagner as an independent organization.
Prigozhin was likely attempting to counter the Russian MoD’s and the Kremlin’s destruction of Wagner and Wagner’s future remains uncertain.
Putin almost certainly ordered the Russian military command to shoot down Prigozhin’s plane.
Putin's almost certain order for the Russian MoD to shoot down Prigozhin’s plane is likely a public attempt to reassert his dominance and exact vengeance for the humiliation that the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24 caused Putin and the Russian MoD.
Specific individuals who may have planned to oppose Putin, the Kremlin, or the MoD have likely taken note of Prigozhin’s ultimate fate and other recent measures to reassert the Kremlin’s backing for the senior Russian military leadership.
The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to deflect overt responsibility for Prigozhin’s assassination away from Putin and the Russian military.
Further tactically significant Ukrainian gains in and around Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast are widening the Ukrainian breach of Russian defensive lines in the area and threatening Russian secondary lines of defense.
Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian S-400 air defense system in Crimea on August 23.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on August 23 and did not make any confirmed advances.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2023
Posted By: Toodoped

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/24/23 08:16 AM

Originally Posted by Strax
Prigozhin was a dead man walking, it was just a matter of time.


KGB still kicks ass lol
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/24/23 08:37 AM

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transc...ig-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/

As it relates to Ukrainian pilot F-16 training in the U.S., we are prepared to support a training effort here in the continental United States if capacity is reached in Europe. I don't have any specifics to provide right now in terms of which bases that training could occur at.
Posted By: Toodoped

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/24/23 09:35 AM

How stupid can you be to travel by plane while being one of the most targeted individuals by both sides...i really cant understand these guys.

Another example is when they personally require some listening machines which can record all phone convos from around the country and its also able to rewind every convo if someone is suspicious. In the end, the same guys who bought that same machine get caught in their own web, meaning most of them usually talk freely on their phones regarding everything, including schemes and murders, and so the whole thing backfires to them.

Again, I cant understand some of these fellas since there are street dealers smarter than them. I mean they talk in codes on their phones regarding 5 grams of weed lol and they use multiple transportations (not by plane) when they need to buy a new stash.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/24/23 08:47 PM

8:54pm: Pentagon announces F-16 training for Ukrainian pilots

The Pentagon announced on Thursday that the United States would begin flight training for Ukrainian pilots on F-16 aircraft in October.

Pentagon spokesman Brigadier General Pat Ryder said the training would begin after the Ukrainian pilots received English language training in September. The flight training would take place in Arizona, Ryder added.

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230824-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-russia-and-ukraine-trade-drone-attacks
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/24/23 08:48 PM

9:13pm: Pentagon dismisses missile strike theory for Prigozhin plane crash

The US Department of Defence said Thursday there was currently no information to suggest that a surface-to-air missile took down the plane presumed to be carrying Russian mercenary leader Prigozhin.

Brigadier General Patrick Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman, offered no further details or evidence as he made his remarks at a Pentagon news conference.

Reuters had reported earlier on Thursday that the United States was looking at a number of theories over what caused Prigozhin’s plane to crash, and cited two US officials saying a surface-to-air missile likely hit it.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/25/23 12:32 AM

Ryder said the U.S. decided to join European allies in the training to avoid bottlenecks in bringing Ukrainian pilots up to speed.

The U.S. training would accommodate “several” Ukrainian fighter pilots and dozens of maintenance people for the jets, he said.

For experienced pilots, training can range around five months, Ryder said. He sketched out courses covering the basics. In addition to flying the advanced craft, they include formation flying, operating weapons, air combat and suppressing air defense systems, on top of centrifuge training on the ground to help pilots withstand the g-forces of an F-16 cockpit.

https://apnews.com/article/f16-ukraine-pilot-training-arizona-d72b03e45b35d2b0edf979724a249a8d
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/26/23 01:34 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 25, 2023
Aug 25, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 25, 2023, 7:55pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on August 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s August 24 remarks about Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death established the Kremlin-approved narrative on the issue, and Russian government officials, Kremlin affiliates, and the Russian information space continued to toe this line on August 25
. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov lambasted suggestions and claims that Putin was involved in the death of Prigozhin, calling them “an absolute lie.”[1] Peskov stated that there are no official forensic details on Prigozhin’s death yet and claimed that Putin had not met with Prigozhin in the Kremlin in recent days.[2] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov mirrored some of Putin’s language about Wagner and Prigozhin by stating that Prigozhin “undoubtedly made a great contribution” to the Russian war effort in Ukraine.[3] The Russian information space largely followed the Kremlin-approved narrative and continues to refrain from linking the Kremlin to the plane crash.

Some prominent voices in the Russian information space notably deviated from Putin’s established narrative, however. Former Putin bodyguard and current Tula Oblast Governor Alexey Dyumin stated that it is possible to “forgive mistakes and even cowardice, [but] never betrayal,” and claimed that Prigozhin and Wagner Group founder Dmitry Utkin were not “traitors.”[5] Dyumin’s statement implies that the Wagner June 24 rebellion was not actually a rebellion. Some Russian sources floated Dyumin as a possible replacement for Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu after the rebellion, and Putin made a public point that Shoigu retains a dominant position.[6] Russian ”Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky stated on August 25 that some groups of sources, excluding imprisoned ardent nationalist Igor Girkin, are trying to use Prigozhin’s death to discredit Russian authorities to sow instability and argued that these claimed discreditation campaigns are a sign of instability within Russia.[7] Khodakovsky called for Girkin‘s release following Prigozhin‘s death on August 23 on the grounds that more (presumably good) people were needed to defend Russia.[8] Girkin’s official Telegram account published a statement from him via his lawyer on August 24, wherein Girkin claims that Prigozhin’s plane crash is indicative of deepening unrest within Russia - mirroring Khodakovsky’s complaint.[9] Girkin also claimed that the ”[19]90s are back,” implying that Putin’s broad effort to restore order to Russia following the chaos and gangsterism following the fall of the Soviet Union has failed — a direct attack on a central tenet of Putin’s claimed legitimacy.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko issued a statement on Prigozhin’s death on August 25 that likely aimed at balancing his relationship with the Kremlin with maintaining domestic control, but that also directly contradicted his previous statements concerning the deal he brokered between the Kremlin and Prigozhin. ISW incorrectly forecasted yesterday that Lukashenko would refrain from publicly speaking about Prigozhin’s death to avoid exacerbating his tenuous position with the Kremlin.[11] Lukashenko’s likely desire to maintain the appearance of being a sovereign leader appears to have outweighed any such concerns. Lukashenko asserted that Wagner would continue to operate within Belarus according to a system that he and Prigozhin had built in recent months and that 10,000 Wagner personnel will be in the country within a few days.[12] The Wagner contingent in Belarus has been reportedly declining in recent weeks, likely due to the Kremlin’s and Russian Ministry of Defense‘s (MoD) apparently successful effort to weaken Wagner.[13] Lukashenko directly responded to satellite imagery showing that up to a third of the tents at the Wagner camp in Tsel, Asipovichy, Belarus had been dismantled in the previous month and claimed that Wagner and Belarusian officials had only dismantled unnecessary tents not needed for the expected number of Wagner fighters.[14] It is extremely unlikely that 10,000 Wagner fighters will arrive in Belarus, nor are that many Wagner personnel needed as advisors and trainers to help Lukashenko build an unspecified Belarusian ”contract army.”[15] Lukashenko has routinely attempted to portray himself as a sovereign leader despite Russia’s current de-facto occupation of the country, and he likely hopes to prevent his domestic audience from viewing Putin’s almost certain assassination of Prigozhin as the Kremlin’s unilateral cancellation of agreements that he had made with Wagner.

Lukashenko also expanded on his role in the negotiations that led to the agreement that ended Wagner’s June 24 rebellion. Lukashenko stated that over a series of several calls he warned both Prigozhin and Utkin that pressing the rebellion would result in their deaths, portraying himself again as the one who convinced Prigozhin to end the rebellion.[17] Lukashenko likely hoped to underscore the initial deal and Wagner’s arrival in Belarus as examples of his ability to make high-level security decisions outside of the Kremlin’s dictates. Lukashenko endorsed the Kremlin narrative line that Putin had absolutely nothing to do with Prigozhin’s “accident,” dismissed assertions that a missile brought down the plane, and even claimed that he had warned Prigozhin via Putin about an unspecified assassination attempt.[18] Lukashenko notably tried to absolve himself of any responsibility for failing to protect Prigozhin by claiming that safety guarantees were never a part of the conversations he had with Wagner and the Kremlin.[19] Lukashenko had indicated on June 27, however, that Putin “promised” both Lukashenko and Prigozhin that Prigozhin and the Wagner would enjoy unspecified “security guarantees” in Belarus.

The Financial Times reported on the bleak future of the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa following Prigozhin’s death. The Financial Times (FT) cited people familiar with the matter as saying that Prigozhin’s recent trip to Africa may have aimed to prevent the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) from taking control of Wagner’s operations in Africa.[21] This report is consistent with ISW‘s previous assessment that Prigozhin was likely attempting to counter efforts by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin to weaken and destroy Wagner following the rebellion.[22] FT reported that a longtime acquaintance of Prigozhin stated that Wagner’s operations in Africa will likely struggle without Prigozhin’s leadership.[23] An FT source close to the Russian MoD stated that it is unlikely the Russian military would be able to fully replicate Wagner’s operations in Africa under Prigozhin if the Russian MoD did take over Wagner.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 25 and reportedly advanced as Russian milbloggers expressed concern over a lack of reinforcements and troop rotations in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified successes in the directions of the Novodanylivka-Novopokropivka (5-13km south of Orikhiv) line and the Mala Tokmachka-Ocheretuvate (9-25km southeast of Orikhiv) line.[25] A prominent Russian milblogger expressed concern about the ability of battle-weary Russian forces to defend against possible future renewed Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) amid claims that fighting shifted to southern Robotyne.[26] The milblogger claimed that many of the Russian servicemen fighting near Robotyne have been on the frontline since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and that these units struggle with a shortage of frontline reinforcements.[27] This claim supports ISW’s assessment that Russian forces fighting in the western Zaporizhia Oblast area have been defending against Ukrainian attacks since the start of the counteroffensive without rotation or significant reinforcement.

Reports of a Russian unit suffering significant losses with inadequate support on an unspecified island in the Dnipro River delta sparked outrage against the Russian military command in some parts of the Russian information space. Russian milbloggers amplified a complaint allegedly from personnel of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) claiming that elements were suffering significant casualties under Ukrainian artillery fire on an island in the Kherson direction and that commanders were ignoring the personnel’s calls for artillery fire.[29] The personnel claimed that a company commander tried to evacuate his unit from the island, but senior commanders stopped the evacuation, sent away the commander, and dismissed two other commanders who supported the withdrawal.[30] Russian milbloggers quickly jumped to criticize the Russian military command for failing to solve systemic issues among Russian forces on the Kherson frontline, including a lack of supplies and frontal assaults against Ukrainian east-bank positions under heavy artillery fire and with no support.[31] Milbloggers heavily criticized Russian commanders for failing to take accountability and for not resolving these issues.[32] The Russian information space previously eviscerated the Russian military command for similar failures combating a limited Ukrainian presence near the Antonivsky Bridge on the Kherson frontline in late June, and some milbloggers claimed that this widespread criticism was the only factor that compelled the Russian military command to fix the issues at the time.[33] The current round of criticism follows recent complaints about the failure to adequately respond to a limited Ukrainian presence on the east bank of the Dnipro River and criticism that Russian authorities never provided promised boats to Russian forces in the area.

Ukrainian drones likely struck a Russian duty station in occupied Crimea on August 25. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov stated that Ukrainian drones targeted the base of the Russian 126th Guards Coastal Defense Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) near Perevalne, Simferopol Raion.[35] Crimean Tatar Resource Center Head Eskander Bariev also stated that residents reported explosions throughout occupied Crimea, particularly near Perevalne.[36] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 42 drones at targets in Crimea but that Russian air defense and electronic warfare (EW) systems downed all 42 Ukrainian drones.[37] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that this was the largest Ukrainian drone strike in recent months.[38] GUR Chief Major General Kyrylo Budanov reiterated on August 24 that Ukrainian forces have the ability to strike any part of occupied Crimea.

Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful missile and drone strike against targets in Odesa Oblast overnight on August 24-25. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 missiles, two Kalibr missiles, and one Shahed-136/131 drone and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all five projectiles.[40] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that the Russian missiles targeted Odesa City and a port in Odesa Oblast.


Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s August 24 remarks about Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death established the Kremlin-approved narrative on the issue, and Russian government officials, Kremlin affiliates, and the Russian information space continued to toe this line on August 25.
Some prominent voices in the Russian information space notably deviated from Putin’s established narrative, however.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko issued a statement on Prigozhin’s death on August 25 that likely aimed at balancing his relationship with the Kremlin with maintaining domestic control, but that also directly contradicted his previous statements concerning the deal he brokered between the Kremlin and Prigozhin.
The Financial Times reported on the bleak future of the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa following Prigozhin’s death.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on August 25 as Russian milbloggers expressed concern over a lack of reinforcements and troop rotations in the area.
Reports of a Russian unit suffering significant losses with inadequate support on an unspecified island in the Dnipro River delta sparked outrage against the Russian military command in some parts of the Russian information space.
Ukrainian drones likely struck a Russian duty station in occupied Crimea on August 25.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Donetsk Oblast on August 25 and advanced.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on August 25 and reportedly advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian authorities are likely setting conditions to falsify the results of the September 2023 regional elections in occupied Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/26/23 03:17 AM

Heineken finally left Russia a bit late but they say they will never go back.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/27/23 12:48 AM

https://www.france24.com/en/africa/...in-west-africa-as-french-influence-wanes

China’s largest weapons producer, Norinco – the seventh-largest military equipment supplier globally – has opened a new sales office in Senegal, according to a South China Morning Post report published August 21.The company already has offices in Nigeria, Angola and South Africa.

Beijing also plans to set up offices in Mali and the Ivory Coast – where it already sells arms – with a physical presence for maintenance, repair and overhauls of vehicles and military equipment, specialist news site Military Africa reported on August 1.

The arrival of the weapons giant on Senegalese soil has also been reported in Chinese media, where it has been heralded as an advance for Chinese influence in West Africa and a challenge to the existing influence of Russia and France.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/27/23 05:04 PM

CEPA
Center for European Policy Analysis
INSIGHTS & ANALYSIS

ARTICLE

EUROPE'S EDGE

Ukraine — Victory Is Closer Than You Think
By Jan Kallberg
August 23, 2023

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is making substantial progress. Russia’s generals will know this, even if the West doesn’t.
The bleakness of the Western commentariat’s recent output is striking — Ukraine’s counteroffensive has made little progress, they say. Major US news outlets cite intelligence agencies opining that things are “grim” and that hopes are fading that Ukraine can reach its (supposed) objective of Melitopol, more than 50 miles away.
This is simply wrong. Intelligence analysts may look at the map of Southern Ukraine and see distances; military planners will apply the military math and see something very different. They know that to crush the Russian army and strangle the troops in frontline fortifications, they don’t need to advance 50 miles. 10 miles will do it.
Why? Because although it would be great if Ukrainian troops broke through to the shores of the Sea of Azov, they do not have to. Instead, they can achieve a significant operational outcome by bringing Russia’s ground line of communication (GLOC) under their guns.
On or around August 22, Ukraine’s troops liberated the village of Robotyne, some 90km (around 55 miles) from the Sea of Azov, a major accomplishment given the enormous efforts of the Russian invaders to fortify and hold it.
From here, the Ukrainians need to advance by a further 10–15 km (7–10 miles), in order to range their guns on Russia’s east-west transport routes that are critical to the ability of its army and armed forces to fight. If Ukraine can interdict these road and rail links, it’s very hard to see how the Russian army can continue to fight.
This will not be easy, but it’s reasonable to think it will happen. This will be achieved using its indirect capability — first the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), whose reach is about 80km-90km, and later its 155 mm artillery with a range of over 40km. These are hugely more capable than Ukraine’s pre-war 152mm Soviet-style artillery that have a range of only 17–20 km.
Russia’s GLOC does not run along the sands of the Azov Sea’s shores but rather inland and, therefore, closer to Ukraine’s advances. The M14 highway running east-west, and largely parallel to the coastline, is about 7km–10km from the shore. Nearby is the broader logistics corridor where the Russians place supply and ammunition dumps, fuel storage, higher-echelon command posts, reserve units, and logistic railheads.
This logistics corridor becomes increasingly narrow for every inch the Ukrainians liberate. Once the Russian assets mentioned above are within Ukrainian MLRS reach, the Russian senior leadership will have an almost impossible choice to make — will they be able to sustain operations west of Melitopol when every aspect of their fighting effort is under fire?
As winter approaches, the logistic situation west of Melitopol is likely to get worse and worse. As occurred on the western bank of the River Dnieper last fall, even Vladimir Putin will be forced to acknowledge reality – he can fight on and risk mass troop surrenders, or pull back. Either way, the so-called land bridge from Russia to Crimea will be snapped.
So Russian commanders will not think they have 90km of space to play with behind their backs. Their only consolation is that the Ukrainians can’t place MLRS artillery at the forward edge of the battle area; these units are extremely valuable and must be used from safer positions 10km–15km behind the frontline.
Operational commanders on both sides will know the math: if the Ukrainian army is 90km from the Sea of Azov, and MLRS has a maximum range of 90km but needs to be placed 10km behind the frontline, then the Ukrainians must advance another 10km southward to cover all the terrain between them and the Sea of Azov.
Ukraine is now closing in on this goal at several spots along the frontline, offering the possibility that its rocket artillery will be able to strike the Russian land bridge from different angles.
Once this happens, there is (forgive the use of this old term) a domino effect. All east-west roads and railroads will be in range, and at this point, Russian private companies will no longer be interested in risking their drivers and $150,000 trucks for a $700 cargo payment from Mariupol to Kherson oblast.
Russia has used civilian haulage contractors for many months now and offers good rates. But the chance of an artillery strike changes the calculation, creating the risk of driver deaths and financial disaster.
A modern private 18-meter truck can carry 15–30 tons of supplies, compared to a Russian Army Kamaz truck, which can carry only a few tons in an unstructured pile on the truck bed. Private companies can, of course, be ordered, nationalized, or otherwise coerced to supply the army, but that carries its own risk of disenchantment or outright anger aimed at the Kremlin.
There are other problems. While Russia’s occupation authorities claim a Crimean population of 2.5 million, the true number on the peninsula is likely closer to 1.5 million.
With Russia’s land bridge disrupted or closed by Ukrainian indirect fire or even its threat, Crimea would be solely supplied by the Kerch Bridge or by sea. At that point, the Kremlin would have to make ugly choices — either the Crimean population will suffer significant shortages during the upcoming winter, or the army will go short. The Kerch Bridge’s capacity, will likely not be enough to supply both the western part of the front and the civilian population.
So, how will Russians in Crimea react? We don’t know, but past Ukrainian attacks have led to an exodus of civilians. That’s hardly a message the Kremlin would welcome.
All of which is ahead of us. In the meantime, everything focuses on those 7-10km advances from Robotyne and other frontline areas. As always, the fighting and the dying will be done by Ukrainians, but the West absolutely must ensure that there are sufficient rocket artillery systems, ammunition, and support to do the job.

Jan Kallberg, Ph.D., LL.M., is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Mathematical Sciences at the United States Military Academy. He is a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Follow him at cyberdefense.com and @Cyberdefensecom.
https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-victory-is-closer-than-you-think/
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/28/23 02:34 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 27, 2023
Aug 27, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 27, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 27, 2023, 6:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern and eastern Ukraine.
Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun reported that Ukrainian forces are advancing in the directions of Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv), Mala Tokmachka (9km southeast of Orikhiv), and Ocheretuvate (25km southeast of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Shtupun also stated that Ukrainian forces advanced near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and achieved unspecified successes near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area) and in an unspecified location in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[2] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction.

A Ukrainian soldier, likely operating in the Robotyne area, offered further tactical details on the prepared Russian defensive positions that Ukrainian forces have penetrated and on those that are currently ahead of them. The Ukrainian soldier stated that, in the Robotyne area, there is a system of interconnected Russian trenches, dugouts, and limited underground tunnels that allow Russian forces to facilitate the movement of personnel, weaponry, and ammunition from different tactical positions along the front.[4] The Ukrainian soldier stated that anti-tank ditches and minefields stretch across fields in front of and in between these interconnected layers of defensive positions.[5] The soldier added that all “unexcavated” areas around these prepared defensive positions are heavily mined and that Russian forces have narrowly designated unmined paths in their defensive layers to allow Russian forces to reach firing positions.[6] The Ukrainian soldier did not indicate whether the Ukrainian forces had passed through the densest minefields but suggested that Ukrainian forces still had to demine areas at a gradual pace before advancing further.[7] ISW previously assessed that areas near the next series of prepared Russian defensive positions may be less heavily mined to give Russian forces operating north of these positions the ability to retreat, although the Ukrainian soldier’s reporting suggests that this may not be the case in the areas where Ukrainian forces are currently approaching the next Russian defensive layer.[8] Ukrainian forces are now within striking distance of the next series of Russian defensive positions, which appears to be comprised of a relatively more contiguous array of anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth anti-tank obstacles with Russian fighting positions behind these obstacles similar to the previous layer of Russian defenses.[9] The highly interconnected systems of trenches and dugouts that the Ukrainian soldier described is the result of months of Russian preparation and it is unclear if Russian forces extended that system throughout subsequent series of defensive positions further south.

The composition of Russian defensive positions in southern Ukraine and the ambiguities about how Russian forces are manning and equipping them continues to obscure how the next phase of fighting will transpire. ISW recently assessed that a lack of observed uncommitted Russian forces in the area may suggest that a subsequent series of Russian defensive positions may be less heavily defended than the positions that Ukrainian forces already penetrated to the north, although this remains unclear.[10] Russian forces have reportedly conducted additional lateral transfers to the Robotyne area with elements of the 76th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division from the Kreminna area in Luhansk Oblast and are also reportedly redeploying unspecified elements from the Kherson direction to the area.[11] Russian forces committed elements of the 7th VDV Division immediately to combat after laterally transferring them to the Robotyne area in early August, although the Russian command could decide to commit these new reinforcements to strengthen the next series of defensive positions south of the current Ukrainian advance.[12] Russian forces committed a considerable amount of materiel, effort, and manpower to hold the series of defensive positions that Ukrainian forces are currently penetrating, and it is unclear if Russian forces will retain the advantages they have held if they cannot commit the same level of resources and personnel to these next layers of defense.[13] The next Russian defensive layer will, nevertheless, very likely pose significant challenges for the Ukrainian advance.

Russian forces conducted missile strikes against targets in Ukraine on the night of August 26 to 27 and reportedly targeted a Ukrainian airfield in Kyiv Oblast. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted four Russian Kh-101, Kh-55, and Kh-555 cruise missiles out of eight unspecified Russian projectiles launched at Ukraine.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian missiles struck a Ukrainian military airfield near Pinchuky, Kyiv Oblast.

The Russian MoD appears to have unsuccessfully attempted to silence Russian milbloggers’ concerns over the alleged mistreatment of a Russian brigade operating in occupied Kherson Oblast — sparking further criticism from the ultranationalist community. A Russian state-affiliated war correspondent released a video on August 26 claiming to show five Russian servicemen of the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) currently operating on the Dnipro River delta islands in a trench.[16] The servicemen asked that Russian milbloggers stop spreading complaints on social media concerning the brigade’s alleged lack of artillery support and accused Russian milbloggers of harming the brigade’s operations in the delta area. The servicemen also called on milbloggers to fight on the frontlines if they wanted to help the Russian war effort. ISW reported on August 25 and August 26 that Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade were suffering significant casualties under Ukrainian artillery fire on an island in the Kherson direction and that commanders were ignoring the personnel’s calls for artillery fire.[17] Several Russian milbloggers responded to the appeal and claimed that the video was clearly staged to deflect criticism from the brigade’s leadership and the Russian MoD.[18] Russian milbloggers claimed that the servicemen appeared to be wearing new uniforms, which the milbloggers noted is inconsistent with claims that these servicemen are fighting in trenches. The Russian MoD had consistently tried throughout the full-scale invasion to silence criticisms in the Russian information space by accusing Russian milbloggers of violating Russian operational security.

The Russian Investigative Committee announced on August 27 that genetic tests confirm that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin was among 10 people killed in a plane crash on August 23.[20] Wagner commanders and representatives have refrained from commenting on the announcement and called on Russians to stop spreading rumors and fake news.[21] Wagner’s official Telegram channels were likely referring to Telegram channels that claim to be affiliated with Wagner and are baselessly speculating that Prigozhin is still alive.

Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian MoD had been actively setting conditions to halt Wagner Group’s operations in the Middle East and Africa prior to Prigozhin’s death on August 23. Kremlin-affiliated milblogger amplified reports that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov visited Syria and Libya to coerce local officials into severing their cooperation with Wagner forces.[23] Yevkurov reportedly told Syrian officials to block Wagner’s logistics to the Central African Republic (CAR) that originated in Syria and prompted Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas to deliver Wagner an ultimatum demanding that Wagner hand over weapons and leave Syria by September 20.[24] The reports noted that Yevkurov will likely be meeting with African officials to set similar ultimatums for Wagner personnel in other countries. Yevkurov also reportedly told Wagner representatives in Syria that there have been no decisions regarding who will oversee the Wagner contingent after Prigozhin’s assassination and urged them to enlist in the Russian MoD-affiliated “Redut” private military company (PMC) as well as preparing to disarm soon. The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD is trying to fully reassign Wagner personnel to either a “volunteer corps” based out of “Patriot” Park in Moscow Oblast or to the “Redut” PMC.[25] The milblogger added that the Russian MoD negotiators are afraid of directly pressuring Wagner personnel and are instead pressuring Middle Eastern and African officials to sever their ties with Wagner – leaving the Wagner personnel without a choice. The milblogger observed that Wagner cannot independently exist following the Russian MoD’s June 1 announcement that volunteer formations cannot be independent of the Russian MoD.

The Russian MoD may be more intensely focused on disbanding the Wagner Group than Russian President Vladimir Putin. Former BBC Russian Service investigative journalist Andrey Zakharov, citing unnamed sources, reported that Putin allowed Prigozhin to continue Wagner operations in the Middle East and Africa but instructed him to not intervene in Ukraine or Russia during one of their two meetings after Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24.[26] Zakharov added that the Russian MoD, on the other hand, intensified efforts to “strangle” Wagner in Syria and Africa, and Prigozhin together with Wagner’s leadership flew to Moscow to attempt to resolve this issue before his assassination. Zakharov added that currently, the fate of “Prigozhin’s empire” — inclusive of his military contracts and contracts for the extraction of oil, gas, and gold — in the Middle East and Africa is unclear. The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted that a third party, possibly another Russian force structure, should adopt Wagner’s foreign assets rather than having the Russian MoD do so to prevent tension and the destruction of these assets. A Russian source also claimed that the Russian MoD may have been rushing to disband Wagner because the Kremlin had yet to decide on Wagner’s fate and because the MoD wanted to be the first organization to assume control over Wagner’s leftovers.

ISW cannot independently confirm the validity of these reports, but if these accounts are true, they may indicate that Putin is not micromanaging the dissolution of the Wagner PMC but rather has passed this responsibility to the Russian MoD. The surge of these accounts across Russian milblogger and opposition communities, however, may also be an attempt to separate Putin from Prigozhin’s assassination and the prospective dissolution of Wagner.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern and eastern Ukraine.
A Ukrainian soldier likely operating in the Robotyne area offered further tactical details on the prepared Russian defensive positions that Ukrainian forces have penetrated and on those that are currently ahead of them.
The composition of Russian defensive positions in southern Ukraine and the ambiguities about how Russian forces are manning and equipping them continues to obscure how the next phase of fighting will transpire.
Russian forces conducted missile strikes against targets in Ukraine on the night of August 26 to 27 and reportedly targeted a Ukrainian airfield in Kyiv Oblast.
The Russian Investigative Committee announced on August 27 that genetic tests confirm that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin was among 10 people killed in a plane crash on August 23.
Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had been actively setting conditions to halt Wagner Group’s operations in the Middle East and Africa prior to Prigozhin’s death on August 23.
The Russian MoD may be more intensely focused on disbanding the Wagner Group than Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian authorities continue efforts to coerce migrants and foreigners living in Russia to fight in the war in Ukraine in exchange for Russian citizenship.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2023-0
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/29/23 06:39 PM

Putin orders security services to prepare for new mutiny after Prigozhin’s death: report
By Snejana Farberov
August 29, 2023 9:07am Updated

Paranoid Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered his security services to prepare for the possibility of a new military uprising after the death of Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin in a suspicious plane crash, according to a report.

Russia’s shadowy government agencies loyal to Putin are working on a plan to thwart future mutinies similar to the short-lived insurrection led by Prigozhin in June, according to two sources close to the Kremlin and a government official speaking anonymously to the Moscow Times.

The Wagner Group’s tanks that came within 124 miles of Moscow — before Prigozhin agreed to stand down — made an “indelible impression” on Putin, the report said.

Prigozhin, a one-time Putin ally, not only defied Russia’s top military leaders but disobeyed a “personal order” from Putin, thus posing the most serious threat to his 23-year rule, four separate sources close to the Kremlin told the publication.

Russian President Vladimir Putin listens to Omsk Region Acting Governor Vitaly Khotsenko during a meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, Monday, Aug. 28, 2023.

Vladimir Putin is said to be preparing for a new military uprising in the aftermath of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death.
AP

As a result of the botched insurrection, the 62-year-old Prigozhin was reportedly labeled a threat to Putin’s regime.

There has been much speculation about what caused Prigozhin’s private jet with 10 people on board, among them the renegade Wagner Group boss — previously labeled a “traitor” by Putin — and his second-in-command, to fall out of the sky over the Tver region last week.

The country’s top criminal investigation agency, the Investigative Committee, officially confirmed Prigozhin’s death Sunday but did not say what might have caused the disaster.

The country’s top criminal investigation agency, the Investigative Committee, officially confirmed Prigozhin’s death Sunday but did not say what might have caused the disaster.
AP

A preliminary US intelligence assessment concluded that an intentional explosion brought down the aircraft.

The Kremlin was quick to shut down allegations that it had orchestrated Prigozhin’s assassination in retaliation for the June mutiny, dismissing them as an “absolute lie.”

But doubts remain, even within Russia.

A preliminary US intelligence assessment concluded that an intentional explosion brought down the aircraft.
AP

“Many members of Wagner believe that the government might be (behind Prigozhin’s death). And the government cannot ignore such risks,” said Oleg Ignatov, the International Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Russia.

Just two days after the plane crash, Putin signed a decree requiring Wagner mercenaries and members of other paramilitary groups to sign an oath of allegiance to the Russian state, swearing to defend the “constitutional order.”

“Putin wants a tighter grip on Wagner, to make sure that he would not be faced with a repeat crisis in the future,” said Natia Seskuria, an expert with the London-based Royal United Services Institute.

https://nypost.com/2023/08/29/putin-orders-security-services-to-prepare-for-new-mutiny/
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/30/23 01:41 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 29, 2023
Aug 29, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 29, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 29, 2023, 8:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on August 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Bakhmut in Dontesk Oblast and Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29.
Geolocated footage published on August 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bakhmut and about five kilometers southeast of Robotyne.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[2] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun reported on August 28 that Ukrainian forces continued to secure positions in Robotyne and are demining the area.[3] Shtupun reported that Ukrainian forces could bring more troops to the Robotyne area and would have greater opportunities for maneuver.[4] Shtupun noted that Robotyne is near the highway to Tokmak, an important Russian ground line of communication (GLOC).[5] A Russian milblogger suggested that Russian forces are continuing to commit a significant number of reserves, Airborne (VDV) elements, and TOS-1 thermobaric artillery systems to the area – likely indicating that Russian forces are worried about the vulnerability of their positions in Robotyne.[6] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces intend to deplete Ukrainian offensive potential by fixing Ukrainian forces in engagements in the settlement of Robotyne.

Russian sources continued to express concerns over Russian vulnerabilities in eastern and western Zaporizhia Oblast. One Russian milblogger claimed that the situation near Verbove (18km southwest of Orikhiv) is “very dangerous.”[8] Russian “Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky, reportedly defending the eastern Donetsk-western Zaporizhia Oblast border area, claimed that Russian forces in his sector are stretched in a long arc along the frontline, are having difficulties transferring reserves, and lack resources.[9] Khodakovsky claimed that Ukrainian efforts to cut off Russian transport routes would further complicate the situation.[10] Khodakovsky has previously highlighted concerns about the Russian defense in the eastern Donetsk-western Zaporizhia Oblast border area, specifically relating to poor Russian counterbattery capabilities, heavy Russian losses, exhausted Russian forces, and a lack of reserves.[11] The “Vostok” Battalion claimed that Ukrainian forces disrupted their logistics on August 28 by striking their rear area with drones.[12] The “Vostok” Battalion noted that Ukrainian shelling has wounded several of its personnel and that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems are failing to down Ukrainian aircraft and drones.[13] Khodakovsky’s and the “Vostok” Battalion’s complaints are likely those of tactical commanders focused on their own local issues on a sector of the front that is of lower priority to Russian theater commanders who are focusing efforts in western Zaporizhia. These concerns could well be valid, but senior Russian commanders could have contingencies in place should the situation here deteriorate that they have not troubled to communicate to Khodakovsky and his colleagues. Such tensions between de-prioritized tactical commanders and higher commanders are not uncommon in war.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and reported Wagner logistics and security head Valery Chekalov were buried on August 29 in St. Petersburg in separate cemeteries, likely to prevent the creation of a single pilgrimage site that would establish the deceased Wagner members as martyrs. Prigozhin’s and Chekalov’s funerals were held at the Porokhovskoye and Severnoye Cemeteries, respectively.[14] The funerals were closed to the public, and Russian police and National Guard (Rosgvardia) units secured the areas.[15] The Kremlin’s likely efforts to separate the Wagner burial sites to prevent their martyrdom in the public eye may prove ineffective as the official Telegram channel of Prigozhin’s press service, which had been inactive since June 26, publicly confirmed Prigozhin’s burial site on August 29 and called on anyone “wishing to say goodbye” to visit.[16] Wagner-affiliated sources did not comment on the future of the Wagner private military company, likely indicating a hesitancy within the organization to appoint a successor given the Kremlin’s and the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) efforts to destroy the Wagner Group since the rebellion and the challenges any successor loyal to the Kremlin would likely face in securing his position within Wagner.

Russian milbloggers accused the Russian MoD for the fifth consecutive day of attempting to conceal concerns over the mistreatment of a Southern Military District (SMD) brigade operating in occupied Kherson Oblast.[18] Russian milbloggers have continued to criticize the Russian MoD for mistreating elements of the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District). The milbloggers also accused the Russian MoD of reportedly staging a response video in which five men claiming to be serving in the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade called on milbloggers to refrain from discussing the brigade’s alleged lack of artillery support and supplies in the Dnipro River delta area.[19] One milblogger noted the Russian military command began punishing servicemen of the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for speaking out about these problems and added that state-affiliated milbloggers and propagandists are discrediting that concerns of a unit that is operating on a dangerous coastal frontline on the east (left) bank Dnipro River.[20] Milbloggers also claimed that these problems began after the Russian military command appointed a former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 100th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade commander with the alias “Skif” to command the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.[21] Milbloggers claimed that “Skif” had previously “destroyed” the 100th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade while receiving state honors.[22]The Russian MoD notably has yet to silence these complaints, which may indicate that the Russian military command is unsure it can effectively do so at this time.

These milblogger persistent complaints are likely an attempt to spark command changes that may favor Russian Airborne Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, who reportedly oversees Russian forces in southern Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command needs to immediately change its leadership if Russia wants to win the war and claimed that Ukrainian forces pose a threat to the allegedly mistreated 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.[23] Ukrainian small-scale raids, however, do not pose a significant threat to the Russian grouping of forces in occupied Kherson Oblast – and milblogger concern is more likely aimed at discrediting unwanted commanders such as “Skif,” who was likely appointed by the Russian Chief of General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov or “Dnepr” Group of Forces (Kherson Oblast) Commander Colonel General Oleg Makarevich. Some of these milbloggers have previously complained about Gerasimov, Makarevich, and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu for failing to respond to Ukrainian threats in occupied Kherson Oblast, not providing boats to Russian forces, or blaming them for other military failures.[24] Some of these milbloggers had specifically attacked Makarevich, whom the Russian military command previously appointed to replace Teplinsky in January 2023 before Russian President Vladimir Putin reinstated Teplinsky in March-April 2023.[25] Some of these milbloggers also have a history of publicly praising Teplinsky and opposing Gerasimov’s or Shoigu’s efforts to remove Teplinsky from his position after the Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24.[26] Teplinsky had been previously loosely affiliated with Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and had repeatedly been insubordinate to Gerasimov and Shoigu.[27] Teplinsky may have lost some authority since the rebellion or may be attempting to prevent Gerasimov and Shoigu from undermining his authority. These complaints may also be a part of an ongoing campaign to discredit Makarevich that existed prior to the rebellion and highlight that factional divisions within the Russian military command have continued past the rebellion.

The Russian MoD may be reverting to the more limited coverage of the war in Ukraine while attempting to censor complaints along the frontline and reports of Ukrainian advances. The Russian MoD recently changed its daily reporting style to reduce the daily amount of information it reports on the war.[28] The Russian MoD previously issued a daily situational report that differed from the individual situational reports from the press services of each Russian grouping of forces.[29] The press services of each Russian grouping of forces issued text directly copied from the overall daily situational report instead of their own original reports on August 29, however.[30] The Russian MoD has consistently attempted to institute an information policy that would provide limited information about the frontlines throughout the war.[31] The Russian MoD’s change in reporting, if this trend continues, may reflect its wider efforts to censor Russian reporting on the war and unify its own narrative.

The US State Department announced a new military aid package for Ukraine on August 29. The $250 million package includes AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, mine clearing equipment, HIMARS rockets, and Javelin anti-armor systems.

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin is currently focused on promoting five main information operations against Ukraine, all of which ISW has observed. The GUR reported on August 29 that the Russian Presidential Administration held a meeting on August 25 to approve the specific narratives that Russian media should promote in the information space.[33] The Russian narratives include claims that Ukraine is conducting mass mobilization regardless of age, gender, or health; claims that Ukraine’s Western partners are disappointed in Ukraine‘s prospects for victory; claims that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is failing; claims that the Ukrainian government is completely corrupt and is not fighting corruption and; claims that Russian authorities provide good living standards and conditions in occupied Ukraine.[34] Russian First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko and Russian media representatives reportedly attended the meeting. ISW has observed all five false narratives in the Russian information space.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces advanced near Bakhmut in Dontesk Oblast and Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29.
Russian sources continued to express concerns over Russian vulnerabilities in eastern and western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and reported Wagner logistics and security head Valery Chekalov were buried on August 29 in St. Petersburg in separate cemeteries, likely to prevent the creation of a single pilgrimage site that would establish the deceased Wagner members as martyrs.
Russian milbloggers accused the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for the fifth consecutive day of attempting to conceal concerns over the mistreatment of a Southern Military District (SMD) brigade operating in occupied Kherson Oblast.
These milblogger persistent complaints are likely an attempt to spark command changes that may favor Russian Airborne Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, who reportedly oversees Russian forces in southern Ukraine.
The Russian MoD may be reverting to more limited coverage of the war in Ukraine while attempting to censor complaints along the frontline and reports of Ukrainian advances.
The United States State Department announced a new military aid package for Ukraine on August 29.
The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin is currently focused on promoting five main information operations against Ukraine, all of which ISW has observed.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border area but did not make confirmed advances.
The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 29 that the Russian MoD is still unlikely to meet its targets for volunteer recruitment, despite offering incentives such as high salaries and additional social benefits.
Ukrainian sources reported that occupation authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/30/23 01:42 AM


US allocates quarter of a billion for new military aid to Ukraine
The United States has announced a new $250 million military aid package for Ukraine. The cargo includes ammunition for Himars missile systems, artillery guns, Javelin anti-tank missile launchers and firearms.

The aid package also includes spare parts, ambulances and equipment to defuse mines, according to the US State Department. Training and transport are also included in the package.

Since the outbreak of war, Washington has transferred more than $43 billion worth of equipment and ammunition to Ukraine. The US is by far the most important military ally of the government in Kyiv.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/30/23 01:47 AM


Drone attack reported at Russian airport
Four transport planes were damaged in a drone attack on an airport in the western Russian city of Pskov, the Russian state news agency TASS reports. It concerns four aircraft of the Ilyushin Il-76 type. Two of them went up in flames. It is unknown who is responsible for the attack.

According to the governor of the region, it appears that no injuries have been reported. Images he posted on Telegram show thick black clouds of smoke. The official states that the Russian army is in the process of repelling the attack. According to reports on Telegram, anti-aircraft systems around the city were in action. Pskov is near the borders with Latvia and Estonia, two NATO member states.

Meanwhile, Russia reports that it has destroyed four crewed vessels belonging to the Ukrainian army in the Black Sea. It is unknown what kind of vessels are involved. There were a maximum of fifty people on board at the time, the Russians say. Russia also says it has downed Ukrainian drones in the regions of Bryansk, Kaluga and Orlov. The information cannot be independently verified.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/30/23 02:02 AM

But I'm glad the Russians take care of this terrorist and mass murderer.

MH17 perpetrator Girkin longer in custody in Russia
Russian nationalist Igor Girkin, who is held partly responsible for the downing of flight MH17 in 2014, will remain in custody for longer. He was arrested in Russia last month. He is suspected of inciting extremism, which could lead to a prison sentence of up to five years.

Girkin had turned out to be a critic of President Putin. He also criticized Defense Minister Shoygu and how the war against Ukraine is being conducted.

Last November, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia in the Netherlands for his role in the downing of MH17 over eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014.
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/30/23 07:13 AM

I watched the video "Modern Conflicts: The Battle of Bakhmut" on the Nebula Channel. It was posted originally on August 18, 2023. It's part of the Real Life Lore Series. Some Real Life Lore videos appear on YouTube, But others, like The Battle of Bakhmut do not, for various reasons.

Here is a description of the video:

For over a year, the Russian and Ukrainian armies threw just about everything they had into a massive battle for control over the small city of Bakhmut in the east of Ukraine. The fight for the city gradually evolved into the most significant and most catastrophic battle fought in Europe since the Second World War, with tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of tanks committed by both sides.

This is the link where I watched the video:
https://nebula.tv/videos/reallifelore-modern-conflicts-the-battle-of-bakhmut
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/31/23 01:05 AM


Large series of drone attacks in Russia: 'Putin underestimates the Ukrainians'

A series of drone strikes across the country, including an attack on an airport hundreds of miles from Ukraine. Russia today reported what may have been the largest coordinated drone attack on Russian territory since the Russian invasion of Ukraine last year.

Moscow accuses Ukraine of being behind the drone strikes, but Ukraine, as usual, has not claimed responsibility.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 08/31/23 01:10 AM


Drone attack on Russian airport in Pskov
The airbase in Pskov is located about 600 kilometers from Ukraine. In a briefing to journalists, a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry said the drones could not have covered such distances without information from Western countries.

Nevertheless, former Commander of the Dutch Army Mart de Kruif does not consider it likely that the West has much to do with it. "That Russia says this also stems from the idea that Ukraine is militarily inferior to Russia. Putin underestimates the Ukrainians. You can see that in how optimistically he started the war, also based on the course of the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014."

But Ukraine is capable of more than the Russians would like to believe, says De Kruif. "The country has quite a modern arms industry. Most of the drones have been developed by Ukraine itself. It must be said that the drones are not very complicated to make."
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/01/23 12:26 AM

Ukrainian troops pass Serovikin line: 'Now it gets interesting'

Chiem Balduk

Foreign editor

Ukrainian troops have managed to pass the main defense line in the south. It concerns the so-called Surovikin line, named after the Russian commander who was responsible for the construction of the strong Russian defense lines last winter. Military experts speak of an important step in the counteroffensive.

Verified images show that Ukrainian troops, presumably reconnaissance units, are present at the village of Verbove in the Zaporizhia region. That would mean that the soldiers have defied several defenses. The message follows shortly after the liberation of the village of Robotyne, which lies just before the Surovikin line.

The presence in Verbove is a more important development than the capture of Robotyne, says Belgian Lieutenant Colonel Tom Simoens of the Royal Military School in Brussels. "Robotyne was in the 'crumple zone', in which the Russians held back and exhausted the Ukrainians. Verbove is a step further. If you break through this line, things can go quickly."

However, there is no breakthrough yet. It is still unclear whether the presence of troops was temporary or permanent. For the time being, it seems that the Russians are retaining control over the village, says Simoens. "Russian attack helicopters can be seen over Verbove. They only fly over their own area."

Hand out blows
It is clear, however, that the Russians are concerned about this local Ukrainian advance, says former commander of the Land Forces Mart de Kruif. "There are signs that the Russians are moving units elsewhere and moving them here. That is significant."

Conversely, it is also becoming clear that the Ukrainians are fully committed to this point in order to maintain momentum. "We see Ukrainian units active that we have not yet seen. We also see more Western equipment appearing in this area," says De Kruif. "That is a sign that they are now using the center of gravity."

The Ukrainian counter-offensive is progressing more slowly and slowly than expected, mainly because of the strong Russian defenses. The strategy was therefore adjusted : no major attack, but many small steps in the hope of exhausting the enemy. "But you can't always throw one blow and then let the other recover," says Simoens. "You also have to throw a punch and make sure the other person stays on the ground."

That is why former commander De Kruif will closely monitor the front in the coming days. "If the Ukrainians progress now, that means the next Russian lines are weak and it could go fast. If they don't progress, they've lost momentum here. So it's definitely going to be interesting."
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/01/23 12:53 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 31, 2023
Aug 31, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF










Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark

August 31, 2023, 6:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on August 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 31 and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front.
The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions and achieved unspecified success in the direction of Novodanylivka-Novoprokopivka (5km to 13km south of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified success in the Bakhmut direction.[2] Ukrainian Chief of the Main Directorate of Missile Forces and Artillery and Unmanned Systems of the General Staff Brigadier General Serhiy Baranov stated that Ukrainian forces have reached parity in counterbattery capabilities with Russian forces.[3] Baranov stated that NATO-provided artillery systems with ranges of 30km to 40km allow Ukrainian forces to destroy Russian artillery systems and force Russian forces to move their artillery further from the frontline.[4] Ukrainian officials previously made statements in late July indicating that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign is successfully degrading Russian counterbattery capabilities.[5] Russian sources have repeatedly expressed concerns since mid-July over the lack of Russian counterbattery artillery capabilities, particularly in southern Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted Ukraine’s domestic production of long-range missiles on August 31, likely as part of a coordinated Ukrainian campaign promoting increased Ukrainian strike capabilities against Russian deep rear areas. Zelensky stated that a Ukrainian-produced long-range weapon successfully hit a target 700 kilometers away, but did not provide further details about the strike or the weapon.[7] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov previously stated on August 26 that a new but unspecified Ukrainian-made missile struck a Russian S-400 air defense system in Crimea on August 23, and Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Major General Kyrylo Budanov stated on August 24 that Ukrainian forces have the ability to strike any part of occupied Crimea.

Russian authorities arrested a notable fringe ultranationalist Russian milblogger on accusations of discrediting the Russian military, likely as part of centralized efforts to silence some critical milblogger voices without prompting a general backlash. Russian authorities arrested Andrei Kurshin, who reportedly runs the Telegram channel “Moscow Calling,” on August 31 but did not specify what content Kurshin posted that prompted the charges.[9] The “Moscow Calling” channel routinely criticizes Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and notably commonly attacks many aspects of Russia’s military conduct of the war in Ukraine while supporting the ultranationalist goals underpinning the war itself. The wider Russian ultranationalist information space welcomed Kurshin’s arrest and noted that he routinely discredited the Russian military by mocking Russian military deaths and writing ”vile” thoughts about the Russian war effort.[10] ”Moscow Calling” also regularly supports imprisoned Russian ultranationalist Igor Girkin, likely generating further Kremlin opposition towards Kurshin.[11] Elements of the wider Russian ultranationalist community revealed Kurshin's previously anonymous identity in April after he joked about the assassination of Russian milblogger Maksim Fomin (Vladlen Tatarsky), and at the time milbloggers called on Russian authorities to punish Kurshin for fostering anti-government attitudes online.[12] Kurshin and Girkin’s arrests suggest that the Kremlin may be arresting prominent ultranationalist voices that the wider community largely reviles to avoid backlash as the Kremlin intensifies its effort to increase its long-term control over the Russian information space.[13] Kurshin’s arrest does not necessarily portend wider repression of more mainstream Russian milbloggers. Milblogger reactions, including those who have been outright critical of the Russian military leadership, additionally suggest that the milblogger community has been and is willing to establish unofficial guidelines for what is permissible criticism of the war and the Russian leadership. The Kremlin likely benefits from and encourages this self-policing, to a certain degree, among milbloggers - tolerating some criticism while cultivating key milbloggers and seeking to silence particularly critical voices.

Russian military authorities allegedly ordered the detention of three Russian milbloggers who have recently criticized the Russian MoD – a move that sparked a backlash in only a small corner of the Russian information space. Russian milbloggers claimed that the commander of the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and possibly a high-level Russian military official ordered Russian Military Counterintelligence to detain the three Russian milbloggers who have recently been critical of the Russian MoD’s handling of issues within the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.[14] Reactions to the detention orders were largely isolated to the small community that has been perpetuating discussions about the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade since August 25, indicating that the Russian MoD is likely choosing targets whose punishment will not have significant repercussions in the Russian information space and this discussion is unlikely to last in the wider milblogger space.

Imprisoned Russian ultranationalist Igor Girkin and his associates conducted likely futile political maneuvers intended to coalesce into a coherent and meaningful political opposition group. Girkin announced on August 31 that he intends to run for president in the 2024 Russian presidential elections, but primarily used the announcement to reiterate his longstanding critiques of Russian President Vladimir Putin.[16] Girkin’s theoretical “campaign” will have little to no impact and should not be construed as a direct political threat to the Kremlin. Girkin criticized Putin for being an ineffective military leader, failing to remove inept senior officials, and for prioritizing rich billionaires and longtime friends over the needs of Russia - all of which are longstanding rhetorical points from Girkin.[17] Girkin’s announcement is not a serious presidential bid (and the Kremlin will not allow it to be one) but rather an attempt to bring attention to Girkin’s imprisonment, his longtime criticisms of Putin, and his attempts to form a political movement. Kirill Fedorov, member of the Girkin-run Angry Patriots Club, stated that Girkin’s presidential announcement is a surprise and that the Angry Patriots Club had previously decided against Girkin or other members participating in the coming electoral cycle after Girkin’s arrest, and did not discuss the possibility of Girkin running for president during a recent meeting.[18] The Russian Movement in Support of Strelkov (Igor Girkin) announced on August 30 that it formed the ”Russian Strelkov Movement” and unanimously elected Girkin as its head, one of many recent political announcements likely aimed at preventing the movement from fracturing without Girkin's leadership and voice to hold the movement together.[19] Girkin’s August 31 announcement prompted limited reactions in the Russian ultranationalist information space that largely centered around confusion, sarcastic support, and criticism of the alleged presidential bid due to Girkin‘s and Russia‘s current political situations.[20] Prior announcements about the formation of political movements from Girkin’s associates have not resulted in any significant reaction, and the Angry Patriots Club is likely desperate to maintain relevance and cohesion with Girkin imprisoned.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 31 and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted Ukraine’s domestic production of long-range missiles on August 31, likely as part of a coordinated Ukrainian campaign promoting increased Ukrainian strike capabilities against Russian deep rear areas.
Russian authorities arrested a notable fringe ultranationalist Russian milblogger on accusations of discrediting the Russian military, likely as part of centralized efforts to silence some critical milblogger voices without prompting a general backlash.
Russian military authorities allegedly ordered the detention of three Russian milbloggers who have recently criticized the Russian MoD – a move that sparked a backlash in only a small corner of the Russian information space.
Imprisoned Russian ultranationalist Igor Girkin and his associates conducted likely futile political maneuvers intended to coalesce into a coherent and meaningful political opposition group.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and unsuccessfully counterattacked in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 31.
Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia and Russify Ukrainian youth.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/02/23 04:43 AM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/03/23 01:22 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 2, 2023
Sep 2, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2023

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 2, 2023, 5:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on September 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 2.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[1] Russian milbloggers who have recently maintained that Russian forces hold positions in the southern part of Robotyne claimed that Russian forces withdrew from the southern outskirts of the settlement to unspecified positions further south.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on September 1 that Ukrainian forces have overcome the Russian “first line of defense” in some areas of the Zaporizhia direction, but that the situation remains difficult due to additional Russian concrete fortifications and dense minefields.

The New York Times reported on September 2 citing Ukrainian military personnel that Russian forces are spreading inflammable agents on mined fields and igniting them with drone-launched grenades while Ukrainian forces clear mines from the areas in an effort to hinder Ukrainian mine clearing efforts that have allowed Ukrainian forces to advance in certain areas.[4] Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Commander Colonel Margo Grosberg reported on September 1 that Ukrainian artillery capabilities are “equal or even better” than those of Russian forces and have been able to push Russian artillery units back from the frontline, preventing them from supporting Russian forces.[5] This observation is not universally true across the frontline, as Ukrainian units regularly report coming under heavy Russian artillery fire corrected by Russian drones. Grosberg also stated that Ukrainian forces have been successful at severely damaging Russian artillery radars since July.[6] Russian sources have repeatedly expressed concerns since mid-July over the lack of Russian counterbattery artillery capabilities, particularly in southern Ukraine.

Select Russian sources claimed that Russian officers of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) defending in Zaporizhia Oblast contacted former 58th CAA commander Major General Ivan Popov due to the worsening situation at the Russian frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Popov has maintained contact with his former subordinates in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and a Russian insider source claimed that these officers turned to Popov for help instead of their new commander.[8] The Russian military command dismissed Popov as the commander of the 58th CAA (Southern Military District) in early July after he engaged in clear insubordination by attempting to bypass Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and bring his complaints about poor counterbattery capabilities, heavy losses, and a lack of rotations directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[9] Russian sources have routinely expressed concern about the issues that Popov highlighted and their detrimental impacts on the Russian defensive effort in southern Ukraine.[10] Popov partially established a precedent for insubordination, and his conduct reportedly prompted the Russian military command to begin removing similarly insubordinate commanders from frontline units, although not all reports of commanders removed were confirmed.[11] Russian sources claimed that Popov encouraged his former subordinates to report the truth about the front to the higher Russian command, possibly encouraging them to replicate his insubordination.[12] Popov’s contact with his former subordinates, if true, suggests that Popov’s replacement has not won the trust of his subordinates either because he is less competent or because he is less forthright with senior Russian leadership about continuing challenges facing the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia.

The Russian ultranationalist information space response to a Russian critique of anti-Western mindsets and Russian propaganda demonstrates that the ultranationalist community retains the ability to coalesce around certain issues. Director of the Russian think tank the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, Valery Garbuzov, published an article on August 29 criticizing Russian ruling elites who, he argues, have created and perpetuated a series of “utopian myths” about Russian hegemony, the “crisis of capitalism,” and Russia’s claimed leadership of a global anti-Western coalition.[13] Prominent voices within the Russian ultranationalist information space levied largely coherent criticisms against Garbuzov’s article on September 2, criticizing Garbuzov’s argument and the Russian political and informational structures that allowed Garbuzov to hold a prominent position in the Russian political sphere.[14] One prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Telegram channels have filled an analytical gap in the Russian information space following the onset of the war in Ukraine that think tanks should fill and continue to do so 18 months later.

Prominent Russian milbloggers likely have a monetary incentive to regularly report information about the war in Ukraine that is uncritical of Russian authorities. BBC reported on September 1 that prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that they can make between about 48,000 and 188,000 rubles (about $500 to 1,950) per advertisement on their Telegram channels.[16] BBC reported that an advertising agent working with Wagner-affiliated channels claimed that a prominent Wagner Group-affiliated source made around 31,500 rubles (about $330) per advertisement.[17] The advertising agent told BBC that several employees of RIA FAN, a now-shuttered media outlet affiliated with former Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, received only about 10,500 to 21,800 rubles (about $108 to $226) per advertisement due to their lower subscriber count.[18] BBC noted that Russia’s average monthly salary is about 66,000 rubles (about $685). Prominent milbloggers’ monthly salaries are thus likely much higher than the Russian average. Russian milbloggers are likely economically incentivized to maintain and grow audiences through war reporting that is uncritical of Russian authorities, as criticism of the Russian authorities, resistance to attempted censorship, and potential legal problems could lead to a decrease in advertisements, although milbloggers who present themselves as telling unpleasant truths can also gain large followings. Alexander “Sasha” Kots, a prominent milblogger who also serves on the Kremlin’s Human Rights Council, claimed that milbloggers have a “direct channel to privately communicate information” to the Russian MoD.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 2.
Select Russian sources claimed that Russian officers of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) defending in Zaporizhia Oblast contacted former 58th CAA commander Major General Ivan Popov due to the worsening situation at the Russian frontline.
The Russian ultranationalist information space response to a Russian critique of anti-Western mindsets and Russian propaganda demonstrates that the ultranationalist community retains the ability to coalesce around certain issues.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 2.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along at least one sector of the front on September 2 and advanced near Bakhmut, in western Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) has formed its own Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) units, elements of which reportedly operate both on the front line and in far rear areas of occupied Ukraine.
Russian and occupation authorities are encouraging residents of occupied Ukraine who are residing in Russia to vote in the occupation regional elections, likely to increase voter turnout and the perception of electoral legitimacy.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2023
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/04/23 05:45 AM

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230904-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-russia-strikes-ukraine-grain-exporting-port-ahead-of-putin-erdogan-talks

Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky said Sunday that defence minister Oleksii Reznikov will be replaced this week with Rustem Umerov, a Crimean Tatar lawmaker.

Zelensky made the announcement on his official Telegram account, writing that new leadership was needed. Later in his nightly address, Zelensky said he believes “that the Ministry needs new approaches and different formats of interaction both with the military and with society".

Resnikov’s removal comes after a scandal around the ministry of defence’s procurement of military jackets. In August, Ukrainian investigative journalists reported that the materials were purchased at a price three times higher than normal and that instead of winter jackets, summer ones were ordered.

In the customs documents from the supplier, the jackets were priced at $29 per unit, but the ministry of defence paid $86 per unit. Reznikov denied the allegations during a news conference last week.

Umerov, 41, a politician with the opposition Holos party, has served as head of the State Property Fund of Ukraine since September 2022. He was involved in the exchange of prisoners of war, political prisoners, children and civilians, as well as the evacuation of civilians from occupied territories and was part of the Ukrainian delegation in negotiations with Russia over the UN-backed grain deal.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/05/23 02:10 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 4, 2023
Sep 4, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 4, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 4, 2023, 7:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian light infantry has advanced to positions beyond anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth anti-tank obstacles that comprise the current Russian defensive layer ahead of the Ukrainian advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces likely intend to hold those positions. ISW is not prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have breached this Russian defensive layer in the absence of observed Ukrainian heavy equipment in these areas.
Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced to tree-line positions that are east of the Russian anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth obstacles that are a part of a tri-layered defense immediately west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[1] Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Ukrainian light infantry has also advanced further into a series of prepared Russian defensive positions along the road that runs northwest into Verbove.[2] Other geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to Russian defensive positions between Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[3] Ukrainian forces are widening the breach they have already made in one Russian defensive layer and are reportedly maneuvering more equipment and personnel into tactical rear areas of this layer.[4] Ukrainian forces appear to be making gains in the immediate vicinity of the not-yet-breached Russian defensive layer that runs northwest of Verbove to north of Solodka Balka (20km south of Orikhiv) with infantry assaults and heavy artillery fire on Russian positions further into and south of this layer.[5] The deployment of Ukrainian heavy equipment and more substantial forces to these areas than ISW has so far observed would indicate both a breach of this Russian defensive layer and an effort to widen that breach.

Russian forces reportedly attempted to expand minefields in southern Ukraine following the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in June. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported that the Russian command determined at the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive that Ukrainian forces might be able to easily breach the Russian doctrinal minefield depth of 120 meters leading Russian forces to aim to increase the depth of their minefields up to 500 meters.[6] RUSI stated that Russian forces lacked enough mines to mine these larger areas as densely as Russian doctrine dictates, causing Russian forces to deviate from doctrine, including by using improvised explosive devices and a wider and differential distance between mines.[7] RUSI stated that Russian forces tried to compensate for decreased minefield density by increasing the effectiveness of anti-tank mines by placing two on top of each other.[8] Ukrainian operations across several sectors of the front have likely further compounded these constraints on the Russian effort to expand minefields by forcing Russian forces to disperse their mining efforts along wide sectors of the frontline. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun stated on September 3 that minefields near the next series of Russian defensive positions in western Zaporizhia are less dense than the initial defensive layer that Ukrainian forces advanced through.[9] ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian forces may encounter denser minefields at certain sections of subsequent series of Russian defensive positions, however.

Limitations on Russian artillery capabilities and Ukrainian advantages in counter-battery fire are forcing the Russians to deviate from their own doctrine, RUSI reported. RUSI stated that Russian forces have been attempting to adapt their fire doctrine since before Ukrainian counteroffensive operations began.[11] RUSI noted that Russian forces are attempting to prioritize strike accuracy over volume because they lack enough ammunition to sustain doctrinally designated artillery fire, have difficulties transporting a large volume of ammunition to frontline areas, and are seeing diminishing effectiveness of mass strikes as they lose counterbattery radars and their guns suffer from barrel wear.[12] RUSI stated that Russian forces are attempting to increase the production of Krasnopol laser-guided shells and the use of Lancet drones (loitering munitions) in order to increase accuracy and reduce the number of munitions used in attacks.[13] RUSI also observed that Russian forces have often prepared their fighting positions for remote demolition with improvised explosives instead of striking their own positions with artillery after Russian forces have withdrawn, as Russian doctrine dictates.[14] These adaptations suggest that reduced Russian artillery capabilities may be further weakening the Russian defense in certain sectors as artillery fire is a critical component of the Russian elastic defense. A shift towards more precise fire doctrine may allow Russian forces to strengthen these capabilities, but constraints on Russian training capacity will likely prevent Russian forces from implementing this shift at scale in the near term. Russian sources have continually claimed since the start of the counteroffensive that the Russians lack sufficient counterbattery capabilities on various sectors of the front.[15] Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Commander Colonel Margo Grosberg reported on September 1 that Ukrainian artillery capabilities are “equal or even better” than those of Russian forces and have been able to push Russian artillery units back from the frontline, preventing them from supporting Russian forces.

Russian forces conducted a drone strike on Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts on the night of September 3-4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 32 Shahed 136/131 drones from Cape Chauda, Crimea, and Primorske-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of September 4 and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 23 of the drones.[17] Ukrainian Southern Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that drones struck port infrastructure in Reni and Izmail, Odesa Oblast.[18] Head of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Council Mykola Lukashuk reported that a drone strike destroyed 1,500 tons of grain in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[19] Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Oleg Nikolenko stated that a Russian drone fell on Romanian territory, which the Romanian Ministry of Defense subsequently denied.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative until all of Russia’s extensive terms are met at a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Putin reiterated claims that the West ignored its obligations to allow Russia to export grain and fertilizer at a meeting with Erdogan in Sochi, Russia on September 4.[21] Putin claimed that Russia will supply 25,000 to 50,000 tons of grain for free to unspecified African countries in “the coming days.”[22] Putin and Erdogan claimed that Turkey is willing to help process and transport one million tons of grain intended for these countries.[23] Putin and Erdogan also announced Qatar’s interest in providing financial support so that these countries can receive free grain.

Head of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine Erik Mose stated on September 4 that the commission has not yet concluded that Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine.
Mose stated that the commission must determine the intent of the perpetrators and identify the “need” to physically or biologically exterminate a certain group to meet the legal qualifications under the Genocide Convention.[25] Mose stated that the commission has found evidence for a large number of war crimes, specifically evidence of torture and strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure that the commission could consider as crimes against humanity.[26] Mose also stated that the commission previously determined that certain statements in Russian mass media could be considered as incitement to commit genocide.[27] Mose noted that the commission’s investigation into genocide in Ukraine will continue.[28] Article II of the 1948 Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention) states that “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measure intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”[29] Article III states that “the following acts shall be punishable: genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide; complicity in genocide.”


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian light infantry has advanced to positions beyond anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth anti-tank obstacles that comprise the current Russian defensive layer ahead of the Ukrainian advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces likely intend to hold those positions. ISW is not prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have breached this Russian defensive layer in the absence of observed Ukrainian heavy equipment in these areas.
Russian forces reportedly attempted to expand minefields in southern Ukraine following the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in June.
Limitations on Russian artillery capabilities and Ukrainian advantages in counter-battery fire are forcing the Russians to deviate from their own doctrine, RUSI reported.
Russian forces conducted a drone strike on Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts on the night of September 3-4.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative until all of Russia’s extensive terms are met at a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Head of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine Erik Mose stated on September 4 that the commission has not yet concluded that Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 4.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 4.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced on September 4 that the Russian military will not be holding “Zapad-2023” joint strategic exercises scheduled for September.
Russian occupation officials continued the fifth day of early voting for Russian regional elections in occupied territories on September 4.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/05/23 07:00 PM


Russian FSB major-general is seriously injured along with his son when Ukrainian bomb hidden in his mobile phone explodes
Yuri Afanasevskii, 64, is in a critical condition in hospital as is his son after attack
Russian sources have blamed the Ukrainian SBU secret service for the attack in the Russian-occupied Luhansk People's Republic
By WILL STEWART

UPDATED: 16:22 BST, 5 September 2023


A major-general in the Russian FSB security services has been seriously wounded after an explosion at his house in Luhansk.

Yuri Afanasevskii, 64, and his son are in a critical condition in hospital.

Explosives were reportedly planted by a Ukrainian sabotage group in a mobile phone that had been handed to Afanasevskii.

Russian sources blame the Ukrainian SBU secret service for the attack in the Russian-occupied Luhansk People's Republic.

Afanasevskii was head of customs in the area of Ukraine's Luhansk that Vladimir Putin's forces annexed in 2014 and last year claimed to incorporate into Russia.

He was sanctioned by Britain, the EU, Canada, Switzerland and Japan.

Yuri Afanasevskii, a major-general in the Russian FSB security services, has been seriously wounded after an explosion at his house in Luhansk, according to reports

The major-general was shown to have financial interests in the British Virgin Islands.

A woman has been detained and is under investigation for attempted murder and handing an explosive device to the FSB officer.

She gave him 'a mobile phone with an explosive device that was set off after the phone was activated. The attacker is detained, she has already confessed,' said the Russian Investigative Committee.

Investigators had 'interrogated a wide range of people' and 'seized objects of interest' over the explosion.

A report by the Russia Today news channel said the FSB official's wife was also injured in the explosion.

A statement from the Russian Investigative Committee said: 'The man and his son received multiple injuries. They are currently in a medical facility.'

Reports of the attack on Afanasevskii came just days after another senior Russian officer was killed by a drone in Russia while mowing his lawn on his day off.

Alexei Chernykh, deputy chief of a local branch of the anti-corruption police, was blown up by a drone at his home in the Russian village of Shchetinovka, reports said.

The village sits just one mile from Russia's border with Ukraine in the Belgorod Oblast, which has come under frequent drone strikes in recent months as Ukraine has stepped up its cross-border attacks.

The Telegram channel Baza, which has known ties to Russian security services, said a drone dropped a bomb on Chernykh's property on Sunday, August 27.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/06/23 12:20 AM

Putin underestimate the Ukrainian SBU secret service they are former KGB and supported by BND, Mossad, CIA, M16 etc..
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/06/23 01:40 AM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/06/23 07:10 PM


PERSEVERANCE AND ADAPTATION: UKRAINE’S COUNTEROFFENSIVE AT THREE MONTHS
MICHAEL KOFMAN AND ROB LEE
SEPTEMBER 4, 2023
COMMENTARY


On June 4, Ukraine launched its long-awaited offensive. The operation has proven to be a test of Ukrainian determination and adaptation. Despite stiff resistance, Ukrainian forces have made steady gains in a set-piece battle against a heavily entrenched force. Ukraine’s main effort is a push from Orikhiv, with the goal of driving south past Tokmak and ideally reaching Melitopol. If successful, this would sever Russian lines along the Black Sea coast and endanger supply routes from Crimea. The second is at Velika Novosilka, a secondary offensive operation likely aimed at Berdyansk, also along the coast. The third is a supporting offensive along the flanks of Bakhmut further to the north. Ukraine has made gains here, pinning several Russian airborne units. The offensive is gaining momentum, and much remains undecided, but three months in offers an opportunity to take stock of the operation thus far.

This has become a war of tree lines, with shifts in the line often counted in hundreds of meters. Artillery fire and drones dominate the battlefield, as small groups of infantry advance through dense minefields, field by field, tree line by tree line. Progress has been fitful and slower than expected, as acknowledged by President Volodymyr Zelensky and now former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov. However, Ukraine’s recent gains illustrate that it has worn down Russian defenses over time, leveraging an advantage in fires and long-range precision weapons to steadily press Russian forces back from their defensive positions. That said, Ukraine will need to both break through Russian lines and exploit that success to reach its objectives. Much could be decided in the coming weeks.

As we and others predicted, this kind of operation was bound to be difficult and costly. Without air superiority, a decisive advantage in fires, and limited enablers to breach Russian lines, any military would have faced similar struggles in such an operation. This is especially so against a force that had time to entrench, preparing a layered defense replete with minefields and fortifications. Ukraine’s military changed tactics, from initially trying to breach Russian lines in a mechanized assault to taking a more familiar attritional approach that achieved incremental gains. Over time this approach can work, and has worked for the Ukrainian armed forces in the past, but each battle has its own context with a different set of conditions, geography, and forces in play.

Ukraine needs more air defense, mine clearing, and similar enabling capabilities. Western assistance over the past 18 months has enabled Ukraine, but it has also limited Ukraine’s options, resulting in undertrained units having to go up against a well-prepared defense without the benefit of air support. However, the challenges of this are not only due to capability and capacity shortcomings. The Ukrainian military continues to struggle with scaling offensive operations, and conducting combined arms operations at the battalion level and above, with most attacks being at the level of a platoon or company. These are important areas to address in Western training programs, as we have discussed with our colleagues in various episodes of the War on the Rocks podcast and the Russia Contingency.

There is no single answer to the challenges Ukraine faces. The problem cannot be reduced to a lack of Western tactical aviation. The more important factors remain ammunition, training, providing the necessary enablers, and effective resource management in a war of attrition. War requires regular adaptation, since few plans survive contact with the enemy, but the process of adaptation equally requires identifying what has worked and what has not. The ability to discuss these challenges openly (which, in our view, doesn’t include leaks to newspapers from behind a veil of anonymity) is what separates successful militaries from those like Russia’s, which often falsifies success and buries bad news. Indeed, a poor understanding of how Ukraine’s military fights, and of the operating environment writ large, may be leading to false expectations, misplaced advice, and unfair criticism in Western official circles.

Ukraine’s summer offensive is coming down to the balance of attrition over time, which side has more reserves, and who can better manage their combat power in a prolonged slugfest. In order to sustain Ukraine’s war effort, Washington should support Kyiv’s preferred approach, which means resourcing ammunition for an intensive fight, providing the requisite long-range strike systems, and supporting enablers. However, it should also learn from this experience, tackling long-term issues such as training, helping Ukraine improve its ability to conduct operations at scale, and transitioning to employ Western airpower along with the associated organizational changes to make it effective. It is also critical for Western countries to draw the right lessons from the development and performance of Ukraine’s new brigades to improve future training efforts. The details discussed in this article are based on open sources and our own field research in Ukraine, but do not disclose anything that is not publicly available about ongoing operations.

State of Play

The offensive has thus far played out as a shaping phase, an initial breaching effort, followed by a prolonged attritional period with fitful gains, leading to the better progress seen in more recent weeks, as both sides are increasingly forced to pull from their reserves. In advance of the offensive, Ukraine spent several weeks conducting shaping operations to set the conditions for the assaults, including attacks on Russian command and control with Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles, raids into Russia’s Belgorod region, and various sabotage efforts. These were designed to weaken Russia’s ability to defend and potentially force Moscow to redirect forces away from Ukraine’s main effort. The initial axis of attack began with a localized counteroffensive around Bakhmut in mid-May, designed to draw Russian forces there by steadily pressuring the flanks. Then Ukrainian units attempted an advance along the Velika Novosilka axis in the south, followed by a push from Orikhiv farther west in Zaporizhzhia.

Ukrainian forces made gains along the flanks of Bakhmut, but the initial advances along the main axis in the south were not as successful as anticipated. In the second week, Ukraine managed to capture a string of towns running south of Velika Novosilka, but the progress afterwards there has been slow. What appeared to be the main axis of advance in this offensive, led by the 47th Mechanized Brigade south of Orikhiv toward Robotyne, also stalled early on. Most of the gains have been at the first Russian line of defense, but this is also where Russian forces had focused their defensive effort, making them particularly significant. The Ukrainian attack has created a salient that is steadily being widened. At the time of this writing, Ukrainian forces have degraded the defending Russian units, and show signs that they may have penetrated the main defensive line near Verbove, but the details are too early to assess. Ukrainian forces have recently liberated Robotyne, and pushed east of it, which represents an advance of about ten kilometers since the offensive began. The distance of advance has been similar on the Velika Novosilka axis at the furthest point.

Ukraine’s overall gains along the three axes of the counteroffensive (Map by Nathan Ruser, based on data from DeepState, an established Ukrainian OSINT source)

While there is no way to truly know what percentage of combat power has been committed, at this point most of the Ukrainian brigades expected to be involved in the offensive, including air assault reserve units, are contributing to the fight in one fashion or another. It is unclear if Ukraine is transferring additional forces from other fronts, though some recent reporting suggests this might be the case. Russia has also deployed strategic reserves, including the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division and 76th Guards Air Assault Division, and elements of its Dnipro task force in Kherson.

A Hard Start

Ukraine likely has more combat power available to continue the attack, but heavier equipped units were indeed committed early in the operation, and the initial attack was not mere reconnaissance or probing, but rather a focused effort to rapidly break through Russia’s forward positions. Indeed, 9th Corps’ 47th Mechanized Brigade is arguably the best equipped new brigade with Bradley M2A2 infantry fighting vehicles. Images also showed that Leopard 2A6 tanks as well as scarce Leopard 2R and Wisent mine-breaching vehicles took part in the brigade’s initial assaults, which indicated that the Orikhiv axis was the priority and not just a probing or diversionary action.

The initial assault fell victim to a myriad of planning, reconnaissance, and coordination issues, which have been widely covered in the news. However, as we explore these, it is important to note that any Western military forced to employ units with only a few months of training would have struggled with such challenges.

One Ukrainian unit ran into problems that forced it to miss the start of the assault by a couple of hours. This meant the unit went into the assault long after the main suppressive artillery barrage had been fired, leaving its assault forces vulnerable to unsuppressed Russian artillery and antitank guided missiles. That advance was supposed to occur under the cover of darkness but instead happened near dawn, negating the advantage provided by their Western armored vehicles’ superior night vision capabilities. Another Ukrainian unit mistook the friendly units holding its flank for the initial Russian line and in the confusion engaged the friendly force . A different grouping became disoriented at night, stacking the formation, which made them vulnerable to Russian artillery and antitank guided missile fire. In some cases, vehicles from the new brigades might have struck mines emplaced by the units whose lines they had to pass through or run into mines by deviating from lanes cleared by the mine-clearing vehicles. These issues were not characteristic of the overall offensive, but of the initial problems faced by new brigades.

Some commentators had assumed the initial assault was not the main effort, and three months in, some still characterize the offensive as in its “early stages.” This reveals the continued problem with a lack of understanding of how Ukrainian forces typically operate. A Ukrainian brigade in the attack in practice is often two or three companies advancing, reinforced by armor, and support elements. A reinforced company or company tactical group is the main element of the assault. Even then, coordination is difficult and prone to mishaps, as the initial offensive illustrated. It takes an entire brigade to plan this kind of action. Significantly increasing the scale is a challenge for Ukrainian forces, especially among newer brigades who lack the experience and command staff training. The initial assault was the breaching effort, but it did not succeed.

Around Bakhmut, for example, many of Ukraine’s mechanized assaults feature one to two squads backed by two tanks. Ukrainian tank units, according to our field research, rarely mass at the company level because of the risk of losing too many tanks at once. Tank battles are rare. Tanks spend much of their time supporting infantry and providing indirect fires. They generally operate in pairs, or in platoons, supporting infantry attacks. This offensive has largely been characterized by platoon-level infantry assaults, fighting tree line to tree line. Despite their size, brigades often have a limited number of platoons and companies that have assault training, constraining the forces available for such tasks. Ukrainian forces conduct mechanized assaults when the conditions permit it, but Russian minefields, antitank capabilities, and artillery remain a potent threat whenever Ukraine masses combat power near Russian defenses. This reality stands in stark contrast to expectations that hundreds of tanks or infantry fighting vehicles will charge forward into Russian lines in a cinematic assault.

Western criticism — often appearing in the form of anonymous leaks by officials — sometimes holds that Ukraine won’t mass forces and accept the inherent casualties in such an assault. This fails to appreciate the real constraints on that military’s capacity to employ forces at scale. The United States has been misinterpreting this as a failure to commit forces to the offensive. Ukraine’s challenges at scaling how it employs forces cannot be overcome by a few months of training and Western equipment. Ukraine’s military excels at mobile and positional defense. It is also highly effective in small unit tactics and in effective employment of fires to degrade the Russian military. Given the challenges the new brigades faced at the beginning, brigade assaults with multiple battalions instead of companies likely would have exacerbated coordination issues and led to greater losses. There is also a failure to appreciate that steep losses to the assault element can significantly impact a brigade’s ability to continue operations and the confidence of its command staff. This is especially so for newer brigades with non-veteran troops.

Ukrainian preferences stem from an understanding of where their strengths lie, given the organizational capacity, experience, force quality, and limited enablers to support a larger scale assault. Western training efforts have suffered from being overly compressed, but also Ukrainian units are not necessarily trained in the West the way they would actually fight in Ukraine, using the same systems, tactics, techniques, and procedures. This is in part because Western training efforts cannot necessarily replicate said conditions. All of this points to the need for future Western training efforts to evolve — to become better linked to the realities of this war and how Ukrainian forces fight it — but also for greater understanding of the operating environment.

The Ukrainian attempt to breach Russian lines in the early days of the offensive was not deterministic for how the offensive would unfold, but it was an important test of whether newly formed brigades with Western equipment and training could more effectively overcome a prepared Russian defense. The offensive also featured a corps structure for the first time helping to coordinate logistics for the various brigades involved, with an overall operational or “front” command layer above the corps. This strategy made choices and took on risk. Putting new brigades into the lead assault role, along the two most expected axes of advance, with a plan that involved nighttime operations, compounded the risk. In addition, Ukraine chose the Orikhiv-Tokmak area as the main axis of advance, which is the most fortified part of the Russian defenses. These units faced a daunting task against a well-prepared defense with dense minefields, entrenched troops, numerous antitank guided missiles, loitering munitions, and attack helicopters backing the Russian lines.

However, based on our research in Ukraine, it also appears the new brigades lacked sufficient unit cohesion and experience, making mistakes that experienced brigades were less likely to make. Not just the infantry battalions and breaching elements but also the artillery and supporting components were new, while the brigade staff lacked sufficient time to train. These brigades were also comprised of freshly mobilized personnel, many without prior military experience, with officers pulled from other units. The new brigades were unfamiliar with the terrain, having not been previously deployed in that area. Asking them to conduct their first assault, in some cases at night, was a tall order. The new brigades’ issues forced other units — including less-well-equipped national guard units — to step into their assigned tasks, in some cases completely replacing them on the line. Indeed, even poorly equipped territorial defense units, which are typically used to defend, have taken part in capturing towns as part of the counteroffensive. Notably, some new brigades have performed better. After early setbacks, the 47th Mechanized Brigade managed to adapt and to advance, and the 82nd Air Assault Brigade appears to have achieved success soon after it was committed. This is likely because their training and equipment was prioritized among the new brigades, and possibly due to the 82nd commitment until much later in the offensive.

Defaulting to Attrition

After the first week, the operation moved into an attritional phase, not dissimilar to the offensive in Kherson. Ukrainian forces have been degrading the Russian defense with artillery fire, HIMARS, drones, and select strikes with Storm Shadow missiles against high-value targets. Ukraine is also attempting to interdict the flow of Russian supplies from Crimea by striking the connecting bridges and rail stations, including a strike on the Crimean bridge, reportedly with naval drones. An intense counter-battery battle has been playing out between Ukrainian and Russian artillery units, with HIMARS increasingly used in a counter-battery role due to improved Ukrainian ability to target behind Russian lines, and apparent distribution of HIMARS systems to individual units.

Despite the natural tendency to focus on settlements liberated, the balance of attrition will prove more significant in shaping Ukraine’s offensive prospects than anything else. This war has consistently demonstrated the difficulty of orchestrating a combined arms offensive against a prepared defense, with attrition proving the key enabler for maneuver warfare. This is in part due to the inability of one side to attain air superiority over the other, but the issue cannot be reduced to this single factor. Given Russia’s layered defensive lines, minefields, and entrenchments, it was unlikely that the Ukrainian military will be able to attain a breakthrough without first inflicting high levels of attrition on the defending Russian force. That said, this process is not necessarily linear, and lines can collapse once available manpower is no longer available to defend them or reinforcing units cannot deploy in time.

To some extent this approach favors the way Ukraine fights, even though it is not representative of what Western allies may have wished to see. Ukrainian forces prefer sequenced assaults, making fires the decisive element and exploiting with maneuver, less so using fires as a supporting component of a maneuver force. Ukrainian infantry has been conducting assaults typically as platoon- and company-sized elements. This is painfully slow and by itself cannot generate momentum, but Ukrainian units are generally better than Russian ones in the close battle. Ukraine is also likely sustaining less attrition by operating in small, dismounted units, but it offers less of an opportunity to achieve a rapid breakthrough. Similarly, with penetrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, Ukraine has been gaining the advantage in the counter-battery battle over time. Steady decimation and blinding of Russian artillery fire by targeting counter-battery radars have helped Ukraine establish a visible fires advantage.

Ukraine has killed multiple Russian generals in Storm Shadow missile strikes and has targeted logistics nodes and key bridges. These strikes have complicated Russian operations, enabling progress, but by themselves, long-range missiles have not proven a panacea. Part of the reason is Russian adaptation after the introduction of HIMARS systems last year, hardening command and control nodes, dispersing logistics, and pushing supplies directly to the front. A robust strike campaign to isolate the theater of operations by focusing on Russian lines of communication might have greater effect. Yet four months of strikes with Storm Shadow missiles suggest that the task of severing Russian supply lines with missiles alone is harder than some might believe.

Attrition makes for poor headlines, but it plays to Ukraine’s strengths, whereas attempting to scale offensive maneuver under such difficult conditions does not. It is, however, burdensome to resource, pressuring Washington to finally authorize dual-purpose improved conventional munitions — cluster munitions for lack of artillery ammunition available. Cluster munitions are a nasty weapon with lingering effects, but there is no other way to sustain Ukraine’s demands for artillery ammunition. This was a critical decision, extending the timeline available to give Ukraine’s approach the opportunity to succeed. They are also more effective against forces in the open and manned trenches. But the dual-purpose improved conventional munition stockpile is not just meant for the offensive. It will be used to sustain Ukraine’s war effort well into next year, until Western production increases sufficiently. This suggests that the primary factors affecting Ukraine’s offensive could still be ammunition and force availability.

A Daunting Task

In the south, the Russian military entrenched at the level of a combined arms army. In practice, this means overlapping minefields, strong points, concrete reinforced trenches, bunkers, and multiple defense lines with communication trenches between them. Russian forces have also adapted with nasty innovations — for example, decoy trenches mined with explosives that can be remotely detonated once they are occupied by Ukrainian soldiers. Russian anti-tank guided missile teams have deployed cameras in front of their positions to identify advancing Ukrainian vehicles, and they have dug tunnels that can be used to transfer ammunition, equipment and personnel They regularly counterattack lost positions, though the overall strategy is not to retain lines at any cost.

Minefields are presenting one of the greatest challenges to Ukraine’s offensive, not dissimilar to the situation Russian units faced in Vuhledar over the winter. Russian forces have deployed more mines than normal in Russian doctrine, according to our field research. Individual Russian company positions generally have minefields with hundreds or thousands of TM-62M antitank mines in front of their positions. They have been stacking three TM-62M mines on top of each other specifically to destroy — not just damage — the mine-rollers and trawls used by breaching vehicles and tanks. These are supplemented by TM-83 explosively formed penetrator antitank mines, often placed in tree lines to target tanks and armored vehicles from the side as they drive down the dirt paths that frequently run parallel.

These antitank mines are often mixed with antipersonnel mines to inflict greater losses when vehicles are disabled, including PMN-4 pressure plate mines, OZM-72 bounding mines, and MON-50 and MON-200 directional fragmentation mines. Russian forces are also using FAB-100 and FAB-250 aerial bombs as improvised mines. Russia is remotely deploying mines with artillery, ISDM Zemledeliye mine-laying systems, and even drones, such as the POM-3 and PFM-1 antipersonnel mines. These are used to refill lanes cleared by Ukrainian sappers and to mine roads behind Ukraine’s front lines. Ukrainian mine-clearing vehicles, including those that carry mine-clearing line charges, are a priority target for Russian defenders and antitank guided missile teams. This has forced Ukraine to employ them more cautiously.

Ukrainian infantry units are having success assaulting Russian positions, but the mines force them to move in a slow and deliberate manner to reach them. Even when infantry units can advance on foot, lanes have to be cleared to bring up vehicles. This complicates casualty evacuation for advancing infantry units and makes it more difficult to bring other supporting capabilities, such as air defense, logistics, and artillery, closer to the front line, which are critical for sustaining momentum. In addition, Ukraine’s advantages in night vision capabilities, which have been strengthened by Bradley vehicles and Leopard tanks, are reduced by these minefields. According to Ukraine’s Brig. Gen. Oleksandr Tarnavskiy, who commands the offensive in the south, “As soon as any equipment appeared there, the Russians immediately began to fire at it and destroy it. That’s why de-mining was carried out only by infantry and only at night.” The presence of mines, even when paths are cleared, has a psychological effect on traversing forces that makes most combat tasks more difficult.

Russian defenses were also stronger than expected, stymieing the initial assault. As Tarnavskiy has also said “In my opinion, the Russians believed the Ukrainians would not get through this line of defence. They had been preparing for over one year. They did everything to make sure that this area was prepared well.” This is different from the fighting in Kherson last year, where secondary lines were well manned while the forward positions folded quickly. In the south, Russian units have densely deployed antitank guided missiles along the forward line. They are defending by employing drones for observation, a heavy use of artillery, antitank guided missile strikes by infantry and spetsnaz units as well as Ka-52 attack helicopters, Lancet and improvised commercial first-person-view drone loitering munition strikes, and glide bombs dropped from Russian fighters and bombers. Ka-52, first-person-view drone, and Lancet-3 strikes are a pernicious problem, because advancing forces lack the same air defense and electronic warfare coverage when attacking.

Russia has also begun deploying modernized Ka-52M helicopters, which can launch the Vikhr-1 and longer-range LMUR antitank missile beyond the range of Ukrainian tactical air defenses. In many cases, a tank or armored vehicle will become immobilized after hitting a mine and then be destroyed by attack helicopters or drones. Russia is forced to ration the use of artillery due to ammunition shortages, but still employs artillery fire and aviation to disrupt advances. Although minefields can be penetrated, breaching them while the defender has good observation and can employ artillery and precision-guided weapons proves costly.

At the end of July, Ukraine began to commit elements of the 10th Corps in assaults along the Orikhiv axis in the south. After more than a month of primarily small-unit dismounted advances in the south, Ukrainian forces attempted a mechanized assault again in company-sized elements, particularly east of Robotyne. The Ukrainian military likely hoped to commit 10th Corps after the 9th Corps had already breached the first main defensive line. 10th Corps includes the NATO-trained 116th, 117th, and 118th Mechanized Brigades, as well as the National Guard 3rd and 14th Brigades. Although these 10th Corps brigades largely replaced 9th Corps at the front, 9th Corps’ 47th Mechanized Brigade continues to fight and recently helped liberate Robotyne.

In mid-August, Ukraine appears to have begun committing elements from its reserves, including the 46th Airmobile and 82nd Air Assault Brigades. The addition of these units seems to have achieved quicker results, as Ukrainian forces liberated the heavily fortified town of Robotyne and continued to advance to the south and east. The current situation is fluid. Geolocated footage and reporting suggests Ukrainian forces, possibly a reconnaissance unit, have advanced past the anti-tank obstacles on the first part of the “Surovikin line” towards Verbove. Though it is unclear if this is just a small dismounted force, or if Ukraine has managed to breach those defenses with vehicles. Ukrainian forces have also advanced towards Novoprokopivka and its eastern flank. The Ukrainian military appears focused on further degrading the Russian defenses and widening the salient, because a narrow advance could leave its forces vulnerable to counterattacks on the flanks. The renewed assault does point to a changing dynamic, forcing the Russian military to react in order to try and stabilize the situation.

The coming weeks are likely to prove decisive, as the battle hinges on available reserves and resolve. Despite recent advances in Staromaiors’ke and Urozhaine, Ukrainian forces are approximately 11 kilometers from the main defensive line along the Velika Novosilka axis, and it appears they have shifted resources to the Orikhiv axis instead. Though the distance to the “main lines” is a less relevant metric than the attrition being inflicted. What matters most is where Russian forces choose to concentrate and man their defense.

Although the 82nd and 46th Brigades achieved results, they were enabled by other units having spent weeks of fighting over those areas. Russian forces appear worried and have also deployed reserves. There are indications that Russia has transferred elements from the airborne force’s 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions, as well as other forces, to that axis. The Russian military likely made this decision after Ukraine began to commit its reserve units, which reduced the risk of a strong Ukrainian advance elsewhere. Ukraine’s recent advances appear to be largely conducted by dismounted units, but to achieve momentum, they will need to employ mechanized formations again. This will put to the test whether weeks of attrition, establishing an advantage in fires, and deep strikes against bridges, logistics, and command-and-control nodes have set the necessary conditions for a Ukrainian breakthrough. In particular, Ukraine’s ability to effectively suppress and degrade Russian anti-tank capabilities could prove critical.

For Russia, the problem is straightforward: The entrenchments matter most if they’re manned. If their forces are degraded, and they lack reinforcements, these defenses will slow down but not impede Ukraine’s advance. It also depends whether Russia chooses to employ its reserves for counterattacks or to man the multiple lines of defense. For Ukraine, the primary challenge is not in breaching Russian lines, but rather doing so with sufficient forces in reserve to exploit that breach toward its objectives.

Russia’s Defense: Doctrine or Folly?

Despite appearances, Russia is not executing a true defense in depth. Russian forces are set up for such a defense, which enables a defender to degrade the attacker as they advance, trading space for attrition. They have constructed three defensive belts, minefields in between, communication trenches, and hardened defensive points in between. This was likely Gen. Sergei Surovikin’s vision (and his name provides the nickname for these defensive lines). But Surovikin is not in charge. Gen. Valeriy Gerasimov, the chief of general staff, is. He has consistently demonstrated poor military judgment and a weak understanding of what Russian forces can and cannot do, most recently in the failed Russian winter offensive. Russian forces have chosen to defend forward of the Surovikin line, concentrating their efforts on holding the first line of defense and the towns that anchor it. To be clear, the first line does feature extensive entrenchments, including tunnel networks. The follow on lines include machine dug trenches, anti-tank ditches, dragons teeth, and likely more minefields. The Russian decision to defend forward has favored Kyiv because it allowed Ukrainian artillery to attrite the Russian units deployed.

In Russia, the strategic concept of “active defense,” often mentioned by Valeriy Gerasimov, encourages maneuver defense and counterattack. This may be what we are seeing from Russian forces now. Essentially a defensive-offense, active defense envisions persistent engagement of an opponent rather than emphasizing a static or positional defense. Russia’s defense has featured regular counterattacks, which also depleted its armor, and available maneuver forces. The Russian military is rotating troops through the front line, but that force has been steadily worn down. On the other hand, Ukraine has also expended considerable combat power fighting in the first line of Russian defenses before reaching the other defensive belts and entrenchments. The course of this battle is therefore increasingly determined by who has the most reserves available and who pursues the best force management strategy over time.

Russian forces have consistently counter attacked during Ukraine’s counteroffensive. While in some cases they have been able to retake towns seized by Ukrainian units or prevent consolidation, their strategy is aggressive and costly. Given the dearth of forces available, the Russian approach has been aggressive and overconfident. Russian units are often fighting in front of their best fortifications instead of leveraging them for advantage. They can fall back if they are put in a disadvantageous position, but this approach has major tradeoffs: If Russian forces suffer too much attrition in holding forward positions or counterattacking to return them, they risk leaving their forces too weak to properly defend the rest of the defensive line. Hence, an “active” approach has stymied Ukraine’s advance, but at the cost of depleting the Russian defense forward of what were considered the ‘main lines.’ Consequently, solely looking at whether Ukraine has broken through the defensive lines is the wrong way to evaluate this offensive’s progress. Most of the fighting, and the attrition, has taken place at the first Russian line of defense, which Ukraine has pressed through at Robotyne and near Verbove.

Russia has a sizable force in Ukraine, but the quality varies significantly, and a sizable portion of that force consists of mobilized regiments. In the south, it appears the front line is largely being held by a mix of regular tank and motorized rifle regiments, mobilized units, naval infantry, and Storm Z units, which are manned by convicts. Storm Z units are distributed to motorized rifle companies to use as forward-deployed expendable infantry, typically along the first line of defenses. Naval infantry and more capable motorized rifle troops hold strong points and towns and are used for counterattacking. The Russian defense features echeloned battalions, with others in the rear. In addition, elements from the 22nd and 45th Spetsnaz Brigades are reportedly defending in the Orikhiv axis. These units appear to be playing a key role in locating targets for artillery strikes and providing a greater anti-armor capability to conventional units with antitank missiles and loitering munitions.

When in contact some Russian units have fled, but others have held their positions even when under pressure from advancing Ukrainian forces. This reinforces the challenge of integrating soft factors and intangibles such as morale into assessments, because the observed effects can be inconsistent and difficult to generalize. Some Russian units are defeated by smaller Ukrainian elements, some abandon positions, and others hold the line and counterattack. Poor morale surely afflicts Russian forces — with attendant effects on cohesion and performance — but it has not yet been severe enough to destabilize their lines and thereby permit sizable Ukrainian advances.

As an example, as we learned during our field research in June 2023, Russia’s 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Division, 58th Combined Arms Army) defended a key part of the front south of Orikhiv that included Robotyne. As of late June, it was reinforced with a Storm detachment, two Storm Z convict detachments, multiple companies and reconnaissance groups from the mobilized Territorial Troops’ 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment, a company from the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment, an Akhmat motorized rifle battalion, and a battalion from the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade. Russia appears to have added a fourth motorized rifle battalion to the regiment’s table of organization, which lacks armored vehicles like the other battalions, to provide more infantry. Compared to its prewar structure of three motorized rifle battalions, the 291st defended with a force closer to the size of six or more infantry and motorized rifle battalions plus a tank battalion and other supporting assets.

The regiment was defending with two echelons. The first was held by two of its motorized rifle battalions reinforced with the less-well-equipped and -manned 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment’s companies and Storm Z detachments, as well as the battalion from the more elite 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, which was defending Robotyne. The second echelon was composed of two motorized rifle battalions, and the tank battalion was held in reserve. The regiment’s other motorized rifle battalion was rotated to the rear to receive new equipment and personnel, and additional companies from the 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment can likely be rotated to replace losses in the first echelon. Elements from the 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade are also operating along the regiment’s front.

Compared to Russian defenses earlier in the war, the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment had been defending less frontage — approximately 11 kilometers — and with additional reinforcements had sufficient forces to maintain a second echelon of defenses as well as reserve. It could also afford to rotate battalions when they sustained attrition, so the exact units and composition have varied over the past two months. Indeed, it appears Russia has decided to not rotate the regiments holding the front line, but instead to rotate companies and battalions from other formations. This is true for both elite naval infantry units and the mobilized territorial troops regiments. The 291st sat behind well-fortified prepared positions and dense minefields, antitank ditches, and other obstacles. Thus, the 291st was better positioned to handle assaults without requiring the commitment of division or higher-level reserves. This is in contrast to Russian forces in Kharkiv in September 2022, when some Russian units were only at 20 percent strength and lacked a cohesive defensive posture. Once the initial line was breached there, Ukrainian forces were able to advance quickly. The situation is less favorable for Ukraine in Zaporizhzhia and southern Donetsk.

Fixing Russian Forces at Bakhmut

Ukrainian forces have also continued to progress on Bakhmut’s flanks after a series of successful counterattacks in mid-May as Wagner forces captured the western parts of the city. These counterattacks initially targeted relatively weak Russian military units that were moved from Vuhledar to guard the flanks of Wagner units. The Russian military units that arrived were poorly prepared, and weak coordination with Wagner forces hampered their defense. However, all Wagner forces were reportedly replaced in Bakhmut at the beginning of June, and most of Russia’s airborne forces are now deployed to the area, including elements from the 31st, 11th, and 83rd Air Assault Brigades as well as the 106th and 98th Airborne Divisions. Russian military units that had been attached to Wagner during the assault on the city returned to the Ministry of Defense’s control as well.

Ukrainian units at Bakhmut have made progress, most notably the 3rd Assault Brigade’s advance to Klishchiivka. In addition, Russian units in this direction appear to be taking heavy losses, including the 31st Air Assault Brigade, which was pulled back from the front line. The Russian military had less time to prepare defenses in the area compared to the south. However, Russian mines and artillery are still hindering Ukrainian forces. In contrast with the southern axis, the Ukrainian units around Bakhmut are almost all experienced brigades, most of which spent much of the winter defending along the frontlines. These units will likely continue to achieve tactical gains, but a deeper advance in this direction may require additional brigades and resources to be committed. Indeed, there has been intense fighting but little movement along the front line around Klishchiivka over the past month.

The challenge with the ongoing battle for Bakhmut is that the opportunity there cannot be exploited without pulling units from Ukraine’s southern offensive. Behind Bakhmut, Russia has better established lines of defense, making a breakout unlikely. At Bakhmut, many of Ukraine’s best units are fighting in a supporting offensive, while its newer and less experienced units are on the strategically significant axis in the south. Although Ukraine’s assaults have forced Russia to commit a large force to defend Bakhmut, Russia still had other reserves it could commit to the south. The losses inflicted on Russian airborne forces could sap Russia’s future offensive potential, but Ukrainian brigades there may also become exhausted by winter. A similar situation set in last year, leading to months of indeterminate fighting once the lines froze.

On Tradeoffs in Strategy

Bakhmut looms large in this offensive, and not just because of Ukraine’s recent advances there. Kyiv made a choice to stake the summer offensive on newly trained brigades that would receive NATO equipment instead of experienced units. Kyiv bought time to train these new brigades by keeping its experienced brigades on the frontline over the winter and spring, often with only a minimal rotation. Many of Ukraine’s best brigades played a key role in defending Bakhmut, including the 3rd Assault and 93rd Mechanized Brigades. Compared to other parts of the front, the fighting in Bakhmut was less favorable for Ukrainian defenders once Wagner took control of the flanks in January and February 2023. When Russian forces were within direct-fire range of the remaining roads into Bakhmut held by Ukrainian forces, resupply, casualty evacuation, and the rotation of units to the city became more dangerous and costly.

Ukraine committed several brigades to hold the city without including additional units holding the flanks and the roads leading out of it. Ukrainian forces fighting in the city faced a worse attrition ratio than the forces on the flanks. While this ratio varied, we estimate it as probably 1:3 to 1:4 Ukrainian to Russian casualties over the course of the battle. Wagner’s heavy reliance on “expendables” — poorly trained and equipped convicts — was more effective in urban terrain than across open fields, particularly when Ukrainian forces were holding high ground. Wagner forces were used for assaults, not defense, and would not have been manning the line in the south. Conversely, Ukraine could have held the high ground west of the city with far fewer units and resources. In an attempt to hold Bakhmut, Ukraine committed itself to an attritional fight under difficult conditions, with a significant percentage of the Russian losses among expendable convicts. Ironically, Russia’s problems began in earnest when Russian forces were saddled with defending Bakhmut.

As a counterfactual, if more experienced Ukrainian brigades were given the new equipment, they may not have committed many of the errors the new brigades made at the beginning of the counteroffensive. They also would have been able to adapt faster. Indeed, one reason Ukraine is having more success south of Bakhmut is due to the 3rd Assault Brigade, which continues to advance despite attrition. But its continued deployment to Bakhmut, as well as some of Ukraine’s other best brigades, is somewhat surprising given that the priority axis of advance is Orikhiv. Of course, pulling more experienced brigades from the front during Russia’s winter offensive would have risked losing more territory, and political considerations and foreign perceptions are hardly irrelevant. Ultimately, strategy comes down to choices and Kyiv had no cost-free or risk-free options.

Observers have also argued that Ukraine would have achieved greater success if it had received F-16 fighters. Western aircraft would undoubtedly have helped Ukraine during this offensive if Ukrainian pilots had started training on these aircraft early in the war. Even if that had happened, they might not have proven decisive, because of Russia’s extensive air defenses and tactical aviation. F-16 fighters will eventually help Ukraine contest the airspace, but having Western aircraft does not automatically convey the ability to attain air superiority. Too often airpower is treated as talismanic, as though it can resolve every challenge on the battlefield. What U.S. airpower can achieve is not representative of a typical Western air force because of the extensive U.S. investments that have been made in enablers, supporting capabilities, organizational capacity, and experience in integrating air-land operations. Those effects are not likely to come from F-16s alone, and their performance also depends on the missiles and additional systems provided. It is worth noting, the United States itself has not faced a capable air defense network akin to Russia’s in recent decades.

Combined arms operations, coordinating airpower with land forces, are much more difficult than just integrating infantry, armor, and artillery. Ukraine’s military is doctrinally, and structurally, oriented toward decisive employment of land-based fires, not airpower. In Western countries, it is often the opposite. This is not to say that a Western military could have done better in this offensive, but to make clear how much a military needs to change about itself to achieve air superiority, and the types of effects often associated with Western airpower. Attaining air superiority is therefore about more than getting aircraft and well-trained pilots. We think Ukraine is up to the challenge. F-16s will enable much better integration with Western weapons systems and give the Ukrainian air force the ability to push Russian airpower farther behind the forward line of troops. Acquiring F-16s is therefore an important step, and the sooner Ukraine can switch to employing Western platforms, the better.

Similarly, Ukraine has extensively employed Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles in this offensive, with range and payload similar to the long-sought-after Army tactical missile system short-range ballistic missile. By itself, Storm Shadow has made a notable contribution, but has not proven to be a “game changer.” Russian adaptations have also complicated the picture. The Russian military no longer relies on massive ammunition depots near the front lines. Instead, ammunition is often picked up by trucks at rail stations in Crimea or Russia, which are transferred to units in Ukraine. The transfer points change regularly, and a missile strike will not cause the same level of disruption as occurred in the summer of 2022 when HIMARS first arrived. That said, Russian logistics are still potentially vulnerable in Crimea, and much further behind Russian lines.

Ukraine cannot just interdict Russian supply lines with long-range missiles and press Russian forces out. If this was so, Ukraine would have little need for a major offensive in the first place. It could pummel away with Storm Shadow missiles and wait for the Ground-Launched Small-Diameter Bomb, with a range of 150 kilometers, to be deployed. Without persistent presence and reconnaissance over the routes in question, such interdiction does not work well in practice, and the munitions are not available to sustain it. In Kherson, HIMARS systems ranged Russian resupply routes across the Dnipro River for over four months. Russian forces were able to sustain themselves via a single bridge and a ferry network, eventually withdrawing over 30,000 troops. Russian positions in Zaporizhzhia are connected via land corridors running east and south to Crimea. Even when within range of tube artillery, supply roads have proven difficult to interdict, raising questions about what “fire control” can achieve. Indeed, the entire offensive in the south, and the long-running battle of Bakhmut, have played out with both sides’ positions barely a few kilometers from each other.

What the past 18 months of fighting illustrate is that Western nations need to develop a long-term plan to sustain and improve Ukraine’s war effort instead of pinning hopes on the next capability that will be introduced on the battlefield. For example, the Army Tactical Missile System would be a useful addition to Ukraine’s arsenal and should be provided, but there needs to be a more holistic approach to increasing Ukrainian capabilities. Often it is more about the basics — more M113s, Humvees, light mobility, night vision, and mine-clearing equipment could have more impact in aggregate than any one advanced weapons system.

Getting Beyond the Offensive

Much could have been done sooner by the West to increase defense industrial capacity sufficient to sustain Ukraine’s war effort. For example, European countries need not have waited 13 months to begin making serious investments in artillery production. The same could be said of scaling up training programs. Ukraine’s recent experience shows there’s more to creating combat-effective units than Western infantry fighting vehicles and more capable tanks. They have saved many lives, and Ukraine’s motivated soldiers can quickly adopt Western systems, but this can lead to the erroneous assumption that the time necessary to train cohesive units, and their commanders, can too be dramatically shortened. It is unclear why the training for Ukraine’s summer offensive had to be such a compressed effort, rather than something that was begun much earlier in 2022.

Looking at where the offensive stands today, Ukraine’s decision to attrit Russian forces via fires and advance incrementally with small units played to its strengths. This is a grueling fight. The combat power and reserves available to both sides will play a significant role in determining the outcome. Ukraine’s offensive neither is over, nor has it failed. Ukraine’s prospects depend on how well Western countries resource the Ukrainian war effort into the fall, replace lost equipment, and provide the necessary enablers — above all, artillery ammunition. Ultimately, in planning for their support, Western countries must also think beyond the offensive, rather than taking a wait and see approach. This includes learning lessons from this spring and summer to improve Ukraine’s chances in future offensives. Western efforts should be geared to the assumption that the war will continue well into next year, balancing long-term transition programs, such as the transfer of F-16s and scaled up unit training, with managing Ukraine’s more immediate needs.

The West ought to be introspective about missing important decision points, which had a profound impact on the course of the war, constraining everyone’s options later on. Decisions about future support should have been made well before this offensive even began, assuming that it was unlikely to end the war. Instead, another cycle of attritional fighting may ensue after this offensive, followed by yet another surge effort to restore Ukraine’s offensive potential. In short, the West has been unappreciative of the lead times required to reconstitute military potential or provide Ukraine with a decisive advantage.

The recent anonymous criticism by officials spilling select narratives in the press, rather than fostering an open discussion about Ukraine’s challenges and successes, reveals enduring problems in this war effort: The first, is a lack of Western understanding of how Ukrainian forces fight. The second, which is closely related, is an insufficient Western presence on the ground to enable closer coordination or even the invaluable understanding that could be offered by battlefield observers. Western capitals have sought to keep this Ukraine’s war, avoiding an in-country presence that includes contractor support or trainers. To be clear, there are Western contractors and companies operating independently in Ukraine, but this is not the same as a government sanctioned and supported effort. There is much more that could be done without becoming directly involved in fighting or deploying uniformed personnel on the ground. The hitherto cautious approach has clear limits to its efficacy. Western support thus far has been sufficient to avert a Ukrainian defeat, and arguably has imposed a strategic defeat on Russia, but not enough to ensure a Ukrainian victory.

Independent of the outcome of this offensive, Western countries need to be clear-eyed about the fact that this will be a long war. Taken together, Western industrial and military potential greatly exceeds Russia’s, but without the political will, potential alone will not translate into results.

Michael Kofman is a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on the Russian military and Eurasian security issues. He served as director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses, where he conducted research on the capabilities, strategy, and military thought of the Russian Armed Forces.

Rob Lee is a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program and a former Marine infantry officer

https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/p...raines-counteroffensive-at-three-months/
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/07/23 12:25 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 6, 2023
Sep 6, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6, 2023

Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, and Mason Clark

September 6, 2023, 5:05pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut and western Zaporizhia Oblast directions and have made gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of September 6.
Geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced along the trench line west of Verbove (about 20km southeast of Orikhiv), and the Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified successes in the Robotyne—Novoprokopivka direction south of Orikhiv.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing successful offensive operations south of Bakhmut.

Ukrainian and Russian sources report the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) faces growing challenges in replacing basic supplies in addition to known challenges in rebuilding its stocks of precision weapons. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov reported on September 6 that Russia can only produce “dozens” of Kalibr cruise missiles and smaller numbers of Iskander missiles per month, which will not enable Russia to the replenish its pre-2022 stocks.[3] Yusov reported that Russia struggles to obtain modern optical equipment, electronics, chips, and circuits and that “gray imports” and smuggling cannot completely cover the Russian DIB’s needs. Russian sources additionally noted that the Russian DIB cannot produce enough rubber to replace worn tires for military equipment vital to frontline operations, and noted that increasing wear on tires will make it difficult for wheeled vehicles to move in muddy, rainy, and icy conditions.[4] The Russian sources claimed that Russian authorities claimed at an unspecified time that they would find solutions to worn tires by mid-August, but the situation has not changed as of September 5.[5] Poor quality and insufficient tires will impose increasing constraints on Russian mobility in the muddy season and winter.

Russian forces conducted a large missile and drone strike against Ukraine overnight on September 5-6. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched seven Kh-101, Kh-555, and Kh-55 air-launched cruise missiles from aircraft operating out of Engels airbase in Saratov Oblast; one Iskander-M ballistic missile; and 25 Shahed 136/131 drones from the Primorsko-Akhtarsk direction.[6] Ukrainian air defenses shot down all eight missiles and 15 drones.[7] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike damaged the port and agricultural infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[8] Romanian Defense Minister Angel Tilvar stated on September 6 that several pieces of a Russian drone fell on Romanian territory near its border with Ukraine.[9] The Romanian Ministry of Defense previously denied the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry’s September 4 statement that a Russian drone fell on Romanian territory.

Russian sources continue to speculate on the current role and future of dismissed Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin, the former commander of Russia’s Aerospace Forces (VKS). Several Russian insider sources and milbloggers remarked that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) removed Surovikin’s profile from the official MoD website other than his video appeal released during the Wagner rebellion asking the group to stand down.[11] The removal of Surovikin’s profile is not remarkable in itself — Russian military leadership removed Surovikin as commander of the Aerospace Forces (VKS) in August, and the absence of his profile from the MoD website could be a simple reflection of this fact.[12] Some Russian insider sources additionally claimed that State Duma Deputy and retired Colonel General Viktor Zavarzin stated that Surovikin has taken a new position in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[13] ISW has previously observed a pattern of Russian generals who underperform in command roles in Ukraine (such as former Eastern Military District (EMD) Commander Alexander Chaiko and former Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Andrey Serdyukov) being reassigned to external theaters and peripheral locations such as Syria as a form of punishment, while not being entirely removed from the Russian military.[14] Appointing Surovikin to a role in the CIS, which does not appear to be a military or command role, suggests that Russian military leadership is likely continuing the practice of shifting disgraced or ineffective commanders to positions not involved in the war in Ukraine.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced an additional $175 million military assistance package for Ukraine during an unannounced visit to Kyiv on September 6. The package includes air defense equipment, artillery rounds, and anti-tank weapons.[15] Blinken stated that the United States aims to ensure that Ukraine “has what it needs” to both succeed in the current counteroffensive and to develop long term defensive capabilities.[16] Blinken called Ukrainian progress in the counteroffensive “very, very encouraging.”


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut and western Zaporizhia Oblast directions and have made gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of September 6.
Ukrainian and Russian sources report the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) faces growing challenges replacing basic supplies in addition to known challenges rebuilding its stocks of precision weapons.
Russian forces conducted a large missile and drone strike against Ukraine overnight on September 5-6.
Russian sources continue to speculate on the current role and future of dismissed Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin, the former commander of Russia’s Aerospace Forces (VKS).
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced an additional $175 million military assistance package for Ukraine during an unannounced visit to Kyiv on September 6.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donestk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 6.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front and advanced near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 6.
Russian authorities continue crypto-mobilization efforts amid continued rumors of a new wave of general mobilization.
Ukrainian reports indicate that Russian and occupation authorities continue attempts to increase social control in occupied Ukraine by cracking down against pro-Ukrainian materials in occupied schools.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/09/23 07:22 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 8, 2023
Sep 8, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2023

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Annika Ganzeveld, and Mason Clark

September 8, 2023, 7:05pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on September 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces have reportedly made notable changes to their command and control (C2) in Ukraine to protect command infrastructure and improve information sharing, although Russian force deployments are likely still exacerbating issues with horizontal integration.
Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) Deputy Director of Analysis Magarita Konaev and CSET Fellow Owen Daniels stated on September 6 that Russian forces moved headquarters out of range of most Ukrainian strike systems and have placed forward command posts further underground and behind heavily defended positions.[1] It is unclear if Russian forces have employed this more protected command infrastructure throughout Ukraine and to what degree these defensive efforts have impeded Ukraine’s ongoing interdiction campaign.[2] Konaev and Daniels stated that Russian forces have improved communications between command posts and units at the front by laying field cables and using safer radio communications.[3] The Royal United Services Insitute (RUSI) stated on September 4 that Russian forces are also trying to improve signals through the wider use of application-based C2 services that require less training.[4] Konaev and Daniels noted that signals at the battalion level downward are still often unencrypted and that Russian personnel still frequently communicate sensitive information through unsecure channels.

Konaev and Daniels concluded that Russian forces still face challenges creating a horizontally integrated command structure to share information across different units in real time, a challenge the Russian military previously identified which has been exacerbated by Russia’s current force structure in Ukraine.[6] The Russian force grouping in Ukraine is comprised of both regular and irregular units, often deployed together and separate from their respective parent formations, further complicating efforts to horizontally integrate units. Russian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast, for example, are notably comprised of elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District), Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), Spetsnaz, naval infantry, irregular volunteer battalions, and brigades entirely made up of mobilized personnel.[7] Russian command is likely struggling to share information and create a common command space across these widely disparate forces defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.

Artillery constraints in Ukraine are reportedly prompting the Russian military to accelerate longstanding efforts to implement a fires doctrine prioritizing accuracy over volume. Konaev and Daniels stated that Russian forces have tightened the link between reconnaissance systems and artillery units to improve fire accuracy, as Russian forces face growing constraints on their ability to leverage mass indirect fire.[8] RUSI noted on September 4 that Russian commanders are doubling down on the need to prioritize the development of a reconnaissance fires complex (RFC) due to assessing that existing Russian fires doctrine, which heavily relies on a high volume of fires and pre-established calculations of the density of fires needed to achieve certain effects, without a reliable system of rapid battle damage assessment, is non-viable.[9] Russian forces have long sought to implement the concept of RFC prior to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which dictates that Russian forces employ high-precision, long-range weapons linked to real-time intelligence data and precise targeting provided by an intelligence and fire-direction center.[10] RUSI added that Russian forces are prioritizing strike accuracy over volume because they lack the ammunition to sustain mass indirect fires, have difficulties transporting a large volume of ammunition to the frontline, and see diminishing effectiveness with mass strikes.[11] Russia is also reportedly increasing the production of Krasnopol laser-guided shells and Lancet drones (loitering munitions) to increase fires accuracy.[12] Russian units at the front are rapidly learning and innovating, but their ability to fully implement the desired RFC will likely be constrained by their ability to issue improved communications systems — and provide necessary training — to forces in combat.

Russian forces are additionally reportedly adapting their deployment of electronic warfare (EW) complexes. Konaev and Daniels stated that Russian forces have dispersed their deployment of EW complexes since spring 2022 from a concentration of roughly 10 EW complexes for every 20 kilometers of the frontline to 1 major EW system every 10 kilometers, with additional supporting EW assets deployed as needed.[13] The dispersal of these EW assets suggests that Russian forces have improved the coverage that a single EW complex provides, although Konaev and Daniels noted that the systems still have issues with limited coverage and EW fratricide.[14] RUSI stated that Russian forces are dispersing Pole-21 systems and treating them as disposable EW systems in order to provide wide-area protection from Ukrainian drone strikes.[15] Russian sources particularly credited superior Russian EW capabilities for aiding Russian forces’ successful defense against the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine in June.[16] Konaev and Daniels added that these EW systems continue to present challenges for Ukrainian drones transmitting targeting information and securing Ukrainian signals.

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to advance south of Bakhmut and south of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed gains on September 8. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing to advance south of Bakhmut and achieved unspecified successes south of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[18] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Andriivka (9km southwest of Bakhmut) and in Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), although another milblogger noted that the situation in Klishchiivka is unclear at this time.[19] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces seized positions on the northwestern outskirts of Novomayorske (18km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on the Donetsk–Zaporizhia Oblast border.

Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes targeting Odesa Oblast on the night of September 7–8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 8 that Ukrainian forces downed 16 of 20 Shahed drones that Russian forces launched at grain and port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[21] Ukrainian Southern Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are launching drone strikes from Crimea in order to bypass Ukrainian air defenses.[22] Humenyuk also noted that the number of drones that Russian forces have launched and markings on the drones indicate that Russia has established domestic drone production.[23] ISW reported on September 6 that Russian authorities intend to expand domestic drone production beyond the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Tatarstan Republic into the Bashkortostan Republic.[24] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat noted that Russian forces may increase the frequency of drone strikes on Ukraine.[25] Romanian news agency Digi24 reported on September 8 that the Romanian National Committee for Emergency Situations authorized the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations to issue warning and alarm messages where there are Russian drone attacks in the area.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov publicly rejected an offer from the UN Secretariat that met many of Russia’s stated demands to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative on September 6, indicating that the Kremlin is either delaying its return to the grain deal in an attempt to extract maximum concessions from the West or has no intention whatsoever of returning to the grain deal. Lavrov stated on September 6 that the Russian government received a letter from UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres offering several concessions in exchange for the resumption of the grain deal.[27] Lavrov stated and Reuters reported that the concessions in the letter included: reconnection to SWIFT for a Russian Agricultural Bank subsidiary in Luxembourg within 30 days, the creation of an insurance platform for Russian cargo and ships against Ukrainian strikes in the Azov and Black seas; the unblocking of Russian fertilizer assets in the EU, and approval for Russian ships carrying food and fertilizers to dock in European ports.[28] Lavrov publicly dismissed the UN Secretariat’s offer as a “workaround” that does not create a real solution to the problem.[29] Guterres stated on September 7 that the UN is “actively engaged” in attempting to improve Russia’s grain and fertilizer exports in order to convince Moscow to allow the safe export of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea.[30] Reuters confirmed the existence of the letter and its contents on September 8.[31] The UN‘s letter notably offers concessions to most of the previously expressed Russian demands, with the exception of the renewal of operations for the Togliatti–Odesa ammonia pipeline as Lavrov noted on September 6.[32] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin likely views the Black Sea Grain Initiative as one of its few remaining avenues of leverage against the West and has withdrawn from the deal and engaged in escalatory rhetoric to extract extensive concessions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated boilerplate rhetoric justifying the current war in Ukraine while commemorating a Soviet military victory during the Second World War on September 8. Putin claimed that soldiers of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR and LNR) militias inherited their courage and resilience from ancestors who fought to recapture Donbas in the Second World War and reamplified the narrative falsely portraying the current Ukrainian government as “Nazis.”[34] Putin’s September 8 speech is a continuation of the rhetoric from his September 5 speech invoking the memory of significant Soviet military victories to set ideological conditions for a prolonged war effort.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) directly responded to recent indications that the Armenian government may be questioning its decades-long security relationship with Russia. The Russian MFA claimed on September 8 that it observed doubts within Armenian official circles and political elite about Armenian bilateral ties with Russia, trilateral Russian-Armenian-Azerbaijani ties, and ties to the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The MFA claimed that Armenian leadership has conducted “unfriendly actions,” including indicators that ISW recently identified: the provision of humanitarian aid to Ukraine, the visit of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s wife Anna Hakobyan to deliver the humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and Armenia’s decision to host joint military exercises with the United States.[36] The MFA also criticized Armenian leadership for moving to ratify the International Criminal Court (ICC) Rome Statute and stated that it issued a formal protest to the Armenian Ambassador to Russia, Vagharshak Harutyunyan, in response to these “unfriendly actions.”[37] The MFA’s direct response to these events indicates that Russian anger over indications of Armenian dissatisfaction with Russian security guarantees are not confined to the Russian ultranationalist information space but includes the Russian government.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package on September 7, providing Ukraine with $600 million worth of military equipment.[39] The DoD reported that the package includes: equipment to sustain Ukraine’s air defense systems, additional ammunition for HIMARS systems, 105mm artillery rounds, electronic warfare and counter–electronic warfare equipment, demolition munitions for obstacle clearing, mine-clearing equipment, and support and equipment for training, maintenance, and sustainment activities.

Unknown Russian actors may be helping Russian officials to censor Russian milbloggers who have previously criticized the Kremlin’s war effort in Ukraine. Supporters of imprisoned former Russian officer and ultranationalist Igor Girkin amplified an appeal from a Russian milblogger and serviceman Mikhail Polynkov who claimed that unknown individuals hacked into and stole access to his Telegram channel.[40] Polynkov claimed that these hackers began to impersonate him and are writing social media posts that contradict his opinions. Polynkov added that the hackers also published a post attacking another prominent milblogger (who advocates for veteran rights), unlisted many of his popular posts, and are trying to find information to blackmail him and his affiliates. Polynkov claimed that these hackers are not ordinary thieves who are attempting to scam his audience for money but instead are individuals who disagreed with his criticism of the Kremlin. ISW has recently observed several crackdowns against Russian ultranationalist veterans who consistently criticized the Kremlin likely as part of a centralized effort to silence some critical milblogger voices.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces have reportedly made notable changes to their command and control (C2) in Ukraine to protect command infrastructure and improve information sharing, although Russian force deployments are likely still exacerbating issues with horizontal integration.
Artillery constraints in Ukraine are reportedly prompting the Russian military to accelerate longstanding efforts to implement a fires doctrine prioritizing accuracy over volume.
Russian forces are additionally reportedly adapting their deployment of electronic warfare (EW) complexes.
Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to advance south of Bakhmut and south of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed gains on September 8.
Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes targeting Odesa Oblast on the night of September 7–8.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov publicly rejected an incredibly favorable offer from the UN Secretariat that met many of Russia’s stated demands to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative on September 6, indicating that the Kremlin is either delaying its return to the grain deal in an attempt to extract maximum concessions from the West or has no intention whatsoever of returning to the grain deal.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) directly responded to recent indications that the Armenian government may be questioning its decades-long security relationship with Russia.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not make any confirmed advances on September 8.
The New York Times (NYT) — citing Western, African, and Russian sources — reported that Russian intelligence structures are competing for control of the Wagner Group’s assets and operations in Africa.
Russian occupation officials continue to hold illegal regional elections in occupied Ukraine. Russian occupation officials in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts announced the start of in-person voting in occupied territories on September 8.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/10/23 12:28 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/10/23 04:51 AM

Ukraine war: Kyiv foils big Russian drone attack, officials say

Like I said last year its a drone war.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/10/23 11:07 PM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/11/23 12:19 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 10, 2023
Sep 10, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 10, 2023

Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark

September 10, 2023, 4:05pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on September 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued to advance south of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on September 10.
Geolocated footage posted on September 10 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced east of Novoprokopivka (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[1] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun noted that Ukrainian forces continue to advance near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) and have liberated 1.5 square kilometers of territory in this direction.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified success near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) in Donetsk Oblast.

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on September 10 that Ukrainian forces will continue counteroffensive operations into late 2023.[4] Cold and wet weather will affect but not halt active combat, as it has done in the first 18 months of the war. Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley stated on September 10 that Ukrainian forces probably have 30 to 45 days of “fighting weather” left.[5] Seasonal heavy rains and heavy mud in late autumn will slow ground movements for both sides, and low temperatures impose a variety of logistics challenges. The start of such seasonal weather is variable, however.[6] While weather considerations will affect Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, they will not impose a definite end to them. A hard freeze occurs throughout Ukraine in the winter that makes the ground more conducive to mechanized maneuver warfare, and Ukrainian officials expressed routine interest in exploiting these weather conditions in winter 2022–2023.

Russian military personnel continue to detail persistent problems hindering Russian operations along the frontline in Ukraine. The “Rusich” Sabotage and Reconnaissance Group, a far-right Russian irregular paramilitary unit, published a list of various issues on September 8 that it claims are persistent along the frontline. Rusich claimed that Russian counterbattery range and accuracy are inferior to Ukrainian capabilities and claimed that Russian forces lack laser-guided Krasnopol shells and UAVs to guide them.[8] The Rusich Group also claimed that the Russian Tornado-S multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) is less resistant to electronic warfare (EW) than Ukraine’s US-provided HIMARS systems.[9] The Rusich Group also noted that many Russian personnel buy their own communication technology, making it difficult for different units using different models of technology to communicate with each other.[10] The Rusich Group claimed that Russian forces do not evacuate wounded or dead personnel from frontline areas, and that this lack of evacuations has prompted some Russian personnel to refuse to complete combat tasks.[11] The Rusich Group may be experiencing these problems at a higher intensity and frequency than Russian forces writ large because it is a small and irregular formation, but ISW has routinely observed other Russian units expressing similar issues with counterbattery capabilities, communications, and evacuations.

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/-136 drone strikes targeting Kyiv Oblast on the night of September 9 to 10. Ukrainian military sources reported on September 10 that Ukrainian forces downed 26 of 33 drones that Russian forces launched from the direction of Kursk Oblast.[13] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces dispersed the Shahed drones in the air and attacked targets from different directions in order to complicate Ukrainian air defense operations.[14] Kyiv Oblast Administration Head Ruslan Kravchenko stated that Russian strikes damaged an infrastructure facility, a school, residential buildings, and a rehabilitation center in Kyiv Oblast.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that NASA FIRMS/VIIRS data suggests that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian military arsenal in Rokytnyanskyi Raion, Kyiv Oblast.

Army General Sergei Surovikin, the previously dismissed Wagner-affiliated former commander of Russia’s Aerospace Forces (VKS), has reportedly become the head of the Coordination Committee on Air Defense Issues under the Council of Defense Ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Several low-profile and local Russian outlets reported on September 10 that the CIS Council of Defense Ministers unanimously voted on Surovikin’s appointment to head of the air defense committee, and noted that Surovikin will now be responsible for overseeing the function of the joint air defense system of CIS member states.[17] More mainstream and Kremlin-affiliated newswires notably did not report on Surovikin’s new appointment and have not mentioned Surovikin at all since Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed him as VKS commander on August 23.[18] ISW previously assessed that Surovikin’s move to a leadership position with the CIS is consistent with previous patterns of the Russian military leadership shifting disgraced and ineffective commanders to peripheral positions far removed from Ukraine without discharging them from the Russian military entirely.

Russia held the final day of voting for regional elections on September 10 amid reports of electoral falsifications and intimidation. Affiliates of imprisoned ultranationalist Igor Girkin claimed that Russian officials falsified all electoral results in Nakhodka, Primorsky Krai, and attacked an independent candidate in Saratov, Saratov Oblast.[20] Girkin’s affiliates noted that Russian officials coerced people to vote to improve voter turnout but that average turnout will likely be at 35 percent.[21] The Radio Free Europe/Free Liberty (RFE/RL) branch Sever Realii reported that Russian authorities detained three Yabloko Party candidates in Veliky Novgorod, Novgorod Oblast.[22] Russian sources also reported that Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti published the results of the regional elections in the Republic of Sakha before the closure of the polls there.[23] RFE/RL branch Idel Realii reported that Russian authorities issued a military summons to a Communist Party candidate in the Republic of Bashkortostan when he visited a polling station.

Russian sources claimed that the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh has not conducted personnel rotations due to increasing tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[25] The Russian sources also claimed that the Russian peacekeeping contingent is on “full alert” because of the potential escalation between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces.[26] Russian sources will likely increasingly discuss the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh if hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan intensify, which may impact their coverage of the war in Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued to advance south of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on September 10.
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on September 10 that Ukrainian forces will continue counteroffensive operations into late 2023. Cold and wet weather will affect but not halt active combat, as it has done in the first 18 months of the war.
Russian military personnel continue to detail persistent problems hindering Russian operations along the frontline in Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/-136 drone strikes targeting Kyiv Oblast on the night of September 9 to 10.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly regained some lost positions in some areas.
Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on September 10 that the Russian military has concentrated over 420,000 military personnel in occupied Ukraine, not including Rosgvardia (Russian national guard) and other military units and structures.
Russian occupation officials held the final day of voting for Russian regional elections in occupied territories on September 10, continuing efforts to coerce residents to vote and portray the elections as legitimate.

https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-10-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/13/23 01:45 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 12, 2023
Sep 12, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF







Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 12, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 12, 2023, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian insider sources claimed that the Kremlin’s inner circle is again actively disagreeing about the necessity of and preparations for a second wave of reserve mobilization ahead of the semi-annual fall conscription cycle, which starts on October 1.
A Russian Telegram channel with alleged connections to Russian security sources claimed that select Russian officials are “seriously” preparing for a second wave of reserve mobilization and are hoping to conduct another reserve mobilization wave in the fall.[1] It is important to distinguish between Russia’s normal semi-annual conscription callup, a large-scale reserve mobilization like the one that brought more than 300,000 reservists into the Russian armed forces in Fall 2022, crypto-mobilizations that bring reservists into the force at lower numbers over a long period of time, and various efforts to encourage or coerce Russians to sign ostensibly voluntary contracts with the Russian military. The channel claimed that Russian officials want to mobilize between 170,000 to 175,000 reservists and move the fall conscription date from October 1 to November 1 to accommodate a reserve mobilization processes, while simultaneously conducting “contract mobilization” to recruit an additional 130,000 personnel for contract service using coercive measures.[2] The channel claimed that a powerful group of “siloviki hawks” is also proposing stricter reserve mobilization measures such as restricting certain individuals from obtaining mobilization deferrals, which has sparked major disagreements with officials in the Russian Presidential Administration. The channel claimed that the Presidential Administration fears a response to such measures from other Russian officials and broader Russian society.

These plans, proposals, and disagreements are not new and do not indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has ultimately decided to conduct a second reserve mobilization wave in the near term. ISW previously observed an increase in discussions about reserve mobilization preparations and speculations in the lead-up to the spring conscription cycle earlier in 2023.[3] Select Russian officials have also proposed more dramatic mobilization measures that have not materialized.[4] Putin also emphasized Russian contract service recruitment rates when responding to the question about the potential second reserve mobilization wave at the Eastern Economic Forum on September 12.[5] Putin’s response does not necessarily set information conditions to prepare Russian society for involuntary mobilization and instead may suggest his commitment to ongoing crypto mobilization practices. Any new reserve mobilization wave depends on Putin.

Putin also reamplified several boilerplate information operations falsely framing the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed endeavor and accused Ukraine of being unwilling to negotiate during his address at the Eastern Economic Forum. Putin claimed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed to produce concrete results and presented likely very inflated numbers of claimed Ukrainian personnel and equipment losses.[7] Putin also accused Ukraine of being unwilling to negotiate and claimed that Russia cannot pursue an end to hostilities as long as Ukraine is pursuing a counteroffensive, thereby furthering a longstanding Russian information operation that seeks to accuse Ukraine as being the party disinterested in negotiations in order to undermine Ukrainian battlefield successes and reduce international support for Ukraine, as ISW has previously reported.

Putin also reamplified several boilerplate information operations falsely framing the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed endeavor and accused Ukraine of being unwilling to negotiate during his address at the Eastern Economic Forum. Putin claimed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed to produce concrete results and presented likely very inflated numbers of claimed Ukrainian personnel and equipment losses.[7] Putin also accused Ukraine of being unwilling to negotiate and claimed that Russia cannot pursue an end to hostilities as long as Ukraine is pursuing a counteroffensive, thereby furthering a longstanding Russian information operation that seeks to accuse Ukraine as being the party disinterested in negotiations in order to undermine Ukrainian battlefield successes and reduce international support for Ukraine, as ISW has previously reported.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 12 and have reportedly advanced south of Bakhmut and Robotyne. Ukrainian military sources stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting active offensive operations near Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut).[9] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Ukrainian forces were additionally successful south and southeast of Robotyne (about 13km south of Orikhiv).[10] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun clarified that Ukrainian forces have advanced between 300-500 meters south and southeast of Robotyne.[11] The Ukrainian Military Media Center noted that Russian forces are increasingly pulling reserves from deep within Russian territory to the frontline in Ukraine out of fear of a Ukrainian breakthrough.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un arrived in Primorsky Krai on September 12 and will meet with Putin in the coming days, likely to discuss the provision of North Korean artillery munitions to Russia. Kim met with Russian Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology Alexander Kozlov and Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako upon arriving in Russia.[13] Kim’s trip to Russia is his first known trip outside of North Korea since the COVID-19 pandemic.[14] ISW will continue to follow developments in the lead-up to the meeting and will report on the content of the meeting once it becomes available.

Russian authorities have reportedly adjusted air defense systems around Moscow in light of recent increased drone strikes on the city, likely in part to assuage complaints in the Russian information space about the ineffectiveness of air defenses around the capital. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) stated that Russian authorities have moved short and medium-range air defense systems, including Pantsir-S1 systems, to elevated positions around Moscow City to target drones.[15] The UK MoD noted that these adjustments are also likely meant to visibly demonstrate to the population that Russian authorities are taking steps to combat increasingly frequent drone strikes in the Russian rear, particularly in Moscow Oblast.[16] ISW has previously reported that Russian sources have complained about Moscow air defenses’ inability to stop such drone strikes, with some blaming Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and his administration directly.

A car killed a Russian milblogger in occupied Donetsk City on September 11. Russian milblogger Gennady Dubovoy died after a car struck him as he crossed the road, and some other Russian milbloggers mourned Dubovoy’s death.[18] Dubovoy’s death comes amid an ongoing Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) campaign to censor Russian ultranationalist milbloggers whose narratives and complaints deviate too far from accepted official narratives.[19] Dubovoy has recently levied criticisms against the Russian government for its treatment of Russian combat veterans and former Wagner Group fighters, and recently stated that he took a step back from the ultranationalist information space due to demands to report on the “confirmation of your [referring to Russian officials] delusions.”[20] Dubovoy recently indicated that he is not a supporter of imprisoned ultranationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin, whose supporters have recently been the targets of official and public censorship.


Key Takeaways:

Russian insider sources claimed that the Kremlin’s inner circle is again actively disagreeing about the necessity of and preparations for a second wave of reserve mobilization ahead of the semi-annual fall conscription cycle, which starts on October 1.
These plans, proposals, and disagreements are not new and do not indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has ultimately decided to conduct a second reserve mobilization wave in the near term.
Putin also reamplified several boilerplate information operations falsely framing the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed endeavor and accused Ukraine of being unwilling to negotiate during his address at the Eastern Economic Forum.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un arrived in Primorsky Krai on September 12 and will meet with Putin in the coming days, likely to discuss the provision of North Korean artillery munitions to Russia.
Russian authorities have reportedly adjusted air defense systems around Moscow in light of recent increased drone strikes on the city, likely in part to assuage complaints in the Russian information space about the ineffectiveness of air defenses around the capital.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia and advanced in some areas on September 12.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on September 12 and advanced near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian officials introduced a bill to the Russian State Duma that would punish Russian servicemen fighting within volunteer armed formations for losing or deliberately destroying military equipment or supplies.
Russian occupation officials continue to deport children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia under the guise of recreational programs.

https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-12-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/15/23 01:22 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 14, 2023
Sep 14, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 14, 2023

Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 14, 2023, 7:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on September 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and around Bakhmut and reportedly advanced south of Bakhmut on September 14.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified partial successes near Bakhmut, Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar prematurely announced the Ukrainian liberation of Andriivka but later clarified that heavy fighting for the settlement is still ongoing.[2] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash stated on September 13 that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of positions near Minkivka (15km northwest of Bakhmut) and Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[3] The Ukrainian General Staff and Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces continue to gradually advance in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast).

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian air defense system near occupied Yevpatoria, Crimea, on September 14, suggesting that there may be systemic tactical failures with Russian air defense systems in occupied Crimea. The Department of Strategic Communications of the Ukrainian Armed Forces stated that Ukrainian forces struck the location of a Russian surface-to-air missile system near Yevpatoria (68km northwest of Sevastopol).[5] Ukrainian news outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported that a source affiliated with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) stated that the SBU and the Ukrainian Navy conducted a “unique special operation” that destroyed a Russian S-400 “Triumf” system near Yevpatoria.[6] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the S-400 system’s radar and antennas with drones and struck the launch complexes with two Neptune cruise missiles.[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian air defenses intercepted 11 Ukrainian drones over Crimea but did not mention any Ukrainian missile strikes.[8] Geolocated footage published on September 14 shows an explosion near Yevpatoria and subsequent smoke plumes in the area.[9] Additional geolocated footage shows that Russian forces had recently deployed an S-400 battery outside of Yevpatoria and that the explosion occurred in the same location where a Russian S-400 system had been deployed in August 2022.[10] The strike suggests that Russian forces were unprepared to intercept missiles with the system or were unable to do so. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defense system near Olenivka, Crimea (117km northwest of Sevastopol) on August 23, and the second Ukrainian strike on a significant Russian air defense system in recent weeks indicates that such tactical failures may reflect a wider systemic issue with Russian air defenses in occupied Crimea.

Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes targeting Ukrainian port infrastructure on September 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 22 drones in the direction of Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Sumy oblasts and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 17 of the drones.[12] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces primarily targeted port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[13] Ukrainian Minister for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development Oleksandr Kubrakov stated that Russian strikes from July 18 to September 12 have damaged or partially destroyed 105 Ukrainian port facilities and that the monthly export of Ukrainian grain has decreased by almost three million tons as a result.[14] The Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian grain and port infrastructure is likely meant to support the Kremlin’s effort to leverage international desire for Russia’s return to the Black Sea Grain Initiative to exact extensive concessions.[15] The Kremlin may have no intention of returning to the deal, however, and may instead aim to increase the market share and attractiveness of Russian grain by degrading Ukraine’s grain export potential.[16] The Kremlin also likely intends for continued strain on Ukrainian grain export routes to intensify divisions between Ukraine and its Central European partners as Ukraine and the West continue to work on re-routing Ukrainian grain exports along land corridors.

The commander of the Russian 247th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) Vasily Popov was reportedly killed in combat in Ukraine. Vasily Popov likely recently replaced Pyotr Popov as commander of the 247th VDV Regiment in August or September 2023, and Vasily Popov is the second commander of the 247th Regiment to be killed in action in Ukraine after Colonel Konstantin Zizevsky died in February 2022.[19] Elements of the 247th Regiment are reportedly operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[20] ISW has previously assessed that relatively elite VDV forces are conducting limited counterattacks in critical sectors of the front, and Vasily Popov’s death supports ISW’s assessment that these counterattacks will likely attrit these units further.

The European Parliament adopted a resolution on September 13 recognizing Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko as complicit in Russian crimes committed in Ukraine and called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to issue an arrest warrant for him. The European Parliament’s resolution stated that Belarus is complicit in the war in Ukraine and is involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus, Russia, and occupied areas of Ukraine.[22] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is a co-belligerent in the war and is involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children.[23] ISW has also assessed that Belarus may be facilitating sanctions evasion schemes for Russia.[24] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Lukashenko will meet in Sochi, Russia on September 15.

Russian State Duma and Federation Council members proposed blocking WhatsApp likely as part of the Kremlin’s broader initiative to establish central control over the Russian information space. Facebook’s parent company Meta announced on September 13 that WhatsApp launched a channel feature to over 150 countries, likely including Russia, that will function similarly to Telegram channels.[26] Russia designated Meta as an extremist organization in March 2022 and banned its Facebook and Instagram services in Russia.[27] Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security Head Viktor Bondarev, State Duma Committee on Information Policy Head Alexander Khinshtein, and State Duma Deputy Anton Gorelkin said that Russia should consider blocking WhatsApp in Russia if WhatsApp launches Russian language channels.[28] Russian state media censor Roskomnadzor reported that Russia could block WhatsApp if it disseminates prohibited information.[29] Russian authorities are likely attempting to funnel the Russian information space onto a limited number of closely monitored or controlled social media platforms.

Some Russian sources suggested that ongoing tensions between the Russian MoD and the Wagner Group are diminishing Wagner’s ability to operate across the African theater. A Russian insider source claimed on September 12 that “difficult logistics” are forcing Wagner forces in Africa to “make do with local reserves” to continue operations after the rebel coalition Coordination of the Movement of Azawad (CMA) claimed to have captured Bourem, Gao Region, Mali.[30] Russian sources, including a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, claimed that the Russian MoD and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) deliberately disrupted Wagner's logistics by preventing Wagner from using Russian airbases in Syria to reinforce the Wagner contingent in the Central African Republic (CAR) — reports consistent with ISW’s recent observations.[31] The milblogger claimed that the CMA took advantage of destabilization fueled in part by tensions resulting from the MoD’s ongoing effort to subsume Wagner.[32] The milblogger warned that other armed groups may also take advantage of the destabilization and that the MoD will have to invest resources in the region to avoid reputational fallout.[33] Wagner forces in Africa notably conduct counterterrorism operations, but these operations are often ineffective, and the current Wagner group contingent in MENA is likely insufficient to conduct counterterrorism operations at a scale that could meaningfully contain new or escalating conflicts.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) declared two US diplomats persona non grata and expelled them from Russia on September 14.[35] The Russian MFA accused the US Embassy’s first and second secretaries of illegally maintaining contact with an arrested former US Consulate employee and ordered the diplomats to leave Russia within the next seven days.

Western defense sources reportedly stated that a Russian fighter jet intentionally fired at a British surveillance plane in September 2022 due to ambiguous commands rather than because of a missile malfunction as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed at the time. The BBC reported that three senior Western defense sources stated that a Russian Su-27 fighter jet pilot intentionally fired a missile at a British Royal Air Force (RAF) plane but missed on September 29, 2022.[36] The Western defense sources reportedly stated that the Russian pilot believed he had permission to fire after receiving an ambiguous command from a Russian ground station and fired a second missile, which reportedly either malfunctioned or was aborted.[37] A second Russian pilot flying another Su-27 reportedly interpreted the order differently and did not fire at the British aircraft.[38] The Russian MoD claimed in October 2022 that the Su-27 jet fired the missile due to a “technical malfunction.”


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and around Bakhmut and reportedly advanced south of Bakhmut on September 14.
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian air defense system near occupied Yevpatoria, Crimea, on September 14, suggesting that there may be systemic tactical failures with Russian air defense systems in occupied Crimea.
Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes targeting Ukrainian port infrastructure on September 14.
The commander of the Russian 247th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) Vasily Popov was reportedly killed in combat in Ukraine.
Some Russian sources suggested that ongoing tensions between the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Wagner Group are diminishing Wagner’s ability to operate across the African theater.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 14.
Ukrainian forces also advanced along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
The Kremlin is reportedly trying to censor Russian media coverage of a possible second wave of reserve mobilization in order to prevent protests and voter discontent ahead of the 2024 Russian presidential elections.

https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-14-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/15/23 08:08 PM

Big development!!



Chechen leader Kadyrov is in critical condition – Ukrainian intelligence
STANISLAV POHORILOV — FRIDAY, 15 SEPTEMBER 2023, 19:53
60512

Andrii Yusov, representative of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence, has stated that Ramzan Kadyrov, Head of the Kremlin-controlled Chechnya, is in critical condition.

Source: Yuson in a comment to Ukrinform

Quote: "We can confirm that he [Kadyrov – ed.] has had another severe exacerbation and has been in critical condition for the past few days."

Background: The Security Service of Ukraine put Kadyrov on the wanted list in September last year. He is wanted under Article 110.3 (encroachment on the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine, which led to the death of people or other serious consequences) and Article 437.2 (planning, preparation, unleashing and waging an aggressive war) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

Kadyrov faces from 10 years to life imprisonment under these articles
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/16/23 01:56 AM

Kadyrov was critical about the Russian military like Prigozhin Putin is cleaning house lol. He's desperate anyway dealing with the pariah North Korea.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/17/23 01:16 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 16, 2023
Sep 16, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2023

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 16, 2023, 6:25pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on September 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on September 16 and continued to make gains in the area.
Geolocated footage posted on September 15 confirms that Ukrainian forces have advanced south of Rozdolivka (about 13km northeast of Bakhmut) and in northern Klishchiivka (about 6km southwest of Bakhmut).[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar noted that fighting is ongoing near Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut) and stated that Ukrainian forces continue to be successful in the Klishchiivka area.[2] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrsky posted footage of Ukrainian personnel in Andriivka (8km southwest of Bakhmut) following the Ukrainian liberation of the settlement on September 14.

Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast have likely forced the Russian command to prioritize the Russian defense there and laterally redeploy elements of a relatively elite formation away from the Russian defense south of Bakhmut. North Ossetian volunteer battalions “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania,” which are operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast, posted an image on September 16 purporting to show a small detachment of the Russian 83rd Separate Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade in Nesteryanka (on the western shoulder of the current Ukrainian breach in western Zaporizhia Oblast).[4] Elements of the 83rd Brigade deployed to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations around Klishchiivka in late June and were observed in combat in the area in late August.[5] Elements of the 83rd Brigade were reportedly still operating in the Bakhmut area as of September 11, although elements of the brigade may have been split across two different sectors of the front.[6] Klishchiivka has been a focal point of fighting in the Bakhmut area in recent weeks, and the redeployment of any elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade amid Ukrainian advances near Klishchiivka suggests a deep concern about Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast and the Russian prioritization of the defense there.

ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations along several lines of effort would force the Russian command to prioritize certain sectors of the front and conduct lateral redeployments that offer Ukraine opportunities for exploitation.[7] Ukrainian counteroffensive operations have fixed relatively elite units and formations to the area, including elements of the 98th VDV Division, the 83rd VDV Brigade, the 11th VDV Brigade, the 31st VDV Brigade, the 106th VDV Division, and the 364th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate).[8] Russian forces have thus far been unwilling to send these relatively elite formations to aid in the critical defensive effort in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian operations around Bakhmut appear to continue preventing the Russian command from doing so at scale. ISW will publish a review of the strategic significance of how Ukrainian operations have fixed Russian forces to the Bakhmut area in an upcoming special edition.

Ukrainian forces also advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 16 and continued to penetrate the Russian defensive layer that lies ahead of the current extent of Ukrainian advances. Geolocated footage published on September 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced along Russian defensive positions to the west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[9] Additional geolocated footage published on September 15 indicates that Ukrainian infantry advanced further along a series of Russian defensive positions immediately west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) but likely did not maintain control of these positions.[10] The Ukrainian presence at these Russian defensive positions indicates that Russian forces do not control these positions either and that Ukrainian forces are continuing to operate past the Russian defensive layer that that runs northwest of Verbove to north of Solodka Balka (20km south of Orikhiv).

Ukrainian forces have likely made a significant tactical breach along a section of the current Russian defense layer in the Robotyne area over the past several weeks that they continue to widen. Ukrainian forces have continued offensive operations past a section of the Russian defensive layer west of Verbove since penetrating it on September 4 and have widened their breach along a 2.6km section of those Russian defensive positions.[11] The continued absence of observed Ukrainian heavy equipment and vehicles past this defensive layer continues to indicate that Ukrainian forces have yet to complete a breakthrough of this defensive layer, however.[12] Ukrainian officials have indicated that the series of Russian defensive positions currently ahead of the Ukrainian advance may be less challenging than the initial Russian defensive layer that Ukrainian forces broke through to the north.[13] Russian forces had concentrated the majority of their combat power at those forward-most Russian defensive positions to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, and these Russian forces have likely suffered heavy losses and conducted fighting withdrawals to prepared positions behind the current defensive layer.[14] ISW has long assessed that Russian forces lack the manpower to man the entire multi-echeloned Russian defensive fortification systems in southern Ukraine, and the Russian forces defending the current layer of defense are likely elements of formations that have been fighting in the area without operational-level unit rotation since the start of the counteroffensive or elements of formations that laterally transferred from elsewhere along the front.

Russian ultranationalists continued to complain about endemic lying within the Russian military after Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev voiced similar complaints on September 15. A Russian milblogger posted a statement reportedly from a subscriber on September 16 that concurred with Gurulev’s assertion that the culture of lying in the Russian military is the main issue preventing a Russian victory in Ukraine.[16] Another Russian milblogger stated that the issue is a “disaster” and that lies occur at all levels of the Russian military as subordinate commanders are afraid to report the truth about the condition and needs of units and formations.[17] The milblogger stated the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian President Vladimir Putin are likely receiving false reports. The milblogger added that tyranny (bad command culture), fraud, and a lack of military resourcefulness are some of the issues affecting the Russian military in Ukraine and that the main goal of the Russian military should be to minimize personnel losses. A Russian insider source compared Gurulev to deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in his role as the “front line truth teller.”

A Ukrainian naval drone strike likely damaged a Russian ship in the Black Sea on September 14. Ukrainian newspaper Ukrainska Pravda published a photo reportedly from a source within the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) that indicates that Ukrainian naval drones struck and damaged a Russian Bora-class corvette near the entrance to Sevastopol Bay in occupied Crimea on September 14.[19] Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated on September 16 that Ukraine will conduct more drone attacks on Russian ships in the future.[20] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian ships do not stay at their bases but are constantly moving between naval bases in Russia and occupied Crimea to avoid strikes against them.[21] Russian forces have previously used large ships in the Black Sea to mitigate the damage that Ukrainian strikes have inflicted on other Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in southern Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces are likely targeting Russian ships in the Black Sea to further damage Russia’s ability to mitigate ongoing logistics complications among other things.

A Ukrainian official confirmed on September 16 that a civilian vessel used the Ukrainian corridor in the Black Sea to reach a Ukrainian port for the first time. Ukrainian Minister for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Oleksandr Kubrakov announced that civilian bulk carriers flying the Palau flag used the existing Ukrainian corridor to sail towards Chornomorsk, where the vessels will load over 20,000 tons of grain for export to countries in Africa and Asia.[23] The Kremlin previously escalated its posturing in the Black Sea to curtail maritime traffic to Ukraine and increase its leverage to extract maximalist concessions to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative.[24] United Kingdom military aircraft are reportedly conducting patrols over the Black Sea to deter Russian forces from acting aggressively towards civilian vessels.[25] Kubrakov stated that five civilian vessels have traveled from Ukraine along the Ukrainian Black Sea corridor since August 15: Joseph Schulte, Primus, Anna-Theresa, Ocean Courtesy, and Puma.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met in Vladivostok, where Kim viewed pieces of Russian weapons technology on September 16. Kim viewed Tu-22MS, Tu-95MS, and Tu-160 strategic bombers; Su25SM3, Su-30SM, and Su-34 fighter-bombers; a MiG-31I missile carrier with Kinzhal missiles; the frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov; a Uranus anti-ship missile system; and Kalibr cruise missiles.[27] Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Lieutenant General Sergey Kobylash told Kim that the Tu-160 strategic bombers received new Kh-BD cruise missiles with a claimed range of over 6,500 kilometers and can carry 12 such missiles.[28] Russia is highly unlikely to provide physical systems or weapons to North Korea due to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s likely concern that this provision may trigger secondary sanctions against Russia, but Putin may be open to other forms of technological and defensive cooperation with North Korea in return for North Korean artillery ammunition.

The Russian military leadership may be removing ineffective air defense officials on the pretext of corruption charges to avoid admitting the failures of Russian air defenses against increasing drone strikes on Russian cities including Moscow. Russian outlet Kommersant reported on September 16 that the Tula Oblast Venesky District Court sentenced Vladislav Gukov, former head of the MoD Department of State Defense Procurement, to a nine-year prison term for corruption.[30] Kommersant noted that the investigation found that Gukov accepted over 15 million rubles ($154,950) in bribes from various enterprises that were meant to supply the MoD with “urgently needed” X-ray diagnostic systems for KamAZ vehicles.[31] A Russian insider source alleged that Gukov was a close personal friend of Major General Vyacheslav Lobuzko, former commander of a division of the 3rd Separate Air Defense Army and one of the designers of the “Voronezh” cruise and ballistic missile detection system, whom Russian authorities also imprisoned for corruption in May.[32] The insider source additionally claimed that Gukov was personally responsible for signing off on the procurement of air defense systems and complexes.

Gukov’s corruption charge and his role as a prominent Russian air defense official closely mirror the case of the commander of the Moscow-based 1st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense, Army Major General Konstantin Ogienko, whom Moscow Oblast authorities arrested on similar corruption and bribery charges relating to giving state defense property to an unnamed civilian organization.[34] ISW has no reason to doubt that these air defense officials are complicit in corruption and bribery schemes, but the recent trend of arrests of prominent air defense officials on corruption charges may suggest that higher echelons of the Russian military wish to remove these air defense officials from their positions without having to admit that the Russian domestic air defense system is failing.

Russian military officials continue efforts to solidify Russia’s relationship with African states amidst changing dynamics on the continent resulting from the Russian MoD’s efforts to subsume the Wagner Group. Russian milbloggers and Malian national broadcaster ORTM reported that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov arrived in Bamako, Mali on September 16 and met with the Malian and Nigerien defense ministers and Malian junta head Assimi Goita.[36] Russian milbloggers speculated that Yevkurov and the Malian and Nigerien ministers discussed military-technical cooperation, the implications of the coup in Niger, and increased the Russian MoD's support for the Malian junta against Tuareg rebels in northern Mali.[37] One Russian source suggested that the MoD seeks to take over Wagner Group remnants in northern Mali, which is consistent with ISW’s previous observation that the Russian MoD has recently made efforts to assume control of Wagner’s operations on the African continent.[38] Yevkurov notably visited multiple African countries including Burkina Faso, Libya, and Syria in early September to replace “private military companies” with MoD elements.[39] The Ukrainian Resistance Center relatedly reported on September 16 that the Russian MoD is increasingly sending representatives to Algeria, Mali, and Sudan to convince remaining Wagner fighters to sign contracts with a structure affiliated with and supervised by the MoD.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on September 16 and continued to make gains in the area.
Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast have likely forced the Russian command to prioritize the Russian defense there and laterally redeploy elements of a relatively elite formation away from the Russian defense south of Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces also advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 16 and continued to penetrate the Russian defensive layer that lies ahead of the current extent of Ukrainian advances.
Ukrainian forces have likely made a significant tactical breach along a section of the current Russian defense layer in the Robotyne area over the past several weeks that they continue to widen.
Russian ultranationalists continued to complain about endemic lying within the Russian military after Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev voiced similar complaints on September 15.
A Ukrainian naval drone strike likely damaged a Russian ship in the Black Sea on September 14.
A Ukrainian official confirmed on September 16 that a civilian vessel used the Ukrainian corridor in the Black Sea to reach a Ukrainian port for the first time.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met in Vladivostok, where Kim viewed pieces of Russian weapons technology on September 16.
The Russian military leadership may be removing ineffective air defense officials on the pretext of corruption charges to avoid admitting the failures of Russian air defenses against increasing drone strikes on Russian cities including Moscow.
Russian military officials continue efforts to solidify Russia’s relationship with African states amidst changing dynamics on the continent resulting from the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) efforts to subsume the Wagner Group.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia on September 16 and advanced in some areas.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on September 16 and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian milbloggers continue complaining about the role of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in perpetuating issues affecting Russian military personnel.
Russian occupation officials continue efforts to resettle residential areas of occupied Ukraine with Russians
.
https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-16-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/19/23 02:39 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 18, 2023
Sep 18, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 18, 2023

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 18, 2023, 9:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on September 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine’s liberation of Klishchiivka and Andriivka south of Bakhmut may have degraded the Russian defense in the area south of Bakhmut and could have rendered combat ineffective as many as three Russian brigades according to Ukrainian military officials
. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on September 18 that Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) were important elements of the Russian Bakhmut-Horlivka defensive line that Ukrainian forces “breached.”[1] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated on September 17 that Ukraine’s liberation of Klishchiivka will allow Ukrainian forces to control Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying the Russian force grouping in the Bakhmut area — likely referring to Ukrainian forces’ ability to establish fire control over the T0513 Bakhmut-Horlivka highway.[2] ISW is currently unable independently to evaluate the strength and extent of the Russian defensive fortifications in the Bakhmut area, although Russian forces have likely fortified their defense lines near Bakhmut less heavily than they did in southern Ukraine. Russian forces south of Bakhmut are also likely battle-weary from the recent efforts to hold Klishchiivka and Andriivka, and the Ukrainian capture of two settlements defending a key Russian GLOC supporting Bakhmut indicates that these forces will likely struggle to replenish their combat strength and defend against any further Ukrainian offensive activity south of Bakhmut. There are no immediate indications that the liberation of Klishchiivka and Andriivka will portend a higher rate of Ukrainian advance south of Bakhmut, however, and the Russian defense of positions west of the T0513 will likely continue to present challenges for Ukrainian forces in the area.

The Ukrainian liberation of two villages that Russian forces were fighting hard to hold could correspond with the severe degradation of the Russian units defending them, as Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast appear to correspond with the significant degradation of defending Russian units and formations in that sector of the front. Russian forces defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast since the start of the counteroffensive have done so largely without operational-level unit rotations and have likely suffered compounding losses.[3] Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division’s 71st, 70th, and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiments (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District)routinely repelled Ukrainian assaults and engaged in various “combat clashes,“ including limited engagements and some counterattacks, during the first phase of the counteroffensive from June to August 2023.[4] In mid-to-late August, Ukrainian forces began breaking through the initial Russian defensive layer that these elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division had spent considerable amounts of manpower, personnel, and effort to hold.[5] Russian reporting and footage suggest that many of these elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division have since withdrawn to positions behind a subsequent Russian defensive layer between Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) and Solodka Balka (20km south of Orikhiv) and now mainly shell advancing Ukrainian units.[6] The absence of recent reports and footage of these elements participating in combat engagements in western Zaporizhia Oblast suggests that casualties sustained during the first phases of the Ukrainian counteroffensive rendered them combat ineffective. Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment reportedly temporarily withdrew to a rear area during the Ukrainian breakthrough and returned to frontline positions in early September, suggesting that Ukrainian advances had degraded this unit enough to compel the Russian command to give it time to refit in the rear — which would be one of the very few unit rotations ISW has observed on this sector of the front.[7] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), which also held forward positions at the initial Russian defensive layer during the earlier phases of the counteroffensive, similarly appear to be deployed further behind the Russian defensive layer ahead of the current Ukraine advance.[8] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade reportedly engaged in close combat during the Ukrainian push through Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv), and Russian milbloggers maintain that some elements of the unit hold positions near the southern outskirts of Robotyne.

Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have resulted in the particularly severe degradation of critical elements of the Russian elastic defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Elements of the Russian 22nd and 45th Separate Spetsnaz Brigades appeared to be responsible for counterattacking against significant Ukrainian advances in the Robotyne area during the earlier phases of the counteroffensive and likely suffered heavy losses in these operations.[10] Russian reporting and footage of the Robotyne area in recent weeks has largely omitted mention of these Spetsnaz brigades, suggesting that this degradation may have severely impacted their ability to continue counterattacking. A prominent milblogger claimed that elements of the 45th Spetsnaz Brigade were still operating near the frontline as of September 12, however.[11] Elements of the Russian 7th Guards Mountain Airborne (VDV) Division that laterally deployed to the Robotyne area in mid-August during the Ukrainian breakthrough now appear to be responsible for conducting counterattacks against the most forward advances of the Ukrainian breach.[12] Russian sources routinely claim that VDV elements, which may include elements of the 76th Guards VDV Division that also laterally redeployed to the area, repel Ukrainian assaults and conduct counterattacks near Robotyne[13] The degradation of the elements of the 22nd and 45th Separate Spetsnaz Brigades initially responsible for counterattacking in the Robotyne area likely prompted the Russian command to laterally redeploy these elements of the 7th and 76th VDV Divisions to assume responsibility for counterattacking. The Russian elastic defense requires one echelon of Russian forces to slow a Ukrainian tactical advance while a second echelon of forces rolls back that advance through counterattacking. Counterattacking requires significant morale and relatively high combat capabilities, and the Russian military appears to rely on relatively elite VDV units and formations for this undertaking, possibly at the expense of heavily degrading these forces.

ISW has not directly observed the level of degradation among the Russian units referenced above and it is possible that some have suffered heavier losses than others. It is also possible that the Russians have used the arrival of elements of the 76th and 7th VDV Divisions to conduct belated unit rotations of their tired frontline units. The current battlefield geometry between the Ukrainian advance and current Russian defensive positions may also be contributing to the apparent absence of these likely degraded units from combat engagements, as the gap between Ukrainian advances and Russian defensive positions may result in less direct combat engagements. Ukrainian forces may engage these units in more direct combat as they further advance into and past the current Russian defensive layer. It is thus too soon to assess with high confidence that the initial defenders in this sector have been rendered combat ineffective, but the evidence currently available points in that direction.

Recent Ukrainian advances south of Bakhmut may correspond with the similar degradation of defending Russian units in the area. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces completely destroyed the combat capabilities of elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps), the 31st Guards VDV Brigade, and the 83rd Guards VDV Brigade during the liberation of Andriivka and Klishchiivka.[15] Russian “Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky’s claim that the 31st VDV Brigade commander has been killed supports this statement.[16] The 72nd Motorized Brigade has likely been rendered combat ineffective, although the exact level of losses among the two VDV brigades remains unclear.[17] These VDV elements were involved in counterattacking and attempting to roll back Ukrainian advances around Bakhmut — similar to the way that VDV elements operate in western Zaporizhia Oblast — and likely suffered heavy losses.[18] If recent Ukrainian advances south of Bakhmut resulted in the destruction of the 31st and 83rd VDV brigades’ combat capabilities, then the Russian command will likely laterally redeploy elements of another relatively elite formation to maintain critical elements of the Russian defense south of Bakhmut. Ukrainian counteroffensive operations have pinned elements of two VDV divisions and another VDV brigade in addition to the 83rd and 31st in the Bakhmut direction, and the Russian command may decide to conduct tactical redeployments to make up for the reported losses among the 83rd and 31st VDV brigades.[19] Lateral redeployments from elsewhere in Ukraine or substantial tactical redeployments of other VDV elements in the Bakhmut area would therefore indicate that recent Ukrainian advances have resulted in significant Russian losses.

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/136 drone and cruise missile strikes on coastal and rear areas of Ukraine on the night of September 17-18. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched 24 Shahed drones from Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea and 17 Kh-101/555/55 air-launched cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers that took off from Volgograd Oblast.[20] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 18 drones and all 17 missiles.[21] The Ukrainian Air Force noted that the Russian drone strike targeted Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.[22] Russian sources claimed that Russian drones hit ports in Odesa Oblast and that the Russian missiles targeted the Starokostyantyniv airfield in Khmelnytskyi Oblast.

An organization with alleged ties to Russian First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko is reportedly responsible for disseminating pro-war propaganda and false information about Ukraine to prominent figures in the Russian information space. Russian opposition news outlets Meduza, Vazhnye Istorii, and the Bell reported on September 13 that the non-profit organization “Dialog” created multiple popular Telegram channels to increase pro-Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion and has subsequently been distributing false information about the war in Ukraine to prominent figures in the Russian information space, including Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, prominent milbloggers, and popular news aggregators.[24] Dialog is also reportedly affiliated with pro-Russian Telegram channels that mimic Ukrainian channels.[25] Dialog reportedly advised unspecified individuals in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to issue a “tough” and “prompt” response following increasing reports of a lack of ammunition and provisions among Russian mobilized personnel in Ukraine.[26] Dialog-affiliated sources also reportedly disseminated negative reports about deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin while Wagner forces were fighting in Ukraine.[27] The Russian Ministry of Digital Development reportedly transferred 6.5 billion rubles (about $67.7 million) to Dialog in 2022, and its deputy general director, Vladimir Tabak, reportedly has ties to Kiriyenko.[28] ISW has consistently observed some Russian sources making similar claims with similar language on the same days, which may suggest that some Russian sources receive information from the same source. Kiriyenko’s reported affiliation with Dialog is consistent with ISW’s assessment that some Russian siloviki and senior military commanders control various Telegram channels intended to further their individual objectives in the Russian information space.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Moscow on September 18. Lavrov stated in his opening remarks that the world is undergoing “tectonic shifts” and reiterated boilerplate rhetoric on the importance and previous successes of Russian-Chinese cooperation.

Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin issued a direct criticism of Russian President Vladimir Putin to rally supporters to his cause. Girkin, via his lawyer Alexander Molokhov, posted a statement on September 18 dated September 15 that justifies Girkin’s opposition to Putin.[31] Girkin humorously answered the question “why Strelkov [Girkin] has gone crazy” for asserting that he is “better than Putin.” Girkin claimed that the “Troubles” (likely referencing the Time of Troubles in 17th century Russia that preceded the rise of the Romanov dynasty) have begun in Russia and that the Kremlin’s attempts to address the direst issues have failed, so the current “bureaucratic-oligarchic system” will eventually “collapse.” Girkin claimed that it is his “duty” to try to unite other patriots to be a suitable alternative but acknowledged that he may lack the resources to succeed or may have begun his initiative too early. Girkin expressed hope that his efforts will inspire others to “act as leaders of the national-patriotic movement” because “it is too late to be afraid and wait” as it is the “eve of the collapse of Russian statehood.”


Key Takeaways:

Ukraine’s liberation of Klishchiivka and Andriivka south of Bakhmut may have degraded the Russian defense in the area south of Bakhmut and could have rendered combat ineffective as many as three Russian brigades according to Ukrainian military officials.
Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have resulted in the particularly severe degradation of critical elements of the Russian elastic defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Recent Ukrainian advances south of Bakhmut may correspond with the similar degradation of defending Russian units in the area.
Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/136 drone and cruise missile strikes on coastal and rear areas of Ukraine on the night of September 17-18.
An organization with alleged ties to Russian First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko is reportedly responsible for disseminating pro-war propaganda and false information about Ukraine to prominent figures in the Russian information space.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia and advanced in some areas on September 18.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front and advanced in western Zaporizhia on September 18.
Some Russian sources claimed that former Wagner Group personnel are working closely with Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) in order to return fighting in Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-18-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/21/23 02:03 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 20, 2023
Sep 20, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20, 2023

Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 20, 2023, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on September 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 20.
The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations and inflicted significant losses on Russian manpower and equipment in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction and are consolidating in newly secured lines.[2] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed that Ukrainian forces secured positions in Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) and that Russian redeployments of airborne (VDV) forces from Bakhmut to the Zaporizhia direction have weakened Russian defenses around Bakhmut.[3] ISW had previously observed elements of the 83rd Separate Air Assault Brigade operating in Zaporizhia, although it is unclear how large a proportion of that unit was redeployed from Bakhmut.[4] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces are preparing defensive positions before Russian forces renew their assaults in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.

Russian servicemen and milbloggers revealed that the Russian military command orders Russian troops to carry out “ill-conceived and unsupported” counterattacks on Bakhmut’s southern flank to urgently regain lost ground.[6] Elements of Altai Krai’s 1st Battalion of the 1442nd Regiment (a mobilized unit) published a video appeal in which the soldiers claim that they abandoned their military equipment in the Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) area after receiving an order from the Russian military command to form an assault group and attack in the Bakhmut direction.[7] The servicemen noted that the Russian military command began deploying different types of personnel to the frontlines — including soldiers who are currently resting in the rear — without providing them with enough functional artillery shells. The servicemen noted that their shells do not explode when fired, which is likely a symptom of Russia's defense industrial base’s (DIB) efforts to speed up the production of shells and skipping quality assurance measures to do so.[8] The servicemen added that the unit is suffering from low morale after hearing reports that Ukrainian forces destroyed most of an unspecified Russian regiment and almost an entire retreating assault group in the area. The servicemen also claimed that they do not have prepared defensive positions and have to rely on small arms whereas the Ukrainians have artillery. Relatives of the personnel in the 1442nd Regiment had previously appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin after the Russian military command beat the troops for refusing to carry out an assault on September 14.

A Russian milblogger also accused the Russian military command of ordering Russian troops to recapture Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) and the surrounding area without setting proper conditions for such counterattacks.[10] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command was planning “weak” counterattacks and failed to provide accurate intelligence to Russian assault units. The milblogger observed that Russian forces also lack artillery support, while “hysterical” counterattacks are depleting Russian resources and reserves. The milblogger also claimed that Russian defenses on the adjacent heights in the Andriivka area had collapsed, and it is likely that the Russian military command’s efforts to regain lost positions are preventing Russian forces from preparing new defensive positions on Bakhmut’s southern flank.

Russian forces conducted another round of Shahed drones strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 19-20. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 17 of 24 launched Iranian-made Shahed 136/131 drones in Sumy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and that some of the drones struck an oil refinery in Poltava Oblast.[11] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reiterated that Russian forces have predictably increased the use of drones against Ukraine because Russia can obtain, manufacture, or assemble more drones domestically.[12] Ihnat stated that Russian forces have not changed their drone tactics and continue attempts to bypass Ukrainian air defenses.

A Russian milblogger outlined Russian reconnaissance groups’ drone operator training and operation tactics in Ukraine. The milblogger claimed that most Russian reconnaissance groups have two types of drone operators — a Mavik drone operator who carries out reconnaissance operations and a first-person viewer (FPV) drone operator who conducts attacks.[13] The milblogger noted that Mavik drone operators usually adjust fire and direct ground and drone attacks, while FPV drone operators strike targets that the Mavik drone operators identify.[14] The milblogger claimed that competent Mavik operators will train for up to six months while FPV drone operators train for three months, but noted that the battlefield effectiveness of drones is contingent upon their operators’ skill.[15] The milblogger noted that Russian reconnaissance group commanders do not need approval from senior commanders to strike targets.[16] The milblogger also claimed that the Russian military is training fewer FPV drone operators due to the time and money needed for FPV drone repair, assembly, and operator training.[17] ISW has not observed a decrease in reconnaissance and FPV drone usage, however. The milblogger may be claiming that the Russian military is decreasing drone usage due to high costs in order to generate monetary and drone donations.

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that unspecified saboteurs damaged Russian strategic aircraft at Chkalovsky airfield near Moscow on September 18.[19] The GUR reported on September 20 that the saboteurs planted explosives on an An-148 and an Il-20 aircraft subordinate to the Russian 354th Special Purpose Aviation Regiment and an Mi-28N helicopter that Russian forces use to repel Ukrainian drones. The GUR stated that the explosions severely damaged the aircraft, including the Mi-28N's tail, and inflicted minor damage on a second An-148 nearby. Russian authorities have not yet reported an attack at the Chkalovsky airfield as of September 20.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on September 20 that he is in good health amidst continued speculations about his possible illness or death. Ramzan Kadyrov directly addressed speculations about his health in a social media post on September 20 claiming that he remains alive and in good health.[20] Kadyrov claimed to not understand why speculations of his health necessitate “fuss” and stated that publications that speculate on his health are untrustworthy. Kadyrov included a video of himself visiting his uncle Magomed Kadyrov in the hospital.

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu met with Iranian Chief of the General Staff Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran, Iran to discuss Russian-Iranian military cooperation on September 19, a day after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi denied Iran’s provision of drones to Russia. Raisi denied that Iran provides drones to Russia during his speech to the United Nations on September 18.[21] Shoigu and Bagheri visited an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force facility where Shoigu saw Iranian-made drones, air defense systems, missiles; and tactical, medium, and long-range missile systems on September 20.[22] Shoigu stated that Russia and Iran plan to implement a range of unspecified activities in spite of Western sanctions, likely in order to evade the sanctions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized Russian peacekeepers’ humanitarian actions in Nagorno-Karabakh as the Russian information space continues to observe that Russia is losing influence in Armenia. The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities accepted a Russian peacekeeper-mediated ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan on September 20 and reported that Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani officials will meet in Yevlakh, Azerbaijan on September 21 to discuss “reintegration” and “ensuring the rights and security of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.”[24] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenian authorities were not involved in the ceasefire agreement and that Armenian forces were not present in Nagorno-Karabakh.[25] Putin emphasized on September 20 Russian peacekeepers’ roles in protecting civilians and claimed that Russia is in constant contact with Armenian, Azerbaijani and Nagorno-Karabakh authorities.

The Russian MoD reported that Azerbaijani small arms fire killed Russian peacekeeping personnel driving in Nagorno-Karabakh and that Russian and Azerbaijani investigative authorities are working to clarify the incident.[27] Several milbloggers noted that the Russian military did not respond when Azerbaijani forces shot down a Russian Mi-24 helicopter during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and expressed irritation at the assumption that the Russian military would similarly ignore these deaths.[28] Russian milbloggers continue to lament Russia’s waning influence in Armenia.[29] Russia’s role as a security guarantor for Armenia may be declining as Russia continues to prioritize its military operations in Ukraine at the same time as the Armenian government increasingly expresses its dissatisfaction with its security ties to Russia.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 20.
Russian servicemen and milbloggers revealed that the Russian military command orders Russian troops to carry out “ill-conceived and unsupported” counterattacks on Bakhmut’s southern flank to urgently regain lost ground.
Russian forces conducted another round of Shahed drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 19-20.
A Russian milblogger outlined Russian reconnaissance groups’ drone operator training and operation tactics in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that unspecified saboteurs damaged Russian strategic aircraft at Chkalovsky airfield near Moscow on September 18.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on September 20 that he is in good health amidst continued speculations about his possible illness or death.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu met with Iranian Chief of the General Staff Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran, Iran to discuss Russian-Iranian military cooperation on September 19, a day after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi denied Iran’s provision of drones to Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized Russian peacekeepers’ humanitarian actions in Nagorno-Karabakh as the Russian information space continues to observe that Russia is losing influence in Armenia.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed gains.
The Russian Red Cross (RKK) indicated that the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, particularly partial mobilization efforts in autumn 2022, caused a decline in mental health among many Russians.
Russian and occupation authorities continue efforts to deport Ukrainian children to Russia and integrate Ukrainian children into Russian culture.

https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-20-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/23/23 01:24 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 22, 2023
Sep 22, 2023 - ISW Press









Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 22, 2023

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 22, 2023, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:45pm ET on September 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces carried out drone and cruise missile strikes on occupied Crimea and significantly damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol on September 22
The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated that Ukrainian forces launched a successful strike on the Russian BSF Command headquarters in Sevastopol, Crimea on September 22.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces used Storm Shadow cruise missiles to conduct the strike, and social media footage of the headquarters indicates significant damage to the building.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down five Ukrainian missiles and acknowledged that the Ukrainian strike damaged a building of BSF Command headquarters.[3] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a drone strike preceding the missile strike, and the Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two Ukrainian drones on the western coast of Crimea on the morning of September 22.

Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk thanked Ukrainian pilots in general when amplifying footage of the strike.[5] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces will strike more Russian military targets in Crimea in the future.[6] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated that Ukrainian forces will continue to strike Sevastopol and that the Russian BSF should destroy their own ships in order to avoid further Ukrainian strikes.

The Russian information space heavily focused its attention on the Ukrainian strike on Sevastopol on September 22. One Russian milblogger complained about Russian authorities’ inability to control the spread of Ukrainian information about the consequences of the strike, and other milbloggers criticized Russian authorities and the Russian military for not retaliating sufficiently.[8] Another Russian milblogger claimed that such Ukrainian strikes on Crimea are expected as Ukraine and its Western partners consider Crimea to be Ukrainian territory.[9] Multiple Russian milbloggers claimed that Western partners helped Ukrainian forces target the BSF Command headquarters.

Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bakhmut and reportedly advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 22. Geolocated footage published on September 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced southeast of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[11] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces slightly advanced north of Novoprokopivka and are currently about 800 meters away from the settlement’s outskirts, a claim that generally corresponds to ISW’s assessment of the closest approach of the Ukrainian counter-offensive to the settlement.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction, exhausting and inflicting losses on Russian forces along the entire front.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package on September 21, providing Ukraine with $325 million worth of military equipment. The DoD package includes AIM-9M missiles for air defense; additional ammunition for HIMARS systems; Avenger air defense systems; anti-drone machine guns; 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds, including dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM); Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; over three million rounds of small arms ammunition; light tactical vehicles; demolition munitions for obstacle clearing; and spare parts, maintenance equipment, and other field equipment.

The US will reportedly soon provide long-range army tactical missile systems (ATACMS) to Ukraine Four unnamed US government officials told NBC News in an article published on September 22 that US President Joe Biden told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that the US would provide Ukraine with “a small number of long-range missiles.”[15] The officials did not state when the US would announce the provision of ATACMS or when the US would deliver them to Ukraine.[16] One US official told NBC News that US officials are still discussing the type of missile and the number of missiles the US would provide to Ukraine.[17] Several unnamed people familiar with ongoing deliberations on ATACMS also told the Washington Post that the Biden administration plans to provide Ukraine with a version of ATACMS armed with cluster bomblets rather than a single (unitary) warhead.[18] The Washington Post reported that cluster-armed ATACMS have a range of up to 190 miles (depending on the version) and could allow Ukraine to strike Russian military positions far into the rear.

Russian efforts to intensify divisions between Ukraine and its Central European partners appear to have suffered a setback as Polish Prime Minister Andrzej Duda reiterated the strength of Polish-Ukrainian relations on September 22. Duda clarified Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morwiecki’s September 21 statement that Poland would no longer transfer weapons to Ukraine and explained that Poland would continue to fulfill weapons supplies agreements with Ukraine but would not transfer new weapons that Poland purchases for its own military.[19] Duda also stated that the potential conflict between the two countries regarding the export of Ukrainian grain along European land routes does not “significantly affect” the two countries’ relationship.[20] ISW has previously assessed that Russian strikes on Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure are part of a Russian campaign to damage Ukrainian relations with its Western neighbors, and Poland’s swift reiteration of its commitment to Ukraine indicates that this campaign is not succeeding as much as Moscow likely intends.

A Ukrainian military official swiftly denied Russian claims that Wagner Group forces are operating in occupied Kherson Oblast. Several Russian sources claimed on September 22 that Wagner personnel arrived in combat areas in occupied Kherson Oblast and that assault troops are distributed across sectors of the Kherson Oblast frontline.[22] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk denied this claim on September 22 and stated that Russian sources likely disseminate such claims in order to improve Russian morale.[23] Humenyuk also stated that Chechen forces and Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) forces arrived in occupied Kherson ”a few weeks ago” in order to prevent Russian military personnel from deserting.[24] Russian milbloggers may be claiming that Wagner forces have arrived in occupied Kherson Oblast amid rumors that Wagner forces will return to hostilities in Ukraine operating alongside Rosgvardia.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly investigating high-ranking Rosgvardia officials over their potential involvement in Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24. Russian insider source claimed on September 22 that the FSB is investigating Rosgvardia officials after Rosgvardia reportedly allowed Wagner to “hide” shells and equipment in Rosgvardia’s warehouses immediately after the Wagner rebellion and during the period of Wagner’s disarmament.[26] The source claimed that an unspecified Rosgvardia general with the first name “Roman” oversaw the storage of up to four large containers of Wagner military equipment near a Rosgvardia training ground in the area of “Kazachy Stan” (likely a settlement in an unspecified region of Russia).[27] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin likely aimed to consolidate Russia‘s internal security apparatus around Rosgvardia following the Wagner rebellion.[28] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 27 that it would prepare to transfer Wagner’s heavy military equipment to unspecified elements of the Russian military on the same day that Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov announced that Rosgvardia would receive heavy weapons and tanks.[29] The Russian government also officially transferred the “Grom” special units of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs) to the control of Rosgvardia in July.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces carried out drone and cruise missile strikes on occupied Crimea and significantly damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol on September 22.
The Russian information space heavily focused its attention on the Ukrainian strike on Sevastopol on September 22.
Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bakhmut and reportedly advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 22.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package on September 21, providing Ukraine with $325 million worth of military equipment.
The US will reportedly soon provide long-range army tactical missile systems (ATACMS) to Ukraine.
Russian efforts to intensify divisions between Ukraine and its Central European partners appear to have suffered a setback as Polish Prime Minister Andrzej Duda reiterated the strength of Polish-Ukrainian relations on September 22.
A Ukrainian military official swiftly denied Russian claims that Wagner Group forces are operating in occupied Kherson Oblast.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly investigating high-ranking Rosgvardia officials over their potential involvement in Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk area, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Donetsk Oblast and reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border area.
The Russian government is reportedly planning to increase defense spending by 4.4 trillion rubles ($46 billion) in 2024.

https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-22-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/23/23 03:57 PM

"Senior" Russian Navy commanders killed in attack on Sevastopol, Kiev says

"Senior" commanders of the Russian Navy were killed or injured in the attack on the headquarters of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, on the annexed Crimean peninsula, on Friday . That's what the Ukrainian army says.

"The details of the attack will be announced as soon as possible," said the army in Kiev, which already reports "dozens" of dead and wounded among the "occupiers" , including "senior" commanders of the Black Sea Fleet. According to the military, the attack took place "during a meeting of leaders of the Russian Navy."

Authorities installed by Russia initially said that anti-aircraft defenses shot down missiles , causing debris to fall from the sky. It later turned out that the attack was a lot more successful than that. Kiev calls the operation a "crab trap" and says it deliberately struck during an important meeting.

On Saturday, the Russian governor of Crimea, Mikhail Razvozhayev, reported again that debris had fallen from the sky because air defenses had shot down missiles. There were explosions on the peninsula and photos of large clouds of smoke were shared on social media. Razvozhayev warned Sevastopol residents to stay indoors because more attacks could come, but later withdrew the warning.

The Crimean peninsula, which is a key logistics hub for Russian forces, was annexed by Moscow in 2014.

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/25/23 01:25 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 23, 2023
Sep 23, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 23, 2023

George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 23, 2023, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3pm ET on September 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

ISW is now prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have broken through Russian field fortifications west of Verbove in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
These fortifications are not the final defensive line in Russia’s defense in depth in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but rather a specific series of the best-prepared field fortifications arrayed as part of a near-contiguous belt of an anti-vehicle ditch, dragon's teeth, and fighting positions about 1.7 - 3.5 km west of Verbove.[

Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated in an interview with CNN published on September 23 that Ukrainian forces achieved a “breakthrough” on the left flank near Verbove and that Ukrainian forces continue advancing.[2] Combat footage posted on September 22 shows a destroyed Ukrainian Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and BMP-2 operating slightly beyond Russia’s fighting positions trench line near Verbove, indicating continued Ukrainian progress in deploying more heavy equipment beyond Russia’s triune belt of the anti-vehicle ditch, dragon’s teeth, and fighting positions.[3] Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces have brought heavy equipment closer to Verbove over the past 96 hours in a manner consistent with Tarnavskyi’s statement.[4] The Wall Street Journal reported on September 21 that Ukrainian forces achieved a “limited breakthrough” west of Verbove citing an unnamed Ukrainian Air Assault Forces officer.

Ukrainian forces have not overcome all of the prepared Russian defensive positions near Verbove. Ukrainian forces’ rate of advance near their breakthrough remains unclear. Russian forces likely still control segments of the long trench line of Russian fighting positions between Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove, especially near the tactical high ground to the south. Russian forces have reportedly established prepared fighting positions in almost every tree line that Ukrainian infantry are slowly and systematically fighting through. Russian forces have more field fortifications beyond Verbove; there are more anti-vehicle trenches and fighting positions north of Ocheretuvate (26km southeast of Orikhiv), for example. It is unclear the extent to which those positions are manned, however. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military does not have sufficient forces deployed to this sector of the front to completely man its defenses in depth and that Ukrainian forces should be able to operate through Russian field fortifications more rapidly if they are not properly manned.

Ukrainian forces are deepening their penetration in Zaporizhia Oblast and are assaulting Novoprokopivka – a frontline village 1.5 km immediately south of Robotyne. Geolocated combat footage posted on September 23 shows elements of the Russian 70th Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) ambushing and killing two Ukrainian infantrymen in Novoprokopivka’s northeastern outskirts, indicating that Ukrainian forces have likely cleared Russian positions between Robotyne and Novoprokopivka.[7] Multiple Russian sources reported that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack against northern Novoprokopivka on September 22.[8] This is the first confirmed Ukrainian ground attack in the immediate vicinity of Novoprokopivka.

Ukrainian military officials stated that the Ukrainian counteroffensive would continue in the winter. Tarnavskyi told CNN that he expected a major Ukrainian breakthrough after Ukrainian forces reach Tokmak (a major Russian stronghold in western Zaporizhia) and that it is important that Ukrainian forces not lose the initiative they currently hold.[9] Tarnavskyi also stated that Ukrainian operations will continue through the winter as Ukrainian forces are mostly advancing on foot without vehicles and that inclement weather will thus not have a major negative effect on the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[10] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov echoed a similar assessment about continued Ukrainian winter operations in an interview with The War Zone published on September 22.[11] ISW has previously assessed that, while seasonal weather can slow ground movements and challenge logistics, it will not impose a definite end to Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[12] The culmination of the Ukrainian counteroffensive will likely depend rather on the Russian and Ukrainian balance of forces as well as on Western aid to Ukraine.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast has likely destroyed the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet). Budanov stated in his interview with The War Zone published on September 22 that the 810th Brigade was “completely defeated” in southern Ukraine.[13] Budanov stated that the 810th Brigade has withdrawn and that Russian airborne (VDV) units replaced them on the front. Budanov‘s description of the status of the 810th Brigade corresponds most closely to the US military‘s doctrinal definition of the tactical mission task of “destroy”: “physically render[ing] an enemy force combat-ineffective until reconstituted.”[14] Elements of the 810th Brigade have reportedly been operating in the Zaporizhia direction since March 2023 and in western Zaporizhia Oblast since June 2023.[15] ISW previously observed the 810th Brigade in October 2022, when it was reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast, and the unit was likely reconstituting in the rear in the interim before assuming positions in Zaporizhia Oblast.[16] The 810th Brigade has repeatedly suffered significant losses, and Ukrainian forces have destroyed the unit in the past, following which the Russian military has reconstituted it. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 19, 2022, that the 158 soldiers of the 810th Brigade had been killed and about 500 wounded.[17] GUR Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on July 31, 2022, that 200 servicemen of the 810th Brigade refused to return to the war in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 12, 2022, that the 810th Brigade lost more than 85% of its personnel in the Kherson direction and that many again refused to return to combat.

A senior Ukrainian official explicitly confirmed that Ukraine’s objective in Bakhmut is to fix Russian forces. Ukraine’s fixing of Russian forces in Bakhmut may be alleviating pressure on the Kupyansk frontline. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukrainian forces achieved their objective of pinning Russian forces in Bakhmut and preventing their transfer to other areas of the theater – such as southern Ukraine – in a September 22 interview.[19] Budanov also stated that the Russian military deployed the recently created and not fully formed 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) of the Eastern Military District “roughly north of Bakhmut.”[20] Budanov previously reported on August 31 that the Russian military deployed elements of the 25th CAA to replace elements of the 41st CAA (Central Military District) in the Kupyansk direction as elements of the 41st CAA began a "slow” redeployment to southern Ukraine.[21] The Russian deployment of elements of the 25th CAA to Bakhmut instead of Kupyansk will likely disrupt Russian efforts to fix Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk direction, as Russian forces need these troops to continue assaults in place of the 41st CAA. Ukrainian officials and Russian sources have indicated that the tempo and the intensity of Russian offensives on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line has significantly decreased in recent weeks as Russian forces are continuing to regroup and rotate personnel in this direction, and the redirection of the deployment of 25th CAA may have alleviated some of the pressure from this frontline.[22] Budanov’s statement supports ISW’s recent assessment that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s southern flank have fixed a large amount of Russian combat power in Bakhmut that would otherwise be available to reinforce Russian defenses in the south — or, in this case, to attempt to force Ukrainian forces to redeploy to defend against Russian assaults around Kupyansk.

Ukraine’s simultaneous counteroffensives in Bakhmut and southern Ukraine are impeding Russia’s long-term force generation efforts as Russia redeploys its new reserves to defend against Ukrainian advances. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) formed a “reserve army” at the end of June, likely referencing the 25th CAA among other formations, which began recruiting personnel from the Russian Far East in mid-May.[24] The formation of the 25th CAA was likely part of Shoigu’s announced intent to conduct large-scale force restructuring by 2026, and the use of these forces in combat and defensive operations will likely expend reserves intended for the long-term reconstitution and expansion of Russia’s military.[25] The Russian military command has also likely been unable to fully staff or properly train the 25th CAA at this time. Budanov specified that the unfinished 25th CAA has about 15,000 troops, whereas the Russian military had reportedly hoped to recruit 30,000 contract personnel for the 25th CAA.[26] Ukrainian military officials assessed that the 25th CAA would not be combat effective until at least 2024.[27] Russia had previously attempted to form the 3rd Army Corps over the summer of 2022 as a reserve force but had deployed and expended much of this ill-prepared formation defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall of 2022.

A Ukrainian intelligence chief stated that the September 22 Ukrainian strike on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol injured senior Russian commanders. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told Voice of America (VOA) in an interview published on September 23 that the Ukrainian strike on the BSF Command headquarters wounded the commander of the Russian grouping of forces in the Zaporizhia direction, Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk, who is in “very serious condition” and the commander of the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet), Lieutenant General Oleg Tsekov, who is “unconscious.”[29] Budanov also reported that the strike killed at least nine and injured 16 Russian personnel.[30] VOA reported that the GUR has no information about the alleged death of BSF commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov.[31] Ukrainian Special Operations Forces reported that Ukrainian forces “precisely” struck the BSF Command headquarters during a meeting of senior BSF leadership.[32] Satellite imagery published on September 22 showing the BSF Command headquarters before and after the strike indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a precision strike.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 22 to 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 14 of 15 Shahed-131/136 drones and that Russian forces launched four missiles.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted a missile attack on Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[35] Several Russian sources claimed that the Russian forces conducted a retaliatory strike on Kremenchuk airfield after the Ukrainian strike on the BSF Command headquarters.

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky appointed former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin as a Russian Federation Council senator representing occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[37] Rogozin is affiliated with the “Tsarskiye Volky” (Tsar’s Wolves) volunteer battalion but has not held a position in the Russian government since his dismissal as head of Roskosmos in July 2022.[38] A Russian insider source claimed that Rogozin has ties to the “Convoy” private military company (PMC) and advocated for its use in Africa and Nagorno-Karabakh to Russian Presidental Administration Head Anton Vaino.[39] ISW previously reported that Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov formed a “Convoy” with Wagner-affiliated Konstantin Pikalov.[40] The insider source claimed that unspecified Russian officials forced Rogozin to go on a “business trip (exile)” to defense industrial base enterprises in Belarus after multiple meetings with Vaino.[41] Rogozin’s appointment as occupied Zaporizhia Oblast Federation Council senator may be indicative of his ties to Russian occupation officials and his attempts to secure a new position in the Russian government.

A Russian insider source argued that the Russian military should reintroduce military officers for political affairs (zampolits) to address the Russian military’s problems with political and ideological commitment — a problem that Russian military thinkers identified in September 2018. The insider source claimed that GRU political officers are using an outdated “Soviet template” to conduct information operations against the enemy and are failing to provide political support to Russian military personnel.[42] The insider source noted that Russian political officers must resolve the contradictions between senior Russian political leaders‘ slogans and reality to ensure that military personnel can distinguish between possible and impossible objectives. The insider source claimed that Russian military-political work encourages blind repetition of phrases and orders, which prevents Russian military personnel from understanding and communicating Russian political decisions to their subordinates or explaining contradictions in political leadership messaging. Chairman of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Colonel General Andrey Kartapolov identified similar issues in his September 2018 essay justifying the creation of the Russian Military-Political Directorate.[43] Kartapolov stated that Russian military-political leadership should adapt Soviet structures to new content. Kartapolov also argued that Russia must ensure the “information protection” of military personnel and create a stable conviction in both the military and broader society about why they must serve Russia. This insider’s argument suggests that the Russian military has not solved the problem that Kartapolov identified over the past five years.

Disjointed Wagner Group contingents reportedly returning to fight in Ukraine are likely to have a marginal impact on Russian combat capabilities without bringing the full suite of effectiveness Wagner had had as a unitary organization under financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s and founder Dmitry Utkin’s leadership. Former Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated on September 23 that Wagner personnel are operating in Luhansk Oblast and across different sectors of the frontline.[44] Haidai also stated that he did not know the number of Wagner personnel or the organization under which these Wagner personnel are operating in Ukraine.[45] A Wagner-affiliated source claimed that about 500 Wagner personnel including those who refused to participate in the Wagner rebellion on June 24 have joined a new unspecified organization organized by the former Wagner personnel department head and will likely return to Ukraine to fight on the southern flank of Bakhmut.[46] ISW previously observed reports that the Wagner personnel department head (previously referred to as Vadim V. “Khrustal”) is attempting to recruit Wagner fighters for a new PMC for operations in Africa.[47] These reports indicate that Wagner forces are fragmented and are unlikely to organize into a cohesive fighting force or have an impact on Russian combat capabilities if they return to fighting in Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

ISW is now prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have broken through Russian field fortifications west of Verbove in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Ukrainian forces have not overcome all prepared Russian defensive positions near Verbove.
Ukrainian forces are deepening their penetration in Zaporizhia Oblast and are assaulting Novoprokopivka – a frontline village 1.5 km immediately south of Robotyne.
Ukrainian military officials stated that the Ukrainian counteroffensive would continue in the winter.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast has likely destroyed the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet).
A senior Ukrainian official explicitly confirmed that Ukraine’s objective in Bakhmut is to fix Russian forces. Ukraine’s fixing of Russian forces in Bakhmut may be alleviating pressure on the Kupyansk frontline.
Ukraine’s simultaneous counteroffensives in Bakhmut and southern Ukraine are impeding Russia’s long-term force generation efforts as Russia redeploys its new reserves to defend against Ukrainian advances.
A Ukrainian intelligence chief stated that the September 22 Ukrainian strike on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol injured senior Russian commanders.
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 22 to 23.
Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky appointed former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin as a Russian Federation Council senator representing occupied Zaporizhia Oblast
A Russian insider source argued that the Russian military should reintroduce military officers for political affairs (zampolits) to address the Russian military’s problems with political and ideological commitment– a problem that Russian military thinkers identified in September 2018.
Disjointed Wagner Group contingents reportedly returning to fight in Ukraine are likely to have a marginal impact on Russian combat capabilities without bringing the full suite of effectiveness Wagner had had as a unitary organization under financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s and founder Dmitry Utkin’s leadership.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances on September 23.
Russian authorities are reportedly embezzling funds from military facilities near the border of Ukraine.
Russian government programs continue to forcibly deport children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.

https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-23-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/25/23 10:46 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/25/23 10:50 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/27/23 01:22 AM

The Ukrainian military will review its own reporting on the death of Viktor Sokolov , the commander-in-chief of Russia's Black Sea Fleet. On Tuesday, images of him emerged in which he took part in an online meeting.

"Our troops will re-verify the information," the Ukrainian ministry promised on Tuesday.

The Russian Defense Ministry released images of Sokolov on Tuesday, a day after Kyiv declared him dead . Based on an accompanying press release, the photos appear to have been taken on Tuesday, but this could not yet be confirmed.

Ukraine said 34 Russian officers were killed last Friday during an attack on its headquarters in the occupied city of Sevastopol. Many of them have not yet been identified.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/27/23 01:24 AM

A year after the attack on the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea, it is still not clear who is behind the sabotage. Yet there are increasing indications that the attack was carried out by a Ukrainian team . The NOS reports this.

Joint research by various European media, including NOS and Nieuwsuur , managed to identify two people involved. According to the investigation , 41-year-old Ukrainian businessman Rustem A. appears to be behind the Polish company that paid for the rental of the suspect ship .

According to sources, the German investigation team also has the man in their sights. The request for the reservation was allegedly made from the email address of a second person , a 28-year-old man from Mariupol, Ukraine. Sources close to the investigation confirm that the Ukrainian is prominently featured, but say they do not know whether the man was used or was actually involved in the attack.

Sweden , which is also investigating the attack, told the press on Wednesday that the prosecutor hopes to decide before the end of the year whether the country will file charges. However, nothing will happen in the next four weeks, said prosecutor Mats Ljungqvist. He also said the country is cooperating with German authorities.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/27/23 01:27 AM

Russia's former president Dmitry Medvedev said on Tuesday that he visited a military training camp in eastern Ukraine . Since the start of the war, several senior Russian officials have visited Ukraine.

"I visited the training camp near the front line in the Donetsk People's Republic on the orders of Vladimir Putin ," the former president said in a video on the Russian social networking site VKontakte. According to a satisfied Medvedev, the training went "adequately" and the troops showed 'willpower', 'fortitude' and 'a spirit of victory'.

Earlier, in March, President Putin made a surprise visit to the bombed-out city of Mariupol in southern Ukraine. He then also moved to Luhansk . Putin met Russian soldiers taking part in the invasion of Ukraine.

Medvedev, the number two on Russia's Security Council, also stated that the Russian army has recruited 325,000 people since the beginning of this year. Since the spring, the Russian army has been conducting a large-scale recruitment campaign, with extensive advertising on the street and online. They promise attractive salaries and other benefits to entice future soldiers.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/27/23 01:53 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 26, 2023
Sep 26, 2023 - ISW Press









Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 26, 2023

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans and Frederick W. Kagan

September 26, 2023, 8:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3pm ET on September 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The tactical situation in Verbove remains unclear as Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 26.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction.[1] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached the northern outskirts of Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[2] Russian sources have still not directly addressed a claim from a source reportedly affiliated with the Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces that Ukrainian forces control half of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) as of September 24.[3] ISW has not observed evidence of such a Ukrainian advance, and the source reporting it has a very small following. It is still noteworthy that other VDV-connected sources have not responded to these claims.

Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) the “Guards” honorific on September 26.[4] The Russian 58th CAA (Southern Military District) has been responsible for the ongoing Russian defense against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine.

Likely degraded elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army’s 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are increasingly counterattacking in the Novoprokopivka area, suggesting that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have degraded relatively more elite Russian Airborne (VDV) elements that were responsible for counterattacking in the area. Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division’s 70th and 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiments have increasingly engaged in limited counterattacks near Novoprokopivka in the past week, and a Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division pushed Ukrainian forces from positions near Novoprokopivka on September 25.[6] Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division's 70th, 71st, and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiments routinely engaged in combat engagements and counterattacks against Ukrainian forces at the forwardmost Russian defensive positions in the Orikhiv area before withdrawing behind the Russian defensive layer between Verbove and Solodka Balka (20km south of Orikhiv) in mid-to-late August.[7] Russian forces laterally redeployed elements of the more elite 7th and 76th VDV Divisions to the Orikhiv direction in early-to-mid August to counterattack against a widening Ukrainian breach in the area, which may have provided these elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division respite from hostilities.[8] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment may have conducted one of the few unit rotations that ISW has observed on this sector of the front, possibly allowing these elements to partially reconstitute.

The 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments’ involvement in counterattacks around Novoprokopivka suggests that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have significantly degraded the combat capabilities of elements of the 7th and 76th VDV Divisions and that these VDV elements can no longer conduct all counterattacks along the entire Ukrainian breach in the Orikhiv direction. The Russian command may have committed the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments to defending and counterattacking in the Novoprokopivka area to allow VDV elements to prioritize defensive operations on the western and eastern flanks of the Ukrainian salient in the Orikhiv direction.[10] It is also possible that elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments have held positions near Novoprokopivka since withdrawing from positions further north and are now engaging Ukrainian forces because the Ukrainian advance has reached the outskirts of Novoprokopivka. Roughly a month of respite and possible reconstitution are unlikely to offset the significant degradation that elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments suffered while defending earlier in the counteroffensive. Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) similarly defended to hold forwardmost defensive positions earlier in the counteroffensive, and Ukrainian counteroffensive operations recently reportedly rendered these elements combat ineffective.[11] The Russian command risks rendering the already degraded elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments combat ineffective if they heavily commit these elements to counterattacking the Ukrainian advance near Novoprokopivka.

Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly deployed as far back as Tokmak, continuing to suggest that the Russian command has not manned the multi-echeloned defense in southern Ukraine in depth. Russian sources reported on September 25 and 26 that elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment’s 3rd Battalion were involved in an altercation with military police from the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment in occupied Tokmak.[12] The presence of elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments in Tokmak suggests that Russian forces have deployed elements of these regiments throughout the multi-echeloned defense between the current frontline and Tokmak. Russian forces, however, appear to be continuing to deploy most of their combat power in western Zaporizhia Oblast to immediate frontline areas.[13] The deployment of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments as far back as Tokmak suggests that elements of the same Russian formations and units defending at forward positions are holding positions, likely in smaller numbers, in subsequent defensive layers. It is possible that unobserved elements of other Russian units and formations hold positions at rear defensive positions, although the current Russian manpower commitment to holding positions on the frontline indicates that this is unlikely.

Interethnic tensions appear to be sowing division between elements of the Russian 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Arsen Temiraev, a mobilized serviceman from the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania serving with the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, posted a video on September 25 alleging that Russian military police of the 70th Regiment beat Temiraev and two other soldiers of the 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment’s 3rd Battalion in Tokmak on September 24.[14] Temiraev claimed that the military police asked about his ethnicity before telling Temiraev that “Russia is for Russians.” Temiraev claimed that the military police beat him and the other servicemen because a Tokmak local alleged that the soldiers had sexually assaulted children, a crime that Temiraev denied having committed. Temiraev complained that he thought the “Nazis were on the other [Ukrainian] side, [but] it turns out they [the Nazis] are among us.”[15] North Ossetian-Alanian Republic Head Sergey Menyailo responded on September 26, claiming that the elements of the “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” volunteer battalions in the area verified the incident.[16] Menyailo reported the incident to the Southern Military District command, which informed the commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army, and called the incident unacceptable towards any Russian soldier. Interethnic tensions between Russian units operating in the frontline and near the rear of western Zaporizhia Oblast may threaten the integrity of Russian defenses and unit cohesion amidst recent Ukrainian gains in the area.

Interethnic tensions may also threaten Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s broader standing within the Russian political sphere amid an ongoing controversy surrounding Kadyrov’s son. Kadyrov posted footage on September 25 of his son, Adam Kadyrov, beating a detained man accused of burning a Quran, and Ramzan Kadyrov praised his son for the beating.[17] The incident prompted varied condemnation and calls for investigations from Russian officials. Russian Human Rights Council (HRC) Head Valery Fadeev stated that burning the Quran is a serious crime but that officials must follow rules for detaining suspects, while HRC member Eva Merkacheva called for an investigation and called the situation a “challenge to the entire legal system of Russia.”[18] Merkacheva levied a thinly veiled criticism of the Chechen Republic, claiming that “in a particular region [Chechen Republic] they [Chechen officials] have shown that they commit crimes and nothing will happen to them about it.”[19] Other Russian officials, including Human Rights Commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova, called for Adam Kadyrov to answer for his crime in a Russian court.[20] Ramzan Kadyrov reportedly responded to a journalist’s request for a follow up and reportedly claimed that he had not witnessed the attack and that Adam Kadyrov is “independent and temperamental.”[21] Ramzan Kadyrov reportedly praised Adam Kadyrov’s behavior and stated he did not punish his son, but said that Adam Kadyrov will be punished to the fullest extent of Russian law if a Russian court convicts him.[22] ISW has long observed tensions between Chechen and non-Chechen officials and military units, and senior Russian officials’ emotional reactions suggest that Kadyrov’s political standing may be insufficient to protect his son from the consequences of this situation.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu discussed ongoing Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to increase Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces’ combat capabilities and add elements similar to those normally found in motorized rifle units to the VDV, likely to better align VDV elements with their current combat roles in Ukraine. Shoigu stated during a speech to the Russian Defense Ministry Board on September 26 that the Russian MoD is implementing measures to increase the Russian VDV’s combat potential by creating new airborne assault formations and increasing the VDV’s reconnaissance, strike, and fire capabilities.[24] Shoigu stated that the Russian MoD has nearly finished forming a fifth Russian VDV division, the 104th Airborne Assault (VDV) Division, and an additional parachute regiment subordinate to the Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division.[25] Shoigu stated that the Russian MoD plans for all Russian VDV divisions to have a logistics brigade and repair and restoration battalions by the end of 2023.[26] Shoigu stated that Russian VDV divisions will be “completed” with an artillery brigade but did not specify a time frame for this addition.[27] These additional elements will bring Russian VDV divisions into closer alignment with the force composition of a typical Russian motorized rifle division.[28] Shoigu did not state that Russian VDV divisions would receive tank regiments, which are common in Russian motorized rifle divisions.[29] These additional units will likely allow the Russian military to use Russian VDV divisions almost interchangeably with motorized rifle divisions in the future, and VDV elements in Ukraine have been increasingly operating as combat infantry similar to motorized rifle divisions.[30] The Russian MoD’s provision of additional elements to Russian VDV units and formations serving in Ukraine is a recognition of the role Russian VDV forces are currently playing in Ukraine and highlights the non-standard way in which the Russian military is using these forces. These Russian formations have become “airborne” in name only, and it is not clear when the Russian MoD intends for them to take to the skies again.

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes on port and military targets in Ukraine on the night of September 25-26. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 38 drones from Krasnodar Krai and Cape Chauda, Crimea, targeting Ukrainian port and border infrastructure and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 26 drones.[31] Russian forces hit the Orlivka-Isaccea ferry crossing that connects Odesa Oblast and Romania, and Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk denied speculations that the Russian drones crossed into Romanian territory.[32] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian MiG-29 fighter aircraft at the Kulbakino airfield in Mykolaiv Oblast.

Russian and Western sources largely claimed that Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov is alive after the Russian MoD posted footage of Sokolov allegedly attending a meeting on September 26, although the situation remains unclear at this time. Russian and Western sources largely speculated that footage posted by the Russian MoD on September 26 of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s remarks at the Russian MoD Board meeting purportedly shows Sokolov attending via teleconference.[34] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces previously reported on September 25 that the Ukrainian strike on the BSF headquarters in Sevastopol on September 22 killed Sokolov, and Russian officials have not yet issued a response confirming or denying reports of Sokolov’s death.[35] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces stated on September 26 that it was clarifying information about Sokolov’s possible death but that available sources indicate that he is dead.[36] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 26 that he had not received any information from the Russian MoD about the matter and that the Kremlin had nothing to say as this is “solely [the Russian MoD’s] prerogative.”[37] ISW is unprepared at this time to make an assessment about the authenticity of the Russian MoD’s footage of Sokolov or about Sokolov’s status on Earth.

The Russian MoD has reportedly recruited some former Wagner Group personnel for MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs) fighting in Ukraine, while negotiations between the reported Wagner leadership and the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) have allegedly stalled over disagreements concerning Wagner’s independence and cohesion. A reported Wagner-affiliated source claimed on September 26 that the Wagner Group is still operating in Africa and Belarus and that there are no plans to close the organization.[38] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that former Wagner personnel that left the organization with Andrey Troshev (known under the callsign “Sedoy”) after Prigozhin’s rebellion have joined the MoD-affiliated “Redut” and “Volunteer Corps” PMCs and have begun to redeploy to the Bakhmut area in Ukraine.[39] The milblogger claimed that Troshev is trying to recruit Wagner personnel who are currently operating in Belarus, Africa, and the Middle East for Russian MoD-affiliated PMCs. The milblogger also claimed that Anton Yelizarov (known as “Lotos”) is now the head of Wagner and is negotiating with Rosgvardia about the inclusion of Wagner units within Rosgvardia. Yelizarov is reportedly resisting Rosgvardia’s condition that Wagner personnel sign individual contracts, which the milblogger complained would allow Rosgvardia to divide the Wagner units and send them to various areas. ISW previously reported that Russian State Duma deputies will reportedly propose a bill allowing Rosgvardia to include volunteer formations, and Yelizarov is likely pushing for Wagner personnel to be considered a distinct Rosgvardia volunteer formation.


Key Takeaways:

The tactical situation in Verbove remains unclear as Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 26.
Likely degraded elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army’s 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are increasingly counterattacking in the Novoprokopivka area, suggesting that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have degraded relatively more elite Russian Airborne (VDV) elements that were responsible for counterattacking in the area.
Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly deployed as far back as Tokmak, continuing to suggest that the Russian command has not manned the multi-echeloned defense in southern Ukraine in depth.
Interethnic tensions appear to be sowing division between elements of the Russian 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Interethnic tensions may also threaten Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s broader standing within the Russian political sphere amid an ongoing controversy surrounding Kadyrov’s son.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu discussed ongoing Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to increase Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces’ combat capabilities and add elements similar to those normally found in motorized rifle units to the VDV, likely to better align VDV elements with their current combat roles in Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes on port and military targets in Ukraine on the night of September 25-26.
Russian and Western sources largely claimed that Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov is alive after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage of Sokolov allegedly attending a meeting on September 26, although the situation remains unclear at this time.
The Russian MoD has reportedly recruited some former Wagner Group personnel for MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs) fighting in Ukraine, while negotiations between the reported Wagner leadership and the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) have allegedly stalled over disagreements concerning Wagner’s independence and cohesion.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas on September 26.

https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-26-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/29/23 01:35 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
Sep 28, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 28, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 28, 2023, 7:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on September 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and in the Bakhmut direction.[1] The “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” volunteer battalions claimed that unspecified sources continue to spread false information about a Ukrainian breakthrough in the Robotyne-Verbove area, possibly referring to a fringe Russian milblogger’s claims on September 22 and 23 that Ukrainian forces advanced into Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[2] ISW has been unable to confirm this report and will not continue to record it in the absence of visual confirmation or similar claims from other Russian sources.

Russian forces have reduced the tempo of their localized offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in recent days. Russian and Ukrainian officials are increasingly reporting fewer Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions, indicating that Ukrainian offensive operations have drawn Russian forces away from the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and significantly degraded the Russian offensive effort on this line.[3] ISW has previously assessed that Russian offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line aimed to pin Ukrainian forces on this line and away from more critical areas of the front.[4] Ukrainian Deputy Director of the Department of Application Planning of the Main Directorate of the Ukrainian National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych stated on September 28 that Russian forces conducted defensive operations and reinforced units in the past week while Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations and pushed Russian forces from unspecified positions.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff’s September 28 morning situation report (SITREP) reported no Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions while the September 28 evening SITREP only reported one Russian attack south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[6] Russian aviation has become increasingly active on this line as ground attacks have apparently diminished, and Russian sources consistently claim that Russian air strikes hit Ukrainian-controlled bridges across the Oskil River — presumably to stymie the threat of any Ukrainian offensive operations east of the river.

Russian aviation is increasingly active in the Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasts and apparently less active in areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast where Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations. Russian forces have been increasingly conducting airstrikes against targets in the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast and against rear Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Kupyansk direction in the past week.[8] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated on September 28 that Russian Su-35 attack aircraft and Ka-52 helicopters are increasingly active in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions and that Russian forces conducted 21 airstrikes in these directions, primarily near the Siversk (19km south of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[9] Kherson Oblast Military Administration Spokesperson Oleksandr Tolokonnikov stated on September 28 that Russian forces have increased the number of airstrikes on Kherson City and right bank Kherson Oblast by a factor of three or four in the past three days and that Russian forces dropped more than 50 aerial glide bombs against targets in these areas.

Russian aviation continues to conduct strikes against rear Ukrainian areas in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, although mentions of Russian aviation repelling Ukrainian assaults in frontline areas have become less routine in Russian reporting than earlier in the counteroffensive. Russian sources noted that Russian aviation, particularly Ka-52 helicopters, played a significant role in disrupting Ukrainian assaults at the start of the counteroffensive.[11] Ukrainian forces appear to have increased their ability to down Russian Ka-52 helicopters in mid-August 2023, and the Russian command may have decreased aviation use in western Zaporizhia Oblast out of fears of aviation and pilot losses.[12] The decreased Russian aviation use in western Zaporizhia Oblast has not seriously undermined the Russian defense, however, as Russian forces appear to have increased their use of strike drones against advancing Ukrainian forces, and Russian artillery units continue to play a significant role in repelling Ukrainian assaults.It remains unclear what Russian forces intend to achieve with increased aviation activity in Kherson Oblast and whether more airstrikes against Ukrainian targets in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions will be able to offset degraded Russian combat power in the area.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 27 to 28.The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed 31 of 39 Russian-launched Shahed drones over Ukraine on the night of September 27 to 28 and three out of five Shahed drones on September 27.[13] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched the drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea.[14] Ukrainian Center for the Research of Trophy and Prospective Weapons and Military Equipment of the Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Captain Andriy Rudyk stated that Russian companies have modified the Russian-produced Shahed-136 drones to contain more domestically produced parts but have not improved the drone’s tactical or technical characteristics.[15] Rudyk stated that the modifications indicate that Russia continues to pursue the domestic mass production of Shahed drones.[16]

Several Russian milbloggers claimed that they self-censor the majority of their reporting amidst an apparent wider self-censorship in Russian reporting about the tactical realities on certain sectors of the front. Some notably critical Russian milbloggers claimed that they only publish five to 15 percent of the amount of information they receive.[17] One milblogger claimed that problems with communications, drones, tires, electronic warfare (EW), personnel payments, and various other issues persist among Russian forces on the frontline but that Russian personnel attempt to mitigate these problems through connections and personal initiatives, likely, according to the milblogger, because Russian commanders routinely silence complaints and ignore efforts to fix problems.[18] The milblogger amplified a statement from a claimed Russian platoon commander who complained about the inefficient flow of information from the Russian frontline to decision makers and who stated that he has had to take unusual measures to mitigate negative battlefield consequences from this poor information flow.[19] Another milblogger noted that certain information should not be shared and that the ability to remain silent at the right moment is an important quality.[20] A Russian milblogger deleted a part of a post on September 25 claiming that Ukrainian forces advanced near Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv) and controlled the northeastern part of the settlement.[21] The milblogger edited the post and instead claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv), just north of Novoprokopivka.[22] Geolocated footage published later in the day showed that Ukrainian forces advanced 1.5km northeast of Novoprokopivka.[23] The milblogger’s deletion suggests that Russian sources are intentionally limiting their reporting on tactical actions, especially those with outcomes unfavorable to Russia. Censorship or self-censorship among Russian milbloggers will affect ISW’s and the wider Western coverage ability of Russian operations, and ISW will continue to track changes in the Russian information space that could affect open-source reporting on the war in Ukraine.

The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading that criminalizes promoting and justifying extremism, likely to encourage self-censorship in the Russian information space. The bill amends a current Russian law that punishes inciting extremism with a fine of up to 300,000 rubles (about $3,100) and up to four years in prison.[25] The amendment would also increase the imprisonment term to five years for calling for, promoting, or justifying extremism online.[26] Russian authorities arrested former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin on July 21 on extremism charges and likely intends to use the proposed expansion of the law on extremism to encourage self-censorship among more figures disseminating criticisms of the Kremlin in the Russian information space.[27]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled his support for Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov during a meeting on September 28 amid continued speculations about Kadyrov’s health and public backlash against the recent behavior of Kadyrov’s son. Putin praised the claimed successes of Chechen forces in Ukraine and Kadyrov’s leadership of Chechnya during the meeting.[28] Putin and Kadyrov appeared comfortable during the meeting in stark contrast with the pair’s last meeting on March 23 where Kadyrov appeared visibly nervous.[29] Kadyrov’s and Putin’s September 28 meeting comes amid continued speculations about Kadyrov’s health and recent public backlash over footage of Kadyrov’s son beating a detainee.[30] Putin’s meeting with Kadyrov is likely a reciprocation of Kadyrov’s expressions of loyalty to Putin following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24 and signals Putin’s willingness to continue supporting Kadyrov despite recent events.

The Russian information space continued to criticize the Armenian leadership and lament Russia’s perceived decreased influence in Armenia. Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin called the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh “pathetic” on September 27 for attempting to undertake “imperial functions” without the “ability and willingness” to support peacekeeping operations.[32] Girkin also claimed that Russian peacekeeping forces would have suffered defeat if they had intervened in the recent fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh.[33] A Russian milblogger criticized the Armenian government for not intervening in Nagorno-Karabakh.[34] Another Russian source claimed that Russia has lost a “frozen conflict” that it can leverage and that the disappearance of a breakaway republic in Russia’s supposed sphere of influence is directly connected to decreasing Russian international influence.[35]

Senior NATO and Western defense officials met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on September 28 to discuss Ukraine’s military needs.[36] NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, UK Defense Secretary Grant Shapps, and French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu discussed defensive cooperation and strengthening Ukrainian air defenses with Zelensky.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28.
Russian forces have reduced the tempo of their localized offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in recent days.
Russian aviation is increasingly active in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasts and apparently less active in areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast where Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 27 to 28.
Several Russian milbloggers claimed that they self-censor the majority of their reporting amidst an apparent wider self-censorship in Russian reporting about the tactical realities on certain sectors of the front.
The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading that criminalizes promoting and justifying extremism, likely to encourage self-censorship in the Russian information space.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled his support for Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov during a meeting on September 28 amid continued speculations about Kadyrov’s health and public backlash against the recent behavior of Kadyrov’s son.
The Russian information space continued to criticize Armenian leadership and lament Russia’s perceived decreased influence in Armenia.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed gains.
Russian sources stated that the Russian Aerospace (VKS) Forces received a new batch of fifth-generation Su-57 stealth fighter and fourth-generation Su-35S air defense fighter aircraft on September 28.
Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on September 28 that Ukrainian partisans set fire to a Russian military facility in occupied Yalta, Donetsk Oblast (21km southwest of Mariupol).

https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-september-28-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 09/29/23 02:23 PM

CEPA
Center for European Policy Analysis

To the Last Ukrainian — What We’ve Learned from Kyiv’s Counter-Offensive

By Oleksandr Moskalenko

September 28, 2023

The counter-offensive has not swept the Russian occupiers from Ukrainian territory, but it has made some things clear.

First: There is a growing dissonance between the broad, international acceptance of Ukraine’s terms for a “just peace” and the understanding of how they can be delivered.

The counter-offensive has emphasized the limited resources Ukraine has to achieve its declared objectives militarily, so what happens on the battlefield should not be regarded as the predominant factor in attaining a just peace. On the contrary, international diplomatic and sanctions pressure should be seen as key to ending the war.

Putin’s Russia has evolved into an existential threat to the international community and it would be unfair to load Ukraine with the burden of bringing it down, even if Kyiv did have all the resources to do so.

Second: The counter-offensive was not adequately prepared nor equipped. Much has been written about the absence of F-16 combat aircraft as a factor impeding success, yet a lot of other equipment was needed, including mine-clearing machines, heavy tanks, long-distance missile systems, and artillery shells.

The relative success of the counter-offensive has demonstrated the motivation and commitment of the Ukrainians who have managed — and continue — to break through Russian lines. But mathematics and military science show an obvious need to supply Ukraine with the equipment necessary to achieve military success. Without it, the campaign will waste the lives of still more Ukrainian soldiers, and 200,000 are already either dead or seriously wounded.

Third: The Russians did not run away from Ukrainian territory, and there was no collapse of the frontline. In this connection, there are already voices discussing the next Ukrainian counter-offensive in the winter and spring. A high-ranking Western official was recently quoted saying there could be seven more years of war. If it does continue for so long, as a war of attrition on Ukrainian territory, the country will be completely destroyed.

What is clear is that Ukrainians have no choice but to fight, as it is a war of genocide. Russia’s stated policy is to destroy Ukraine as a nation, either by smashing its identity or killing everybody who remains loyal to that identity.

The only choice is whether my nation should die on its feet or on its knees. It is cynical to suggest Ukraine should stop military action and start negotiations. As has been emphasized many times, the surrender of Ukrainian territory will not stop Russian aggression but will raise Russia’s appetite for a pause followed by further military action.

Fourth: There are two options that may positively transform the counter-offensive: a qualitative leap in NATO’s involvement, through more and better weapons in war-winning numbers, and intensified pressure on Russia through diplomacy and sanctions (the so-called oil price cap on Russian crude is now openly failing, for example, and yet the G7 is refusing to take any corrective action.)

Should these steps be taken simultaneously, there is some chance that Russia will either step back and withdraw from Ukraine or be defeated. In this case, NATO’s follow-up in the peace negotiations is vital, to restore peace in Europe and re-establish the European security system, reasserting the old yet still relevant slogan “Never again!”
Oleksandr Moskalenko is an academic?researcher ?focusing on European politics. He is? an In-resident Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA, Washington, DC). He has a?Ph.D. in European Law? and previously lived in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv.
https://cepa.org/article/to-the-last-ukrainian-what-weve-learned-from-kyivs-counter-offensive/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/01/23 01:51 PM

Slovakia elects pro-Russian politician who wants to cut military support for Ukraine
A pro-Russian politician has won Slovakia's parliamentary elections, throwing NATO's unity amid the Russia-Ukraine war into question.

Ukraine will divide Europe in the long term, that is Putin's strategy.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/03/23 01:30 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 2, 2023
Oct 2, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 2, 2023

Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 2, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A prominent Russian milblogger and front-line unit commander claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky “saved” the Russian 31st Guards VDV Brigade, which was fighting south of Bakhmut, mirroring claims made by a much smaller milblogger about VDV units in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Vostok Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky recalled a conversation with then-Commander of the 31st VDV Airborne Brigade Colonel Andrei Kondrashkin prior to Kondrashkin’s death around Bakhmut in mid-September, in which Kondrashkin revealed that his forces suffered personnel losses and that their motivation to fight dropped to a critical level.[1] Kondrashkin reportedly stated that the Russian military command demanded that his forces undertake “decisive actions,” while he knew that his personnel were suffering a critical lack of motivation. Khodakovsky noted that Kondrashkin refrained from raising his concerns to the military command and proceeded to blame his military failures on the lack of cohesion among Russian forces. Khodakovsky, in turn, noted that cohesion was not the problem, but rather that Kondrashkin needed to make a choice to either “waste” his troops in combat or protest the Russian military command’s order at the expense of his career. Khodakovsky observed that Kondrashkin never had a chance to make this choice because he sustained an injury in combat immediately after the conversation, and that Teplinsky “saved” the 31st VDV Brigade by taking the “remnants [of the brigade] under his wing” and giving them the opportunity to take a break from combat.

A Telegram channel that advocates for Teplinsky also amplified Khodakovsky’s account, claiming that Russian VDV forces – namely elements of the Russian 7th and 76th VDV divisions – are facing similar issues in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[2] The milblogger claimed that Teplinsky is no longer able to rescue these divisions, however, as he was quietly stripped of his responsibilities. ISW cannot confirm either Khodakovsky‘s or the pro-Teplinsky milblogger’s claims, but both narratives attempt to portray Teplinsky as a commander who values the wellbeing of his forces over his career – likely to advance political goals that could support changes in the Russian military command. Khodakovsky’s account of Kondrashkin’s dilemma prior to his death also supports ISW’s prior assessment that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations south of Bakhmut may be degrading Russian units defending and counterattacking the area.

A Russian “Storm Z” assault unit instructor speculated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) removed Lieutenant General Andrey Sychevoy from commanding in the Bakhmut direction due to his poor performance. The instructor claimed on October 1 that the Russian military command removed Sychevoy from his position for conducting unprepared and unsupported counterattacks south of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[4] Sychevoy’s current formal position within the Russian military is unknown. Sychevoy previously commanded the Russian Western Group of Forces in Kharkiv Oblast until his dismissal in early September 2022, and this claim is the first observed speculation that Sychevoy has had a role in military operations in Ukraine since September 2022.[5] Prominent Russian ultranationalist media outlet Tsargrad claimed in August 2023 that Sychevoy refuses all journalistic requests for comment, indicating that Sychevoy retained an official position and may have intended to keep this position concealed.

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Bakhmut on October 2. Geolocated footage published on October 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced northwest of Novomayorske (18km southeast of Veylka Novosilka).[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Bakhmut directions.[8] ISW is updating its October 1 assessment that Ukrainian forces lost positions in a trench system southwest of Robotyne (13km south of Orikhiv) to Russian counterattacks between September 13 and 30.[9] Geolocated footage published on October 2 and satellite imagery indicate that Ukrainian forces likely retook these positions sometime between September 12 and 17 and currently hold them.

Prominent actors in the Russian information space continue to speculate about the possible future of the Wagner Group under Rosgvardia. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on October 2 that the Wagner Council of Commanders and Wagner Commander Anton Yelizarov (call sign “Lotos”) reached an agreement with Rosgvardia in which Wagner personnel must sign individual and group agreements to join Rosgvardia before January 1, 2024.[11] The milblogger claimed that the group agreements “serve as a guarantee that [Wagner] will not be ‘torn apart’” and that Wagner personnel will be able to keep their symbols and callsigns while serving under Rosgvardia. The milblogger claimed that although it is unclear where Rosgvardia will deploy its Wagner personnel in Ukraine, it will likely not be to the Bakhmut area where former Wagner personnel who signed contracts with the Russian MoD under former Wagner representative and current MoD employee Andrey Troshev are reportedly operating. The milblogger stated that the future of Wagner’s operations in Africa and the Middle East is also not clear as Rosgvardia has reportedly only approved Wagner’s use of aircraft for operations in the war in Ukraine and the new Wagner leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s son Pavel, is focusing only on Wagner’s business in Russia.[12] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s ideas about the relationship(s) between Wagner elements and the Russian government are unclear at this time as Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly embraced Troshev and subordinated some Wagner elements to the Russian MoD on the one hand, while the Russian MoD will need to supply Rosgvardia with the equipment it lacks on the other.[13] Russian milbloggers’ continued discussion of the matter recently indicates that the relationship is likely still not fully defined or made public.

Interethnic tensions and claims about the superiority of Chechen “Akhmat” forces over regular Russian forces continue to generate controversy in the Russian information space. Chairman of the “Patriots of Russia” political party and the State Duma Committee on Nationalities Gennady Semigin reportedly published a since-deleted statement on the “Patriots of Russia” website in support of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s son on September 29 after Kadyrov’s son was filmed beating a detainee accused of burning a Quran.[14] The post stated that “if the Russian soldier defended his ideals as uncompromisingly, then the [Chechen] Akhmat battalion would not have to kick the soldiers of the Russian Armed Forces onto the battlefield.”[15] Semigin’s post generated widespread criticism within the Russian information space on October 2, with one Russian official going so far as to call for Russian authorities to ban Duma members from speaking publicly about the war in Ukraine.[16] One Russian milblogger accused Semigin of attempting to incite ethnic hatred by comparing ”brave Chechens with cowardly Russians.”[17] Semigin later issued a statement on Telegram claiming that unspecified actors hacked the ”Patriots of Russia” website to publish the statement in protest of a bill on interethnic relations that his team was developing.[18] A milblogger also criticized Semigin‘s claim of a hacker posting the message, asking why Semigin did not take down the statement sooner or how Semigin was able to access the “Patriots of Russia“ website if it had been hacked.[19] ISW has long observed tensions between Chechen and non-Chechen officials and military units, and the continued emotional reaction within the Russian information suggests that these tensions are still present.

Russian forces conducted a small-scale Shahed-131/136 drone strike on Ukraine on the night of October 1-2 after Russian forces conducted a record number of drone strikes targeting Ukrainian grain and port infrastructure in September 2023. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched seven drones from the Krasnodar Krai direction and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down four drones.[21] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that even though Russian forces have launched fewer drones in the past days, the Russian strikes still target Ukrainian military and infrastructure areas and are reconnoitering Ukrainian air defenses.[22] Ukrainian military expert Aleksandr Kovalenko stated on October 1 that Russian forces launched a record number of 521 drones that mostly targeted Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure in September 2023.[23] Kovalenko stated that Russia is still dependent on Iran for drone production due to issues with domestic production and that this September increase was due to Iran’s possible increased production from 100 Shahed-136 drones per month at the end of 2022 to 150-200 per month by May 2023.


Key Takeaways:

A prominent Russian milblogger and front-line unit commander claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky “saved” the Russian 31st Guards VDV Brigade, which was fighting south of Bakhmut, mirroring claims made by a much smaller milblogger about VDV units in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
A Russian “Storm Z” assault unit instructor speculated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) removed Lieutenant General Andrey Sychevoy from commanding the Bakhmut direction due to his poor performance.
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Bakhmut on October 2.
Prominent actors in the Russian information space continue to speculate about the possible future of the Wagner Group under Rosgvardia.
Interethnic tensions and claims about the superiority of Chechen “Akhmat” forces over regular Russian forces continue to generate controversy in the Russian information space.
Russian forces conducted a small-scale Shahed-131/136 drone strike on Ukraine on the night of October 1-2 after Russian forces conducted a record number of drone strikes targeting Ukrainian grain and port infrastructure in September 2023.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kreminna, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas on October 2.
The Russian “Vostok” Battalion continued to complain on October 1 that the Russian military command is not fulfilling its promises of having the unit fight as a second-echelon force and is not providing state awards.
Russian occupation officials continued to transport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of educational trips.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/04/23 01:09 AM

Day 588 of the invasion !

‘Absolutely possible’ EU membership talks could begin this year, says Zelenskiy. The EU wants it but there are elections next year.
\

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/05/23 01:52 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 4, 2023
Oct 4, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 4, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 4, 2023, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on October 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military recently transferred several Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels from the port in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea to the port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, likely in an effort to protect them from continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in occupied Crimea.
Satellite imagery published on October 1 and 3 shows that Russian forces transferred at least 10 vessels from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk.[1] The satellite imagery reportedly shows that Russian forces recently moved the Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen frigates, three diesel submarines, five landing ships, and several small missile ships.[2] Satellite imagery taken on October 2 shows four Russian landing ships and one Kilo-class submarine remaining in Sevastopol.[3] Satellite imagery from October 2 shows a Project 22160 patrol ship reportedly for the first time in the port of Feodosia in eastern Crimea, suggesting that Russian forces may be moving BSF elements away from Sevastopol to bases further in the Russian rear.[4] A Russian think tank, the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, claimed on October 3 that the BSF vessels’ movements from occupied Sevastopol to Novorossiysk were routine, however.[5] Russian forces may be temporarily moving some vessels to Novorossiysk following multiple strikes on BSF assets in and near Sevastopol but will likely continue to use Sevastopol’s port, which remains the BSF’s base. Former Norwegian Navy officer and independent OSINT analyst Thord Are Iversen observed on October 4 that Russian vessel deployments have usually intensified following Ukrainian strikes but ultimately returned to normal pattern.] ISW will explore the implications of Ukrainian strikes on the BSF in a forthcoming special edition.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced on October 4. Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks towards the rail line between Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and the Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success near these settlements.[7] Geolocated footage published on October 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced east of Novoprokopivka (5km southeast of Robotyne) in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and the Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success west of Robotyne.[8] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced up to a Russian trench line on the Robotyne-Kopani line (5km northwest of Robotyne).

Autumn and winter weather conditions will slow but not stop Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on October 3 that good weather will last for another six to eight weeks before weather will impact both Ukrainian and Russian operations.[10] ISW has previously observed that seasonal heavy rain and resulting mud in the autumn will slow ground movements on both sides, and that the autumn rain and mud are usually less intense than spring conditions.[11] Hardening ground during the winter freeze will likely enable the tempo of combat operations to increase, however, and Ukrainian officials have expressed their intent to continue counteroffensive operations into late 2023 and exploit cold weather conditions.[12] ISW has frequently assessed that offensive operations will continue through the winter season and has observed the continuation of combat activities throughout the fall mud season of 2022, winter season of 2022–2023, and spring mud season of 2023.

The Kremlin is likely intensifying its use of tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repression and tighten control of the information space. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on October 4 that the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office requested that Russian social media platform VKontakte (VK) begin blocking posts from relatives of mobilized servicemen calling for their loved ones to return home.[14] Vazhnye Istorii noted that VK is hiding posts with several hashtags pertaining to the treatment or return of mobilized servicemen and that several posts in group chats have reportedly disappeared.[15] The Prosecutor General is likely able to impose this form of censorship under the existing law that concerns “unreliable” information about Russian operations in Ukraine.[16] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) additionally proposed a draft resolution on October 3 that would expand the list of personal and geolocation data that “organizers of information dissemination” (ORIs) are required to store and provide to law enforcement bodies upon request.[17] The FSB’s October 3 proposal notably follows its recent backing of amendments that would allow it unrestricted access to user data of Russian internet, banking, and telecom companies.[18] Some Russian opposition outlets notably suggested that this apparent expansion of digital authoritarianism may be increasingly based on the restrictive Chinese model. One Russian opposition source, later amplified by an insider source, claimed that the Russian State Social University is developing and testing a social rating system for Russians based on the Chinese model and that the intended generated social scores will link to personal data that government entities and banks will have access to.[19] ISW has recently reported on previous instances of the Kremlin’s efforts to expand digital authoritarianism to surveil the Russian information space, likely to consolidate power and increase information space oversight prior to the 2024 presidential elections.

CNN reported on October 4 that the US will transfer seized Iranian weapons and ammunition rounds to Ukraine.[21] CNN cited US officials saying that the US intends to transfer “thousands” of such weapons to alleviate some equipment shortages that Ukraine is facing. US Central Command (CENTCOM) noted that the US obtained the weapons through a Department of Justice civil forfeiture claim against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on July 20, 2023, and that the US has already transferred one million rounds of small-arms ammunition to Ukraine as of Monday, October 2.

Russian sources continue to speculate about the current role of former Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander and Wagner Group–affiliate Army General Sergei Surovikin after the Wagner rebellion, further highlighting his continued relevance in the Russian information space. Some Russian sources amplified footage on October 3 and 4 allegedly of Surovikin and his family outside a church near Moscow on October 3.[22] This speculation comes after prior speculation of Surovikin allegedly appearing in various African countries on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[23] Russian news outlet Novye Izvestia claimed that Surovikin denied to comment to journalists who approached him near the church.

The European Union (EU) is reportedly preparing for negotiations on Ukraine’s EU accession that will take place in December. Politico reported on October 4, citing three unnamed diplomats, that EU leaders are preparing to begin formal talks with Kyiv on Ukraine’s accession to the EU as early as December of this year.[25] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba reported on October 4 that he and Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom spoke about Ukraine’s EU integration and are working bilaterally to opening talks about Ukraine’s accession by the end of the year.


Key Takeaways:

The Russian military recently transferred several Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels from the port in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea to the port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, likely in an effort to protect them from continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in occupied Crimea.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced on October 4.
Autumn and winter weather conditions will slow but not stop Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
The Kremlin is likely intensifying its use of tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repression and tighten control of the information space.
CNN reported on October 4 that the US will transfer seized Iranian weapons and ammunition rounds to Ukraine.
Russian sources continue to speculate about the current role of former Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander and Wagner Group-affiliate Army General Sergei Surovikin after the Wagner rebellion, further highlighting his continued relevance in the Russian information space.
The European Union (EU) is reportedly preparing for negotiations on Ukraine’s EU accession that will take place in December.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made limited gains near Kreminna.
Russian authorities continue efforts to collect information about Russian citizens for future conscription and enlistment cycles.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin is reportedly heavily involved in Russian infrastructure projects in occupied Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/05/23 01:59 AM

UKRAINE AID: CONGRESS’ FAILURE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY LEADERSHIP
Oct 4, 2023 - ISW Press








Ukraine Aid: Congress’ Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy Leadership

By Lt. Gen. (Ret.) James M. Dubik

October 4, 2023 8:00 AM ET


That there has been no major war in Europe since 1945 isn’t an accident. It is because that generation of American leaders — political, diplomatic, economic and military — came together to defeat Adolf Hitler’s expansionist, war-crime-filled aggression. This same set of leaders then designed a set of structures that (a) provided near-term stability in a very turbulent and quite violent post-fighting Europe that (b) laid a foundation for a long-term peace — NATO and the European Union — from which almost four generations have benefitted. That is, until Russia invaded Ukraine.

American and European leaders worked together to fashion post-war European security, economic, and political institutions that were mutually beneficial to all — including America. Many of these leaders had very visceral reasons to succeed at this monumentally difficult task: They had lived through or fought in two world wars. America falsely believed that “what happened in Europe doesn’t affect us,” only to be drawn into World War I and suffer almost 260,000 U.S. killed and wounded. And again, when an aggressive dictator went unanswered for too long: World War II, in which millions of civilians and hundreds of thousands of those fighting were killed or wounded in Europe alone — including approximately 552,000 Americans.

The scale of death, destruction, famine and the massive displacements of European civilians, many parentless children, all led senior leaders of the period to the same conclusion — never again. “The enormity of the task before all of them,” said Dean Acheson in the opening of his memoir Present at the Creation, “began to appear as just a bit less formidable than that described in the first chapter of Genesis.”

The men and women who fought, and then built the Europe most of us inherited, would be appalled by the growing attitude today among too many American leaders and citizens of not supporting Ukraine.

The full text of this piece is available at https://themessenger.com/opinion/uk...policy-leadership-putin-war-nato-funding

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-aid-congress%E2%80%99-failure-us-foreign-policy-leadership
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/06/23 02:03 AM

Oct. 5, 2023 — A village cafe and store in eastern Ukraine was hit by a Russian rocket, killing at least 51 civilians in one of the deadliest attacks of the year. Zelenskyy denounced the strike in the village of Hroza as a "demonstrably brutal Russian crime" and "a completely deliberate act of terrorism." The cafe was hosting a wake following a funeral.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/07/23 01:42 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 6, 2023
Oct 6, 2023 - ISW Press











Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark

October 6, 2023, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2pm ET on October 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 6.
Ukrainian military sources noted that Ukrainian forces continued successful offensive actions south of Bakhmut near Andriivka (8km southeast of Bakhmut).[1] Geolocated footage posted on October 5 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced towards a tree line between Robotyne and Verbove, about 6km southeast of Robotyne.[2] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash noted that Ukrainian forces are preparing for offensive operations throughout the autumn-winter period. Yevlash emphasized that while supply requirements will increase and rainy and foggy conditions may complicate the use of drones and tactical and army aviation, Ukrainian forces will continue to fight through the winter.[3] Yevlash’s statement supports ISW’s longstanding assessment that weather will not prevent either side from conducting offensive operations throughout the winter of 2023-2024 if they are well-supplied and choose to do so, as they did in the winter of 2022, and that the pace of Ukrainian offensives will largely be metered by Western provision of appropriate small-arms and ammunition and non-lethal supplies to Ukraine - not simply winter weather conditions or any specific weapons system.

Russian forces appear to have recently conducted a regimental rotation in the Orikhiv area, demonstrating an ability to sustain their defenses in this critical sector of the frontline. A Ukrainian military observer reported on October 6 that elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District), which were recently “partially restored,” withdrew to positions east of Nesteryanka (about 10km northwest of Robotyne) after the Russian command previously committed them to the area.[5] The Ukrainian observer also suggested that elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (also of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are ”persistently” counterattacking on the northern outskirts of Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne).[6] ISW observed in mid-September that critical elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, particularly its 291st and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments, withdrew behind the Russian defensive line between Verbove and Solodka Balka (about 5km south of Robotyne) due to casualties that may have rendered them combat ineffective.[7] Following the withdrawal of elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division to rear areas in western Zaporizhia Oblast, elements of the 7th and 76th Airborne (VDV) divisions laterally redeployed to the area from Kherson and Luhansk oblasts to fill in the gaps left by 42nd Motorized Rifle Division elements.[8] By late September, ISW observed elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division apparently recommitting to the front near Novoprokopivka, suggesting that they rotated back to the front after resting and reconstituting for a short time.[9] The Ukrainian military source’s observations about the 291st and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments, as well as increased recent Russian reporting of these regiments defending against Ukrainian attacks in the areas south and west of Robotyne, suggest that Russian forces have conducted regiment-level rotations in this sector of the front over the past month.[10] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces were likely struggling to conduct tactical to operational level rotations along the entire frontline, but is revising this assessment considering the apparent rotation of substantial elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division and two VDV divisions to and from the frontline south of Orikhiv.

Russian forces reportedly resumed an offensive effort near Kupyansk on October 6, but the majority of the Russian forces reportedly deployed to this sector of the front likely remain combat ineffective.Ukrainian military officials reported a decrease in Russian activity near Kupyansk in recent weeks, but Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated on October 6 that Russian forces resumed combat operations in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces launched an offensive push near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces are heavily shelling the N26 (Shevchenkove-Kupyansk) highway.[12] One milblogger characterized the renewed Russian offensive push towards Kupyansk as “large-scale” in a now-deleted post.[13] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov previously reported that the Russian military deployed elements of the newly formed 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (reportedly formed under the Eastern Military District) to the Kupyansk direction to replace elements of the 41st CAA (Central Military District).[14] The resumption of Russian offensive operations near Kupyansk, possibly including elements of the 25th CAA, is likely intended to draw Ukrainian attention away from other sectors of the front in southern Ukraine. ISW previously assessed, however, that the 25th CAA was hurriedly deployed ahead of an intended deployment date of December 2023 and is likely severely understaffed, poorly trained, or both.[15] ISW has also previously observed the presence of heavily degraded Western Military District (WMD) elements, particularly of the 1st Guards Tank Army and 6th Combined Arms Army, in the Kupyansk area, and ISW does not assess at this time that a grouping comprised of the newly formed 25th Combined Arms Army with degraded WMD elements will be able to sustain meaningful offensives in this area.

Russian forces may be expanding military training infrastructure in occupied eastern Ukraine as part of ongoing efforts to increase the training and mobilization capacity of the Russian military. A Ukrainian reserve officer published satellite imagery on October 5 showing that Russian forces are expanding multiple training facilities in rear areas in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, including near Novopavlivka in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[17] The Ukrainian reserve officer stated that Russian forces are likely attempting to alleviate logistical bottlenecks and improve infrastructure to support continued mobilization and training.[18] Russian forces may be expanding training infrastructure in rear areas of occupied eastern Ukraine as part of the effort to establish nine reserve regiments, as well as ”self-sufficient” force groupings, in occupied areas of Ukraine as part of ongoing large-scale military reforms.[19] ISW assessed with low confidence that the nine reserve regiments undergoing training may be training regiments through which Russian volunteers could flow on their way to the front.[20] The Russian military may also be expanding bases in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts as part of ongoing efforts to integrate and formalize Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic forces within the Russian military and to increase the self-sufficiency of Russian groupings in occupied Ukraine by establishing forward training and C2 infrastructure in occupied Ukraine, rather than running operations in Donetsk and Luhansk from the Southern Military District itself.

The Kremlin’s continued attempts to deflect blame for the crash of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s plane crash and disgrace Prigozhin are generating continued praise for Prigozhin and efforts to defend his legacy among select information space communities. Pro-Wagner and Wagner-affiliated channels largely lampooned Putin’s suggestion on October 5 Prigozhin’s plane crashed due to grenades detonating onboard, possibly due to the passengers using alcohol or drugs onboard.[22] Some channels called Putin’s claims “laughable,” “a farce,” and disrespectful to “heroes” of Russia.[23] A Russian insider source claimed that members of the Russian Presidential Administration ”provoked” Putin to deliver these statements in order to “de-heroize” Prigozhin, since Prigozhin’s previous statements questioning the reasons for the start of the war in Ukraine are apparently gaining popularity throughout Russia.[24] Putin’s comments do not appear to have had the intended effect and have instead pushed some elements of the Russian information space to attempt to preserve Prigozhin’s reputation and disprove Putin‘s implication that Prigozhin was to blame for the plane crash by continuing to discuss Prigozhin and criticize the Kremlin’s official line on his death. However, the Kremlin’s apparent perceived need to continue to discuss Prigozhin’s death and denigrate him further is noteworthy regardless of any information space responses, indicating the Kremlin likely perceives some continuing threat from Prigozhin’s statements and stance on the war.

Former Russian military commanders who participated in the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reportedly remain in peripheral positions of some influence within the Russian military or defense-industrial base. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger amplified a claim by a Russian insider source on October 6 that listed the current positions of Russian military commanders whom the Russian military leadership replaced after the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2022 failed to achieve its intended goals.[25] The source claimed that former Western Military District (WMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Zhuravlev and former Southern Military District (SMD) Commander Army General Alexander Dvornikov are currently advisors to High Precision Complexes (a subsidiary of Rostec, Russia’s primary state-owned defense conglomerate) and the Almaz-Antey Aerospace Defense Concern (another state-owned defense enterprise), respectively. The source claimed that Dvornikov is still in “army circles” and hopes to return to the military. The source claimed that former Central Military District Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin is currently the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces. The source claimed that former Eastern Military District (EMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Chaiko served in Syria and the Russian General Staff after his dismissal as EMD commander but that his current position is unknown. Former United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defense Ben Wallace stated on October 1 that the Russian military leadership had removed all commanders who led major Russian units into Ukraine in February 2022.[26] These insider source claims are largely consistent with ISW’s previous observations of a pattern of Russian military leadership shifting disgraced and ineffective commanders to peripheral positions far removed from Ukraine without entirely discharging them from military or security sector government positions, leaving open the option of returning to a command position.

Russian forces conducted a Shahed-131/136 drone strike targeting port, grain, and border infrastructure in southern Ukraine on the night of October 5-6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 33 Shahed drones from Cape Chauda, Crimea and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 25 of the drones.[28] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that the Russian strike damaged port infrastructure and a granary along the Danube River in Odesa Oblast, and geolocated footage published on October 6 indicates that the strike hit the Orlivka-Isaccea ferry crossing that connects Odesa Oblast and Romania.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 6.
Russian forces appear to have recently conducted a regimental rotation in the Orikhiv area, demonstrating an ability to sustain their defenses in this critical sector of the frontline.
Russian forces reportedly resumed an offensive effort near Kupyansk on October 6, but the majority of the Russian forces reportedly deployed to this sector of the front likely remain combat ineffective.
Russian forces may be expanding military training infrastructure in occupied eastern Ukraine as part of ongoing efforts to increase the training and mobilization capacity of the Russian military.
The Kremlin’s continued attempts to deflect blame for the crash of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s plane crash and disgrace Prigozhin are generating continued praise for Prigozhin and efforts to defend his legacy among select information space communities.
Former Russian military commanders who participated in the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reportedly remain in peripheral positions of some influence within the Russian military or defense-industrial base.
Russian forces conducted a Shahed-131/136 drone strike targeting port, grain, and border infrastructure in southern Ukraine on the night of October 5-6.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Lyman line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut and advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russia has reportedly recruited up to several hundred Serbian nationals to fight in Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/09/23 01:22 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 8, 2023
Oct 8, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 8, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark

October 8, 2023, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NOTE: ISW has added a new section on Russian information operations and narratives to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, found at the end of the update.

Russia advanced legal mechanisms to reform the Leningrad Military District as part of ongoing large-scale military reforms.
The Russian federal portal of draft regulatory legal acts published a presidential decree on October 8, prepared by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which proposes stripping the Northern Fleet (NF) of its status as an “interspecific strategic territorial association.”[1] Russian state media noted that the proposal indicates that the NF will no longer be a separate military-administrative unit equal to a military district, suggesting that the NF and its four constituent regions (The Komi Republic, Arkhangelsk, and Murmansk oblasts, and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug) will be transferred to the reformed Leningrad Military District.[2] Russian military analyst Yuri Fedorov noted that the recreation of the Leningrad Military District suggests that Russia is preparing for possible conflicts with Baltic states and NATO.[3] The Russian military merged the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts into the Western Military District in 2010.[4] The MoD created the Northern Fleet in 2014 out of territory covered by the Western Military District, and Russian President Vladimir Putin made the NF a military-administrative unit equal to a military district starting January 1, 2021.[5] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu proposed the recreation of the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts on the basis of the Western Military District (reversing the 2010 and 2014 changes) in December of 2022, and confirmed that these military districts were under active formation as of August 2023.[6] The MoD’s decision to re-divide the WMD indicates Russia sees the need to restructure its forces facing NATO and likely posture on the Finnish border, although it remains unclear how Russia will be able to mobilize, train, and organize these forces into new military district-level formations.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 8. Geolocated footage published on October 8 shows that Ukrainian forces made limited gains north of Novoprokopivka (14km south of Orikhiv), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced near Kopani (10km southwest of Orikhiv).[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success northeast of Andriivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks near Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka (11km southwest of Bakhmut).[8] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that deteriorating weather conditions are impacting both Russian and Ukrainian operations across the theater. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian drone and aviation activity has decreased in the past few days due to poor weather.[9] Russian milbloggers claimed that deteriorating weather conditions in the Bakhmut and Zaporizhia directions are impacting Ukrainian offensive operations as well as Russian aerial reconnaissance operations.[10] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash reiterated that poor weather may impact drone and aviation operations but that the weather will not halt Ukraine’s counteroffensive.

Russian forces are intensifying mining efforts in the Robotyne-Verbove area and seek to fix Ukrainian forces on areas of the front away from western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have begun remining previously cleared areas on the Robotyne-Verbove line (10km south to 18km southeast of Orikhiv) to achieve tactical surprise.[12] The milbloggers claimed that heavy Russian mining and remining efforts have disrupted the movement of heavy Ukrainian cargo and equipment in these areas in recent days. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified tactical offensive operations in several areas of the front beyond Zaporizhia Oblast in order to stretch Ukrainian defenses and divide Ukrainian attention.[13] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces are trying to fix Ukrainian forces in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions and prevent them from deploying reserves to the Zaporizhia direction.

Russian sources are highlighting apparent fault lines between regular Russian forces and irregular formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR). A Russian milblogger claiming to be a Buryat soldier fighting in the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade [MRB] (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) responded on October 7 to a post published by another milblogger on August 13 that accused the 37th MRB of abandoning their positions around Novodonetske (in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia border area) during Ukrainian attacks that ultimately liberated the village, leaving only elements of the DNR “Kaskad” operational tactical combat formation to defend the area.[15] The Buryat milblogger refuted this story and claimed that “Kaskad” conducts a small part of combat activities on the front while regular Russian troops shoulder more of the offensive burden, and derided other DNR units for having positions far behind frontline areas held by regular units.[16] The milblogger also claimed that DNR units have low skill levels and that regular Russian troops distrust them.[17] The allegations made by this milblogger against DNR formations suggest that there is continued friction between DNR forces and regular Russian forces, which is likely to further complicate efforts to integrate DNR forces into the regular Russian military as part of ongoing military reforms.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat expressed concern over an anticipated Russian Shahed 131/136 drone strike campaign against Ukraine this winter. Ihnat stated on October 8 that Russian forces have increased the intensity of Shahed strikes recently, as Ukrainian officials previously warned.[19] Ihnat stated that Russian forces used 1,000 Shahed drones during the 2023-23 heating season but used a record 500 drones during September 2023 alone, indicating that Ukraine needs to prepare seriously for Russia’s 2023-24 winter drone strike campaign. Ihnat noted that Ukraine is gradually replacing Soviet air defense systems with Western-provided systems and intends to use these systems to protect Ukrainian energy facilities, port infrastructure, grain silos, and other critical infrastructure against Russian drone strikes this winter. Ihnat added that Russian authorities want to increase the production of Shahed drones domestically but cannot overcome their reliance on Iran for certain technologies and spare parts required for production.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) observed satellite imagery showing that rail traffic between North Korea and Russia “dramatically” increased since Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un on September 12-17.[21] CSIS’ Beyond Parallel project found that satellite imagery captured on October 5 showed an “unprecedented” 73 freight railcars at the North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility. Beyond Parallel noted that previous satellite images showed a maximum of approximately 20 railcars at the Tumangang facility at once over the past five years. Beyond Parallel also observed shipping crates/containers and equipment laid out in the open at the main warehouse area at the Tumangang facility, although the contents of the transported goods remain unclear. Beyond Parallel remarked that the external characteristics of the containers and equipment are different from those observed during the past five years at the facility and assessed that it is “probable that these shipments are, or include, munitions and artillery.” Russian milbloggers and sources amplified Beyond Parallel findings in the Russian information space without confirming or denying the possibility of North Korean arms supplies to Russia.[22] ISW previously assessed that Putin may be open to some forms of technological and defensive cooperation with North Korea in return for North Korean artillery ammunition as long as such cooperation does not trigger secondary sanctions against Russia.

The Russian federal government continues to disenfranchise certain ethnic minority federal subjects (regions) while selectively empowering others. Radio Liberty’s Tatar-Bashkir service Idel Realii amplified an opinion piece written by Tatar activist Ruslan Aisin on October 8 which criticizes the implementation of a new Tatarstan state national policy as federally enforced “feudalism.”[24] Aisin noted that the new policy dropped a provision on “strengthening Tatarstan identity,” which Aisin emphasized is aimed at Russifying ethnically diverse populations living in the Russian Federation, and claimed that the Russian federal government likely prompted the provision’s removal.[25] Aisin remarked that the removal of this provision is meant to deprive ethnic minority regions of their ability to empower their own cultures, languages, and traditions but questioned why Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov is allowed to publicly promote Chechen traditions and identity.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin have recently signaled explicit support for Kadyrov and his style of rule in Chechnya despite increased interethnic tensions within Russian society and the military.[27] The suggestion that Russian federal policy is purposefully trying to disenfranchise Tatar identity while simultaneously empowering Kadyrov indicates that the Kremlin is interested in rewarding the ethnic minority regions that are the most overtly loyal to the Kremlin and provide the Kremlin with substantial military manpower for the war in Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

Russia advanced legal mechanisms to form the Leningrad Military District as part of ongoing large-scale military reforms.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 8.
Russian forces are intensifying mining efforts in the Robotyne-Verbove area and seek to fix Ukrainian forces on areas of the front away from western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian sources are highlighting apparent fault lines between regular Russian forces and irregular formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR).
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat expressed concern over an anticipated Russian Shahed 131/136 drone strike campaign against Ukraine this winter.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) observed satellite imagery showing that rail traffic between North Korea and Russia “dramatically” increased since Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un on September 12-17
The Russian federal government continues to disenfranchise certain ethnic minority federal subjects (regions) while selectively empowering others.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, western Donetsk Oblast, and on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border on October 8 and reportedly advanced in some areas.
Prague-based Russian-language outlet Current Time reported on October 8 that the number of desertion cases within the Russian military has increased.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/09/23 01:38 AM

Special Edition Campaign Assessment


SPECIAL EDITION CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT: UKRAINE’S STRIKE CAMPAIGN AGAINST CRIMEA
Oct 8, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Special Edition: Ukraine’s Strike Campaign Against Crimea

Ukraine’s Strike Campaign Against Crimea Seeks to Degrade Russian Defenses in Southern Ukraine and Supports Ongoing Ukrainian Counteroffensive Operations

Nicole Wolkov and Mason Clark

Note: ISW is publishing this special edition update on Ukraine’s strike campaign against Crimea in addition to its regular daily update for October 8.

Key Takeaway:
Ukrainian forces have conducted a campaign of strikes against Russian military infrastructure, headquarters, and logistics routes in Crimea since June 2023 in order to degrade the Russian military’s ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian strikes on logistics routes are disrupting Russian supplies to Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblast. Strikes on Black Sea Fleet assets are degrading its role as a combined arms headquarters but have not defeated it as a naval force. Ukrainian strikes generate outsized morale shocks among Russian commanders and in the Russian information space. Western provision of long-range missiles to Ukraine would amplify this ongoing, essential, and timely campaign to weaken Russia’s ability to defend southern Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces began a successful and ongoing campaign of strikes on Russian military infrastructure in Crimea in summer 2023, intended to degrade Russia’s ability to use Crimea as a key staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes on Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Crimea – including the Chonhar and Henichesk Bridges, and likely the Kerch Strait Bridge – during the first phases of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in June 2023 to disrupt Russia’s ability to provide personnel and material to defensive operations in southern Ukraine.[1] Ukrainian forces have since then consistently targeted Russian airfields, air defense systems, command posts, and supply depots in Crimea and along the Crimea-Melitopol-Rostov-on-Don route.[2] Ukrainian military officials including Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi have stated that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign has successfully degraded Russian logistics and defensive systems, and Ukraine has increasingly expanded its strike campaign to target Russian naval assets.

The Russian military used Crimea as a springboard for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and continues to use it as a key staging area. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely considers Crimea a “platsdarm” – ? Russian military term roughly translated as “bridgehead,” but defined more broadly as an area that a military can use to concentrate forces and use as a starting point for military operations.[4] Russian forces, primarily from the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and other Southern Military District (SMD) formations, began concentrating personnel and equipment in Crimea and conducting exercises in 2021 in the buildup to the February 2022 invasion.[5] The Russian axis of advance north from Crimea achieved greater successes than Russia’s multiple other axes during the first weeks of the full-scale invasion, and ISW previously assessed that Russian forces advancing out of Crimea (including elements of the SMD, 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, and Black Sea Fleet) had higher readiness and performed more effectively than Russian forces in northern and eastern Ukraine.

The Russian military continues to use Crimea as the primary rear area for Russian forces defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine and would use Crimea to support any future offensive operations in this region. The Russian military continues to use rail lines and roads in Crimea to transit military personnel, equipment, fuel, and lubricants intended for Russian frontline operations in southern Ukraine, supporting the longer supply route from Rostov Oblast, Russia, across occupied southern Ukraine.[7] Russian forces have also consistently used major Crimean cities including Sevastopol, Armyansk, and Dzhankoi as military logistics hubs.[8] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Radio Svoboda reported in April 2023 that the Russian military operated multiple military hospitals in Sevastopol, Simferopol, and Fedosia with a total of 1,250 beds and that Russian officials closed these hospitals to civilian patients about three months prior to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Russia has leveraged these hospitals to treat wounded Russian personnel throughout the war.

Ukrainian forces are conducting precision strikes on Black Sea Fleet (BSF) elements in addition to strikes on Russian logistics routes and hubs, likely disrupting its role as a combined arms – not strictly naval – headquarters coordinating Russian ground operations in southern Ukraine. Despite its name, the BSF is a major combined arms formation, roughly equivalent in stature to Russia’s land Combined Arms Armies. In addition to naval surface and submarine warfare elements, the BSF formally controls several surface-to-surface missile batteries and air defense batteries which have been deployed to occupied southern Ukraine; the 22nd Army Corps; and Naval Infantry elements.[10] Russian fleet and army headquarters are additionally designed to flexibly take control of attached units, and the BSF is likely responsible for commanding some portion of Russian volunteer formations and other irregular units in southern Ukraine. The BSF is also likely responsible for maintaining Russian logistics between Krasnodar Krai and Crimea to the Russian southern grouping of forces, as the BSF is the only formal Russian military structure with a long-term presence in occupied Ukraine.[11] Satellite imagery published on September 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a precise strike on the BSF headquarters despite Russian air defenses and electronic warfare capabilities.[12] Ukrainian military officials reported that the September 22 Ukrainian strike on the BSF Command headquarters occurred during a meeting of senior BSF officials and reportedly wounded 105 Russian personnel including the commander of the Russian grouping of forces in the Zaporizhia direction, Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk, and killed 34 BSF officers.[13] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that the loss of unspecified BSF leadership will likely cause significant challenges to command and control because junior commanders lack the initiative to make individual decisions.[14] Pletenchuk also reported that some unspecified mechanisms of the BSF have become inoperable due to the BSF’s centralization of command.

Ukrainian strikes against BSF naval assets and repair facilities in Crimea may be preventing BSF naval elements from fully conducting their desired missions, though BSF elements remain capable of conducting most wartime operations, and assertions Ukraine has driven away or defeated the BSF are premature. A Ukrainian missile strike on Sevastopol damaged a Russian landing ship, Kilo-class submarine, and the state-owned ship repair facility Sevmorzavod on September 13.[16] Satellite imagery published on October 1 and 3 shows that Russian forces transferred at least 10 vessels from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, likely to protect them from continued Ukrainian strikes.[17] Further satellite imagery taken on October 6 confirms that at least thirteen vessels, including at least one Kalibr missile-equipped warship, remain in Sevastopol, and it is premature to state Ukraine has defeated or driven away the BSF.[18] The threat of Ukrainian strikes on BSF vessels may be prompting Russian command to withdraw some vessels away from the shore of occupied southern Ukraine. Russian withdrawals from the coast may partially impede Russia’s ability to conduct regular patrols and close support of defensive operations in southern Ukraine but do not remove Russia’s seaborne strike capabilities entirely. Russian vessels could continue to strike Ukraine with Kalibr cruise missiles and other systems even if the Russian military chooses to move vessels from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, and Russian forces have conducted multiple sea-based Kalibr cruise missile strikes since Ukrainian military officials officially acknowledged the interdiction campaign.

However, Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels and Russia’s decision to withdraw vessels from the western Black Sea likely have limited the ability of BSF vessels to threaten Ukraine’s “grain corridor” in the Black Sea. Russia likely intended to impose a blockade following Russia’s departure from the Black Sea grain deal without having to formally commit warships and legally declare a blockade, but at least six commercial vessels have successfully traveled to Ukraine through the unofficial corridor since July 2023.[20] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 26 that Ukrainian strikes have diminished the BSF’s ability to conduct wide security patrols, conduct routine maintenance, and enforce blockades of Ukrainian ports despite continuing to execute its core capabilities.

Ukrainian strikes are successfully degrading Russian air defenses, possibly enabling future strikes on key Russian assets. Suspilne Crimea reported on September 21 that Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) sources stated that the SBU and the Ukrainian Navy enabled a successful Neptune missile strike on a Russian airfield near Saky, Crimea by first launching drones to overwhelm Russian air defense systems.[22] The SBU sources reportedly stated that the missile strike inflicted unspecified serious damage to the airfield.[23] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian air defense system (likely a S-400 system near Yevpatoria, Crimea) in September and likely struck another S-400 system near Olenivka, Crimea in August.[24] Russian sources expressed concerns over Ukraine’s ability to operate drones over Crimea during these strikes.[25] Successive Ukrainian strikes on Russian air defense infrastructure may be indicative of wider systemic issues with Russian air defenses in Crimea.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian military assets in Crimea often generate Russian panic disproportionate to their kinetic effect and negatively impact Russian morale. Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas consistently cause panic in the Russian information space and generate frustration and criticism about the Russian military command.[26] Ukrainian strikes on Crimea have also caused some Russian milbloggers to panic and erroneously perceive any Ukrainian actions targeting Crimea as conditions setting for imminent Ukrainian operations to liberate the peninsula.[27] Russian milbloggers notably expressed concern that Ukrainian forces were able to operate a drone and record footage of a strike on a Russian S-400 air defense system in Crimea about 120km behind the current frontline.[28] The Russian withdrawal of aviation elements and other military equipment from the Chornobaivka base from May to September 2022 following the Western provision of HIMARS to Ukraine and the more recent withdrawal of some BSF surface elements from Crimea suggest that preemptive fears of Ukrainian strikes can compel Russian forces to withdraw military assets further into the rear.[29] Several Russian milbloggers accused other milbloggers of spreading panic by publishing images purportedly showing the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes in Crimea in late July 2023.[30] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov announced on August 14 that Crimean occupation officials will propose amendments at a federal level to increase the liability for the spread of photos and videos showing the location and operation of Russian air defense systems, other systems, and military and strategic assets, indicating increased concern over Ukrainian strike capabilities.

A sustained and expanded Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian military targets in Crimea would likely degrade Russian efforts to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian strikes against Russian military infrastructure in occupied southern Ukraine often cause Russian occupation officials to temporarily suspend transit, disrupting key Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) connecting Crimea to occupied Kherson Oblast for periods from a few hours to a few months.[32] Disruptions to Russia’s southern GLOCs have created severe logistics delays and bottlenecks, as the only routes to or from Crimea to occupied Kherson Oblast or Russia are a limited set of bridges. Suppressing or destroying Russian air defense capabilities in southern Ukraine would increase the vulnerability of these GLOCs to Russian ground operations in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. Sustained missile strikes on Russian offensive air capabilities would likely strain Russian aviation attempting to conduct strikes on Ukraine by increasing their flight time, thereby decreasing the loitering time for Russian aviation to conduct strikes on Ukraine.

Sustained long-range strikes against Russian military targets in Crimea could additionally force the Russian military to move military assets and command centers farther away from the frontline, disrupting command and control. Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Western-provided HIMARS forced the Russian military to establish and execute a withdrawal plan from the Russian military base at the Kherson International Airport Chornobaivka (1km northwest of Kherson City) that concluded in September 2022.[33] ISW has also observed reports that Russian forces have moved command headquarters out of range of some Ukrainian platforms in an attempt to protect command centers from HIMARS and other long-range missile strikes after summer 2022.[34] A sustained and successful Ukrainian strike campaign against Crimea could likely achieve similar effects.

Western provision of long-range missiles to Ukraine would amplify this ongoing, essential, and timely campaign to weaken Russia’s ability to defend southern Ukraine. No single Western-provided system will provide Ukraine with a decisive advantage or directly enable Ukrainian victory, and this report does not assert that ATACMS or other systems would provide Ukraine with a silver bullet.[35] However, Ukraine is demonstrably degrading Russian forces and logistics in Crimea, and the Western provision of long-range missiles would enable further strikes on the Russian rear. Four unnamed US government officials told NBC News in an article published on September 22 that US President Joe Biden told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that the US would provide Ukraine with “a small number of long-range missiles.”[36] Several unnamed people familiar with ongoing deliberations on ATACMS told the Washington Post that the Biden administration plans to provide Ukraine with a version of ATACMS armed with cluster munitions rather than a single (unitary) warhead.[37] Ukraine’s use of precision fires enables ongoing counteroffensive operations against occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and is not focused solely on a hypothetical future ground attack into Crimea itself - and Ukraine’s need for ATACMS and similar systems is therefore a timely requirement to support ongoing Ukrainian operations.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-assessment-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strike-campaign-against-crimea
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/11/23 12:49 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 10, 2023
Oct 10, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 10, 2023

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark

October 10, 2023, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on October 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NOTE: ISW has added a new section on Russian information operations and narratives to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, found at the end of the update.

Russian forces launched localized offensive operations in the Avdiivka area of Donetsk Oblast and southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 9, which are likely intended to fix Ukrainian forces away from the Robotyne area.
Russian forces intensified offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Ocheretyne, Tonenke, and Berdychi and southwest of Avdiivka on the Vodyane-Opytne line.[1] Russian forces also attacked southwest of Orikhiv on the Pyatykhatky-Zherebyanky line, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up two kilometers in the area.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed up to three Russian battalions conducted an attack in the Avdiivka direction, and ISW has observed footage of fighting in the area, but ISW has not observed any confirmation of these claimed Russian advances as of this writing.[3] Russian milbloggers are largely portraying the Avdiivka-area operations as a significant offensive effort aimed at encircling the Ukrainian force grouping in Avdiivka and capturing the city.[4] A successful encirclement of Avdiivka, one of the most heavily fortified areas of the Donetsk Oblast front line, would very likely require more forces than Russia has currently dedicated to the Avdiivka-Donetsk City effort. Russian forces have largely deployed irregular forces along this frontline, primarily elements of the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Army Corps and additional volunteer formations that have largely suffered from poor and abusive command culture and tensions with regular Russian units.[5] ISW has observed no recent Russian deployments to this line. Russian forces have also conducted grinding offensive operations for relatively minimal territorial gains near Avdiivka for the past year and a half of the war, and the Russian military command is likely aware that an effort to capture Avdiivka would require more and higher-quality units than those currently deployed in the area.

The increased Russian offensive operations in the Avdiivka and Zherebyanky areas coincide with other localized offensive efforts in Luhansk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, all likely aimed at fixing Ukrainian forces and preventing Ukrainian command from transferring reserves to critical areas of the front in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[7] Ukrainian officials have made a number of statements within the past few weeks to this effect, particularly noting that Russian attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line are meant to prevent Ukrainians from transferring forces to Zaporizhia Oblast.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made confirmed advances in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Geolocated footage published on October 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar and about 30km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success near Andriivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[10] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Novofedorivka (15km northeast of Robotyne and 6km northeast of Verbove).

Russian military leadership may have once again replaced the commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA), suggesting ongoing pervasive Russian command and control issues in western Zaporizhia Oblast. A Russian insider source claimed on October 9 that the Russian command removed Lieutenant General Denis Lyamin from command of the 58th CAA, after Lyamin replaced former commander Major General Ivan Popov on July 13.[12] The insider source claimed that during Lyamin’s three-month tenure, the Russian General Staff went to great lengths to conceal the true nature of the situation within units of the 58th CAA, which are currently defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and claimed that this is in large part because Lyamin is a close associate of Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov. The insider source suggested that Gerasimov removed Lyamin from command of the 58th CAA and re-assigned him the position of Chief of Staff of the Central Military District to shield him from criticism over Russian operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast. While ISW cannot independently confirm Lyamin’s alleged re-appointment, the suggestion that the 58th CAA has undergone two major command changes in a short period possibly indicates command-and-control challenges, and at minimum concern among Russian command over the conduct of operations in this key sector of the front.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes targeting southern Ukraine on the night of October 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff and Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 27 of the 36 Shahed-131/-136 launched from occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea towards Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts.[13] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk reported on October 10 that Russian forces are likely conducting strikes using only Shahed drones because the Russian military is attempting to conserve missiles since Russian missile production has slowed due to sanctions.[14] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Ukrainian air defense systems will continue to operate as usual during the winter and that Ukrainian forces will strengthen their defense of energy and fuel facilities.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced plans to open a new corridor through Moldova and Romania for the export of Ukrainian grain. Zelensky announced that the overland grain corridor will open soon during a press conference with Romanian President Klaus Iohannis in Bucharest on October 10.

NATO adopted several resolutions aimed at increasing aid to Ukraine on October 9. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly adopted six resolutions related to the war in Ukraine and called for NATO countries to increase and expedite political, military, intelligence, financial, training, and humanitarian support to Ukraine and to “sustain this support for as long as it takes for Ukraine to prevail.”[18] The resolutions also called for the increased and rapid delivery of military equipment to Ukraine, including air defense systems, missiles, and fighter aircraft.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces launched localized offensive operations in the Avdiivka area of Donetsk Oblast and southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 9, which are likely intended to fix Ukrainian forces away from the Robotyne area.
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed up to three Russian battalions conducted an attack and ISW has observed footage of fighting in the area, but ISW has not observed any confirmation of these claimed Russian advances as of this writing.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made confirmed advances in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian military leadership may have once again replaced the commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA), suggesting ongoing pervasive Russian command and control issues in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced plans to open a new corridor through Moldova and Romania for the export of Ukrainian grain.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on October 10.
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Luhansk Oblast occupation authorities are cracking down against Ukrainian underground communication networks.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2023
.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/13/23 02:45 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 12, 2023
Oct 12, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 12, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark

October 12, 2023, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on October 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NOTE: ISW has added a new section on Russian information operations and narratives to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, found at the end of the update.

Russian forces likely launched a significant and ongoing offensive effort around Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast on October 10.
ISW observed Russian forces simultaneously attacking northwest, west, and south of Avdiivka using armored assault groups, rotary wing aircraft, and concentrated artillery starting on October 10.[1] Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash indicated that Russian forces are carrying out assaults with air support in 10 to 12 directions around the settlement.[2] Ukrainian military observers framed Russian offensive operations against Avdiivka as a “major attack” and noted that Russian forces used an unusually high number of armored vehicles in combat.[3] Russian forces’ increased use of armored vehicles and aviation – alongside persistent simultaneous ground attacks – indicates that Russian forces are conducting an offensive effort more significant in scope and intent than ISW previously assessed on October 10 and October 11.[4] ISW is revising its assessment that Russian attacks around Avdiivka are local efforts intended solely to fix Ukrainian forces but is not prepared to assess the exact objectives and likely outcome of Russian efforts in the Avdiivka direction at this time.

Russian forces have not secured any major breakthroughs near Avdiivka as of October 12 and are unlikely to immediately cut off Ukrainian forces in the city.near Avdiivka as of October 12 and are unlikely to immediately cut off Ukrainian forces in the city. ISW estimates that Russian forces have captured 4.52 square kilometers of territory from different directions around Avdiivka since October 10 and that Russian forces are 3.32km away from a Ukrainian ground line of communication (GLOC) along the O0562 highway from the south and 5.25km from the north of Avdiivka, and Russian claims of advances beyond these distances are likely overstated. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are attempting to create a cauldron around Ukrainian forces in Avdiivka, but quickly acknowledged that current advances are slow.[5] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that it is too early to discuss a “full-scale [Ukrainian] exodus from the city” despite some Russian advances in the area.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have already advanced 12km in the Avdiivka direction despite geolocated footage indicating only that Russian forces made limited advances northwest, south, and west of Avdiivka as of October 12 and did not immediately threaten Ukrainian forces with encirclement.[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces gained additional ground on a waste heap on Avdiivka’s northern flank near the Avdiivka Coke Plant; seized a section of a railroad south of Avdiivka; and advanced around the city, but ISW cannot confirm these claims at the time.[8] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces destroyed the Ocheretyne railway station (13km northwest of Avdiivka), which they claimed supports Ukrainian logistics to Avdiivka.

Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have likely lost at least a battalion tactical group’s (BTG’s) worth of armored vehicles in offensive operations around Avdiivka. A reliable X (Twitter) user observed on October 12 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 33 Russian armored vehicles and 15 tanks since October 10 near Avdiivka.[10] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that conservative estimates suggest Ukrainian forces have destroyed a minimum of 36 Russian armored vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and transport vehicles.[11] A milblogger also claimed that both sides are suffering “significant losses” in operations around Avdiivka.[12] Footage published on October 11 purportedly shows a Russian armored vehicle in a column near Avdiivka falling into a body of water, and geolocated footage published on October 11 and 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian vehicle columns around Avdiivka.[13] This footage indicates that Russian armored forces may not be applying lessons learned from previous offensive operations near Vuhledar in February 2023 or around Kyiv in March 2022, when Ukrainian forces destroyed a disorderly advancing column of Russian armored vehicles.[14] ISW previously reported that Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating around Avdiivka were effectively incorporating lessons learned from Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine.[15] While Russian implementation of lessons learned will vary and Russian forces have achieved some advances in the Avdiivka area which were likely enabled by more effective units, ISW’s October 11 assessment was likely overstated.

Defending Ukrainian forces are inflicting relatively heavy losses and suppressing Russian logistics near Avdiivka, likely slowing down the Russian pace of advance. A Russian milblogger claimed that the pace of Russian advance had slowed down and Russian forces are now focusing on “quality” attacks after Russian forces endured initial high equipment losses.[16] Geolocated footage published on October 12 shows that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge northeast of Avdiivka between Yasynuvata and Horlivka.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that the bridge’s destruction will negatively impact Russian logistics in the Avdiivka area and that Russian forces will likely face difficulties attempting to repair the bridge due to its proximity to the frontline.

The Russian information space is likely exaggerating the degree of Russian successes on the Avdiivka front and will continue to do so despite military failures or a slow pace of advance. Russian sources are celebrating Russian offensive operations but are largely not reacting to the significant vehicle losses sustained in just a few days of fighting. This muted response is largely inconsistent with prior outcry when Russian forces lost a whole armored vehicle column as the Russian offensive against Vuhledar culminated in February 2023.[19] The milbloggers are likely engaging in self-censorship following the recent arrests of prominent critical information space voices. Many prominent Russian milbloggers also have strong connections to formations in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia, many of which are fighting in the Avdiivka area, further providing incentive for milbloggers to censor defeats and exaggerate claimed victories.[20] One prominent milblogger praised the Russian military command for providing information about claimed successes and noted that “this is the first operation in a long time where the [Russian] command tried to create an information cap.”

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front on October 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved some unspecified successes east of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and east of Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[22] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensives in the Bakhmut direction and have advanced several hundred meters in unspecified areas.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun reported that Ukrainian forces improved their tactical positions west of Robotyne.

Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky advocated for Russian forces to freeze the frontlines in Ukraine in order to replace exhausted mobilized personnel with fresh contract servicemen and launch a renewed offensive effort. Khodakovsky stated on October 12 that Russian forces could conduct a “deliberate final phase” to end the war after replacing tired units with contract servicemen, which aligns with ISW’s longstanding assessment that Russian forces will almost certainly take advantage of any short or long-term freeze to refresh their forces and restart fighting at a later date.[25] Khodakovsky also noted that Russian forces will likely face effective Ukrainian defenses and resistance as Russian forces attempt to advance further west into Ukraine. Imprisoned former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin has consistently claimed that a specific faction of the Russian leadership, which Khodakovsky appears to be a member of, has long advocated for freezing the current frontline in Ukraine.[26] Girkin claimed on October 9 that Russian forces will continue to conduct a strategic defense to freeze the frontlines ahead of the Russian presidential elections in March 2024.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes across Ukraine, targeting port infrastructure in southern Ukraine and critical infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast on the night of October 11 to 12. Ukrainian official military sources reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 28 of the 33 Shahed-131/136 drones.[28] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that an unspecified number of Russian drones struck the port area in Odesa Oblast.[29] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on October 12 that the Russian military is stockpiling weapons intended for strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities and the oil and gas sector.[30] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that a Russian drone partially damaged a critical infrastructure facility in Kharkiv Oblast and noted that Russian forces will increasingly target the Ukrainian energy sector in the fall and winter.[31] Ukrainian Minister of Energy Herman Halushchenko reported that Ukrainian power engineers are undergoing training in case of massive power outages but noted that it is difficult to predict the scale and impact of Russian attacks on the power system.

The Russian Presidential Administration continues preparations to manage and falsify the March 2024 presidential elections. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on October 12 that the Russian Presidential Administration may install electronic voting terminals with passport scanners at polling stations in certain regions of Russia ahead of the presidential election in March 2024.[33] The electronic voting terminals will reportedly allow Russian authorities to collect data about Russian citizens in an electronic database, including data regarding mobilization eligibility and voting habits. Meduza noted that Russian authorities first used electronic voting terminals during the Moscow mayoral elections in September 2023. ISW has previously observed the Kremlin manipulate national election results using electronic voting after the September 2021 State Duma elections.[34] Ural Regional State newswire URA.ru reported that its sources close to the Russian government claimed that the Russian federal government is closely monitoring the social media accounts of almost 90 current and former Kurgan Oblast politicians who expressed support for deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion in June 2023.[35] Russian authorities have reportedly advised politicians to consider their social media posts carefully ahead of the presidential elections, likely an attempt to encourage self-censorship among politicians.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces likely launched a significant and ongoing offensive effort around Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast on October 10, and ISW is revising its initial assessment these attacks are a limited effort to fix Ukrainian forces.
Russian forces have not secured any major breakthroughs near Avdiivka as of October 12 and are unlikely to immediately cut off Ukrainian forces in the city.
Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have likely lost at least a battalion tactical group’s (BTG’s) worth of armored vehicles in offensive operations around Avdiivka.
The Russian information space is likely exaggerating the degree of Russian successes on the Avdiivka front and will continue to do so despite military failures or a slow pace of advance.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front on October 12.
Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky advocated for Russian forces to freeze the frontlines in Ukraine in order to replace exhausted mobilized personnel with fresh contract servicemen and launch a renewed offensive effort.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes across Ukraine, targeting port infrastructure in southern Ukraine and critical infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast on the night of October 11 to 12.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, around Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizha Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on October 12 that the Russian military has recruited more than 357,000 contract, volunteer, and conscripted military personnel since January 1, 2023.
Russian authorities continue to persecute religious communities in occupied Ukraine as part of ongoing Russian efforts to destroy the Ukrainian identity.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/15/23 02:11 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 14, 2023
Oct 14, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 14, 2023

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Mason Clark

October 14, 2023, 4:25pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US and Ukrainian officials reported on October 12 and 13 that they anticipated the Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka and expressed confidence in Ukrainian defenses
US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby reported on October 13 that the new Russian offensive operations near Lyman and Avdiivka “did not come as a surprise.”[1] Kirby stated that the US is confident that Ukrainian forces will repel these Russian attacks.[2] Kirby also reported that Russian forces appear to be using human wave tactics, wherein the Russian military uses masses of poorly trained and equipped Russian soldiers to attempt to advance - the same practice Russian forces used during their failed winter offensive in winter 2023.[3] ISW has additionally observed Russian forces using higher than usual numbers of armored vehicles in ongoing operations.[4] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov similarly reported on October 12 that Ukrainian forces knew about and prepared for the Russian attack near Avdiivka and that Russian forces did not form sufficient reserves to attack along the entire frontline, but only in certain sectors.[5] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian mines are slowing Russian advances near Avdiivka, indicating Ukrainian prior preparations for the attack.

The Russian information space remains divided on the prospects of Russian successes near Avdiivka and on current Ukrainian capabilities. Geolocated footage published on October 13 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of the waste heap north of Avdiivka.[7] Additional geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Russian forces also advanced south of Avdiivka.[8] Some Russian sources claimed on October 13 and 14 that Ukrainian defensive fortifications pose a significant challenge to Russian advances around Avdiivka.[9] Some Russian sources indicated that Russian problems with medical support are also impeding Russian advances in the Avdiivka area. One Russian source claimed on October 12 that there is a shortage of surgeons in occupied Horlivka and Donetsk City near Avdiivka and called on Russian doctors to travel to the front to help treat wounded Russian soldiers.[10] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun similarly stated on October 14 that the majority of Russian casualties in the Avdiivka direction are due to low-quality medical treatment and local hospitals reaching capacity.[11]

Other Russian milbloggers continued to praise Russian offensive efforts on October 13 and 14 and reiterated the Kremlin’s desired narrative that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is over.[12] One Russian milblogger warned that Russian officials and sources have likely dismissed the Ukrainian counteroffensive too quickly and noted that it is too early to determine if the Russian attacks near Avdiivka will develop into an organized offensive operation.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 14 and advanced west of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Marinka (just west of Donetsk City).[14] Ukrainian and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to attack Russian positions on Bakhmut’s southern flank.[15] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) towards Rivne (24km southwest of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will maintain some vessels at its main Sevastopol naval base amid Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels, as the Russian Navy’s main drydock on the Black Sea is in Sevastopol. Ukrainian Naval Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on October 14 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Professor Nikolai Muru tugboat and the Pavel Derzhavin patrol ship on October 13 and stated that the BSF has redeployed vessels from Sevastopol to Kerch, Feodosia, and Novorossiysk (in mainland Russia).[17] Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces continue to use the Sevastopol base because there are not enough piers to accommodate vessels at other ports, however.[18] The BSF‘s headquarters and main facilities including a dry dock are located in Sevastopol, and the Russian navy therefore must send some vessels for repairs within range of Ukrainian strikes.[19] The UK Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on October 14 that the BSF has likely increased its defensive and reactive posture after multiple Ukrainian strikes on BSF assets in August and September 2023.

Armenia ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute on October 14, obliging Armenia to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he enters Armenia due to the ICC’s outstanding arrest warrant, directly after Putin’s efforts on October 13 to claim that the Russia-Armenia relationship is not deteriorating. Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed the corresponding degree as well as a statement recognizing the ICC’s jurisdiction on October 14 following the Armenian parliament‘s vote to ratify the statute on October 3.[22] Ratifying the Rome Statute notably legally obliges Armenia to arrest Putin on behalf of the ICC, which issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest on March 17, 2023, for illegally deporting Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.[23] Armenia’s ratification of the Rome Statute comes one day after Putin boasted about the strength of Russia-Armenia relations during the meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Member States.

Ukrainian forces will reportedly begin training on F-16 fighter jets in the US next week.Politico reported on October 13 that anonymous US officials stated that a “small number” of Ukrainian pilots will begin F-16 fighter jet training next week at Morris Air National Guard Base in Arizona after having completed English language training at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas.[25] One US official reportedly stated that the training may be accelerated due to Ukrainian forces’ urgent need for F-16 fighter jets.


Key Takeaways:

US and Ukrainian officials reported on October 12 and 13 that they anticipated the Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka and expressed confidence in Ukrainian defenses.
The Russian information space remains divided on the prospects of Russian successes near Avdiivka and on current Ukrainian capabilities.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 14 and advanced west of Donetsk City.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will maintain some vessels at its main Sevastopol naval base amid Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels, as the Russian Navy’s main dry dock on the Black Sea is in Sevastopol.
Armenia ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute on October 14, obliging Armenia to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he enters Armenia due to the ICC’s outstanding arrest warrant, directly after Putin’s efforts on October 13 to claim that the Russia-Armenia relationship is not deteriorating.
Ukrainian forces will reportedly begin training on F-16 fighter jets in the US next week.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
Relatives of Russian mobilized men and recruited prisoners continue to complain that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Russian military command are mistreating troops on the frontlines – especially on the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to establish patronage programs between Russian federal subjects and occupied areas in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/17/23 01:56 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 16, 2023
Oct 16, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 16, 2023

Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark

October 16, 2023, 6pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia likely deployed elements of at least two Central Military District (CMD) brigades to reinforce offensive operations by Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces on the Avdiivka front.
A Ukrainian military observer reported on October 16 that three Russian brigades — the DNR’s 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (MRB) and the CMD’s 15th and 21st MRBs (both of the 2nd Combined Arms Army [2nd CAA]) — have been involved in recent attacks on Avdiivka alongside various scattered DNR elements, while Russian forces are holding the CMD’s 30th MRB in tactical reserve.[1] Elements of the CMD, particularly of the 2nd CAA, have been active along the Svatove-Kreminna line until recently, and the newly formed 25th CAA likely relieved them along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[2] 2nd CAA elements have primarily conducted defensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line for the last several months and have therefore likely had more time to rest and reconstitute before deploying to a more challenging sector of the frontline, which accounts in part for recent Russian advances in the previously stagnant Avdiivka sector of the front.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction on October 16 and recently made some gains, albeit at a relatively slower pace than in the initial attacks. Geolocated footage posted on October 16 shows that Russian forces have marginally advanced past the E50 road about 3km south of Avdiivka.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a total of 22 Russian attacks in the Avdiivka direction in the past day, notably fewer than the 30 reported attacks on October 15.[4] Russian sources noted that Russian forces have increased the intensity of air and artillery strikes on the settlement in order to compensate for slow ground maneuvers, which are complicated by heavy Ukrainian fortifications surrounding Avdiivka.[5] During a meeting on the operational situation in Ukraine on October 16, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Russian forces have improved their tactical positions in unspecified areas and that the Russian “active defense” along the front, including near Avdiivka, is prohibiting Ukrainian advances.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Bakhmut directions.[7] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults near Avdiivka and on Verbove’s western and northwestern outskirts (10km east of Robotyne or 18km southwest of Orikhiv).[8] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are within 200 to 300 meters of Russian positions west of Verbove.

Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova reiterated statements admitting that Russia deported millions of Ukrainians — including 700,000 children — to Russia since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as a Qatari-mediated deal returned four children from Russia to Ukraine. Lvova-Belova claimed in a report published on October 15 that Russia has “accepted” about 4.8 million Ukrainians, including 700,000 children, since February 2022 and that Russian authorities have placed 380 Ukrainian orphans into foster care in Russia between April and October 2022.[10] Lvova-Belova also attempted to discredit information about Russia’s deportation of Ukrainian children and claimed instead that Ukrainian authorities act “against the interests of children.”[11] The Washington Post reported on October 16 that four children ranging from two to seventeen years old have returned or will return to Ukraine from Russia after Ukraine asked Qatar to mediate negotiations on the matter.[12] An official source told The Washington Post that more Ukrainian children may be returned in the future as part of the Qatari-mediated negotiations but that the process has been complicated by Russia providing a list of only hundreds of Ukrainian children currently in Russia while Ukraine has identified thousands of deported children. International humanitarian law defines the forced transfer of civilians to the territory of an occupying power as “deportation,” and ISW continues to assess that Russian authorities are conducting a large-scale campaign to deport Ukrainians to Russia.

Some Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the alleged restriction of information about Russian military failures. A Russian milblogger criticized an unspecified associate of Russian Lieutenant General Andrey Sychevoy, who was reportedly recently dismissed from a command position for military failures near Bakhmut, for causing Russian forces (presumably near Bakhmut) to suffer 1,500 casualties in September 2023.[14] The milblogger also criticized the broader Russian military command for communication failures and forcing injured personnel back into combat.[15] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have crossed the railway line south of Bakhmut in some places and complained that only one major milblogger has discussed this issue, underlining the fact that many milbloggers restrict their presentation of negative information about Russian capabilities.[16] Another milblogger, who previously claimed to censor all but 10-20 percent of the “sad” information they receive, claimed that the first milblogger’s complaints provide a glimpse into the 80-90 percent of unreported information, yet criticized other Russian milbloggers for consistently claiming that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed.

Russian forces conducted a drone and missile strike against Ukrainian rear areas on the night of October 15-16. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched five Kh-59 cruise missiles, one Iskander ballistic missile in eastern and southern Ukraine, and 12 Shahed-131/136 drones in western Ukraine.[18] Ukrainian air defense reportedly destroyed two of the Kh-59s and 11 Shahed drones.[19] Ukrainian officials reported explosions near Myrhorod, Poltava Oblast, and in Kirovohrad Oblast.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that one strike destroyed a Ukrainian communication center at the Myrhorod airfield in Poltava Oblast.

A new Russian procedure restricting the border checkpoints that Ukrainians can use to enter Russia from third countries came into force on October 16, effectively only allowing Ukrainians to enter Russia from third countries through the Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow. The new procedure only allows Ukrainians aged 14 and older to enter Russia from third countries through the Ludonka automobile checkpoint from Latvia and Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow.[22] Latvia announced on October 12 that it would close its side of the Ludonka checkpoint beginning on October 16.[23] ISW previously assessed that Russia implemented this new border crossing procedure likely in response to continued concern over the security of Russian border regions.[24] The new procedure does not apply to Ukrainians entering Russia from occupied Ukrainian territories or Ukrainians under the age of 14 traveling with a legal guardian.

A group of Russian lawyers appears to be challenging the Kremlin’s precariously crafted veneer of legality surrounding the Russian judicial system, calling for a strike three days after Russian authorities arrested four lawyers on extremism charges. A group of Russian lawyers published a petition encouraging members of the Russian Federal and Regional Chambers of Lawyers and other public lawyer associations to strike from all types of legal proceedings from October 25 to 28 in response to commonplace intimidation of lawyers in the Russian judicial system.[26] The petition states that Russian authorities often ignore violations of the professional rights of lawyers and threaten violence against them on “trumped-up administrative and criminal charges.”[27] The petition also argues that Russian judges increasingly abuse their powers and accuse Russian law enforcement officers of perpetrating crimes against lawyers. The petition states that “sophisticated methods of prosecuting lawyers for their professional activities on far-fetched administrative and criminal charges” have become established practices by Russian law enforcement agencies and courts. This petition comes three days after Russian authorities arrested four lawyers, including three of imprisoned Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny’s lawyers, on extremism charges on October 13.[28] The Russian lawyers calling for a strike appear unwilling to further tolerate the Kremlin’s weaponization of the Russian judicial system, challenging the Kremlin’s veneer of legality and legitimacy in Russian institutions that are intended to provide cover for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian and corrupt rule.


Key Takeaways:

Russia likely deployed elements of at least two Central Military District (CMD) brigades to reinforce offensive operations by Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces on the Avdiivka front.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 16.
A new Russian procedure restricting the border checkpoints that Ukrainians can use to enter Russia from third countries came into force on October 16, effectively only allowing Ukrainians to enter Russia from third countries through the Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow.
A group of Russian lawyers appears to be challenging the Kremlin’s precariously crafted veneer of legality surrounding the Russian judicial system, calling for a strike three days after Russian authorities arrested four lawyers on extremism charges.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut direction, near Avdiivka, southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported further details on ongoing North Korean weapons shipments to Russia on October 16.
Senior Russian officials reiterated boilerplate narratives about the Ukrainian counteroffensive and the Israel-Hamas war during a Russian Security Council meeting on October 16 likely to deter Western support for Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/18/23 01:06 AM

US Supply Of Long-range ATACMS To Ukraine Is 'Grave Mistake': Russian Envoy To US

AFP - Agence France Presse
October 17, 2023
Washington's decision to supply Ukraine with ATACMS long-range missiles is "a grave mistake", Russian ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov said Wednesday.

"The White House's decision to send long-range missiles to Ukrainians is a grave mistake. The consequences of this step, which was deliberately hidden from the public, will be of the most serious nature," he said in a statement.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/19/23 02:08 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 18, 2023
Oct 18, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 18, 2023

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, and Mason Clark

October 18, 2023, 5:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on October 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian sources claimed that likely company-sized elements of two Ukrainian naval infantry brigades conducted an assault across the Dnipro River onto the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17-18.
Geolocated footage published on October 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Pishchanivka (14km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and into Poyma (11km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[1] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that two Ukrainian “assault groups” landed on the east bank of the Dnipro River and broke through initial Russian defenses, temporarily occupying all of Poyma and positions on the northern outskirts of Pishchanivka on the afternoon of October 17.[2] The milblogger later claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back from these positions towards the Dnipro River.[3] The milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian sabotage group is still operating in Pishchanivka as of the afternoon of October 18. The milblogger, however, suggested that Russian forces only maintain positions on the southern outskirts of the settlement. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also acknowledged the Ukrainian operations, claiming that Russian forces stopped four Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Pidstepne (16km east of Kherson City) and Poyma.[4] Another prominent Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces occupied Poyma on the night of October 17 to 18.

Russian sources expressed pronounced concern about ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast and framed these activities as part of a potential larger Ukrainian operation. The majority of Russian claims about developments on the east bank are largely single-sourced to one prominent Russian milblogger who has recently heavily focused his reporting on this section of the front.[6] Russian sources characterized the reported assaults as a Ukrainian effort to expand a “bridgehead” on the east bank and the initial stages of a larger offensive operation across the Dnipro River.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin similarly described Ukrainian activity in Kherson Oblast as the “next counteroffensive” and continued his typical rhetorical line by painting all Ukrainian offensive operations as a failure.[8] The prominent Russian milblogger who is the basis for many of these claims has expressed concern about a Ukrainian offensive across the Dnipro River on and off throughout 2023 and escalated his warnings in late September 2023. The milblogger reacted to the reported assault on the night of October 17 to 18 by accusing the Russian MoD of not taking the threat of a Ukrainian crossing seriously.

across the Dnipro River may be partially connected to the condition of the Russian grouping of forces on the left bank. The Russian command has drawn relatively more elite units from the Kherson direction to support defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast in recent months due to likely viewing Kherson as a quiet sector, and the current force composition in the area is likely relatively less combat effective.[10] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on October 17 that Russian forces were still redeploying trained units from the Kherson direction to the Zaporizhia and eastern directions.[11] The Russian military may have recently redeployed elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army (Central Military District) and the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) to the Kherson direction, however, but it is unclear where in Kherson Oblast elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army are currently deployed.[12] Ukrainian counteroffensive operations reportedly previously rendered the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade combat ineffective as of September 22.

ISW will not speculate on the scope and prospects of ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast but does not assess that Ukrainian forces have created a bridgehead on the east bank of Kherson Oblast suitable for the further maneuver of sizeable mechanized forces at this time. However, it is noteworthy that prominent and generally reliable Russian sources are discussing Ukrainian activities on the east bank as occurring at a larger scale than previously documented tactical cross-river raids by Ukrainian forces. ISW will continue to monitor the area closely and assess control of terrain changes and Russian responses, in line with its standing policy of not forecasting Ukrainian actions.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions south of Bakhmut and had partial success south of Robotyne.[14] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Klishchiivka, 5km southwest of Bakhmut.

Western media reported that the United States has thus far provided Ukraine with a limited number of ATACMS missiles. The Associated Press reported on October 17 that an unnamed US official stated that the United States provided Ukraine with “fewer than a dozen” missiles “within the last few days.”[16] The New York Times (NYT) reported on October 18 that two unspecified Western officials stated that the United States sent “about 20” ATACMS to Ukraine.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at a press conference in Beijing on October 18 that the ATACMS are “fundamentally incapable of changing the situation on the frontline.”[18] The Kremlin does not view the provision of ATACMS to Ukraine as an escalatory step, and the United States has not crossed a Russian “red line” by providing Ukraine with these missiles. Ukraine will need additional ATACMS to sustain the operational effects of their use on the arrayment of Russian aviation assets and logistics.

Satellite imagery from October 17 suggests that the Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Berdyansk airfield likely substantially damaged Russian aircraft and airfield infrastructure, but ISW cannot yet confirm the extent of the damage. Several open-source intelligence analysts amplified satellite imagery of the Berdyansk airfield and suggested that it shows at least seven burned-out areas where satellite imagery previously showed various Russian helicopters, and additionally noted that many helicopters have since moved.[20] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that prior to the strike, Russian forces had Mi-28, Mi-24, and Ka-52 helicopters at the airfield, and suggested that the extent of the damage is likely more widespread than depicted in preliminary satellite imagery.[21] Ukrainian military sources previously reported that the Ukrainian strike destroyed nine helicopters, one anti-aircraft missile launcher, special equipment, ammunition depots, and runway infrastructure, but ISW cannot fully confirm these Russian losses with available imagery at this time.

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated his desire to deepen Russian-Chinese economic and political ties but did not announce any practical changes at the One Belt One Road International Forum in Beijing, China on October 18. Several open-source intelligence analysts amplified satellite imagery of the Berdyansk airfield and suggested that it shows at least seven burned-out areas where satellite imagery previously showed various Russian helicopters, and additionally noted that many helicopters have since moved.[20] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that prior to the strike, Russian forces had Mi-28, Mi-24, and Ka-52 helicopters at the airfield, and suggested that the extent of the damage is likely more widespread than depicted in preliminary satellite imagery.[21] Ukrainian military sources previously reported that the Ukrainian strike destroyed nine helicopters, one anti-aircraft missile launcher, special equipment, ammunition depots, and runway infrastructure, but ISW cannot fully confirm these Russian losses with available imagery at this time.

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated his desire to deepen Russian-Chinese economic and political ties but did not announce any practical changes at the One Belt One Road International Forum in Beijing, China on October 18. Putin stated that close Russian and Chinese foreign policy coordination is especially necessary in “current difficult conditions” and emphasized Russian and Chinese cooperation through multilateral formats including the One Belt One Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[23] Putin claimed that economic cooperation between Russia and China is integral to strengthening Russian economic, technological, and financial sovereignty.[24] Putin notably did not emphasize Russian-Chinese security cooperation, possibly due to China’s reticence at the no-limits partnership that Russia wants to establish, as ISW has previously reported.[25] Putin also held bilateral talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and available Kremlin readouts of the meeting similarly stressed economic ties between Russia and China.[26] Putin’s visit to China and meeting with Xi does not appear to have resulted in any substantial change in the Chinese reticence to establish the Kremlin’s desired level of bilateral relationship or any breakthroughs in the degree of Chinese military support to Russia. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov notably claimed on October 18 that almost all of Russia’s dual-use civilian drones come from China and stated that the Russian government aims to increase domestic civilian drone production to 41 percent by 2025.[27] ISW has previously observed reports that China often exports dual-use equipment to Russia, including civilian drones, which Russian forces can employ on the battlefield in Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

Russian sources claimed that likely company-sized elements of two Ukrainian naval infantry brigades conducted an assault across the Dnipro River onto the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17-18.
Russian sources expressed pronounced concern about ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast and framed these activities as part of a potential larger Ukrainian operation.
ISW will not speculate on the scope and prospects of ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast but does not assess that Ukrainian forces have created a bridgehead on the east bank of Kherson Oblast suitable for the further maneuver of sizeable mechanized forces at this time.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Western media reported that the US has thus far provided Ukraine with a limited number of ATACMS missiles, and the Kremlin issued a muted response to the provision of these systems
Satellite imagery from October 17 suggests that the Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Berdyansk airfield likely substantially damaged Russian aircraft and airfield infrastructure, but ISW cannot yet confirm the extent of the damage.
Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated his desire to deepen Russian-Chinese economic and political ties but did not announce any practical changes at the One Belt One Road International Forum in Beijing, China on October 18.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka direction, southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced south of Avdiivka.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/21/23 02:10 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 20, 2023
Oct 20, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 20, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark

October 20, 2023, 4:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on October 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces launched a renewed offensive push near Avdiivka on October 20 and marginally advanced, indicating that the Russian military command remains committed to offensive operations in the area despite heavy materiel and personnel losses.
Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows that Russian forces secured minor advances west of Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka).[1] Russian milbloggers and a Ukrainian military observer claimed that Russian forces captured a Ukrainian stronghold near the waste heap just northeast of Avdiivka, advanced to a rail station north of Avdiivka, and advanced near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant south of Avdiivka.[2] One prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), south of Avdiivka, near Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka), and near Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka), however.[3] Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to one kilometer on the Stepove-Berdychi line (8-10km northwest of Avdiivka) on October 19 and that fighting is ongoing near Berdychi on October 20.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka, Novokalynove, Stepove, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Sieverne.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 20 that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed almost 50 Russian tanks and over 100 armored vehicles during the past day of fighting near Avdiivka.[6] Ukrainian soldiers operating in the Avdiivka area reported on October 20 that Ukrainian forces have destroyed 200 Russian armored vehicles in the past four days.[7] Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash stated that Russian forces are attempting to repair damaged equipment while still in the field.[8] Footage published on October 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian TOS-1 thermobaric artillery system near Avdiivka.[9] A Russian milblogger complained that Russian counterbattery fire near Avdiivka is decreasing in effectiveness due to poor communication and the failure to stockpile munitions ahead of the offensive effort, very likely exacerbating material losses in the area.[10] The initial Russian offensive operations in the Avdiivka area on October 10 also resulted in high verified Russian equipment losses, and the fact that Russian forces regrouped and re-launched assaults after the initial attacks suggests that either Russian forces believe they can feasibly take Avdiivka, or that the Russian military command is poorly prioritizing offensive operations regardless of cost.

Ukrainian forces continued larger-than-usual ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 20 and established a confirmed presence in a settlement on the east bank. Geolocated footage published on October 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced into northeastern Krynky (27km east from Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[12] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are establishing a foothold near Krynky and continue to maintain their presence near the Antonivsky roadway and railway bridges.[13] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces temporarily advanced further into Krynky up to the Kozachi Laheri-Krynky-Korsunka road before Russian airstrikes pushed Ukrainian troops back to the northern outskirts of the settlement.[14] Another Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing near Pishchanivka (14km east from Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and that a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group is operating on the southern outskirts of the settlement.[15] The prominent Russian milblogger suggested that Russian forces only maintained positions on the southern outskirts of Pishchanivka as of the afternoon of October 18, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 19 that Russian aviation struck Pishchanivka, implying that Ukrainian forces were still operating in the settlement.[16] ISW has not observed any other visual confirmation of Ukrainian forces maintaining positions in east bank settlements other than Krynky, however.

Russian and Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that the Russian units defending the east bank of Kherson Oblast are relatively less combat effective than other Russian forces elsewhere on the frontA Ukrainian military observer stated that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces is primarily comprised of elements of the 49th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) and likely elements of the newly created 18th Combined Arms Army.[17] The majority of the 49th Combined Arms Army (CAA) has been deployed to east bank Kherson Oblast since Russian forces withdrew from the west (right) bank, and elements of the 49th CAA’s 205th Motorized Rifle Regiment have since suffered significant casualties.[18] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on August 21 that the Russian military was likely forming the new 18th CAA from other units currently operating in Kherson Oblast, and it is unlikely that the new units of the 18th CAA are entirely comprised of fresh forces or staffed to doctrinal end strength.[19] The deployment of the 18th CAA to Kherson Oblast is reminiscent of the rushed deployment of the newly created 25th CAA to the Kupyansk and Lyman directions in early September 2023, and the 18th CAA likely faces similar issues with a lack of personnel, equipment, and proper training.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly of 70th Motorized Rifle Division of the 18th CAA, are defending against Ukrainian activities near Krynky.[21] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 1st Battalion of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are operating near the Antonivsky railway bridge.[22] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment have been defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and have likely suffered significant casualties.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances northwest of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne), though ISW has not observed evidence to confirm this claim.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[25] Russian sources reported Ukrainian attacks south of Bakhmut on the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line and south of Orikhiv near Robotyne, Novoprokopivka, and Verbove.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, on October 19 to discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine. Russian media reported that Putin met with the Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander for Russian forces in Ukraine Army General Valery Gerasimov, who told Putin that Russian troops are "solving problems in accordance with the operation plan."[27] Various elements of the SMD are notably currently deployed in critical areas of the frontline — elements of the SMD's 8th Combined Arms Army are conducting offensive operations near Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast, elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army are defending against ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and elements of the 49th Combined Arms Army are operating in the Kherson Oblast direction as of late August 2023.[28] Putin's publicized visit with Gerasimov indicates that Gerasimov is still the active figurehead of Russian operations in Ukraine and was likely meant to posture the effectiveness and involvement of the Russian military leadership as Russian forces pursue offensive and defensive operations along multiple sectors of the front. ISW will provide additional updates on Putin's visit to Rostov-on-Don once more readouts become available.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces launched a renewed offensive push near Avdiivka on October 20 and marginally advanced, indicating that the Russian military command remains committed to offensive operations in the area despite heavy materiel and personnel losses.
Ukrainian forces continued larger-than-usual ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 20 and established a confirmed presence in a settlement on the east bank.
Russian and Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that the Russian units defending the east bank of Kherson Oblast are relatively less combat effective than other Russian forces elsewhere on the front.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, on October 19 to discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine with Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, around Avdiivka, west of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made limited advances in some areas.
Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin argued on October 20 that Russian authorities should strip migrants of acquired Russian citizenship if they are unwilling to fight in Ukraine
.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/23/23 01:03 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 22, 2023
Oct 22, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 22, 2023

Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, and Mason Clark

October 22, 2023, 4:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces are funneling additional forces to the Avdiivka front despite ongoing challenges with frontal mechanized assaults and the failure of a renewed push on October 19-20.
Several Russian milbloggers claimed that there were no significant changes along the front in the Avdiivka direction on October 22.[1] Russian forces are likely once again pausing following a failed major push which suffered heavy losses. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces “unexpectedly” counterattacked in the direction of Pisky (8km southwest of Donetsk City) and pushed Russian forces from positions in the area. Another milblogger stated that claims of Ukrainian advances near Pisky and Opytne (4km south of Avdiivka) are false.[2] Another Russian source allegedly serving in the Avdiivka direction claimed that Ukrainian forces did not conduct counterattacks in his unspecified sector of the front.[3] Geolocated footage published on October 21 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal advances southeast of Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[4] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not completely cleared the Avdiivka waste heap area and that the area is currently a contested “gray zone.”

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger discussed difficulties that may be contributing to a “positional deadlock” for Russian offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction as of October 22.[6] The milblogger claimed that it is difficult to conduct maneuver warfare on a static front line with a large number of personnel and fortified areas on both sides. The milblogger noted that Ukrainian drones and other precision weapons have made armored vehicles increasingly vulnerable and have made ground attacks increasingly difficult. The milblogger also noted that Russian forces are facing difficulties in overcoming Ukrainian minefields near Avdiivka and are unable to completely destroy Ukrainian logistics, allowing the Ukrainian command to quickly transfer personnel to critical areas. Russian sources have previously claimed that Ukrainian defensive fortifications pose a significant challenge to Russian advances around Avdiivka.[7] These challenges are highly similar to those faced by Ukrainian forces in southern Ukraine in the initial weeks of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in June 2023. However, it remains to be seen if Russian forces have the capabilities and flexibility to adapt in some manner, as Ukrainian forces did following early setbacks in June 2023.

Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces continue to transfer personnel to the Avdiivka direction to support offensive efforts despite heavy losses. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that the Russian military is deploying personnel from Russian territory directly to the Avdiivka direction to replace personnel losses.[8] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command has recently transferred several Russian regiments comprised of mobilized personnel to the Avdiivka direction, indicating that Russia likely does not plan to abandon operations in this direction.[9] Mashovets noted that the Russian military also transferred elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps, Western Military District) to the Spartak-Yakolivka-Minerale-Kashtanove area (4km south to 5km southeast of Avdiivka).

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops continue offensive actions south of Bakhmut and in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[10] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun noted that Ukrainian forces maintained offensive pressure in western Zaporizhia Oblast despite active Russian hostilities in the Avdiivka direction.

The nationalist pro-war Russian information space is reckoning with the possibility of a major demographic decline by weaponizing anti-migrant rhetoric. The Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) published a new demographic forecast for the Russian Federation on October 20 that predicts that Russia's population will decrease to 138.77 million people by January 1, 2046.[15] Rosstat estimated that the rate of natural population decline will exceed 600,000 people per year between 2024-2032 but will slow to 400,000 people per year from 2032-2046.[16] Several Russian commentators seized on these statistics and warned that they portend “demographic catastrophe” if restorative measures are not undertaken immediately.[17] One Russian source blamed Russia’s declining population on migrants and called for ethnic Russians to immediately increase the national birthrate, as well as to automate many production systems to replace migrant labor.[18] ISW has previously reported on instances of vocal Russian nationalist enclaves within the pro-war information space amplifying anti-migrant rhetoric to explain away and try to remedy reports of Russian demographic transitions.[19] Such rhetoric is particularly noteworthy as the Russian force generation apparatus is increasingly exploiting migrant and other ethnic minority communities as a mobilization resource, which ISW outlines in the force generation section of today’s update.

A prominent Russian milblogger and frontline commander criticized Russian top-down censorship campaigns. Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky claimed on October 22 that many Russians are dissatisfied with official reports and summaries about the war in Ukraine and urged Russian officials to report honestly about the frontline to garner wider public support.[21] Khodakovsky, who has consistently complained about problems affecting Russian combat operations, claimed that all of his statements are “inspected with increased scrutiny” given his official status.[22] Khodakovsky argued that one can “install filters on the central media” but cannot make people think a certain way.[23] Khodakovsky claimed that unspecified actors who are “embarrassed” by his statements are pushing Rosgvardia to take action against him for his criticisms.[24] Khodakovsky was appointed the deputy head of the Main Directorate of Rosgvardia in occupied Donetsk Oblast in February 2023 and commands Rosgvardia’s special rapid response and riot police (OMON and SOBR) in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[25] Khodakovsky‘s claim, if true, indicates that some actors may be trying to leverage Rosgvardia's likely concern about potential repercussions for Khodakovsky’s increasingly vocal criticisms, which have become more conspicuous as other Russian milbloggers engage in greater self-censorship over fears of running afoul of Russian authorities.

Deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's ideological and rhetorical campaign against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has largely become decoupled from the issue of the Wagner Group and appears to have outlived Prigozhin himself. Russian lawyer Kirill Kachur, whom the Russian Investigative Committee charged in absentia for embezzlement and bribery in 2022, claimed on October 22 that Prigozhin filed applications to the Russian Investigative Committee to initiate a criminal case against Russian Defense Minister Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov for the “genocide of the Russian people, the murder to tens of thousands of Russian citizens, and the transfer of Russian territories to the enemy” before Wagner’s June 24 armed rebellion.[27] Kachur appealed to Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to publicly address what has happened to these applications since Prigozhin’s death and concluded that Russians who support Prigozhin and his message should coalesce around the ideological principles Prigozhin espoused and push for the restoration of justice in Russian society.[28] Kachur’s invocation of Prigozhin’s ideological opposition to the Russian MoD suggests that the intense dislike for and disapproval of the MoD has outlived Prigozhin, even as the Wagner Group has disbanded as a centralized entity. A select camp within the Russian information space that aligns itself with Prigozhin’s hyper-nationalist pro-war, yet anti-MoD ideology will likely continue to launch informational critiques on the MoD and the Russian military command as the war continues.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces are funneling additional forces to the Avdiivka front despite ongoing challenges with frontal mechanized assaults and the failure of a renewed push on October 19-20.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 22.
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on October 22.
The nationalist pro-war Russian information space is reckoning with the possibility of a major demographic decline by weaponizing anti-migrant rhetoric.
A prominent Russian milblogger and frontline commander criticized Russian top-down censorship campaigns.
Deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's ideological and rhetorical campaign against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has largely become decoupled from the issue of the Wagner Group and appears to have outlived Prigozhin himself.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on October 22.
Russian authorities are intensifying mobilization efforts targeting Central Asian migrant communities.
Russian occupation authorities continue to use cultural and education programs to forcibly Russify Ukrainian children.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/24/23 02:30 AM

Ukraine SBU killed dozens trained by CIA.

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023...ns-of-russians-collaborators-wapo-a82857
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/25/23 02:00 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 24, 2023
Oct 24, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 24, 2023

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 24, 2023, 5:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on October 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 24 and advanced south of Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast
. Geolocated footage published on October 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Andriivka (10 km southwest of Bakhmut), and geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced west of Robotyne.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on October 24 that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions south of Bakhmut and achieved partial success near Robotyne.

Russia appears to be increasingly supplementing the use of Shahed-131/136 drones with cheaper and lighter domestically produced drone variants during strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. Russian media speculated on October 23 that Russian forces used new long-range "Italmas" drones and Italmas variants for the first time in Ukraine during a drone attack on Kyiv Oblast.[3] Russian sources noted that Italmas drones are lighter than Shaheds and are harder to detect and shoot down. Russian milbloggers noted that Italmas drones are cheaper than Shaheds, which means that they can be more widely manufactured and used, but that they deliver lighter payloads, which restricts their usefulness in isolation.[4] Russian sources noted, therefore, that Russian forces will likely use the Italmas drones in tandem with Shaheds.[5] ISW previously assessed that Russia is likely trying to expand and diversify its arsenal of drones, missiles, and guided bombs for strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in advance of the fall-winter season, and increased use of Italmas drones is likely part of the wider munitions diversification effort.

Russian authorities are intensifying mobilization efforts targeting Central Asian migrant communities in Russia. Russian Internal Affairs (MVD) Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev met with the MVD board to discuss “migration problems” and “ethnic crime” and insinuated that migrants commit crimes at a higher rate than natural born Russian citizens.[7] Kolokoltsev defended recent Russian law enforcement mobilization raids on migrant communities and claimed that Russian law enforcement is enforcing standard legal norms.[8] A Russian insider source claimed that the Russian Investigative Committee is conducting investigations into naturalized migrants with Russian citizenship and is reopening previously terminated and canceled criminal cases in order to mobilize migrants to fight in Ukraine.[9] The insider source also claimed that the Russian Investigative Committee will now investigate migrants for committing any offense, even minor ones, and will expand that individual’s investigation to include their friends and family. The insider source claimed that unspecified actors, possibly the MVD or MVD Head Alexander Bastrykin, ordered Russian state media to increase reporting about ethnic crime in Russia, likely to set informational conditions for further mobilization raids on migrant communities.[10] Bastrykin has continually advocated for the targeted mobilization of migrants with Russian citizenship, in line with Russian law enforcement’s recent expansion of its efforts to detain and forcibly register migrants with Russian citizenship for military service.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted diminishing Russian control over the Black Sea and Ukraine’s temporary grain corridors during a speech at the Crimean Platform summit on October 24. Zelensky stated that Russia attempted to create the illusion that Russian dominance of the Black Sea was insurmountable but said that this illusion is fading as the Russia Black Sea Fleet (BSF) gradually "flees" Crimea and increasingly struggles to operate in the western Black Sea.[12] Zelensky stated that the Russian authorities recently announced the creation of a new naval base for BSF assets in occupied Ochamchire, Abkhazia, far from the reach of long-range Ukrainian missiles and naval drones. ISW has previously reported on the impact of Ukraine’s strike campaign against Crimea and BSF assets and the construction of a permanent Russian naval base in Abkhazia.[13] Zelensky added that Russian forces no longer have a completely reliable logistical route between Crimea and mainland Russia. Zelensky noted that Ukraine has launched new temporary export routes from the Danube port in Odesa Oblast through the Black Sea and the overland “Solidarity Lanes” through Europe.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 24 and advanced south of Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russia appears to be increasingly supplementing the use of Shahed-131/136 drones with cheaper and lighter domestically produced drone variants during strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure.
Russian authorities are intensifying mobilization efforts targeting Central Asian migrant communities in Russia.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted diminishing Russian control over the Black Sea and Ukraine’s temporary grain corridors during a speech at the Crimean Platform summit on October 24.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 24 and made confirmed advances northeast of Avdiivka.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions in Krynky (30km east of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) and continued limited attacks on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated "Redut" private military company (PMC) is reportedly trying to recruit women into combat roles.
Russian occupation authorities continue to establish programs to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/27/23 02:40 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 26, 2023
Oct 26, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26, 2023

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 26, 2023, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Heavy Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely undermine Russian offensive capabilities over the long term.
Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated on October 26 that Russian forces have suffered 5,000 personnel killed and wounded and 400 armored vehicles losses near Avdiivka and Marinka (southwest of Donetsk City) since October 10.[1] Satellite imagery has confirmed that the Russian military has lost at least 109 military vehicles, primarily armored fighting vehicles and tanks, near Avdiivika between October 10 and 20.[2] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that Russian forces appear to be using fewer armored vehicles near Avdiivka, although Russian forces may be regrouping for renewed large mechanized assaults as they did between the initial mechanized assaults on October 10 and a second series of large mechanized assaults on October 19 and 20.[3] The Russian command has funneled additional forces to the Avdiivka front to offset heavy manpower losses and maintain the Russian military’s ability to sustain its ongoing offensive effort.[4]

The Russian command will likely struggle to offset Russian equipment losses, particularly in armored vehicles, however. Widespread Russian equipment losses and shortages in the first year of the full-scale invasion heavily restricted Russia’s ability to conduct effective mechanized maneuver warfare during the Russian military's winter-spring 2023 offensive, contributing to further losses in disorderly mechanized assaults near Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast in January and February 2023.[5] Heavy losses around Vuhledar likely prevented the Russian command from committing to sustained mechanized assaults elsewhere in Ukraine later in the winter-spring 2023 offensive.[6] Recent Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka appear to be much larger than earlier equipment losses around Vuhledar. It remains unclear if the prospect of further heavy equipment losses will deter the Russian command from launching another series of large, mechanized assaults near Avdiivka. Russia has gradually mobilized elements of its defense industrial base (DIB) to address equipment shortages but has not done so at a scale remotely sufficient to offset the cumulative Russian equipment losses in Ukraine.[7] Recent Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely lead to even more pronounced Russian equipment shortages and setbacks for any progress that the Russian military has made in addressing degraded mechanized maneuver warfare capabilities.

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 25 shows that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced north of Pidstepne (15km east of Kherson City).[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.

Ukrainian officials denied reports that Ukraine suspended a corridor for civilian vessels in the Black Sea on October 26. Reuters reported that British security firm Ambrey, Ukrainian consulting firm Barva Invest, and specialized Ukrainian news outlet Ukrainian Ports stated that Ukraine had temporarily suspended traffic through the corridor on October 26.[10] Barva Invest stated that the Ukrainian Sea Ports Administration announced the suspension on the evening of October 25 and that a de facto suspension had already been in place for two days.[11] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that many factors, including threats from Russian forces and weather, affect the Ukrainian military’s decisions to allow individual civilian vessels to pass through the corridor.[12] The Ukrainian Ministry of Reconstruction and the Ukrainian Minister for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development, Oleksandr Kubrakov, later clarified that reports about the suspension are false and that civilian vessels are using all available routes established by the Ukrainian Navy.[13] Russia has continually pursued efforts to disrupt Ukrainian grain exports and curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports and will likely continue escalatory posturing in the Black Sea meant to undermine confidence in the Ukrainian corridor.

An amendment to the Russian citizenship law allowing for the revocation of naturalized Russian citizenship came into force on October 26, providing the Russian government with a new mechanism to coerce migrants into Russian military service. The amendment most notably allows Russian authorities to revoke Russian citizenship from naturalized citizens who are convicted of discrediting the Russian military and of committing “certain crimes encroaching on public and personal safety” regardless of when the crime was committed, the date of sentencing, or for how long the convicted has held Russian citizenship.[15] Russian authorities have recently increased raids against migrants accused of committing crimes to deliver summonses and impress migrants into signing military contracts.[16] Russian authorities will likely use this new amendment to further recruit naturalized migrants under threat of revoking their Russian citizenship or after having done so.[17] It is unclear what procedure Russian authorities will follow once they deprive someone of their citizenship, and Russian authorities may intend to use deportation procedures to increase the number of migrants in detention centers, where Russian officials regularly try to recruit.[18] Russian authorities will also likely exploit denaturalized migrants whose labor options will become limited upon conviction of a crime and loss of their Russian citizenship and therefore more vulnerable to military recruitment efforts. The new amendment to the citizenship law also streamlines the process for allocating Russian citizenship to certain individuals, including children with at least one Russian parent, migrants currently residing in Russia, and participants in the Russian state resettlement program, by removing certain entrance requirements.
The EU is reportedly behind on its artillery ammunition round provision to Ukraine. Unspecified sources told Bloomberg in an article published on October 25 that the EU has currently delivered only 30 percent of the promised one million shells that are expected by March 2024.[20] Bloomberg also reported that some unspecified counties have asked to extend the provision deadline.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) and the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently announced new military aid packages to Ukraine. The UK MoD announced on October 11 a new package of military material support for Ukraine valued at over 100 million pounds (about $121 million).[21] The US DoD announced on October 26 a new security assistance package valued at up to $150 million in materiel.

Armenia continues to distance itself from Russia amid deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated in an interview with the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published on October 25 that there are no “advantages” to the continued presence of Russian military bases in Armenia.[23] Pashinyan also stated that Armenia is in the process of diversifying its security partnerships.[24] Pashinyan previously stated on October 11 that Russian peacekeepers should return to Russia instead of the Russian bases in Armenia if they leave Nagorno-Karabakh.

A senior Hamas delegation traveled to Moscow and met with Russian and Iranian officials on October 26.[26] (NOTE: This text also appeared in the Critical Threats Project (CTP)’s October 26 Iran Update) Hamas’ International Relation Office head and political bureau member Musa Abu Marzouk led a delegation, which also included the Health Minister of the Gaza Strip, Basem Naim.[27] The delegation held a joint meeting with Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister and Special Representative for the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov and Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani. Hamas leaders issued statements around the visit praising Russia’s stance toward the Israel-Hamas war. Russia has framed itself as a possible mediator between Israel and Hamas and submitted a UN resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire on October 16. The UN resolution failed to mention Hamas by name.[28] The Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry condemned Russia’s invitation to Hamas on October 26.[29]CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is already exploiting and will likely continue to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to advance several information operations intended to reduce US and Western support for and attention to Ukraine.[30] A senior Hamas delegation most recently visited Moscow in March 2023 amid strained tensions between Russia and Israel over the Russian invasion of Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

Heavy Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely undermine Russian offensive capabilities over the long term.
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Ukrainian officials denied reports that Ukraine suspended a corridor for civilian vessels in the Black Sea on October 26.
An amendment to the Russian citizenship law allowing for the revocation of naturalized Russian citizenship came into force on October 26, providing the Russian government with a new mechanism to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
A senior Hamas delegation traveled to Moscow and met with Russian and Iranian officials on October 26.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
Several Russian opposition outlets reported that Russian defense industrial base (DIB) companies continue to use Western components supplied through intermediaries to manufacture missiles to use against Ukraine.
Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to forcibly indoctrinate Ukrainian youth into Russian culture and identity through the expansion of military-patriotic educational programs.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/27/23 02:58 AM

The MoD update, dated October 17, says that heavy casualties have forced Russia from the offensive into what it calls “active-defence”. Death tolls vary widely and should be taken with a grain of salt, but Newsweek claimed in a report on October 20 that Russia’s death toll was approaching 300,000 men, including 1,300 killed in a single day.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/29/23 02:16 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 28, 2023
Oct 28, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 28, 2023

Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 28, 2023, 7:50pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Remnants of the Wagner Group appear to be fighting in the Avdiivka direction subordinate to Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) controlled formations.
A Russian military correspondent published an interview on October 25 with the commander of the Russian “Arbat” Separate Guards Special Purpose Battalion that is serving the Avdiivka direction, who claimed that an element of the Arbat Battalion is almost entirely composed of former Wagner personnel.[1] The commander claimed that the Avdiivka direction is the Arbat Battalion’s “main direction” because the unit is part of the “Dikaya Division of Donbas” and the “Pyatnashka” Brigade — a Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) formation that is responsible for the defending Donetsk City.[2] The commander noted that the Wagner-staffed unit sends drone operators, electronic warfare (EW) specialists, and other fighters to other units in different frontline sectors as needed. The correspondent also indicated that the Arbat Battalion is part of the Russian Armed Forces, and it is likely that the brigade consists of former Wagner personnel who signed military contracts directly with the Russian MoD following Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion and or his death.

A Ukrainian military observer also stated on October 25 that Wagner Group remnants are fighting near Avdiivka.[3] Ukrainian and Russian sources have previously stated that small groups of former Wagner personnel, possibly under Russian MoD-controlled formations, are deployed to the Bakhmut area.[4] It is too early to determine what role former Wagner personnel may play in Russian offensive operations against Avdiivka. The Arbat Battalion’s commander noted that the battalion’s situation on the front line is “good but not great” due to heavy personnel losses near Avdiivka.[5] Ukrainian military observers expressed concern about continued Russian operations in the Avdiivka direction, however.

Commander of the “Akhmat” Spetsnaz forces Apty Alaudinov confirmed that Rosgvardia is recruiting former Wagner fighters into Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz units. Alaudinov stated in an interview published on October 28 that a “massive” number of Wagner soldiers have joined various detachments of the “Akhmat” forces and are operating in several unspecified sectors of the front in Ukraine.[7] Alaudinov claimed that former Wagner soldiers are following their former commanders to the “Akhmat” units. Alaudinov noted that Wagner fighters have “always spoken very respectfully about [‘Akhmat’],” likely in an attempt to stifle discussions of possible tension between the Wagner and Chechen forces after the feud between deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov.[8] ISW continues to assess that former Wagner forces fragmented between the Russian MoD and Rosgvardia Chechen units across various sectors of the front are unlikely to reemerge as an effective military organization as they will lack the strength Wagner had drawn from being a unitary organization under clear and coherent leadership.[9] They may be tactical combat power multipliers for the units they embed with in some circumstances, however.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut and in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[10] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Robotyne, Nesteryanka (12km northwest of Robotyne), Kopani (6km northwest of Robotyne), Rivne (8km west of Robotyne), Novoprokopivka (3km south of Robotyne), and Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[11] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 27 that Ukrainian forces achieved “minor successes” during attacks near Robotyne.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of October 27 to 28. Ukrainian military sources reported on October 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed three of four Iskander-K cruise missiles that Russian forces launched from Crimea.[13] The fourth missile reportedly did not reach its target.[14] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih and Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Izmail, Odesa Oblast.

Russian forces are reportedly using a new version of the “Lancet” kamikaze drone that can autonomously identify targets. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces began using the new “Izdeliye-53” kamikaze drone as of October 21.[16] The sources claimed that the “Izdeliye-53” drone reportedly has an automatic guidance system that can distinguish types of targets and increase strike success rates.[17] Russian forces are reportedly not using the “Izdeliye-53” drones on a wide scale yet, but Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are currently testing the drones for mass synchronized swarm strikes.[18] ISW previously reported on October 24 that Russian forces also allegedly recently used the new “Italmas” (also known as “Izdeliye-54”) drones during a drone strike on Kyiv Oblast.[19] ISW also previously assessed that the Russian command may believe that a large number of strike drones will allow Russian forces to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, although the payload of the “Izdeliye-53” drones, which is reportedly between three and five kilograms, may not be sufficient to significantly damage most critical military targets.

Russian authorities are capitalizing on domestic ethnic tensions by increasing public coercion of Central Asian migrants into Russian military service, likely to appeal to Russian ultranationalists ahead of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s expected presidential campaign announcement. The Moscow Investigative Committee announced on October 27 that it began 12 criminal investigations against naturalized migrants for evading military service and claimed that this number rose on October 28 to 22 opened investigations with 80 migrants already sent to military service.[21] Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Rosgvardia agents detained 40 migrant taxi drivers during a raid at the Norilsk airport in Krasnoyarsk Krai on October 27 for allegedly failing to register with Russian military registration and enlistment offices.[22] These announcements are part of a series of recent measures and statements that highly publicize Russian intent and efforts to mobilize Central Asian migrants likely aimed to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ultranationalist constituency, which has long expressed hatred for Central Asian migrants and increasingly called for these migrants to serve in the Russian military.

The Kremlin maintains a relatively measured stance on alleged migrant crimes against ethnic Russians, likely unintentionally establishing a cycle that keeps these ethnic tensions in frequent Russian ultranationalist dialogue. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers expressed anger on October 28 over criticisms of footage that shows a Russian man insulting migrant children while breaking up an alleged fight between 10 migrant children and an ethnic Russian child in Rostov-on-Don.[24] The milbloggers insulted the children and the wider migrant community, with some even claiming that the migrant children intended to kill the ethnic Russian child, but largely praised the Russian man for intervening.[25] The milbloggers claimed that such incidents are commonplace and that no one cares or steps in to mitigate the incidents.[26] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin announced an investigation into the Rostov-on-Don incident on October 27 as well as claims of separate incidents in Chelyabinsk Oblast on October 25 and Novosibirsk and Novgorod oblasts on October 28.


Key Takeaways:

Remnants of the Wagner Group appear to be fighting in the Avdiivka direction subordinate to Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) controlled formations.
Commander of the “Akhmat” Spetsnaz forces Apty Alaudinov confirmed that Rosgvardia is recruiting former Wagner fighters into Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz units.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 28.
Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of October 27 to 28.
Russian authorities are capitalizing on domestic ethnic tensions by increasing public coercion of Central Asian migrants into Russian military service, likely to appeal to Russian ultranationalists ahead of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s expected presidential campaign announcement.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that he personally heard Russian President Vladimir Putin express his decision to send Russian conscripts to serve in the Russian Border Service.
Pro-Ukrainian actors reportedly conducted a cyber attack against Russian telecom operators in occupied Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/31/23 02:46 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 30, 2023
Oct 30, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 30, 2023

Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 30, 2023, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3:00pm ET on October 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian officials announced that Russian law enforcement suppressed the antisemitic riots in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan on October 30.
The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) stated that employees of the MVD and other law enforcement agencies suppressed mass riots in Makhachkala and restored order at the local airport after identifying over 150 participants and detaining 60 rioters.[1] The MVD also claimed that rioters injured at least nine police officers and that searches for other rioters are ongoing. Dagestan Head Sergey Melikov claimed that he personally inspected the Makhachkala airport, which sustained minor damage, and claimed that the MVD and Rosgvardia used physical force as a last resort in hopes of calming the mob with reason.[2] Russian sources claimed that rioters threw stones at law enforcement and that officers responded by firing guns into the air.[3] Melikov stated that unspecified foreign actors, including pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels, are attempting to destabilize the region and claimed that the Telegram channel that published the rumors of the arrival of “Israeli refugees” in Dagestan was managed from Ukrainian territory.

Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to the October 29 antisemitic demonstrations in Dagestan by accusing Ukraine of trying to “instigate pogroms in Russia” under Western guidance. Putin claimed during a meeting with members of the Russian Security Council on October 30 that demonstrations in Makhachkala “were inspired, among other things, through social networks, from Ukraine’s territory by Western intelligence services.” Putin added that the West is trying to use regional conflicts to break Russia from within, and tasked regional authorities with undertaking “firm, timely and clear actions to protect the constitutional system of Russia, the rights and freedoms of [Russian] citizens, interethnic and interreligious harmony.” Putin did not specify which measures Russia will undertake to resolve interreligious conflicts and antisemitism in Russia, however. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov did not comment on the measures that could be taken against the demonstrators.[6] Kremlin officials largely reiterated similar statements prior to Putin’s speech and refrained from directly condemning the rioters, and the Kremlin’s narrative about foreign involvement in the riots is likely an attempt to deflect from the international criticism of antisemitism and growing animosity towards ethnic and religious minorities in Russia.

A minority of Russian officials directly condemned rioters and regional authorities for ignoring antisemitic attitudes in Dagestan. Melikov stated that rioters betrayed Russian servicemen fighting in Ukraine by “playing for the enemy” and noted that he was ashamed about the riots.[8] Russian State Duma Deputy Vasiliy Vlasov criticized Dagestani authorities for ignoring antisemitic attitudes and unrest that lasted for three days.[9] Vlasov added that unnamed regional officials should be dismissed from their positions for failing to preempt the riots in time.

The October 29 riots in Dagestan highlight the growing radicalization and factionalism of Russian society resulting from the hyper-nationalist ideologies that the war in Ukraine has empowered. Director of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Janis Sarts stated that events in Makhachkala represent some of the manifestations of the radicalization of the Russian society resulting from the war in Ukraine and the surrounding media environment.[10] Sarts stated that Russian media has been inciting hatred against Ukrainians, the West, and Israel and observed that many deceased Russian servicemen who had fought in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine hailed from Dagestan. A Russian milblogger similarly implied that the Kremlin’s efforts to blame the riots on foreign psychological and information operations allow Russian officials to avoid responsibility for enabling the strengthening of radical sentiments among Russian Muslim populations.[11] ISW has previously assessed that the hyper-nationalist ideologies espoused by the Kremlin as the justifications for the war are having domestic ramifications for Russia, particularly in ethnic minority communities.

Unidentified Russian soldiers reportedly murdered a Ukrainian family in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast, further highlighting a threatening environment of violence that is pervasive throughout the occupied areas of Ukraine. Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on October 29 that Russian troops killed nine civilians, including two young children, in their home in Volnovakha overnight and suggested that Chechen units may have committed the murders because the family refused to shelter Chechen forces in their house.[13] Several Ukrainian sources and a prominent Russian insider source reported that forensic evidence indicates that well-prepared and well-equipped military personnel likely perpetrated the attack.[14] Attacks on civilians hors de combat (in rear areas far removed from active combat zones) by representatives of an occupying power constitute a clear violation of multiple international legal norms and very likely rise to the level of a war crime or crime against humanity.

Several Russian commentators exploited the circumstances of the tragedy in Volnovakha to accuse Ukraine of trying to stoke interethnic tensions within the Russian information space. . One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian sources first reported that “Kadyrov’s men” (in reference to Chechen troops) committed the murders and linked the issue to the October 29 riots in Dagestan.[16] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Chechen forces are not deployed anywhere near Volnovakha and accused the Ukrainian information space of trying to use Chechens as a “trigger” to further destabilize Russia.[17] The fixation on the Ukrainian accusation rather than on the atrocity itself, the need to hold the perpetrators accountable, or the unprofessionalism and indiscipline of soldiers committing such crimes suggests that these Russian commentators are very concerned about inter-ethnic tensions in Russia and the Russian armed forces.

Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30. Geolocated footage posted on October 30 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced northeast of Kurdyumivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[18] Additional geolocated footage from October 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces have marginally advanced west of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive actions near Bakhmut and offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.

Russian forces continue to use “Storm-Z” assault units predominantly made up of prisoner recruits in highly attritional infantry-led frontal assaults. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated on October 30 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct “meat assaults” (colloquial jargon for infantry-led frontal assaults) near Avdiivka and are training “Storm-Z” assault units for future assaults without equipment.[21] A Russian milblogger reportedly serving in the Avdiivka direction claimed that “meat assaults” are when Russian infantry forces attack without artillery support to suppress Ukrainian firing positions.[22] The milblogger claimed that when two Russian regiments conduct ”meat assaults” side by side, the seam between the areas of responsibility of both regiments remains unsecured and vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks. Another Russian milblogger claimed that “Storm-Z” assault detachments in the Avdiivka direction and on Bakhmut’s southern flank are often destroyed after a few days of active operations and on average lose between 40-70 percent of their personnel.[23] The milblogger criticized the Russian military’s poor training of “Storm-Z” units and the unwillingness of superior officers to consider the proposals of “Storm-Z” commanders when assigning them combat missions. The milblogger stated that “Storm-Z” units are often introduced into battle before conducting reconnaissance or establishing connections with neighboring units and typically struggle to evacuate their wounded without artillery cover, leading to higher losses. Both milbloggers noted the lack of proper artillery support for Russian attacks and counterattacks.[24] One milblogger stated that these factors contribute to “Storm-Z” units being turned into “trash” before achieving any significant results.[25] ISW has frequently reported on the ineffectiveness of “Storm-Z” units.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted the allegedly cooperative nature of the Russian-Chinese relationship at the 10th Beijing Xiangshan Forum on October 30. Shoigu labeled the Russian-Chinese relationship as a “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction” and stated that Russia and China consider each other “priority partners.”[27] Shoigu claimed that the confidential contacts between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping play a “special role” in maintaining the “traditionally friendly relations” between the two states.[28] Shoigu highlighted Russia’s cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and noted Russia’s desire to increase military and military-technical cooperation with states in the Asian-Pacific region.[29] Despite Shoigu’s characterizations of the Russian-Chinese partnership, the majority of his speech focused not on Russia’s relationship with China, but rather on the alleged threats of the West, NATO, and the war in Ukraine, likely in an attempt to paint a picture of a world hostile to Moscow and Beijing.[30] ISW continues to assess that China has reservations concerning the Kremlin’s desired ”no limits partnership” between the two states.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 29 to 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 30 that Russian forces launched 12 Shahed 131/136 drones, two Kh-59 missiles, and four Iskander missiles against Ukraine and that Ukrainian air defenses downed all the Shahed drones and the Kh-59s.[32] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command stated that Russian Iskander missiles struck port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are beginning to use several new “smart” glide bombs – the FAB-250, FAB-500, and FAB-1500.[34] The milblogger claimed that the new glide bombs have laser and satellite guidance, making the accuracy of their impact radius as small as 5 meters, compared to conventional air bombs with an accurate impact radius of 50 meters. The bombs reportedly have a strike range of 200 kilometers. The milblogger claimed that Russian FAB-250 bombs weigh 250 kilograms, hold an explosive weight of 99 kilograms, have a damage radius of 120 meters, and can destroy manpower, equipment, and light fortifications. Russian FAB-500 bombs reportedly weigh 500 kilograms, hold an explosive weight of 150 kilograms, have a damage radius of 250 meters, and can destroy headquarters, warehouses, and concrete and reinforced concrete objects. Russian FAB-1500 bombs weigh 1550 kilograms, hold an explosive weight of 675 kilograms, have a damage radius of 500 meters, and can destroy underground bunkers up to 20 meters in depth and penetrate up to 3 meters of reinforced concrete. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces can arm Su-34, Su-30, and Su-35 aircraft with the new glide bombs.


Key Takeaways:

Russian officials announced that Russian law enforcement suppressed antisemitic riots in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan on October 30. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to the October 29 antisemitic demonstrations in Dagestan by accusing Ukraine of trying to “instigate pogroms in Russia” under Western guidance.
A minority of Russian officials directly condemned rioters and regional authorities for ignoring antisemitic attitudes in Dagestan.
The October 29 riots in Dagestan highlight the growing radicalization and factionalism of Russian society resulting from the hyper-nationalist ideologies that the war in Ukraine has empowered.
Unidentified Russian soldiers reportedly murdered a Ukrainian family in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast, further highlighting a threatening environment of violence that is pervasive throughout occupied areas of Ukraine. Several Russian commentators exploited the circumstances of the tragedy in Volnovakha to accuse Ukraine of trying to stoke interethnic tensions within the Russian information space.
Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30.
Russian forces continue to use "Storm-Z" assault units predominantly made up of prisoner recruits in highly attritional infantry-led frontal assaults.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted the allegedly cooperative nature of the Russian-Chinese relationship at the 10th Beijing Xiangshan Forum on October 30.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30 and advanced in some areas.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/31/23 02:59 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/31/23 03:06 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 10/31/23 03:17 AM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/02/23 02:20 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 1, 2023
Nov 1, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 1, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 1, 2023, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on November 1 that the war in Ukraine has taken on a positional nature and offered a series of recommendations for Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlespace.[1]
In an essay entitled "Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It" and an interview with The Economist, Zaluzhnyi outlined the current operational environment in Ukraine and noted that, despite several previously successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2022, the war is now "gradually moving to a positional form."[2] Zaluzhnyi heavily stressed that the current positional nature of the war is largely a result of military parity between Ukrainian and Russian forces, noting that a deep and dramatic Ukrainian penetration of Russian lines will likely not be possible with the relative technological and tactical equilibrium currently between Ukrainian and Russian forces.[3] In his interview with The Economist, Zaluzhnyi acknowledged that technological and tactical parity between opposing forces in Ukraine has resulted in a "stalemate" similar to the case of the First World War.[4] In the more extensive essay on the subject, Zaluzhnyi notably refrained from classifying the situation as a full stalemate and instead framed it as a "positional" war resulting from aspects of this technological-tactical parity.[5] According to Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine's ability to overcome this technological-tactical parity will be contingent on Ukraine's ability to secure five main operational components that have become particularly significant since the summer of 2023 — gaining air superiority; breaching Russian mine barriers in depth; increasing the effectiveness of counterbattery combat; creating and training the necessary reserves; and building up electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.

Zaluzhnyi offered a series of specific tactical solutions to the five aforementioned operational components that have created the conditions for positional warfare, which in his view will allow Ukraine to overcome military parity with Russian forces. Regarding the issue of air superiority, Zaluzhnyi argued that Ukrainian forces need to significantly improve drone capabilities to gain air superiority along the frontline.[6] Zaluzhnyi argued that Ukrainian forces need to overload Russian air defenses, neutralize Russian strike drones, and degrade Russian visibility over the front by deploying cheap drones en masse, developing specific drones meant to target Russian strike drones, and employing EW complexes throughout the front.[7] Zaluzhnyi argued that to overcome the challenges of EW use on the frontline, Ukrainian forces need to introduce necessary command and control (C2) processes for EW complexes, increase EW production capabilities, and streamline engagements with volunteer organizations that provide smaller EW complexes to Ukrainian forces.[8] Zaluzhnyi also recommended that Ukrainian forces improve counter-EW measures and develop new drones with EWs in mind.[9] To gain counterbattery superiority, Zaluzhnyi recommended that Ukrainian forces use more reconnaissance and strike drones to improve Ukrainian counterbattery fire and argued that Ukrainian forces need to strengthen GPS support for Ukrainian counterbattery units and increase the number of counterbattery assets.[10] Zaluzhnyi stated that improved sensors, more widespread and varied mine clearing capabilities, and anti-drone equipment will allow Ukrainian forces to more successfully breach Russian mine barriers in depth while under concealment.

Zaluzhnyi also highlighted wider administrative adaptations and domestic developments in addition to his specific tactical battlefield solutions. Zaluzhnyi specifically called on Ukraine to introduce a Unified State Register for draftees, reservists, and those liable for military service to prepare a necessary reserve for Ukrainian forces.[12] Zaluzhnyi more broadly called on Ukrainian officials to incentivize Ukrainian citizens to join the military reserve and expand the number of citizens that Ukrainian forces are allowed to train.[13] Zaluzhnyi also noted that improving Ukrainian C2 and logistics support will be critical to improving operations writ large.[14] Zaluzhnyi stated that the formation of a "single information environment" for C2 through the use of modern information technology will allow Ukrainians to get ahead of Russian forces in terms of situational awareness.[15] Zaluzhnyi particularly highlighted the need for Ukraine to develop its own defense industry to sustain operations, long-range strike capabilities, and an asymmetric munitions arsenal to break out of military parity with Russian forces.

Russian forces are likely preparing for another wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka area. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces near Avdiivka have largely slowed the pace of ground attacks north and south of Avdiivka in favor of heavy indirect fire against Ukrainian frontline positions and near rear areas. Russian forces may be conducting an interdiction campaign against Ukrainian assets in the Avdiivka area, but this heavy fire is more likely air and artillery preparation for the battlefield ahead of another wave of Russian assaults.[17] Other milbloggers also characterized the current Russian operations as “preparatory support,” presumably for later assaults.[18] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun also notably stated on October 30 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct “meat assaults” (colloquial jargon for infantry-led frontal assaults) near Avdiivka and are training “Storm-Z” assault units made largely of convict recruits for future assaults without equipment.

Russian forces may be preparing to transition to such infantry-led frontal assaults following heavy artillery preparation to compensate for heavy materiel losses in Avdiivka over the course of October. Open-source geolocation project GeoConfirmed used commercially available satellite imagery to verify that Russian forces have suffered at least 197 damaged and destroyed vehicles since October 9, losing 99 vehicles during the first wave of assaults between October 9 and 13, 94 vehicles during the second wave between October 14 and 23, and four confirmed and 18 potentially lost vehicles between October 24 and31.[20] GeoConfirmed characterized the Russian effort near Avdiivka as the costliest Russian effort thus far in the war in Ukraine.

The current situation near Avdiivka is a microcosm of the Russian General Staff’s wider failure to internalize and disseminate lessons learned by Russian forces during previous failed offensive efforts in Ukraine to other force groupings throughout the theater. Various Russian elements have engaged in similarly catastrophic mechanized attacks with infantry-led frontal assaults on fortified Ukrainian positions along several different axes over the course of 2022 and 2023, suggesting that the ultimate fault in the lack of strategic adaptation lies with the General Staff. Russian forces previously suffered significant personnel and materiel losses during an unsuccessful offensive against Vuhledar, western Donetsk Oblast in winter 2022-2023, which was characterized by multiple waves of mechanized attacks against fortified Ukrainian positions.[22] These infantry-heavy assaults completely destroyed the Russian units involved in them, including the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), which reportedly had to reconstitute several times due to losses suffered near Vuhledar.[23] By contrast, elements of the 1st Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Army Corps, operating under the command of the Southern Military District's 8th Combined Arms Army, and elements of the Central Military District's 41st Combined Arms Army, have recently conducted analogous costly mechanized assaults near Avdiivka.[24] The fact that two very distinct groupings of forces have engaged in similarly ineffective operations suggests that the Russian military command is struggling to learn and disseminate lessons across the theater or, in the case, even within the same military district.[25] The Russian General Staff is in principle responsible for learning lessons, adapting Russian doctrine, and disseminating lessons and new approaches throughout the force. Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov is ultimately responsible for this failure both in his capacity of chief of the Russian General Staff and as overall theater commander. The contrast between Gerasimov’s failure in this regard and General Zaluzhnyi’s thoughtful and public evaluation of the challenges facing Ukraine and the solutions to them is notable.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[26] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Zelenopillya (12km southwest of Bakhmut) and along a section of the railway line between Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced from Shcherbaky (18km west of Orikhiv) towards Myrne (16km southwest of Orikhiv) and made gains west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s framing of ongoing Ukrainian ground activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as part of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Shoigu stated during a conference call on November 1 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kherson directions, grouping Ukrainian activity in the Kherson direction with directions recognized as currently part of ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts.[29] Putin described Ukrainian activity in Kherson Oblast as the “next [Ukrainian] counteroffensive” and dismissed all Ukrainian offensive operations as failures during a press conference in Beijing on October 18.

Russian forces conducted a relatively large series of drone and missile strikes mainly targeting Poltava Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 1 that Russian forces launched three Kh-59 missiles and 20 Shahed 131/136 drones and noted that Ukrainian air defenses downed all three of the Kh-59 missiles and 18 Shahed drones.[31] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck an oil refinery in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[32] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also struck the Myrhorod airfield in Poltava Oblast.[33] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces are targeting “weak points” in Ukrainian air defenses.[34] Ihnat added that Russian forces are looking at several different courses of action to replenish weapons stocks for continued strikes this fall and winter.

The Russian military appears poised to re-establish its military districts as the primary joint headquarters for its ground forces while transferring naval assets back to the command of the Russian Navy. Russian state media outlet TASS reported on November 1 that sources close to the Russian military leadership stated that the Russian Northern, Pacific, Black Sea, and Baltic fleets and Caspian Flotilla will return to direct subordination under Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Nikolai Evmenov on December 1.[35] The Russian Northern Fleet (NF) will also lose its status as a separate military-administrative unit equal to a military district effective December 1, and its ground, aviation, and air defense forces will be transferred to the newly re-created Leningrad Military District. TASS noted that this information has not been officially confirmed. The Russian federal portal of draft regulator legal acts published a presidential decree on October 8, prepared by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which proposed stripping the NF of its status as a joint "strategic territorial association,” signaling that this change would happen in the future but not specifying a date. [36] It remains unclear how Russia intends to mobilize, train, and organize forces previously under its fleets into new military district-level formations, but this restructuring writ large suggests that Russia intends to reconsolidate control of ground forces under the military district structure, including the newly re-created Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, while separating the naval assets under the Russian Navy.

Russian sources speculated that Pavel Prigozhin, the son of deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, is officially the acting head of Wagner remnants operating under the auspices of Rosgvardia. Russian regional news outlets reported on November 1 that the Wagner Group has resumed recruiting in Perm and Novosibirsk oblasts under Pavel’s leadership.[37] Russian outlet Ngs.ru reported that a Wagner representative in Novosibirsk stated that Wagner is no longer recruiting criminals or people with illnesses.[38] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Pavel is the new leader of the remnants of Wagner and expressed hope that Pavel’s appointment is an indication that Wagner will survive its subordination to Rosgvardia.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on November 1 that the war in Ukraine has taken on a positional nature and offered a series of recommendations for Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlespace. Zaluzhnyi offered a series of specific tactical solutions to the five aforementioned operational components that have created the conditions for positional warfare, which in his view will allow Ukraine to overcome military parity with Russian forces.
Russian forces are likely preparing for another wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka area.
The current situation near Avdiivka is a microcosm of the Russian General Staff’s wider failure to internalize and disseminate lessons learned by Russian forces during previous failed offensive efforts in Ukraine to other force groupings throughout the theater.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 1.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s framing of ongoing Ukrainian ground activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as part of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Russian forces conducted a relatively large series of drone and missile strikes mainly targeting Poltava Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1.
The Russian military appears poised to re-establish its military districts as the primary joint headquarters for its ground forces while transferring naval assets back to the command of the Russian Navy.
Russian sources speculated that Pavel Prigozhin, the son of deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, is officially the acting head of Wagner remnants operating under the auspices of Rosgvardia.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut direction, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in various sectors of the front.

https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...ve-campaign-assessment-november-1-2023-0
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/03/23 02:35 AM

Ukraine War Risks Stalemate, Armed Forces Chief Says
In sobering assessment, Valeriy Zaluzhniy says Ukraine is unlikely to achieve major breakthrough without upgrade to military capabilities

The commander of Ukraine’s armed forces says the war with Russia is at risk of becoming a stalemate and Kyiv would need a major upgrade in weapons and technological capabilities to regain the initiative.

In an interview and essay for the Economist, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhniy, Ukraine’s top military commander, said the war was entering a new phase of “static and attritional fighting, as in the First World War.”
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/04/23 02:53 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 3, 2023
Nov 3, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 3, 2023

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 3, 2023, 6:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on November 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a notably larger series of drone strikes throughout Ukraine on November 3
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four dozen Shahed-131/-136 drones from Kursk Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and a Kh-59 cruise missile from occupied Kherson Oblast at targets in Ukraine.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down the Kh-59 cruise missile and 24 of the Shahed drones.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces intercepted over half of the roughly 40 drones that Russian forces launched at Ukraine.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck targets in Kharkiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Odesa oblasts, and Zelensky stated that Ukrainian air defenses activated in Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, and Lviv oblasts.[4] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces primarily struck civil infrastructure, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast Military Administration Head Svitlana Onyshchuk stated that Russian forces struck an unspecified military facility in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast.[5] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched small groups of Shaheds to identify the locations of Ukrainian air defenses and then launched several waves of drones to complicate the Ukrainian response.[6] Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, stated that Russian forces plan to launch more damaging strikes throughout Ukraine as winter approaches.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on November 3, primarily aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s air defenses. The US DoD announced an aid package of military materiel support for Ukraine valued at $125 million, including munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and HIMARS; 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds; Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) anti-tank missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; and over three million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades.[8] The US DoD will also allocate $300 million to the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses over the long term. The US DoD will provide Ukraine laser-guided munitions to counter UAVs under USAI.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled eight Ukrainian assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast and several Ukrainian attacks near Bakhmut from October 28 to November 3.

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the Russian military command for failing to establish long-term training capabilities because it is keeping skilled commanders and soldiers at the front and leaving inexperienced careerists to train new recruits and officers. One Russian milblogger claimed that Russia continues to only learn from its mistakes at the cost of significant losses and that the Russian military command fails to teach effective tactics employed by competent commanders and servicemen to new personnel.[11] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command commits the most capable commanders and servicemen to the most dangerous frontlines in Ukraine instead of using them to train the incoming class of Russian soldiers. The milblogger added that Russia needs to resolve this problem on a systemic level, otherwise newly formed units will repeat prior Russian mistakes on the frontline. Another Russian milblogger responded to the milblogger’s critiques, noting that Russia needs to have experienced servicemen teach graduating classes at Russian military schools since graduates only study theory and do not receive any practice in modern warfare.[12] The milblogger implied that there are problems with Russian military theory and a lack of proper officer training because generals and officers who receive teaching positions do not have combat experience and only care about their own career growth. The milblogger concluded that the poor command of Russian operations in the Avdiivka direction and near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) indicates that Russian generals do not think about the wellbeing of the Russian Armed Forces in the long-term.

Alleged long-time allies of Russian President Vladimir Putin are reportedly financing two Russian Ministry of Defense–subordinated private military companies that have subsumed former Wagner Group operations in Africa. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on November 3 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), including Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and members of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), is continuing efforts to subsume Wagner Group activities in Africa under the MoD-subordinated Redut and Convoy private military companies (PMCs).[13] WSJ reported that Arkady Rotenberg and Gennady Timchenko, two Russian billionaires who have known Putin for decades and are in Putin’s inner circle, are financing Convoy and Redut, respectively. This decision is likely an attempt to prevent a single PMC and single financier from again gaining the power and influence to potentially threaten Putin and the Russian central leadership. ISW has previously assessed that Putin routinely appoints people to positions such that no one figure amasses too much political influence.[14] WSJ also reported that Konstantin Pikalov leads Convoy PMC and that Konstantin Mirzayants leads Redut PMC. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartopolov stated on November 3 that Wagner has “completely disbanded” and that some Wagner fighters continue to operate in Africa but under a “different brand” under the Russian MoD.

Wagner elements in Syria will reportedly transfer Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense systems that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has agreed to provide to Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah. (NOTE: This text also appeared in the Critical Threats Project’s (CTP) November 3 Iran Update) CNN reported on November 3 that two people familiar with US intelligence stated that Assad agreed to provide the Russian air defense systems to Hezbollah and tasked Wagner with their delivery during joint conversations between the three actors.[16] WSJ reported on November 2 that US intelligence indicated that Wagner itself would give the Russian air defense systems to Hezbollah.[17] Israel frequently conducts airstrikes on Iranian weapons shipments into and through Syria, and Assad may have asked Wagner to deliver the air defense systems to Hezbollah to act as a deterrent to potential Israeli interdiction efforts.[18] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Russia may be able to facilitate weapons shipments in Syria without risking Israeli airstrikes, and the Kremlin may believe that this Israeli reluctance will extend to Wagner.[19] Russia and Israel have a complex relationship in Syria, as Israel has historically relied on Russia to curb Iranian activities in Syria.

Dagestani officials claimed they would punish those who participate in and organize alleged future demonstrations, in contrast to calls for leniency for those participating in the October 29 antisemitic riots. The office of the Mayor of Makhachkala called on local residents to refrain from participating in unauthorized rallies, including one allegedly planned for November 5, and preemptively threatened that participants and "those who provoke the population” will face “serious consequences.”[21] Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Telegram channels continue to call on Dagestani residents to attend a November 5 demonstration to demand the release of those detained for the October 29 antisemitic riots.[22] A Russian milblogger continued to criticize the weak official response to the recent riots, stating that “to have mercy means to show weakness.”

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s continued appeals to Chechen nationalists likely aim to solidify domestic support without disrupting his appearance as a steadfast supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Kadyrov announced on November 3 that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree assigning original Chechen names to eight Chechen villages that suffered from Stalin-era deportations and that Soviet authorities disbanded.[24] Russian officials have increasingly suppressed acknowledgements of Stalinist deportations, yet the Kremlin’s support for reversing Stalin’s 1944 order disbanding these Chechen villages suggests that Kadyrov is coordinating his rhetorical appeals with the Kremlin.[25] This likely rhetorical overture follows similar allusions to Chechen national history from Kadyrov, who recently named two new Chechen volunteer battalions after 18th and 19th Century Chechen fighters who resisted Russian imperial rule.[26] These allusions to Chechen national history are a low stakes approach to currying favor with Chechen nationalists who may have negative attitudes towards the Kremlin and Kadyrov’s avowed support of Putin. Kadyrov’s rhetorical support for historical Chechen nationalism diverts conversations away from his current support of the increasingly ultranationalist Kremlin, while only drawing temporary ire from select Russian ultranationalists.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces conducted a notably larger series of drone strikes throughout Ukraine on November 3.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on November 3, primarily aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s air defenses.
Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the Russian military command for failing to establish long-term training capabilities because it is keeping skilled commanders and soldiers at the front and leaving inexperienced careerists to train new recruits and officers.
Alleged long-time allies of Russian President Vladimir Putin are reportedly financing two Russian Ministry of Defense–subordinated private military companies that have subsumed former Wagner Group operations in Africa.
Wagner elements in Syria will reportedly transfer Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense systems that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has agreed to provide to Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah.
Dagestani officials claimed they would punish those who participate in and organize alleged future demonstrations, in contrast to calls for leniency for those participating in the October 29 antisemitic riots.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s continued appeals to Chechen nationalists likely aim to solidify domestic support without disrupting his appearance as a steadfast supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, near Vuhledar, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers began advertising recruitment into an “elite regiment” in Moscow Oblast and offering recruits one-million-ruble (about $10,900) salaries.
Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continued attempts to discredit information about Russia’s deportation of Ukrainian children.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/06/23 03:35 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 5, 2023
Nov 5, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 5, 2023

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 5, 2023, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted a successful strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4, likely damaging a naval vessel.
The Ukrainian Amed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated that Ukrainian forces conducted successful strikes on Russian marine and port infrastructure at the Zalyv Shipyard in Kerch on the evening of November 4.[1] Satellite imagery from November 4 shows that the strike damaged a Project 22800 Karakurt-class Kalibr missile carrier corvette at the shipyard, although the extent of the damage to the ship is currently unclear.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 13 of 15 Ukrainian missiles targeting the shipyard and acknowledged that two missiles damaged an unspecified ship.[3] Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian cruise missiles damaged the Askold missile carrier, a Karakurt-class corvette that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) launched in 2021.[4] The Zalyv shipyard reportedly planned to construct 14 warships intended for the BSF between 2016 and 2021, including eight Project 22800 Karakurt-class corvettes.[5] ISW has only confirmed that three Project 228000 Karakurt-class corvettes have launched from the Zalyv shipyard as of 2023, however.[6] The Zalyv shipyard is the largest shipyard in Eastern Europe and is likely the main repair facility for the BSF in Crimea following a successful Ukraine strike on the Russian state-owned ship repair facility Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol on September 13, 2023.[7] The extent of damage to the repair facilities at the Zalyv Shipyard is unclear, although the available satellite imagery suggests that the Ukrainian strike has likely not caused damage that will disrupt its operations in the medium-to-long term, unlike the previous strike on the Sevmorzavod facility.[8] Radio Free Europe/Free Liberty (RFE/RL) has reported that Russian forces have three active shipyards, including the Zalyv facility, in occupied Crimea.[9] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have conducted an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily BSF assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military's ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces reportedly intensified strikes on rear Russian areas in southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea on November 5. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Skadovsk, occupied Kherson Oblast on the night of November 4-5.[11] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also disabled Ukrainian drones targeting a railway at an oil refinery in Dzhankoi, occupied Crimea on November 5.[12] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a Storm Shadow missile strike on Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast on November 5.[13] Ukrainian Berdyansk City Military Administration Head Viktoria Halitsyna stated that locals reported two explosions in the city but that the Ukrainian General Staff was clarifying information.[14] Ukrainian Chief of the Main Directorate of the Missile Troops and Artillery and Unmanned Systems Brigadier General Serhiy Baranov notably stated in an interview with the Independent published on November 4 that Ukrainian forces intend to “capitalize” on their learned experiences and conduct large-scale drone strikes on Russian targets when fighting slows in the winter.[15] The Independent reported that Baranov stated that Ukraine intends to build on its “significant successes” with recent drone strikes that targeted critical Russian military assets and naval sites.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave an interview to NBC and repeated that the war is not in a stalemate. Zelensky emphasized that the situation on the battlefield remains very challenging but noted that he does not believe that the war is at a "stalemate." He described it instead as a "check on the part of the Russian army," suggesting that Ukraine can resume making significant advances when it resolves the military parity with Russian forces described by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.[17] Zelensky noted that Ukraine continues to destroy Russian Black Sea Fleet assets and continued to reiterate Ukraine’s urgent need to receive air defense systems from Western partners. Zelensky further noted that Ukraine will not negotiate with Russia until or unless Russia entirely withdraws from Ukrainian territories, concluding that Ukraine is not ready to concede its freedom to the "f###ing terrorist Putin."[18] ISW continues to assess that external pressure to force Ukraine to negotiate with Russia is harmful and counterproductive as long as Putin maintains his maximalist objectives and believes that he can attain them on the battlefield.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and made confirmed gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut and in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[20] Geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces have made limited advances west of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast), as well as on the east bank of Kherson Oblast near Pidstepne (12km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and in Krynky (30km east of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).

Chechen officials announced that Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appointed his 15-year-old-son Adam to a prominent position in a Chechen security service, though there is confusion over Adam Kadyrov’s exact position. Chechen Duma Chairperson Magomed Daudov, Chechen Republic Press Head Akhmed Dudaev, and Russian State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov stated that Adam holds an unspecified “important position” in the security service of the Head of the Chechen Republic.[22] Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs special regiment commander Zamid Chalaev and Health Minister Adam Alkhanov claimed that Adam Kadyrov was appointed as the head of this security service.[23] Ramzan Kadyrov has not yet commented on his son’s appointment. Ramzan Kadyrov notably headed the security service of his father, former Chechen Republic President Akhmat Kadyrov, in the early 2000s until Akhmat Kadyrov’s death in 2004.[24] Adam Kadyrov will turn 16-years-old on November 24, 2023.

Courts in the Republic of Dagestan reportedly charged participants in the antisemitic riots on October 29 with minor crimes and issued limited punishments. Russian authorities reportedly charged many of the antisemitic riot participants with using obscene language, disobedience of police orders, petty hooliganism, and violations of procedures for holding a rally.[26] Dagestani courts sentenced rioters to six to 10 days of administrative arrest or compulsory labor. ISW previously assessed that the Russian leadership is likely avoiding wider punishments for antisemitism in the North Caucasus out of concerns that they will inflame discontent towards the Kremlin.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted a successful strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4, likely damaging a naval vessel. Ukrainian forces reportedly intensified strikes on rear Russian areas in southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea on November 5.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave an interview to NBC and repeated that the war is not in a stalemate.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and made confirmed gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 5.
Chechen officials announced that Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appointed his 15-year-old-son Adam to a prominent position in a Chechen security service, though there is confusion over Adam Kadyrov’s exact position.
Courts in the Republic of Dagestan reportedly charged participants in the antisemitic riots on October 29 with minor crimes and issued limited punishments.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
A Russian milblogger called on Russian “propagandists” to increase the use of Russian propaganda against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russia in an effort to increase the number of “volunteers” in the Russian military.
Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continued to promote the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of vacations.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/08/23 02:07 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 7, 2023
Nov 7, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 7, 2023

Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 7, 2023, 5:40pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces transferred a limited number of armored vehicles to the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are continuing larger-than-usual ground operations on the east bank with a light infantry grouping of roughly battalion size.
Russian milbloggers amplified a picture on November 6 purporting to show a Ukrainian tracked amphibious transport (PTS) vehicle carrying an infantry fighting vehicle onto the east bank near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[1] Other milbloggers claimed on November 7 that a Ukrainian amphibious infantry fighting vehicle crossed the Dnipro River on its own near Krynky and amplified separate footage on November 7 purporting to show a destroyed Western amphibious armored personnel carrier in an unspecified location on the east bank.[2] Select Russian milbloggers claimed that either one or two Ukrainian PTS vehicles crossed the Dnipro near Krynky, while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces transferred several unspecified armored vehicles to the area.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that more than 300 Ukrainian personnel (about a battalion’s worth) are operating on the east bank in the Krynky area and continue to claim that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in central Krynky and nearby areas.[4] One milblogger claimed that several hundred Ukrainian personnel are operating throughout east bank Kherson Oblast.[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that combat engagements continued near Krynky, as well as near Poyma (12km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), Pishchanivka (13km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), and Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), but did not claim that Ukrainian attempts to advance on November 6 and 7 were particularly larger than in previous days.[6]

Ukrainian forces likely conducted initial company-sized assaults across the Dnipro River onto the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17 and 18.[7] The reported battalion-size Ukrainian force grouping on the east bank suggests that heavy Russian interdiction efforts along the Dnipro River have not prevented Ukrainian forces from transferring additional personnel and materiel to positions on the east bank. ISW will not speculate on the prospects of ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 6 that Ukrainian forces crossed the railway near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[9] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are entrenched in forest areas near Verbove (9km east of Robotyne) and that a lack of Russian control of the airspace in the area is complicating Russian artillery fire on these positions.

A prominent pro-war Russian milblogger who is typically optimistic about Russian capabilities expressed a relatively pessimistic assessment of the war and emphasized the need for the Kremlin to fully mobilize the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to a wartime footing to win. The milblogger claimed on November 7 that Ukraine is committed to an “exhausting war” against Russia and that Russian needs “enormous combat potential” and an “accurate calculation” of its capabilities to beat Ukraine.[11] Another Russian milblogger expressed surprise that a milblogger who was previously so positive in his assessments of the Russian offensive campaign in Ukraine would openly admit to the need for a wider mobilization of the Russian economy in the face of a long war.[12] The Kremlin has largely appeared unwilling to conduct wider economic mobilization, and the milblogger's call to change this line is noteworthy.[13] Yet another Russian milblogger claimed that Russia is ”paying terribly” for the Kremlin’s unwillingness to fully commit to the war.[14] The milbloggers’ suggestion to further mobilize the Russian economy appears to be part of recent discussions in the Russian information space about operational changes that could help Russian forces overcome challenges in Ukraine, likely in response to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s recent essay on the subject of “positional warfare.”[15] Zaluzhnyi’s essay appears to have prompted even the most positive Russian milbloggers to make more straight and honest assessments about the Russian war effort.

Russian authorities detained Republic of Dagestan's deputy Minister of Internal Affairs on the pretext of corruption charges, likely in an effort to demonstrate that the federal government is taking action in Dagestan without drawing further attention to the interethnic and interreligious tensions and the propensity for destabilization in the region. Russian state media outlet TASS stated on November 7 that Russian security forces detained Dagestani Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Rufat Ismailov and are currently conducting searches of his home and office.[16] Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti further reported that a source within the Russian security forces stated that Ismailov is preliminarily suspected of bribery.[17] A Russian insider source claimed that Ismailov is believed to have received a 100-million-ruble (about $1,085,770) bribe from an insurance company.[18] The insider source and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities transferred Ismailov to Moscow, and the milblogger claimed that this indicates that there are risks of high-level officials at the federal subject level “escaping responsibility.”[19] Russian opposition media outlet SOTA reported that Russian authorities, including the Federal Security Service (FSB), are also investigating the deputy head of the investigative department of the Dagestani Ministry of Internal Affairs, Dalgat Abdulgapurov.[20] Russian authorities previously removed multiple ineffective air defense officials in charge of the defense of Moscow on the pretext of corruption charges after increasing drone strikes on rear Russian cities, showing that there is a recent pattern of Russian authorities using corruption charges to circumvent publicly disciplining Russian officials for not performing their duties well and thereby admitting to their ineptitude.[21] Although ISW has no reason to doubt the charges against Ismailov his detention suggests that Russian authorities are attempting to create a semblance of federal government control over the situation in Dagestan while avoiding highlighting the recent antisemitic riots. ISW similarly assessed that the Russian leadership likely avoided meting out more severe punishments for more serious charges for participants of the antisemitic riots out of concerns that they will inflame discontent towards the Kremlin.

The Ukrainian strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4 significantly damaged a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) naval vessel. occupied Crimea on November 4 significantly damaged a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) naval vessel. Russian and Ukrainian sources posted photos on November 7 showing significant damage to the Askold Project 22800 Karakurt-class Kalibr missile carrier corvette that will likely render it inoperable for the foreseeable future.[23] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have conducted an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily BSF assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military's ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces transferred a limited number of armored vehicles to the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are continuing larger-than-usual ground operations on the east bank with a light infantry grouping of roughly battalion size.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 7.
A prominent pro-war Russian milblogger who is typically optimistic about Russian capabilities expressed a relatively pessimistic assessment of the war and emphasized the need for the Kremlin to fully mobilize the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to a wartime footing to win.
Russian authorities detained Republic of Dagestan's deputy Minister of Internal Affairs on the pretext of corruption charges, likely in an effort to demonstrate that the federal government is taking action in Dagestan without drawing further attention to the interethnic and interreligious tensions and the propensity for destabilization in the region.
The Ukrainian strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4 significantly damaged a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) naval vessel.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas.
A Russian battalion comprised of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) will likely deploy to Ukraine in the near future in an apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.
Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova advertised several benefit schemes targeting children in occupied Ukraine as part of the "A Country for Children" strategic program.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/08/23 08:34 PM



Yeah, we did it: Ukraine admits car-bomb killing of pro-Russia politician
Kyiv assassinates longtime collaborator.

Mikhail Filiponenko, a pro-Russian lawmaker and ex-militiaman in occupied eastern Ukraine, walked over to a car outside his house on Wednesday morning … and was promptly blown to smithereens, Russian media reported.

Ukraine’s Military Intelligence immediately claimed responsibility for the assassination.

“Yeah, it was our operation,” Andriy Cherniak, representative of Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate, also known as GUR, told POLITICO in a phone conversation about the car bomb attack.


Military intelligence worked together with local Ukrainian partisans to prepare to assassinate Filiponenko, GUR said in a statement.

Filiponenko was born in Luhansk and studied in Kyiv. However, in 2014 he joined Russian-backed mercenaries who seized power and helped President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin to establish its rule over the occupied territories of Luhansk and Donetsk, in eastern Ukraine.

“He was involved in the organization of torture camps in the occupied territories of the Luhansk region, where prisoners of war and civilian hostages were subjected to inhumane torture. Filiponenko himself personally brutally tortured people,” Ukraine’s military intelligence said.

GUR revealed the exact address where Filiponenko lived in Luhansk and added that Ukraine’s spies knew where other high-profile collaborators were living in the occupied territories.

“All war criminals will be punished,” GUR said.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/10/23 03:47 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 9, 2023
Nov 9, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9, 2023

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Amin Soltani, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 9, 2023, 6:55pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat effective reinforcements to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine.
Russian milbloggers claimed on November 9 that Ukrainian forces established control over new positions in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) and conducted assaults towards Russian positions south and southwest of the settlement.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are reports that Ukrainian forces advanced to forest areas south of Krynky.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Poyma (12km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), Pishchanivka (13km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), and Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and are trying to establish positions between Pidstepne and Kozachi Laheri (23km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[3] Ukrainian military observer Konstyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces have established continuous control of positions from the Antonivsky railway bridge north of Poyma to the Antonivsky roadway bridge north of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson and 4km from the Dnipro River) as of November 9 and have cut the Oleshky-Nova Kakhovka (53km northeast of Kherson City) road in at least two areas.[4]

Elements of the Russian 18th Combined Arms Army’s (CAA) 22nd Army Corps (formerly of the Black Sea Fleet) and 70th Motorized Rifle Division as well as the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) appear to be the main Russian forces responding to Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[5] The Russian military reportedly formed the 18th CAA from other units previously operating in the Kherson direction, and it is unlikely that new units of the 18th CAA are comprised of fresh forces or staffed to doctrinal end strength.[6] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment previously defended positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast for almost the entirety of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and have likely suffered significant casualties.[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on November 5 that unspecified elements of the 7th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division are operating in the Kherson direction, although the bulk of the 7th VDV Division appears to be committed to defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] Mashovets claimed on November 2 and 9 that elements of the 7th VDV Division's 171st Air Assault Battalion (97th VDV Regiment) are operating near Pishchanivka and Poyma, but it is unclear if these reported elements have been present in the Kherson direction since the start of the counteroffensive or recently redeployed to the area.[9] Elements of the 49th CAA (Southern Military District) have reportedly been operating in the Kherson direction since the Ukrainian liberation of Kherson City in November 2022, but some Russian and Ukrainian sources claim that the Russian command has since redeployed elements of at least one its brigades to the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area.[10] Mashovets claimed that elements of the 49th CAA still comprise the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces in the Kherson direction, and elements of the 49th CAA’s 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade appeared to be operating on the left bank as of late August 2023.[11]

The Russian command will likely face significant challenges in redeploying units from other sectors of the front should relatively combat ineffective Russian formations and currently uncommitted Russian forces in the Kherson direction prove insufficient to respond to the Ukrainian operations on the east bank of the Dnipro. Redeployments of considerable elements of the 7th VDV Division or other VDV formations and units in western Zaporizhia Oblast would likely disrupt Russian defensive operations there. Russian forces reportedly continue to accumulate forces for sustaining the Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka and localized offensive operations in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts.[12] Any potential Russian redeployment to the Kherson direction will likely degrade the Russian ability to sustain these other operations and efforts.

Russian forces have likely launched opportunistic localized offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and intensified ground attacks near Bakhmut in recent days. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted nearly 30 attacks northwest and southwest of Bakhmut between November 8 and November 9, which is notably a higher number of attacks than the Ukrainian General Staff typically reports for the Bakhmut area.[13] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces entered Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and pushed Ukrainian troops back from the railway that runs northeast and east of the settlement.[14] Geolocated footage published on November 9 indicates that Russian forces have advanced towards Klishchiivka and hold positions just east of the settlement and west of the railway line.[15] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also drove Ukrainian forces out of positions in and around Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed visual evidence to substantiate these claims.[16] Several Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Bakhmut in the Berkhivka-Bohdanivka direction (directly northwest of Bakhmut to 5km northwest of Bakhmut) south of the Berkhivka Reservoir towards the Vilyanova plant nursery.[17] Geolocated footage from around November 7 shows that Russian forces have advanced south of the Berkhivka Reservoir, about 3km northwest of Bakhmut.[18]

These localized offensive operations northwest and southwest of Bakhmut are likely opportunistic tactical ground attacks intended to take advantage of the reported reallocation of Ukrainian resources away from Bakhmut. Several milbloggers noted that the pace of Ukrainian artillery fire and ground activity in the Bakhmut direction has decreased in recent days, with some Russian sources remarking that this is partially because Ukrainian forces have redeployed to other areas of the front.[19] Russian forces are likely taking advantage of a decrease in Ukrainian activity on this sector of the front to launch localized and successful attacks. Russian forces are unlikely to be able to translate offensive efforts near Bakhmut into wider and more meaningful offensive operations, as the Russian force grouping around Bakhmut is weak and disorganized because Russian forces have been committing more manpower and materiel to deliberate and larger-scale offensive operations near Avdiivka and on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border.

Russian forces struck a civilian ship near Odesa City on November 8. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that a Russian Kh-31P missile struck a civilian ship flying the flag of Liberia in a port near Odesa City, Odesa Oblast, injuring several people and killing the ship’s pilot.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 8 and 9 in an attempt to justify the strike that the ship was carrying military cargo.[21] Russia has continually pursued efforts to disrupt Ukrainian exports and curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports and will likely continue escalatory posturing in the Black Sea meant to undermine confidence in the Ukrainian corridor.

Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference will occur in tandem on an unspecified date by the end of the year, potentially to set conditions to cancel the events as the Kremlin sees fit.[23] The Kremlin canceled Putin's annual press conference in December 2022, which ISW assessed was likely in order to preempt the informational risks of Putin addressing difficult questions about the war and international situation live.[24] Similarly, in early June of 2023, Putin postponed the "Direct Line" until November or December 2023.[25] The vagueness with which Peskov announced the two live events suggests that the Kremlin may desire to have the flexibility to cancel them if they deem the informational risks of holding them to be too great. The Kremlin may hope for a wider operational victory in Ukraine to frame both the "Direct Line" and the press conference in a positive light and is likely trying to leave itself room to mitigate if Russian forces cannot secure meaningful battlefield success in Ukraine in the coming month.

Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan. Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized during a meeting with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the 19th Russian-Kazakh Regional Cooperation Forum in Ankara that Russia currently transports gas to Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan and seeks to further develop this transport.[26] Russia began exporting natural gas to Uzbekistan for the first time in October 2023, and Uzbekistan notably still exports its own domestically produced natural gas, including to Russia as recently as 2021, despite suffering domestic shortages in recent years.[27] Uzbekistan‘s continued export of gas while importing Russian gas for the first time suggests that Uzbekistan may not be the final destination for all its Russian gas imports. Uzbekistan is capable of providing Iran with direct access to other Central Asian as well as Russian and Chinese markets, as ISW-CTP previously reported.[28] Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi, discussed reviving Iranian-Uzbek economic relations and signed agreements to increase bilateral trade with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Tehran on June 18, 2023.[29] Iran has also increased its economic diplomacy efforts, including on gas supplies, with other countries in Central Asia. Raisi discussed increasing the volume of gas swaps with Turkmenistan during a meeting with Turkmenistan People’s Council Chairman Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in Tehran on May 30.[30] Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji separately announced on May 30 that Iran and Turkmenistan will soon sign an agreement for Iran to import 10 million cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan each day, which will allow Iran to use some of the gas it imports from Turkmenistan to supply electricity and heat to its northern provinces.[31] Iran has consistently struggled with natural gas shortages in winter and summer 2023, and Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to secure further military cooperation with Iran.

Unspecified actors appear to be targeting Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov as he continues to heap honors on his children. Russian insider source claimed that Moscow authorities are investigating and charging members of the inner circle of an unspecified nephew of Kadyrov for various crimes including kidnapping, extortion, and organizing a criminal community in both Moscow and Chechnya.[33] The insider source claimed that two high-ranking Chechen security officials lead this inner circle, and that its other members include Chechen police officers and bureaucratic officials.[34] The source claimed that Russian authorities allowed this circle to commit these crimes for “quite a long time” but that “apparently, something is starting to change.”[35] It is possible that Russian authorities are targeting Chechen organized crime activities. This insider source’s specific reference to Kadyrov, however, suggests either that some Russian authorities may seek to target Kadyrov’s affiliates through criminal charges or that some actors may seek to target Kadyrov informationally by using this insider source to discredit him and his family. Kadyrov has notably awarded his children, many of whom are underage, with prominent Chechen governmental positions and awards in recent weeks following the Kremlin’s refusal to become involved when his 15-year-old son Adam was filmed beating a detained man in September 2023, sparking domestic outrage.


Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat effective reinforcements to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine.
• Russian forces have likely launched opportunistic localized offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and intensified ground attacks near Bakhmut in recent days.
• Russian forces struck a civilian ship near Odesa City on November 8.
• Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference will occur in tandem on an unspecified date by the end of the year, potentially to set conditions to cancel the events as the Kremlin sees fit.
• Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan.
• Unspecified actors appear to be targeting Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov as he continues to heap honors on his children.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka direction, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kupyansk.
• Russian authorities appear to be increasingly reliant on private security companies to protect domestic energy infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian far rear areas.
• Occupation authorities reportedly continued efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/12/23 02:18 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 11, 2023
Nov 11, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 11, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 11, 2023, 6:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on November 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces launched a large-scale missile and drone strike series against Ukraine on the night of November 10 to 11, targeting Kyiv Oblast for the first time in 52 days.
Ukrainian military sources reported on November 11 that Russian forces launched 31 Shahed 131/136 drones, two Kh-59 missiles, one Kh-31 missile, one P-800 Onyx anti-ship missile, and an S-300 missile against various targets in Ukraine, and specifically targeted Kyiv Oblast with either an Iskander-M or an S-400 missile.[1] Ukrainian air defenses downed 19 Shaheds (primarily targeting front line areas), one Kh-59 missile, and used a Patriot air defense system to destroy the ballistic missile targeting Kyiv Oblast.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were targeting an air defense system at the Boryspil Airport near Kyiv City.[3] The Kyiv City Administration stated that it has been 52 days since Russian forces last launched a missile strike against Kyiv Oblast.

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) was reportedly involved in at least one of three strikes on Russian territory on November 10-11. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne Crimea reported that sources in the GUR stated that the GUR orchestrated an explosion of railway tracks in Ryazan Oblast that caused 19 railroad cars of a freight train to derail on the morning of November 11.[5] The GUR source stated that the explosion will complicate Russian military logistics for the near future. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the train was carrying mineral fertilizer.[6] Moscow Railways stated that the situation did not affect passenger and commuter trains and that Russian Railways created a headquarters to coordinate any disruptions caused by the derailment.[7] Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti stated that the derailment was due to an “intervention of unauthorized persons.”[8] The Main Directorate of the Ministry of Emergency Situations for Tambov Oblast also stated that a fire covering 300 square meters broke out in a gunpowder factory near Kotovsk on the night of November 11.[9] Eyewitnesses reportedly heard explosions before the fire ignited.[10] BBC Russia stated that this is the second such incident at this gunpowder factory after a fire there killed five people in June 2023.[11] GUR spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on November 11 that he cannot officially confirm or deny information about events in Russia, such as the explosion at the gunpowder plant near Tambov or the train derailment but that such strikes will continue.[12] Geolocated footage published on November 10 also shows smoke coming from a building in Kolomna, Moscow Oblast.[13] Russian sources claimed that locals heard explosions near the Machine-Building Design Bureau, a Rostec state corporation in Kolomna that specializes in missile systems.[14] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces downed one or more drones over the Machine-Building Design Bureau, and a Russian insider source claimed that a drone crashed into the building.[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two Ukrainian drones over Smolensk and Moscow oblasts on the night of November 10, and a prominent Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted several air targets over Smolensk Oblast and Kolomna, Moscow Oblast in the night.[16] Ukrainian officials have not commented on the Kolomna strike as of the time of this publication. Ukrainian Minister of Energy Herman Halushchenko notably stated in an interview published on November 11 that Ukraine would answer Russian strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the winter with reciprocal strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, including oil and gas infrastructure.

Continued Russian milblogger discussion of widespread Russian infantry-led frontal assaults highlights the challenges Russia will face in using massed infantry assaults to offset the problems contributing to the current positional warfare identified by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi. One milblogger emphasized on November 11 that the Russian practice of conducting tactical assaults intended to storm Ukrainian fortified positions in forest areas of Donbas will not translate into a wider operational breakthrough anywhere on the front.[18] The milblogger noted that there is no way to train enough Russian personnel for the intensive frontal assaults required for significant advances in Ukraine.[19] Another milblogger claimed that the Russian military is about to experience a "real renaissance of infantry combat" because there are fewer tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and armored personnel carriers (APCs) close to the frontline.[20] A critical milblogger responded to the "infantry renaissance" comment and remarked that the comment is a negative reflection of Russian equipment losses and poor frontline coordination that has created a reliance on assault tactics.[21] A Russian Spetsnaz-affiliated Telegram channel additionally complained that the reliance on infantry-led frontal assaults is heavily attriting all Spetsnaz elements that have deployed to Ukraine because the Russian command has reportedly been using Spetsnaz forces for frontal assaults since the beginning of the war.[22] Spetsnaz forces are not meant to conduct such infantry-led assaults like standard Russian motorized rifle infantry, and some Russian sources are clearly frustrated with the ramifications of the misapplication of such Spetsnaz elements.

ISW has previously observed that Russian forces are increasingly relying on such infantry-led frontal assaults, likely to compensate for a lack of adequately trained personnel and due to widespread equipment losses.[23] The Russian General Staff appears to be relying heavily on frontal assaults as the predominant tactic in Ukraine as an important part of the Russian solution to the problems of "military parity" laid out by Zaluzhnyi's essay on the issue of "positional warfare."

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to be increasingly sidelining his eldest son, 18-year-old Akhmat Kadyrov, in favor of his younger son Adam Kadyrov. Ramzan Kadyrov quietly indicated on November 9 that he appointed Akhmat Deputy First Minister of the Chechen Republic for Physical Culture, Sports, and Youth Policy.[25] This appointment follows Akhmat’s 18th birthday on November 8, when Ramzan Kadyrov praised Akhmat for success in his “chosen business“ as head of the Chechen “Movement of the First“ youth movement.[26] Ramzan Kadyrov’s quiet acknowledgment of Akhmat’s new position stands in contrast to the recent praise and appointments of his other children, including his appointment of his younger son, Adam, to the Chechen security service position that Ramzan Kadyrov held prior to succeeding his own father.[27] The reason for Ramzan Kadyrov’s apparent snubbing of his eldest son is unclear. Akhmat Kadyrov notably met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in early March 2023 while rumors about Ramzan Kadyrov’s declining health circulated, fueling speculation that Ramzan Kadyrov, Akhmat, and Putin may have been preparing for Akhmat to succeed his father.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces launched a large-scale missile and drone strike series against Ukraine on the night of November 10 to 11, targeting Kyiv Oblast for the first time in 52 days.
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) was reportedly involved in at least one of three strikes on Russian territory on November 10-11.
Continued Russian milblogger discussion of widespread Russian infantry-led frontal assaults highlights the challenges Russia will face in using massed infantry assaults to offset the problems contributing to the current positional warfare identified by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to be increasingly sidelining his eldest son, 18-year-old Akhmat Kadyrov, in favor of his younger son Adam Kadyrov.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka.
Russian authorities have reportedly launched another large-scale crypto-mobilization wave.
Russian authorities continue efforts to fill out the workforce and artificially alter the demographics of occupied Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/14/23 04:17 AM

RUSSIA’S MILITARY RESTRUCTURING AND EXPANSION HINDERED BY THE UKRAINE WAR
Nov 12, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russia’s Military Restructuring and Expansion Hindered by the Ukraine War

By Karolina Hird

November 12, 2023

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is pursuing three simultaneous and overlapping force generation efforts as it seeks to manage short- to medium-term requirements in Ukraine while also pursuing long-term restructuring to prepare for a potential future large-scale conventional war against NATO.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov have explicitly framed Russia’s announced long-term force restructuring as increasing conventional capabilities against NATO.[1] The Russian MoD is also creating new formations intended as reinforcements for Russia’s war in Ukraine separate from the peacetime Russian force structure, specifically the several new formations reportedly forming entirely in occupied areas of Ukraine and under the command and control of operationalized “groupings of forces” in Ukraine rather than under existing Russian military districts. The MoD appears to be undermining its long-term restructuring effort, however, by rushing some new formations - which were likely intended to form a strategic reserve or be the basis of long-term force restructuring – as rapid reinforcements to Russian forces in Ukraine. The Russian MoD’s use of ongoing force structure changes to rush newly created and understrength formations to Ukraine will likely impede the accomplishment of the parallel objective of restructuring Russian ground forces to orient on conventional warfare with NATO as the main adversary.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu first proposed a series of force structure changes and intended military reforms in December 2022, and Russian President Vladimir Putin approved select changes in January 2023.[2] These changes include re-dividing the Western Military District into the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts; the creation of "self-sufficient groupings of troops" in occupied Ukraine; the formation of a new army corps, three new motorized rifle divisions, and two new air assault divisions; and the reorganization of seven existing separate motorized rifle brigades into motorized rifle divisions.[3] The Russian military is already in the process of implementing these changes at the military district level, is standing up several of these new formations from the army to brigade level, and has already deployed several of these formations to Ukraine.

This special edition will focus on the implications of force structure changes ordered in 2023 (and changes that are reportedly under consideration but have not yet been confirmed to have begun) on Russian operations in Ukraine into 2024. ISW will assess the likely ramifications of the MoD’s mid-to-long-term force restructuring on the Russian military threat to both Ukraine and NATO in a report forthcoming in 2024.

Shoigu first presented the proposed force structure changes at the Russian MoD collegium on December 21, 2022.[4] At the next Russian MoD collegium on January 17, 2023, Shoigu announced Putin’s directive to implement a slightly altered form of the December 2022 proposal for large-scale military reforms between 2023 and 2026.[5] Shoigu and other Russian military officials have discussed further specifics on the force restructuring since the initial January 17 presentation, which are assessed below.

The MoD is in the process of splitting the Western Military District (WMD) and eliminating the Northern Fleet as an independent military district-level command to restore the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts (MMD and LMD), reversing the 2010 formation of the WMD. Shoigu announced the creation of two “new interservice strategic territorial administrations,” the LMD and MMD, on January 17 and reported that both military districts were undergoing recruitment, formation, and staffing as of July 3.[6] The Russian MoD merged the LMD and MMD into the WMD in 2010, with part of the WMD further splitting to form the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command in 2014.[7] The 2010 Military District restructuring was part of wider reforms intended to modernize the Russian armed forces and create a more consolidated command and control (C2) system but has since been decried by Russian military analysts as the “thoughtless reduction of military units” or “completely ill-conceived and voluntaristic,” and particularly ineffective when applied to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[8]

The restoration of the MMD and LMD is likely intended to create the streamlined C2 structures necessary to concentrate on and manage operations in the northwestern and western directions due to the war in Ukraine. The WMD is currently oriented on the northeastern part of the Ukrainian border; Belarus; and the Russian border with NATO through the Baltic states. The WMD’s strategic focus is therefore stretched between supporting Russian operations in Ukraine and posturing against NATO. Finland's recent NATO accession (and Sweden’s likely accession) has exacerbated this challenge. The Russian MoD additionally announced the elimination of the Northern Fleet, which borders Finland and the Arctic, as a formation equal to a military district on October 8 and is in the process of transferring its ground, aviation, and air defense forces to the LMD and its naval assets to the Russian Navy by December 1.[9] If the Russian MoD restores the pre-2010 boundaries of these districts, the LMD will border Finland, Sweden, and the Arctic; and the MMD will border northeastern Ukraine and Poland. The WMD will cease to exist in its current form. This military district restructuring will in theory split the command burden of Russian forces postured against NATO between two full-fledged districts (rather than the WMD and the last-among-equals Northern Fleet headquarters), strengthen Russian power projection capabilities along the Finnish border, and likely enable the MMD to prioritize operations in Ukraine on the Russian-Ukrainian border as well as through Belarus. It is unclear when the recreation of the MMD and LMD will be fully complete, however, and ISW will assess the implications of these district-level changes further in a forthcoming 2024 report.

The Russian MoD is additionally formalizing several ad hoc headquarters and force structures of Russian units operating in Ukraine as part of ongoing force restructuring. Shoigu announced on January 17 that the MoD would create “self-sufficient groups of forces” in occupied areas of Ukraine.[10] This change may in part be intended to further Russia's rhetorical claim to have annexed these occupied territories, as well as to solidify current C2 structures and set conditions for protracted deployments in Ukraine. These ”self-sufficient” troop groupings may be entirely based in and commanded out of occupied Ukraine as opposed to having to route C2 into existing headquarters in Russia. The specifics of this new structure remain unclear, considering that the two groupings of forces already based in occupied Ukraine — the 1st Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Army Corps and 2nd Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Army Corps — are technically already subordinate to the 8th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District (SMD), which is headquartered in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. Shoigu may have been signaling his intent for occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts to stand up their own groupings of forces that will be commanded entirely out of occupied Ukraine.

Shoigu and other senior Russian military officials have discussed further details of force structure changes below the district level since January 2023:

• Shoigu announced on January 17 that Russia will form three new motorized rifle divisions (MRDs) and will reorganize seven existing separate motorized rifle brigades (MRBs) of the current Western, Central, and Eastern military districts and Northern Fleet into MRDs.[11]
• Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander of Russian troops in Ukraine Army General Valery Gerasimov noted on January 24 that three of these MRDs will be formed in combined arms armies (CAAs) operating in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.[12]
• Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff Head Colonel General Yevgeny Burdinsky claimed on June 2 that “it is necessary to provide timely organizational and staffing support for the formation of combined arms and air armies, an army corps, the Azov naval region, 5 divisions and 26 brigades, [and] the creation of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts.”[13] It is unclear if • • • Burdinsky was suggesting that Russia should establish 26 new independent brigades in addition to the conversion of seven existing brigades into divisions and the creation of new corps and combined arms armies, or that the brigades mentioned are units already organic to or existing under newly forming armies and army corps. The Russian military is extremely unlikely to be able to stand up 26 new brigades to their doctrinal end strengths rapidly alongside the other announced changes, so these mentioned brigades are most likely subordinate to existing or new formations.
Burdinsky's statements about the Azov naval district, likely a subordinate naval headquarters similar to the existing Caspian Flotilla, suggests that Russia may seek to alleviate some of the command responsibilities of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), particularly as Russia seeks to base the Azov naval region out of occupied ports in Berdyansk and Mariupol.[14]
• During the January 17 collegium, Shoigu reported that Russia is forming an army corps (AC) in Karelia, on the Finnish border.[15] Head of the Republic of Karelia Artur Parfenchikov confirmed the formation of this AC in July.[16]
• Russian state media outlet TASS reported on November 1 that its internal sources claimed that the Northern, Pacific, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets and Caspian Flotilla are all returning to the direct control of the Russian Navy rather than reporting to military districts.[17] TASS also reported that the ground, aviation, and air defense forces of the Northern Fleet will transfer to the control of the newly-reforming Leningrad Military District.[18] These initial reports indicate that the army corps reporting to Russia’s fleets will transition into combined arms armies under the direct control of Russia's military districts.

Russia’s Airborne Forces (VDV) are additionally undergoing several force structure changes and expansions:

• Shoigu reported that Russia will create two new air assault divisions.[19] VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky confirmed on August 2 that the VDV is converting the existing 31st Air Assault Brigade into the 104th Air Assault Division, making it the fifth VDV Division.[20] Shoigu claimed that the 104th Air Assault Division was completing its formation as of September 26.[21]
• Teplinsky also stated that the VDV will form two new regiments by the end of 2023, likely referring to the currently forming 299th and 119th Parachute Regiments – which will be subordinated to the 98th and 106th Airborne Divisions, respectively, increasing the complements of these divisions from two to three regiments to match the structure of the 76th Air Assault Division.[22]
• Shoigu and Teplinsky both alluded to the formation of a new VDV artillery brigade, which would be the first ever VDV artillery brigade.[23] All existing VDV divisions have a subordinate artillery regiment.[24] Russian and other open sources have suggested that this unit may be the 52nd VDV Artillery Brigade, which has reportedly already deployed to Ukraine.[25]
• Limited Russian sources have additionally speculated about the creation of the second of the two new VDV divisions mentioned by Shoigu — likely the 44th Air Assault Division, which is being formed on the basis of the existing 387th MRR and 111th MRR of the 1st DNR AC.[26] Information about the 44th Air Assault Division is generally of lower confidence than information about the 104th Air Assault Division and remains unconfirmed. The 44th Air Assault Division will be a VDV division in name only and not in function, however, if it is formed out of DNR motorized rifle regiments (the implications of this erosion of the specific designation of units as “airborne” are considered).

New Russian formations that ISW has confirmed to have deployed to Ukraine:

25th Combined Arms Army (25th CAA):
Russian sources and Western open-source analysts noted that the 25th CAA began forming in the Russian Far East in mid-May 2023.[27] The exact composition of the 25th CAA remains unclear. At least two of the 25th CAA's confirmed constituent elements, the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) and 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (MRB), deployed to the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area as of early September and are currently supporting Russian offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[28] Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the Ukrainian General Staff General Oleksii Hromov noted on July 5 that the 25th CAA would have one MRD (confirmed to be the 67th MRD), 2 MRBs (confirmed to be the 164th MRB and one unidentified MRB), and a tank battalion.[29] Some Western analysts have suggested that the 25th CAA will be comprised of the 67th MRD (reportedly comprised of four constituent elements: the 19th Tank Regiment (TR), and 31st, 36th, and 37th MRRs); the 164th MRB; the 11th Tank Brigade; the 73rd Artillery Brigade, and various support elements.[30] ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of the constituent entities of the 25th CAA in combat beyond the 67th MRD and 164th MRB but has no reason to doubt that these other units exist within the 25th CAA's structure. Several Russian sources reported that the 25th CAA will report to the Eastern Military District (EMD), as it largely formed in the Russian Far East.[31] Some sources claim that the 25th CAA is part of the Central Military District (CMD), however.[32] The Russian MoD may have formally transferred the 25th CAA between districts, or these sources may have conflated the Central Grouping of Forces, which commands the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast axis where the 25th CAA is currently committed, with the CMD in discussing the 25th CAA.

• 25th Combined Arms Army [Confirmed, Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast axis] [33]
• 67th Motorized Rifle Division [Confirmed, Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast axis] [34]
• 19th Tank Regiment [Unconfirmed]
• 31st Motorized Rifle Regiment [Unconfirmed]
• 36th Motorized Rifle Regiment [Unconfirmed]
• 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment [Unconfirmed]
• 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade [Confirmed, Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast axis] [35]
• 11th Tank Battalion [Unconfirmed]
• 73rd Artillery Brigade [Unconfirmed]
Various support battalions

18th Combined Arms Army (18th CAA):
Russia has already formed the 18th CAA in occupied Crimea as part of the Southern Military District (SMD) and deployed some of its elements to critical areas of the frontline in southern Ukraine.[36] Russian 58th CAA reserve officer Oleg Marzoev claimed on August 18 that Russia formed the 18th CAA "on the basis" of the 22nd Army Corps (AC) (formally of the Black Sea Fleet), likely meaning that Russian MoD has eliminated the 22nd AC and transferred its assets to the new, army-level headquarters, which will report directly to the SMD rather than to the Black Sea Fleet.[37] Other Russian sources have additionally suggested that the 22nd AC and its constituent elements are now subordinate to the 18th CAA.[38] This change tracks with other reports that the Russian military is currently stripping its four fleets – which are in fact combined arms headquarters commanding land and air assets – of their non-naval assets while returning their naval assets to the direct control of the Russian Navy, as ISW has previously reported.[39] Oleg Marzoev claimed that the 18th CAA is “one of the largest military formations” within the Russian armed forces and noted that elements of the 18th CAA deployed to the Kherson direction in the spring and summer of 2023.[40] Oleg Marzoev also named Lieutenant General Arkady Marzoev (no apparent relation to Oleg Marzoev) as the new commander of the 18th CAA as of August 2023.[41] The UK Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) confirmed the creation of the 18th CAA on August 21, 2023, and reported that the 18th CAA deployed to the Kherson direction to free up other more experienced units, such as VDV forces, to redeploy to the western Zaporizhia Oblast sector to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[42] One Russian milblogger suggested that at least one MRD of the 18th CAA, likely the 70th MRD and its constituent 28th MRR, have been involved in the defense of Kozachi Laheri and other frontline settlements on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[43] These units are likely currently engaged in defending against larger-than-usual Ukrainian operations on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[44]

• 18th Combined Arms Army [Confirmed, Kherson Oblast] [45]
• 70th Motorized Rifle Division [Confirmed, Kherson Oblast] [46]
• 28th Motorized Rifle Regiment [Confirmed, Kherson Oblast] [47]
• 22th Army Corps [Likely newly subordinated to the 18th Combined Arms Army, but still
unconfirmed in formal composition] [48]
• 40th Army Corps [Potentially subordinate to the 18th Combined Arms Army, but still
unconfirmed] [49]
• 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade [Confirmed, southern Ukraine] [50]
• 47th Motorized Rifle Division [Confirmed, southern Ukraine]

40th Army Corps (40th AC):
Russian military officials have confirmed the formation of the 40th Army Corps (AC) under the SMD in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic.[52] A Rostov Oblast media outlet stated on May 12 that volunteers began entering contracts with a motorized rifle battalion of the 144th MRB of the 40th AC, confirming the existence of at least one constituent brigade of the 40th AC.[53] A Russian source also indicated that the 47th MRD is also under formation as part of the 40th AC, and Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov claimed that the 47th MRD deployed to southern Ukraine as early as September 2022.[54] Some Russian reporting on the 40th AC suggests that it is actually subordinate to the 18th CAA (established in Crimea on the basis of the 22nd AC), akin to how the 1st and 2nd Acs are both subordinate to the 8th CAA. Regardless of whether the 40th AC is officially part of the 18th CAA or reports directly to the SMD, it has likely been committed to the same area and is fighting alongside elements of the 18th CAA as part of the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces in Kherson Oblast.

• 40th Army Corps [Potentially subordinate to the 18th Combined Arms Army, but still unconfirmed]
[55]
• 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade [Confirmed] [56]
• 47th Motorized Rifle Division [Confirmed, southern Ukraine] [57]

3rd Army Corps (3rd AC):

The 3rd AC formed in late summer 2022 out of volunteer units but has undergone significant changes over the course of 2023, and the MoD appears to be formalizing it as a permanent unit, rather than a headquarters to command ad hoc volunteer battalions. Russian sources claimed that while the 3rd AC initially formed as part of the WMD in August of 2022, it transferred to the command of the Central Grouping of Forces and the CMD in the summer of 2023.[58] According to Russian sources, the 3rd AC is comprised of the 6th MRD (comprised of the 57th MRR and two other unnamed MRRs, the 27th Artillery Regiment, 52nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Division, and 10th Tank Regiment); the 72nd MRB (comprised of several volunteer battalions); the 17th Artillery Brigade; and several support elements.[59] ISW observed elements of the 72nd MRB operating in the Bakhmut area as of September 2023, although Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations south of Bakhmut have essentially rendered the 72nd MRB combat ineffective.[60] Russian sources noted that elements of the 3rd AC likely deployed to the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast area as of late summer 2023, which may be why some sources suggest that the 3rd AC is transferring to the command of the Central Grouping of Forces, which has responsibility over this axis.[61] It is unclear if the 3rd AC remains administratively subordinate to the WMD while operating under the auspices of the Central Grouping of Forces, or if it has been entirely and formally shifted to the CMD.

• 3rd Army Corps [Confirmed] [62]
• 6th Motorized Rifle Division [Confirmed, Bakhmut area][63]
• 3 unidentified motorized rifle regiments
• 27th Artillery Regiment
• 52nd Separate Anti-Aircraft Missile Artillery Brigade
• 10th Tank Regiment
• 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade [Confirmed, partially around Bakhmut][64]
• Bashkir “Shaimuratova” volunteer battalion
• Chuvash “Atal” volunteer battalion
• Tatar “Alga” volunteer battalion [Confirmed, Bakhmut area][65]
• Orenburg Oblast “Yaik” volunteer battalion
• 17th Rocket Artillery Brigade
• Various support regiments and battalions

52nd VDV Artillery Brigade
ISW has confirmed the formation of the 52nd VDV Artillery Brigade in Krasnodar Krai and its likely deployment to Ukraine. The Russian Paratroopers Union announced that it collected and distributed aid for the 52nd VDV Artillery Brigade in Raevka village, Anapa, Krasnodar Krai, and claimed that the 52nd VDV Artillery Brigade is fighting in the Kherson direction.[66] The Moscow State Pedagogical University additionally confirmed the existence and deployment of the 52nd VDV Artillery Brigade and reported that students of its “NeFormat” program provided humanitarian assistance to the brigade, earning the thanks of its commander, Colonel Alexander Kalish.[67] It is unclear how the 52nd VDV Artillery Brigade functions in relation to other VDV elements – if it is a centralized reserve of artillery intended to support specifically VDV regiments and brigades in combat; or if it is a VDV unit in name only and is functionally a regular artillery brigade.

387th Motorized Rifle Regiment (387th MRR):
Various Russian sources have offered different discussions of the formation of the 387th MRR. Some sources have speculated the 44th VDV Division is currently being formed with the 387th MRR and the 111th MRR as its main constituent elements. Other Russian sources, however, claimed that the 387th MRR formed in October 2022 from mobilized servicemembers from central Russia, including Tula Oblast, and has already been active in Ukraine.[68] ISW has observed elements of the 387th MRR fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast alongside VDV units as recently as late October 2023.[69] Kherson Oblast occupation senator Andrey Alekseenko also mentioned a 387th Regiment (unspecified if motorized rifle or airborne) in July 2023, claiming that it was fighting as part of the 7th VDV Division in Kherson Oblast.[70] It is likely that the 387th MRR is fighting alongside VDV elements and at least nominally subordinated to VDV command on the frontline, though it is unlikely to be trained and equipped as a VDV unit.

New Russian formations that ISW has confirmed are currently forming, but have not yet been observed in Ukraine:

104th VDV Division:
Teplinsky confirmed on August 2 that the 104th VDV Division is in the process of forming, and Shoigu stated on September 26 that its formation is "being completed."[71] Russian media initially reported plans to revive the 104th VDV Division (which was reformed into the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade in 1998) with a three-regiment structure in April 2022.[72] Several Russian sources noted that the 31st Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade will form the basis of the revived 104th Division in Ulyanovsk, Ulyanovsk Oblast.[73] The 104th VDV Division will likely follow the structure of other VDV divisions and consist of between two and three airborne and air assault regiments, a reconnaissance battalion, artillery regiment, anti-aircraft missile regiment, and tank battalion – and will likely be closer to a true VDV formation in terms of training and equipment than the previously discussed 44th VDV Division, as it is being formed out of a VDV brigade and not DNR motorized rifle regiments.

299th Guards Parachute Regiment:
Local Yaroslavl Oblast media began reporting on August 1 that the 299th Parachute Regiment is currently forming as part of the 98th VDV Division.[74] Shoigu additionally alluded to the formation of the 299th Parachute Regiment on September 26, confirming that a parachute regiment is currently forming as part of the "Ivanovo formation" (the 98th VDV Division is based in Ivanovo Oblast).[75] Former Russian soldier and current author and military commentator Aleksei Sunonkin noted that Yaroslavl Oblast recruitment ads suggest that the 98th VDV Division will be expanding from its previous two regiment structure to include the 299th Parachute Regiment as its third regiment.[76] Sunonkin also speculated that the new parachute regiment would be formed as a motorized rifle or infantry regiment without VDV-specific equipment.

119th Parachute Regiment:
Russian and Ukrainian sources suggested that the 106th VDV Division is forming the 119th Parachute Regiment.[77] Sunonkin claimed that as is the case with the 299th Parachute Regiment, the 119th Parachute Regiment may be formed either as a motorized rifle or infantry regiment without proper VDV equipment.

Russian formations which Russian sources have mentioned but whose existence ISW cannot confirm:

14th Combined Arms Army (14th Army Corps):
Russia may be reorganizing the 14th Army Corps (Northern Fleet) into a combined arms army, potentially as part of a wider effort to disaggregate the ground formations of fleets into combined arms armies while transferring their naval forces to the direct control of the Russian Navy.[79] Russian outlet Izvestia reported on July 3, 2023, that the Russian MoD is currently forming a new combined arms army in the Northern Fleet out of an existing army corps, and the 14th Army Corps is the only corps in the Northern Fleet.[80] A Russian military commentator noted that the Baltic Fleet's 11th Army Corps may also undergo a similar transition, but we have not observed any confirmation of this speculation.[81] The purported transformation of the army corps of two of Russia's fleets into combined arms armies further confirms that Russia appears to be moving its ground forces to the control of military districts while transferring naval assets back to the Russian Navy.

55th Naval Infantry Division:
An obituary posted to a VKontakte page on August 17 claims that a soldier of the 55th Naval Infantry Division of the Pacific Fleet died fighting in Ukraine.[83] A Russian source amplified the obituary and claimed that it is evidence that Russia is reforming the 55th Naval Infantry Division (disbanded in 2009) on the basis of the Pacific Fleet's existing 155th Naval Infantry Brigade.[84] ISW has not observed any confirmation of the 55th Naval Infantry Division beyond this single obituary and Russian source speculation, however.

245th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR):
Russian outlet Izvestia announced on April 26, 2023, that the Russian MoD is reforming the 245th MRR as part of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District).[85] ISW has not observed any mention of the reformation of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment by other Russian sources, however.

Ongoing Russian military restructuring highlights several Russian military priorities in the immediate and mid-term, which should shape the overall analysis and forecasts of conventional Russian capabilities in Ukraine:

The immediate commitment of several new and understrength formations to the frontline in Ukraine suggests the Russian MoD is electing to replace losses in Ukraine in part by creating new formations, rather than rebuilding and restoring existing formations and recommitting the rebuilt versions. This phenomenon could cause an over-estimation of Russian capabilities and military strength, as destroyed and highly degraded Russian units and formations remain active on paper, even if they lack any significant combat power. Combining the essentially defunct formations with new formations, which are very unlikely to be staffed to doctrinal end strength, will generate an artificially inflated count of Russian formations active in Ukraine.

The Russian MoD’s focus on rapidly deploying these new formations to Ukraine is obfuscating the difference in chains of command to operationalized “group of forces” headquarters in Ukraine versus permanent administrative military district designations. Russian media has reported, for example, that the 25th CAA formed in the Russian Far East is part of the EMD. Subsequent Russian reporting on the army suggests that it has either been fully subordinated to the CMD or that it will be operating in Ukraine under the operational control of the Center Grouping of Forces, which is responsible for the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area. The fact that the actual command and subordination of the 25th CAA remains so unclear even as the army has been largely committed to operations in Ukraine suggests that Russia is prioritizing the deployment of these new formations to Ukraine over solidifying or clarifying permanent C2 structures. This phenomenon could have tactical and operational impacts on the areas of the front where such formations are deploying, as the C2 lines between new formations, the regionally based grouping of forces that they are operating under, and the wider military district that they are part of, increasingly blur and overlap. This confusion could also simply be an artifact of the opacity of Russian officials reporting on chains of command. It is unlikely that units in the field are confused about which higher headquarters control them.

The Russian MoD appears committed, at least nominally, to retaining doctrinal distinctions between Russian regiments and brigades, despite the fact that these distinctions ultimately blur on the battlefield. Shoigu notably telegraphed Russia's intent to convert several motorized rifle brigades into motorized rifle divisions, while still simultaneously standing up new brigades.[86] Despite the division/brigade split on paper, however, it is unlikely that these distinctions will actually survive deployment to the frontline in Ukraine. For much of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian formations have deployed individual units ad hoc to the frontline and operated as company or battalion level units, and elements of several different formations often operate in the same discrete geographic area. The Russian military has long debated the need for division structures suited for protracted and large-scale conventional maneuver warfare versus smaller and more mobile brigades. The Russian military's dedication to building out mechanized divisions while still maintaining (and even adding to) the existing brigade structure suggests that the Russian military envisions the need for both such formations for future large-scale conventional operations in Ukraine or elsewhere.

The formal distinctions between the size and structure of Russian units and formations at different echelons and of different types are eroding on the battlefield, and most frontline and currently forming units are essentially understrength and low-quality motorized rifle units – though these units remain dangerous and should not be underestimated. Ukrainian military observer Konstantyn Mashovets provided an example of this phenomenon in relation to Russian deployments to the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area, remarking that Russian command is choosing to "strengthen" groupings of forces with understaffed motorized rifle formations that are comprised of around 75 percent of their intended complement of personnel, armored combat vehicles, and artillery systems.[87] Similarly, the formation of the 44th “VDV” Division out of former DNR motorized rifle formations suggests that understrength motorized rifle formations are now being classified as higher-echelon and more well trained and equipped formations.

None of these changes appear to take account of the way Russian forces are actually fighting in Ukraine, moreover, as Russian milbloggers have recently hinted. Russian units have repeatedly shown themselves unable to operate effectively as coherent mechanized structures. Renewed attempts to conduct mechanized maneuver war around Avdiivka generated massive losses in armored vehicles, causing the Russian command to return to a combination of small-unit attacks and massed infantry assaults.[89] The retention of pre-war doctrinal structures in Shoigu’s reform scheme suggests that the Russian military has either not learned the lessons of combat in Ukraine or else is for some reason confident that the tactical problems that have led to the current positional war will not recur in future wars.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/14/23 04:38 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 13, 2023
Nov 13, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13, 2023

Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 13, 2023, 6:55pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian state media released and later retracted reports about the "regrouping" of Russian forces on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to positions further east of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian command and/or Russian state media apparatus has failed to establish a coordinated information line for the Russian response to ongoing Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank.
Kremlin press wire TASS and Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti published reports claiming that the command of the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces (currently active in east bank Kherson Oblast) decided to transfer troops to unspecified “more advantageous positions” east of the Dnipro River and that the Russian military command would transfer elements from the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces to other directions for offensive operations following the regrouping.[1] TASS and RIA Novosti withdrew the reports within minutes and TASS later issued an apology wherein it claimed that it had “erroneously” released its report.[2] Russian state-affiliated outlet RBK reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) called the reports of a regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast “false” and a ”provocation.”[3] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question about the situation in Kherson Oblast by stating that only the Russian military can and should comment on the situation.[4]

The Russian MoD has not acknowledged persisting Ukrainian positions on the east bank or ongoing larger-than-usual Ukrainian ground operations in recent weeks. Russian milbloggers have increasingly reported on Ukrainian activity on the left bank, however, sharply contrasting with the continued lack of acknowledgement from Russian state media and Russian officials.[5] The Russian command has previously struggled to establish a coordinated informational approach to developments in Ukraine, particularly when the Russian command failed to set informational conditions for defeats during the Kharkiv 2022 counteroffensive.[6] Previous failures to set coordinated informational approaches have led to chaotic fractures and pronounced discontent in the Russian information space, and the Russian command risks repeating these incidents with the situation on the east bank, which has drawn notable concern from Russian ultranationalists.[7] The reports‘ references to Russian “offensives“ elsewhere on the front suggests that the uncoordinated informational approach may be more widespread than the east bank, since the Russian command has not explicitly recognized any current Russian operations in Ukraine as an offensive effort.

The now-retracted reports of a Russian regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast may be indicative of actual discussions taking place in the high echelons of Russian military command that may have prematurely entered the information space before being officially released by the Russian military. Russian media outlet RBK reported that the original TASS and RIA Novosti reports stated that the commander of the joint Russian group of forces in Ukraine (unnamed in the article, but in reference to Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov) heard and agreed with arguments from the "Dnepr" group command (also unnamed in the article, but known to be Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky) and ordered the "Dnepr" group to redeploy and free up forces for offensive operations in other unspecified directions.[9] The suggestion that two high-ranking military commanders would have a discussion on reallocating Russian forces away from a certain sector of the front to another is not outlandish or improbable. RBK’s report further suggests that the Russian military command has assessed that the situation in Kherson Oblast is not overtly threatening to Russian forces. Despite near-constant anxiety about the Kherson direction on the part of milbloggers, the Russian military command itself seems to be preoccupied with other sectors of the front, namely the Avdiivka direction, where Russian forces are pursuing renewed offensive operations.[10] Gerasimov and Teplinsky may have weighed the costs of maintaining frontline units in Kherson Oblast with the benefits of redeploying these units to other areas of the front and decided that the current Russian grouping in rear areas of Kherson is sufficient to defend against Ukrainian operations on the east bank. Ukrainian military observer Konstantyn Mashovets remarked on November 12 that the Russian command in the Kherson direction has refused to commit to the front lines additional forces of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (of the newly formed 18th Combined Arms Army) and 7th Air Assault (VDV) Division beyond the elements of single regiments and battalions, opting instead to maintain the remainder of these formations in near rear areas and secondary echelons of defense.[11] Mashovets noted that the Russian presence in frontline areas of Kherson Oblast is "limited."[12] The suggestion that Russian forces have a stronger rear-area presence in Kherson Oblast largely tracks with purported discussions between Gerasimov and Teplinsky to free up these frontline elements and commit them to other areas of the front.

Alternatively, the Russian military command may have instructed state media to release and then retract these reports as part of an information operation that aims to have Ukrainian forces underestimate available Russian manpower on the east bank of Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on November 13 that Ukrainian officials have not observed any Russian forces withdrawing from positions on the east bank and that the TASS and RIA Novosti reports are a part of a Russian information operation to distract Ukrainian forces.[13] Ukrainian forces are very unlikely to make any operational-level decisions based on limited media reports of a Russian regrouping, however, and if the reports are a part of an information operation, they will likely fail to deceive the Ukrainian command.

It is unlikely that an outside source posing as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided information about the reported “regrouping” of Russian forces on the left bank of Kherson Oblast to Russian state media outlets. Several Russian sources suggested that an unspecified actor posing as the Russian MoD from a fake account could have provided the information to Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti.[14] It is very unlikely that an outside actor posing as the Russian MoD could deceive Russian state media outlets as Russian state media is closely connected to Russian government bodies including the Russian MoD.

Regardless of the causes and circumstances of the TASS and RIA Novosti reports, the reaction to them suggests that events in Kherson Oblast continue to be highly neuralgic in the pro-war information space and emphasizes that the Russian media space still has not coalesced around a singular rhetorical line about what is happening on the east bank of the Dnipro. The published reports use relatively neutral language and notably do not announce a "retreat" or "withdrawal," instead discussing a "transfer" and "regrouping."[15] The Russian media frenzy that followed, including the immediate retraction of the statements, a direct response from the Kremlin, and emphatic milblogger refutations, reflects the fact that any mention of the Russian grouping in Kherson Oblast generates near-immediate information space neuralgia.[16] It also appears that the Russian information space has not yet determined how to discuss the operational situation on the east bank of the Dnipro, and that any inflection in the situation there can generate an informational shock. The Russian MoD falsely framed the Russian retreat from Kharkiv Oblast in early September of 2022 as a "regrouping," and that word and general concept apparently remains highly neuralgic for the Russian information space.

Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that weather conditions are impacting the battlespace but not halting operations. Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo noted on November 13 that rain and mud in Donbas impede the speed of ground maneuver advances.[17] Ukrainian 14th Mechanized Brigade Spokesperson Nadiya Zamryha stated on November 12 that fog and rain complicate both Russian and Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance efforts and lead to reduced numbers of attacks.[18] Zamryha added that the falling leaves complicate efforts to hide equipment and personnel. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian aviation has been less active in southern Ukraine due to weather conditions and that Russian forces are attempting to launch as many glide bombs as possible with each sortie.[19] A Ukrainian reserve officer assessed that mud will make many roads near Avdiivka impassable, complicating logistics for both sides.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that recent heavy rains led to reduced shelling and that strong winds and rain interfere with Russian drone operations and complicate offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[21] Russian sources also circulated footage purporting to show mud and rain filled Ukrainian trenches.[22] ISW continues to assess that fall weather conditions will decrease the tempo of Russian and Ukrainian operations but not halt them entirely, and that fighting will continue on both sides throughout the winter months as it did in the winter of 2022-2023 and in the years between 2014-2022.

Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukraine will likely conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in the upcoming winter. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk responded on November 13 to the forecasted large-scale Russian strike series against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the upcoming winter and stated that Ukraine is preparing air defense capabilities and needs additional air defense systems and long-range missiles, such as ATACMS, to hit Russian rear areas.[24] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on November 12 that Ukrainian forces’ current main task is to disrupt Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) and that these disruptions, coupled with the onset of inclement weather, will “freeze” Russian offensive operations.[25] Fityo also stated on November 13 that Ukrainian disruptions of Russian GLOCs will create issues for the supply of food, water, ammunition, and winter materials to Russian forces.[26] Ukrainian forces have been conducting an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily Black Sea Fleet assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military’s ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine, and Ukraine may intend to intensify and widen this interdiction campaign in the coming months.

A Russian milblogger called on actors in the Russian information space to more widely amplify Russian strikes on Ukrainian military assets as opposed to Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas, indirectly highlighting a unique dynamic wherein the majority of reported Russian strikes seem to affect Ukrainian civilian objects, whereas the majority of reported Ukrainian strikes affect Russian military assets. A Russian milblogger claimed that all types of Russian units work together to identify, record, direct, and confirm Russian strikes on Ukrainian targets.[28] The milblogger complained that the Russian information space barely covers these events, which creates a “false impression of [Russian forces’] inaction.” The milblogger claimed that the Russian information space instead devotes more coverage to Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory and that Russian milbloggers have to search for information about the alleged Russian strikes on their own. The milblogger urged other milbloggers and “ordinary pro-Russian residents of Ukraine” to offer “brighter” coverage of Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure and military targets in order to “create the spirit of victory in the media space.” The milblogger offered an example of the alleged insufficient coverage, claiming that Russian forces struck five unspecified Ukrainian railway junctions on an unspecified date in response to the Ukrainian operation that derailed a Russian freight train in Ryazan Oblast on November 11. The milblogger did not report on these five alleged Russian strikes previously but did report on the Ukrainian operation in Ryazan Oblast.[29] The wider Russian information space has also not reported on these alleged five retaliatory strikes, and the Russian milblogger did not specify where they got this information.[30]

Russian forces have used many of their long-range weapons to target Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure and have recently increased glide bomb strikes against populated areas of the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast.[31] One critical Russian milblogger, whom Russian authorities later arrested, complained in July 2023 that the Russian strike campaign was more “retaliatory” than “operationally sound” and blamed the Russian General Staff for wasting Russian efforts on striking Ukrainian civilian infrastructure rather than military infrastructure.[32] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 12 that Ukraine will focus on responding to the large-scale Russian series of strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure that are likely to occur in the winter, and Ukrainian officials have signaled their intent to strike military and energy targets within Russia and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.

US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink stated that the 100th civilian ship departed the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels on November 13, amid continued Russian efforts to deter usage of the corridor. Brink also stated that Ukraine has used the corridor to export 3.7 million tons of food and other goods, presumably since the first civilian vessel successfully departed from a Ukrainian port through the corridor on August 15.[34] Russian forces have continually conducted strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure and mined water areas to disrupt and discourage civilian maritime traffic through the corridor.

Former Wagner Group personnel are reportedly rejecting Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruitment attempts aimed at subsuming Wagner operations in Africa. . A Russian insider source claimed on November 13 that the Russian MoD, led by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and members of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), has been attempting to recruit former Wagner personnel at the former Wagner base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to Russian MoD operations in Africa since September 2023.[36] The insider source claimed that the Russian MoD is offering former Wagner personnel 110,000-ruble (about $1,200) salaries, “promising” positions and ranks, and the formation of a separate unit capable of operating in Libya, Syria, Mali, and Burkina Faso.[37] The insider source also claimed that the reported leader of Redut private military company (PMC), Konstantin Mirzoyants, denied the MoD’s offers on November 8 and claimed that the Russian MoD would not form a separate unit and that all personnel would go to Burkina Faso, which caused over 120 former Wagner personnel to reject contracts with the Russian MoD and leave Molkino.[38] ISW cannot confirm any of the insider source’s claims.


Key Takeaways:

Russian state media released and later retracted reports about the "regrouping" of Russian forces on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to positions further east of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian command and/or Russian state media apparatus has failed to establish a coordinated information line for the Russian response to ongoing Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank.
There are three hypotheses of varying likelihood for the release of the now-retracted reports of a Russian regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast: They may be indicative of actual discussions taking place in the high echelons of Russian military command that may have prematurely entered the information space before being officially released by the Russian military; the Russian military command alternatively may have instructed state media to release and then retract these reports as part of an information operation that aims to have Ukrainian forces underestimate available Russian manpower on the east bank of Kherson Oblast; or an outside source posing as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided information about the reported “regrouping” of Russian forces on the left bank of Kherson Oblast to Russian state media outlets.
Regardless of the causes and circumstances of the TASS and RIA Novosti reports, the reaction to them suggests that events in Kherson Oblast continue to be highly neuralgic in the pro-war information space and emphasizes that the Russian media space still has not coalesced around a singular rhetorical line about what is happening on the east bank of the Dnipro.
Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that weather conditions are impacting the battlespace but not halting operations.
Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukraine will likely conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in the upcoming winter.
A Russian milblogger called on actors in the Russian information space to more widely amplify Russian strikes on Ukrainian military assets as opposed to Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas, indirectly highlighting a unique dynamic wherein the majority of reported Russian strikes seem to affect Ukrainian civilian objects, whereas the majority of reported Ukrainian strikes affect Russian military assets.
US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink stated that the 100th civilian ship departed the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels on November 13, amid continued Russian efforts to deter usage of the corridor.
Former Wagner Group personnel are reportedly rejecting Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruitment attempts aimed at subsuming Wagner operations in Africa.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas of the frontline.
Ukrainian officials continued to discuss Russian forced mobilization of Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas of Ukraine.
Russian occupation officials continued to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under vacation schemes

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/14/23 04:50 AM

Originally Posted by CNote

[b]Unspecified actors appear to be targeting Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov as he continues to heap honors on his children.
Russian insider source claimed that Moscow authorities are investigating and charging members of the inner circle of an unspecified nephew of Kadyrov for various crimes including kidnapping, extortion, and organizing a criminal community in both Moscow and Chechnya.[33] The insider source claimed that two high-ranking Chechen security officials lead this inner circle, and that its other members include Chechen police officers and bureaucratic officials.[34] The source claimed that Russian authorities allowed this circle to commit these crimes for “quite a long time” but that “apparently, something is starting to change.”[35] It is possible that Russian authorities are targeting Chechen organized crime activities. This insider source’s specific reference to Kadyrov, however, suggests either that some Russian authorities may seek to target Kadyrov’s affiliates through criminal charges or that some actors may seek to target Kadyrov informationally by using this insider source to discredit him and his family. Kadyrov has notably awarded his children, many of whom are underage, with prominent Chechen governmental positions and awards in recent weeks following the Kremlin’s refusal to become involved when his 15-year-old son Adam was filmed beating a detained man in September 2023, sparking domestic outrage.


The Chechens could become a problem for Putin in the future, so many were killed in the Chechen wars many still hate the Russian authorities.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/16/23 03:37 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 15, 2023
Nov 15, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 15, 2023

Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 15, 2023, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The European Union (EU) appears poised to ban the export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia.
The ban, if enacted and effectively enforced, could deal a significant blow to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) given precision machine tools’ importance in industrial manufacturing. Bloomberg reported on November 15 that the EU’s 12th sanctions package proposes a ban on the export of precision machine tools and machinery parts that Russia uses to make weapons and ammunition, such as welding machines, lithium batteries, thermostats, motors, and drone motors.[1] Bloomberg reported that Russia has been importing precision machines and precision machine tools from Europe to sustain its ammunition production and other DIB production efforts. Bne Intellinews reported in June 2021 that Russia’s near total reliance on European- and US-produced precision machine tools makes Russia particularly vulnerable to such sanctions and noted that at the time Russia imported almost all of the precision machines it required.

Russia has been increasingly attempting to develop import substitution solutions for sourcing Western-made precision machine tools in 2023, likely in preparation for Western sanctions targeting this vulnerability. The Russian government approved in May 2023 the “Concept of Technological Development until 2030,” which encourages domestic production of high-tech products such as precision machine tools and mandates that domestic enterprises produce at least 75 percent of Russia’s high-tech products by 2030.[3] Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec reported in August 2023 that Russia’s STAN group, the country’s largest domestic precision machine manufacturer, which Rostec purchased in 2019, is a major element of Russia’s import substitution program.[4] Rostec subsidiary RT-Capital’s head, Semyon Yakubov, told Kommersant on October 26 that Rostec hopes to use the STAN Group to meet Russia’s “great need” for modern precision machines in the absence of Western imports.[5] Yakubov stated that Western sanctions and the war in Ukraine have sharply increased Russia’s military and civilian demand for domestically produced machine tools. Yabukov noted that STAN was unable to meet even a third of the total volume of Russia’s orders for precision machines in 2023, worth around six billion rubles (approximately $67.1 million). Yabukov stated that Russia’s demand for precision machines is “much greater” than its current production abilities.

Denmark will reportedly start inspecting and potentially blocking Russian oil tankers in an effort to enforce a price cap on Russian oil and the European Union’s (EU) insurance regulations. The Financial Times (FT) reported on November 15 that the EU proposed measures that would allow Denmark to inspect and block Russian oil tankers traveling through the Danish straits. These measures are part of an EU effort to enforce a G7 cap demanding that Western insurers only provide coverage to Russian shipments where oil is sold for less than $60 per barrel.[6] An unnamed senior European government official told FT that “almost none“ of the Russian maritime oil shipments in October 2023 were below the $60 barrel price cap.[7] FT also reported that the EU is concerned that Russian tankers are violating EU regulations by frequently traveling with falsified financial statements or non-Western insurance.

The Ukrainian government reached a deal with international insurers that will provide affordable coverage to vessels carrying grain and other critical food supplies through the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels, amid continued Russian efforts to deny navigation through the corridor. The Financial Times (FT) reported on November 15 that the Ukrainian government reached a deal with insurance broker giant Marsh McLennan to provide up to $50 million in hull and liability insurance from Lloyd’s of London firms for each vessel carrying agricultural goods.[9] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that this agreement would allow Ukraine to “provide vital food supplies to the world at the same time as supporting the Ukrainian economy and keeping the Black Sea open for international trade.”[10] Russian forces have continually conducted strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure and mined areas in the Black Sea to deny freedom of navigation in the corridor.

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting with Russian election commission representatives on November 15 that the Russian government will suppress any foreign or domestic election interference. Putin stated that the Russian government will “continue to do everything necessary to prevent any illegal intrusion into electoral processes.”[12] Putin notably did not specifically reference the March 2024 presidential elections, nor did he announce his announce his presidential campaign.

Recent Russian opinion polls indicate that roughly half of Russians maintain support for the war in Ukraine and for Russia to engage in peace negotiations. The Levada Center – an independent Russian polling organization – reported on October 31 that 55 percent of respondents to a recent poll believe that Russia should begin peace negotiations while 38 percent favor continuing to conduct the war.[13] The Levada Center observed that while these numbers slightly increased between September and October by four percent, they have largely remained consistent since July 2023.[14] The Levada Center added that support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine remained high with 76 percent of respondents stating that they support Russian military operations in Ukraine. The Levada Center reported that 62 percent of surveyed Russians believe that the full-scale invasion is progressing well, while 21 percent of respondents believe that the war is going reasonably or very poorly for Russia.[15] The Levada Center reported on November 14 that two-thirds of respondents believe that Russia is headed in the right direction and of those who believe the opposite, 45 percent cited the war in Ukraine.[16] Opposition-leaning Russian research organization Russian Field reported similar numbers supporting negotiations on November 15, noting that 48 percent of respondents said that Russia should engage in peace negotiations and that 74 percent would support Russian President Vladimir Putin if he signed a peace agreement “tomorrow.”[17] Russian Field stated that 36 percent of respondents believe that the war is going well for Russia whereas 25 percent believe that the war is going poorly for Russia and that respondents who trust Telegram channels are twice as likely to believe that the war is going poorly for Russia as those who rely on Russian television.

Yandex NV - the Dutch holding company of Russian internet technology company Yandex - reportedly aims to sell all its Russian assets by the end of 2023, allowing the Russian government to further increase its hold over the Russian information space. Reuters and Bloomberg reported on November 14, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Yandex NV likely aims to sell all its Russian assets, not just a controlling stake, by the end of 2023.[19] One of Reuters’ sources claimed that Yandex NV seeks a complete break from Russia while another source stated that a complete exit is likely but undecided. Reuters and Bloomberg reported that Yandex NV will host a board meeting on the deal in late November and hopes to finalize a deal by December 2023.[20] The Kremlin has been attempting to crypto-nationalize Yandex through coercive measures since at least the summer of 2023 and reportedly approved a prior deal to sell Russian Yandex holdings to an affiliate of Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergey Kiriyenko.[21] The Yandex crypto-nationalization effort likely supports the Kremlin’s preparations for the 2024 Russian presidential elections.


Key Takeaways:

• The European Union (EU) appears poised to ban the export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia.
• Denmark will reportedly start inspecting and potentially blocking Russian oil tankers in an effort to enforce a price cap on Russian oil and the European Union’s (EU) insurance regulations.
• The Ukrainian government reached a deal with international insurers that will provide affordable coverage to vessels carrying grain and other critical food supplies through the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels, amid continued Russian efforts to deny navigation through the corridor.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting with Russian election commission representatives on November 15 that the Russian government will suppress any foreign or domestic election interference.
• Recent Russian opinion polls indicate that roughly half of Russians maintain support for the war in Ukraine and for Russia to engage in peace negotiations.
• Yandex NV - the Dutch holding company of Russian internet technology company Yandex - reportedly aims to sell all its Russian assets by the end of 2023, allowing the Russian government to further increase its hold over the Russian information space.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• A Russian insider source claimed that Kremlin-created Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, which presented a limited number of former Wagner fighters with the certificates of their combat veteran status, is coercing former Wagner fighters into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Russian and occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian students in occupied Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/20/23 01:32 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 19, 2023
Nov 19, 2023 - ISW Press









Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 19, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 19, 2023, 6:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00 pm ET on November 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian and Russian forces are continuing combat operations in eastern and southern Ukraine, although the rainy weather will likely continue to slow the pace of combat operations until winter conditions fully set in.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to defend against a strong group of Russian forces attacking near Avdiivka and that Ukrainian forces maintain the initiative in southern Ukraine.[1] The milblogger added that it is premature to declare any Russian victories to avoid creating any false impressions about the situation on the battlefield. Another Russian milblogger observed that poor weather is impeding the use of armored vehicles in western Zaporizhia Oblast but that Ukrainian forces are still attacking Russian positions with infantry units.[2] The United Kingdon (UK) Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed on November 18 that neither side has achieved any substantial progress in the Kupyansk and Avdiivka directions, or in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast — where the most intense battles are ongoing.[3] The UK MoD added that there are fewer immediate prospects of major changes on the frontlines as colder winter weather begins to set in. Ukrainian military officials anticipate that Russia will launch a third wave of assaults on Avdiivka.[4] Freezing weather conditions during the winter will likely prompt the resumption of more active combat operations, and ongoing rainy weather is unlikely to halt Ukrainian or Russian attacks.

Russian forces conducted another series of drone strikes primarily targeting Kyiv, Poltava, and Cherkasy oblasts on the night of November 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 19 that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed 15 of the 20 Russian Shahed-131/-136 drones.[5] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated the strike series did not result in any casualties or critical damages and that this was an “excellent result.”[6] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian ammunition depots in Kirovohrad City, Kirovohrad Oblast and Olshanytsya, Kyiv Oblast and a fuel storage facility at the Kanatove airfield, Kirovohrad Oblast.

Ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin formally announced his intent to run in the 2024 Russian presidential elections despite his imprisonment. Girkin acknowledged that his August 30 post claiming that he is better than Russian President Vladimir Putin aimed to attract attention before formally announcing his intent to run for president as an independent candidate.[8] Girkin claimed that the current Russian government fears his nomination because it would disrupt the Kremlin’s plans to have sham candidates run against Putin, as Putin is the “only winner [of the presidential election] already known in advance.” Girkin acknowledged that running in the Russian presidential election is “like sitting down at a table to play with cheaters” but that bringing like-minded “patriots” together through the election is a defeat for the Russian officials living on the delusional “planet of the pink ponies.” Girkin appealed to the Russian Strelkov (Girkin) Movement (RDS), which has supported Girkin’s defense against his criminal case for allegedly discrediting the Russian military, to help canvas to receive the necessary number of signatures to run as an independent candidate.

Girkin’s presidential announcement indicates a possible rift between the RDS and his wife, Miroslava Reginskaya. Reginskaya has been the first to transcribe Girkin’s prior letters from prison to post on Telegram but did not claim to post Girkin’s presidential campaign announcement on November 19 and has not yet acknowledged Girkin’s presidential announcement on her own Telegram channel.[9] Reginskaya has been a staunch advocate for Girkin’s release since the first day of his imprisonment in July 2023 and appears to maintain ties with Russian veterans who support Girkin’s release, so her silence regarding Girkin’s most recent announcement is notable.[10] Reginskaya and the RDS contradicted each other on November 8 when the RDS called for character witnesses to speak for Girkin at his trial, but Reginskaya stated that witness recruitment on ”other channels and by other persons is not coordinated with the general defense and can be dangerous for Igor [Girkin].”[11] The RDS announced on November 15 that it had found several such witnesses for Girkin, despite Reginskaya’s November 8 statement.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be censoring irregular Russian armed formations as part of its ongoing efforts to formalize Russia’s irregular forces and establish greater control over the Russian information space. The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion claimed on November 19 that the DNR's Internal Affairs Ministry issued a censorship order, prohibiting the battalion from “showing its life and work.”[13] The “Vostok” Battalion is currently serving in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and provides near-daily updates on the situation in their sector of the front.[14] The DNR Internal Ministry may be administering the censorship order as part of the Russian MoD’s ongoing efforts to formalize the DNR/Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militias into the Russian armed forces, which has previously trigger backlash within the Russian information space.[15] ISW has extensively reported on the Kremlin’s ongoing censorship efforts targeting Russian milbloggers and state media.

Ukrainian officials announced on November 19 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a teenage Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, returned to Ukraine.[17] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated that Yermokhin’s return occurred within the framework of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s “Bring Kids Back UA” program.[18] Yermak and Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets stated that Qatar and UNICEF mediated the return, and Lubinets noted that this was the first time UNICEF was involved in efforts to return Ukrainian children back from Russia.[19] Russia dictated that Yermokhin travel to a third country to meet a relative once he turned 18 years old, and Yermokhin turned 18 on November 19 and met his sister in Belarus before returning to Ukraine.[20] Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continued attempts to dispute Russia‘s practice of illegally deporting Ukrainian children to Russia and claimed on November 19 that the Russian military found Yermokhin “neglected” in Mariupol in 2022 and took him to “safety” with a Russian foster family.

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger expressed anger on November 19 about Armenia’s decisions to distance itself from Russia against the backdrop of recent deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces used a Tochka-U missile to strike Belgorod Oblast on November 19, and a prominent Russian milblogger used the opportunity to allege that Armenia, possibly with assistance from the US, agreed to give Tochka-U launchers and missiles to Ukraine.[22] The milblogger offered no evidence in support of this allegation, and ISW has not observed anything to substantiate it. The milblogger speculated about the number of weapons Armenia could possibly transfer to Ukraine but did not offer any specifics or the sourcing of his information. The milblogger also claimed that the Armenian government has begun to prepare to withdraw from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). ISW has not observed any confirmation of the milblogger’s claim that Armenia is planning to leave the CSTO, and Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan told journalists on November 9 that Armenia is not discussing the legal process of leaving the CSTO.[23] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated on November 18 that Armenia and Azerbaijan were able to agree on the basic principles for a peace treaty but that the two countries are speaking “different diplomatic languages” and that there is an atmosphere of mistrust.


Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian forces are continuing combat operations in eastern and southern Ukraine, although the rainy weather will likely continue to slow the pace of combat operations until winter conditions fully set in.
• Russian forces conducted another series of drone strikes primarily targeting Kyiv, Poltava, and Cherkasy oblasts on the night of November 18 to 19.
• Ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin formally announced his intent to run in the 2024 Russian presidential elections despite his imprisonment.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be censoring irregular Russian armed formations as part of its ongoing efforts to formalize Russia’s irregular forces and establish greater control over the Russian information space.
• Ukrainian officials announced on November 19 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a teenage Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, returned to Ukraine.
• A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger expressed anger on November 19 about Armenia’s decisions to distance itself from Russia against the backdrop of recent deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas on November 19.
• Regional Russian officials continue to fear the emergence of localized protests in response to the Russian military’s refusal to return some mobilized personnel from the frontlines.
• Occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine into Russian national and cultural identities.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/22/23 07:29 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 21, 2023
Nov 21, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 21, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 21, 2023, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on November 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to conduct offensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine despite rainy and snowy weather conditions.
Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on November 20 that Russian shelling of the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast had decreased due to poor weather conditions.[1] Ukrainian 14th Mechanized Brigade Spokesperson Nadiya Zamryha stated on November 21 that Russian forces continue to conduct assaults in the Kupyansk direction despite the snow and frost.[2] Zamryha added that the number of Russian attacks will likely decrease due to weather conditions but that Russian forces will not stop offensive operations completely. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized the need to strengthen Ukrainian capabilities before the winter period during a meeting with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on November 20.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 20 and 21 that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are struggling to operate drones, including for artillery fire adjustment, in the poor weather conditions throughout the front.[4] Russian milbloggers also claimed that muddy conditions are complicating vehicle movements but that both Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to maneuver and operate in all directions.[5] ISW continues to assess that freezing weather conditions during the winter will likely prompt the resumption of more active combat operations, and ongoing rainy weather is unlikely to halt Ukrainian or Russian attacks.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian officials are struggling to subdue Russian hysteria around Ukrainian operations in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu addressed the Russian MoD Collegium on November 21 and claimed that Russian forces prevented all Ukrainian attempts to conduct successful “amphibious operations in the Kherson direction.”[6] Shoigu further claimed that Russian forces are inflicting “colossal” losses on Ukrainian forces.[7] Shoigu’s statement is likely an attempt to downplay some Russian milbloggers’ concerns over Russia’s inability to decisively repel Ukrainian attacks on the east bank of the Dnipro River but is unlikely to calm the ever-growing complaints in the Russian information space.

Russian milbloggers continue to acknowledge a Ukrainian presence in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and complain that Russian forces are unable to suppress Ukrainian operations in the area.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 21 that Ukrainian forces killed an entire Russian assault group near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[9] A Russian insider source claimed on November 17 that a Ukrainian strike killed 76 Russian personnel in the 1st Battalion of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) attempting to conduct a “distraction maneuver” in Skadovskyi Raion, east bank Kherson Oblast on November 10.[10] A Russian soldier reportedly in the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) operating near Krynky claimed in a video amplified on November 21 that the Russian military is forcing personnel who are still recovering from wounds to conduct assaults and that there are three Ukrainian drones for each Russian soldier operating in the Krynky area.[11] A Russian milblogger published a letter purportedly from a Russian soldier operating near Krynky on November 21 who claimed that Russian forces in the Krynky area lack reconnaissance drones, slowing their movements and putting them at risk of Ukrainian attacks.[12] The purported Russian soldier claimed that Russian forces in the Krynky area also lacked fire support because artillery and mortar units quickly changed locations after firing “a few shots” in order to evade counterbattery fire.[13] The Russian soldier claimed that his unit has practically no interaction with other Russian units operating nearby and that the Russian command headquarters in the Kherson direction devises unsuccessful plans because the headquarters receives incorrect and delayed information.[14] The Russian soldier also claimed that the Russian command in the Kherson direction had failed to implement changes resulting in increased Ukrainian attacks.[15] A milblogger claimed that some Russian Telegram channels are unsuccessfully attempting to focus criticism of Russian operations in the Kherson direction toward Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky.[16] The milbloggers do not appear to be responding to Shoigu’s claims nor has ISW observed any significant changes in Kherson Oblast that would prompt these milblogger complaints.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes overnight on November 20-21 and on November 21 targeting port and civilian infrastructure, including a hospital in Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 10 Shahed-131/136 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk; one Iskander-K ballistic missile from Dzhankoi, occupied Crimea; and four S-300 missiles in the Donetsk direction on the night of November 20-21.[17] Ukrainian forces shot down nine Shahed drones and the Iskander missile.[18] Ukrainian officials reported that the overnight Russian strike hit the civilian Central City Hospital in Selydove, Donetsk Oblast; the Kotlyarevska mine in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast; and other civil infrastructure.[19] Ukrainian military officials also reported that Russian forces also launched an unspecified number of Kh-31P medium-range supersonic anti-radiation missiles on November 21, which struck port infrastructure and administrative buildings in Odesa City and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi Raion, Odesa Oblast.

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby reported on November 21 that the Wagner Group is preparing to provide an air defense system to either Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah or Iran.[21 Kirby stated that the Wagner Group would provide the system to either Lebanese Hezbollah or Iran under the Russian government’s direction but did not specify the origin or type of system.[22] ISW previously observed Russian claims that the Russian MoD is using the Syrian government’s agreements to supply weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah to subsume the remnants of the Wagner Group in Syria and seize their air defense systems.

Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin’s presidential campaign announcement has generated some discourse in the Russian information space, but most Russian milbloggers refrained from discussing Girkin’s campaign likely due to self-censorship. A Russian milblogger who previously amplified praise of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov and Foreign Intelligence Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bastrykin praised Girkin’s decision to run in the 2024 Russian presidential campaign.[24] The milblogger claimed that Girkin will not become president but that he may become a “[bright energetic figure] in the Russian political arena” who at best could galvanize a new healthy political opposition within Russia, but that Girkin’s decision to run is at minimum interesting.[25] Another milblogger who has been critical of the Russian conduct of the war amplified Girkin’s campaign announcement.[26] Mainstream Russian milbloggers have largely not acknowledged Girkin since the arrest of Girkin and Andrei Kurshin, the “Moscow Calling” Telegram channel administrator who frequently amplified Girkin’s complaints, on July 21 and August 31 respectively, and are likely self-censoring to avoid a similar fate.[27] Girkin’s presidential platform may provide him a chance to reenter the broader Russian information space. Girkin’s wife, Miroslava Reginskaya, also acknowledged Girkin’s presidential campaign announcement on November 21 and stated that she supports Girkin as his wife but that she has her own goals, including freeing Girkin from prison and supporting Russian frontline soldiers in Donbas.[28] Reginskaya’s response likely reflects the risk associated with opposing Russian President Vladimir Putin and danger to her ability to secure Girkin’s release if she maintains a strong association with this opposition.

Washington, D.C.-based analytics company Gallup found that Russian society’s confidence in the Russian military has marginally decreased in 2023. Gallup observed that 75 percent of Russians interviewed in the summer of 2023 expressed confidence in the Russian military compared to 80 percent of Russians who expressed a similar opinion in the early months of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[29] Gallup added that Russians’ confidence in the police, financial institutions, and the judicial system has increased, however – making confidence in the Russian military the only observed decline in public trust among all surveyed age, gender, and financial status groups. Gallup concluded that the root of Russians’ waning faith may be a result of the growing disconnect between the perception of the Russian military and the political leadership, noting that confidence in the Russian military remained at around 90 percent among Russians who approve of their political leadership but decreased to 40 percent among Russians who disapprove of the Russian political leadership – the lowest approval rate since 2006. Gallup noted that overall approval of leadership in Russia remained high and stable at 68 percent, which is on par with the 66 percent approval rate in 2022. Gallup stated that the survey indicates that support for the Russian military is still high despite the five percent decline. ISW has observed some Russian milbloggers and ultranationalists express low confidence in Russian military leadership throughout the full-scale invasion, which may have impacted how certain Russians who closely monitor the progress of the war feel about trusting the Russian military.

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced a new military aid package to Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv on November 21. Pistorius announced that the package valued at 1.3 billion euros includes four IRIS-T SLM air defense systems; 20,000 155mm artillery shells, and anti-tank mines.

The Armenian Ministry of Defense (MoD) denied Russian allegations that Armenia is planning to supply Ukraine with weapons. Russian sources have recently alleged that Armenia is planning to provide Ukraine with missiles and missile launchers, and Armenian MoD Spokesperson Aram Torosyan officially denied these claims on November 21.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused the West of destabilizing the South Caucasus region by supplying weapons to Armenia. Aliyev claimed at the “Decolonization: Women’s Empowerment and Development” international conference in Baku on November 21 that France is arming Armenia and that this is destabilizing the South Caucasus, “encourag[ing] revanchist forces in Armenia,” and “prepar[ing] the ground for the start of new wars in [the] region.”[32] Russian sources have also recently alleged that France supplied Armenia with ACMAT Bastion armored personnel carriers, which Ukraine had rejected due to the vehicles’ deficiencies.[33] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan previously stated on November 18 that he believes that Azerbaijan’s rhetoric indicates that Azerbaijan is organizing a new round of military activity against Armenia.

A former Russian Investigative Committee departmental head who was serving sentences for accepting bribes from the Russian mafia died in prison on the night of November 20-21, allegedly by suicide. BBC Russia reported on November 21 that Russian authorities found the former head of the Department of Interdepartmental Cooperation and Internal Security of the Russian Investigative Committee, Mikhail Maksimenko, dead in a prison colony.[35] A Russian law enforcement source told Russian state outlet TASS that authorities found Maksimenko’s body in a storage room in Correctional Colony 11 in Bor, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[36] Russian state outlet RBK reported that a source close to the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service stated that Maksimenko committed suicide on the night of November 20-21 in the psychiatric hospital in which he was receiving treatment following a previous suicide attempt.[37] Russian authorities sentenced Maksimenko to 13 years in prison in April 2018 for accepting a $500,000 bribe in return for his assistance in the release of Andrei Kochuykov, an assistant to Russian mafia boss Zakhary Kalashov.[38] Russian authorities also sentenced Maksimenko to 14 years in prison in March 2020 for accepting a one million dollar bribe from Russian businessman Dmitry Smychkovsky, who was also working to release Kochuykov.[39] A member of Russia’s Presidential Human Rights Council, Yeva Merkachyova, stated that Maksimenko’s death was “strange” and that Maksimenko had previously told her that he would not commit suicide under any circumstances.[40] A Russian insider source claimed that Maksimenko had recently filed a petition to serve the remainder of his sentence in a correctional labor camp but that the decision-making commission instead issued a penalty on November 20 that would deny his request.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to conduct offensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine despite rainy and snowy weather conditions.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian officials are struggling to subdue Russian hysteria around Ukrainian operations in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes overnight on November 20-21 and on November 21 targeting port and civilian infrastructure, including a hospital in Donetsk Oblast.
US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby reported on November 21 that the Wagner Group is preparing to provide an air defense system to either Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah or Iran.
Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin’s presidential campaign announcement has generated some discourse in the Russian information space, but most Russian milbloggers refrained from discussing Girkin’s campaign likely due to self-censorship.
Washington, D.C.-based analytics company Gallup found that Russian society’s confidence in the Russian military has marginally decreased in 2023.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced a new military aid package to Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv on November 21.
The Armenian Ministry of Defense (MoD) denied Russian allegations that Armenia is planning to supply Ukraine with weapons.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused the West of destabilizing the South Caucasus region by supplying weapons to Armenia.
A former Russian Investigative Committee departmental head who was serving sentences for accepting bribes from the Russian mafia died in prison on the night of November 20-21, allegedly by suicide.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 21 and advanced in some areas.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu addressed the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium on November 21 and announced that the Russian MoD is increasing its military training efforts across Russia.
US Department of State Spokesperson Matthew Miller commented on November 20 about a report that found that Russian officials in collaboration with Belarusian officials transported more than 2,400 Ukrainian children between ages six and 17 to Belarus.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/25/23 06:01 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 24, 2023
Nov 24, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 24, 2023

Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 24, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on November 24, and covers both November 23 and November 24 due to the fact that ISW did not publish a Campaign Assessment on November 23 in observance of the Thanksgiving Day holiday. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces began a renewed offensive effort towards Avdiivka on November 22, although likely with weaker mechanized capabilities than in the previous offensive waves that occurred in October.
Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi reported on November 23 that Russian forces launched a “third wave” of assaults as part of the Russia offensive operation in the Avdiivka direction, and Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that this “third wave” began on November 22.[1] Shtupun reported a 25 to 30 percent increase in Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka on November 22 and stated that Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian columns of roughly a dozen armored vehicles in total during assaults.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least 50 Russian assaults in the Avdiivka direction on November 23 and 24.[3] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations on Avdiivka’s northern and southern flanks but did not characterize any Russian assaults as heavily mechanized.[4] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to advance north of Avdiivka and made further gains in the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka but did not make any territorial claims consistent with a successful renewed large-scale Russian offensive push.[5]

Shtupun stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed three Russian tanks and seven armored fighting vehicles on November 22, suggesting that Russian forces are currently conducting a smaller set of mechanized assaults than in October.[6] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces lost 50 tanks and 100 armored vehicles in renewed assaults on Avdiivka on October 19 and 15 tanks and 33 armored vehicles during the initial large, mechanized assaults on October 10.[7] Russian forces have lost a confirmed 197 damaged and destroyed vehicles in offensive operations near Avdiivka since October 9, and the Russian military appeared to spend the end of October and all of November preparing for a wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults to compensate for these heavy-equipment losses.[8] Large infantry-led ground assaults will likely pose a significant threat to Ukrainian forces defending in the Avdiivka direction but will not lead to a rapid Russian advance in the area.

High-ranking Russian officials may be engaged in a wider scheme of forcibly adopting deported Ukrainian children. BBC Panorama and Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii published investigations on November 23 detailing how Just Russia Party leader Sergei Mironov adopted a 10-month-old Ukrainian girl whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from a Kherson City orphanage in autumn of 2022 alongside over 40 other children.[9] The investigations found that Mironov's new wife, Inna Varlamova, traveled to occupied Kherson Oblast, where occupation authorities issued her a power of attorney to deport two children—a 10-month-old girl and a two-year-old boy.[10] Both BBC and Vazhnye Istorii noted that Varlamova falsely introduced herself to the leadership of the children's home as the "head of children's affairs from Moscow," a position which she does not hold and that still would not legitimize the deportations of the children under international law.[11] Russian court documents show that Mironov and Varlamova then adopted the girl in November 2022, changed her name from her Ukrainian birth name to a new Russian name and the surname Mironova, and officially changed her place of birth from Kherson City to Podolsk, Russia.[12] Neither investigation could confirm the whereabouts of the two-year-old boy. Mironov notably responded to the investigation and called it a "fake from Ukrainian special services and their Western curators" meant to discredit him.[13]

Mironov and his wife, who reportedly holds a low-level unspecified position in the Russian Duma, follow in the footsteps of Russian Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, who has also adopted at least one Ukrainian child from occupied Mariupol.[14] While ISW can only confirm that these two Russian officials have forcibly adopted deported Ukrainian children at this time, the adoptions may be indicative of a wider pattern in which Russian officials adopt deported children in order to legitimize the practice in the eyes of the Russian public. Russian politicians may be adopting deported Ukrainian children to set administrative and cultural precedents for wider adoptions of Ukrainian children to further escalate Russia's campaign to deport Ukrainians to Russia. ISW continues to assess that the forced deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children likely amounts to a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Ukraine’s Western allies declared their commitment to further develop Ukrainian air defense capabilities during the 17th Ramstein Group virtual meeting on November 22. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Germany and France will lead a coalition of 20 countries to further develop Ukraine’s air defenses, and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov added that the coalition will help Ukraine further develop its ground-based air defense systems.[16] Zelensky noted on November 23 that improved Ukrainian air defenses will save lives and resources, allow Ukrainian citizens to return from abroad, and deprive Russia of the ability to terrorize Ukraine.[17] Ramstein Group members also agreed on issues such as additional equipment and weapons for Ukraine during the winter of 2023–24, mine trawling and other security measures in the Black Sea, Ukraine’s NATO Interoperability Roadmap, and additional security assistance packages from the US, Germany, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Finland, the Netherlands, and Estonia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO) Collective Security Council session in Minsk, Belarus on November 23 against the background of Armenia’s continued absence from recent CSTO events and exercises. Putin attended the session alongside Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, and the CSTO’s Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov.[19] The summit marked the end of Belarus’ chairmanship of the CSTO, and Lukashenko stated that Kazakhstan will hold the chairmanship beginning December 31, 2023. Putin thanked the session’s attendees for contributing to the regional defense structure and highlighted expanding military-technical cooperation between CSTO member states. Putin stated during his bilateral meeting with Rahmon that Russia will deliver two air defense divisions equipped with S-300 air defense systems to Tajikistan as part of the CSTO’s unified air defense system.[20]

Russian sources widely noted Armenia’s absence from the CSTO summit on November 23.[21] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan also did not attend the CSTO’s summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan on October 13 after Armenian forces refrained from participating in the CSTO “Indestructible Brotherhood-2023" exercises in early October.[22] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated on November 23 that the Kremlin regretted Armenia’s absence in Minsk but stated that Armenia remains “an ally and strategic partner” to Russia.[23] The Kremlin has previously attempted to dispel concerns about the deterioration of Russian-Armenian relations.[24] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Safaryan reiterated that Armenia is not considering leaving the CSTO or asking Russia to withdraw its forces from Russia’s 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, Armenia.

Chinese businesses, including a prominent state-owned Chinese construction firm, are reportedly working with Russian businessmen to plan the construction of an underwater tunnel that would connect Russia with occupied Crimea. The Washington Post reported on November 24 that it corroborated information in emails provided by Ukrainian intelligence services that detail the formation of a Russian-Chinese business consortium that aims to build an underwater tunnel along the Kerch Strait connecting Russia to occupied Crimea.[26] Vladimir Kalyuzhny, identified by the emails as the general director of the consortium, reportedly messaged the Crimean occupation representative to the Russian President, Georgy Muradov, and stated that he has a letter from Chinese business partners attesting to the Chinese Railway Construction Corporation’s (CRCC) readiness to participate as a general contractor for the tunnel project.[27] The CRCC is under the supervision of China’s state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and is one of China’s largest construction firms.[28] The emails reportedly indicate that the CRCC stipulated that its involvement would occur through an unaffiliated legal entity and that an unnamed Chinese bank was willing to convert dollar funds into rubles to fund the consortium's projects.[29] Kalyuzhny, Crimean occupation head Sergei Aksyonov, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov denied the Washington Post’s reporting.[30] The reported Russian interest in the tunnel project, which would likely take years to complete, is an additional indicator of deep Russian concern about the vulnerability of ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Russia and occupied Crimea along the Kerch Strait Bridge.

European states are responding to Russia's continued orchestration of an artificially created migrant crisis on its northwestern borders. The Finnish government announced on November 22 that Finland will close three more checkpoints on the Finnish-Russian border from November 23 to December 23, leaving only the northernmost checkpoint open.[31] Norwegian Prime Minister Johan Gahr Store stated on November 22 that Norway would also close its border to Russia “if necessary.“[32] Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur stated on November 23 that an increased number of migrants have also arrived at the Estonian-Russian border and that Russia is organizing the arrivals as part of an effort to “weaponize illegal immigration.”[33] Reuters reported on November 23 that the Estonian Interior Ministry stated that Estonia has undertaken preparations to close its border crossings with Russia if “the migration pressure from Russia escalates.”[34] Latvian Prime Minister Evika Silina stated on November 24 that Latvia has experienced a similar influx of migrants on its border with Russia, and Silina and Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo stated that these are Russian and Belarusian “hybrid attacks.”[35] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Finland on November 22 of “stirring up Russophobic sentiments” and interrupting border services that were an integral part of Russian–Finnish cooperation.[36] ISW previously assessed that Russia is employing a known hybrid warfare tactic similar to Russia’s and Belarus’s creation of a migrant crisis on the Polish border in 2021 that is likely similarly aimed at destabilizing NATO.

The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS) called prior Russian regional elections and the upcoming Russian presidential election illegitimate, likely in an effort to establish Girkin’s inevitable presidential election loss as a long-standing grievance. The RDS Congress issued a resolution on November 24 in which it claimed that unspecified actors are doing everything possible to preserve the existing system of power in Russia regardless of the political situation or Russian citizens’ will.[39] The RDS Congressional resolution issued a list of demands for Russian election reform and claimed that the RDS would not recognize any future elections as legitimate if the Russian government does not meet these demands.

Russian law enforcement reportedly detained about 700 migrants at a warehouse in Moscow Oblast and issued some military summonses, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service. Russian sources reported on November 24 that Russian police and Rosgvardia raided a Wildberries (Russia’s largest online retailer) warehouse in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast looking for migrants who had recently acquired Russian citizenship.[42] Russian law enforcement reportedly took about 135 detained migrants with Russian citizenship and transferred them to military registration and enlistment offices.[43] An unspecified Russian law enforcement official told Russian news outlet Interfax that Russian law enforcement conducted the raid as part of “Operation Migrant,” which aims to ensure that all naturalized citizens are registered for military service and issue them military summonses.[44] A Russian source claimed that Russian law enforcement also conducted a raid near the Wildberries warehouse on November 23, fined 16 migrants for violating migration protocols, and deported three.[45] The Wildberries press service stated this mass detention of migrants interrupted company’s shipments and put billions of dollars at risk.

Kremlin is reportedly renewing attempts to control all video surveillance systems in Russia, likely as part of ongoing efforts to intensify its tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repressions. The Russian Ministry of Digital Development proposed an initiative to create a unified platform for storing and processing footage from all video surveillance systems in Russia, which would reportedly cost 12 billion rubles (about $134 million).[47] Kommersant reported that there are about 1.2 million surveillance cameras in Russia, about half of which are currently accessible to the Russian government.[48] The Russian Ministry of Digital Development reportedly plans to increase the number of surveillance cameras across Russia to five million by 2030 and integrate all of them with facial and image recognition software.[49] Kommersant also noted that the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations attempted a similar initiative in 2020 to 2022 as part of the Hardware and Software Complex “Safe City” project aimed at standardizing and installing surveillance systems with artificial intelligence software in Russian regions but faced criticism from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Russian Ministry of Economy.


Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces began a renewed offensive effort towards Avdiivka on November 22, although likely with weaker mechanized capabilities than in the previous offensive waves that occurred in October.
• High-ranking Russian officials may be engaged in a wider scheme of forcibly adopting deported Ukrainian children.
• Ukraine’s Western allies declared their commitment to further develop Ukrainian air defense capabilities during the 17th Ramstein Group virtual meeting on November 22.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO) Collective Security Council session in Minsk, Belarus on November 23 against the background of Armenia’s continued absence from recent CSTO events and exercises.
• Chinese businesses, including a prominent state-owned Chinese construction firm, are reportedly working with Russian businessmen to plan the construction of an underwater tunnel that would connect Russia with occupied Crimea.
• European states are responding to Russia's continued orchestration of an artificially created migrant crisis on its northwestern borders.
• The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS) called prior Russian regional elections and the upcoming Russian presidential election illegitimate, likely in an effort to establish Girkin’s inevitable presidential election loss as a long-standing grievance.
• Russian law enforcement reportedly detained about 700 migrants at a warehouse in Moscow Oblast and issued some military summonses, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
• The Kremlin is reportedly renewing attempts to control all video surveillance systems in Russia, likely as part of ongoing efforts to intensify its tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repressions.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced in some areas.
• The Russian aviation industry is likely under significant constraints due to international sanctions and demands from the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• The Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine into Russian national and cultural identities.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/27/23 08:12 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 26, 2023
Nov 26, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 26, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 26, 2023, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:15pm ET on November 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed drone strikes on Ukraine on the night of November 25-26.
Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched nine Shahed-136/131 from Primorsko-Akhtarsk direction and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down eight drones.[1] Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev, like other Ukrainian officials on November 25, continued to praise the actions of Ukrainian mobile fire groups in intercepting Russian drones.[2] Nayev stated that mobile fire groups will receive foreign-made man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) in the near future.

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a large-scale drone strike on Russian territory, and Russian occupation officials accused Ukrainian forces of launching a strike on occupied Donetsk Oblast that resulted in widespread power outages. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down 24 Ukrainian drones over Moscow, Tula, Kaluga, Bryansk, and Smolensk oblasts on the night of November 25-26 and on the morning of November 26.[4] Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin stated that one drone crashed into an apartment building in Tula City after Russian air defenses shot it down.[5] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne, citing its own unnamed sources, reported that the overnight Ukrainian drone strike on Russia was a GUR special operation.[6] Russian sources, including Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin, also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a large artillery and HIMARS strike on power distribution substations in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight, causing electricity outages in many settlements and cities, including Donetsk City, Mariupol, and Manhush.

Russian forces reportedly complained about the vulnerability of Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities on the east bank. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 26 that personnel of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (of the newly formed 18th Combined Arms Army) often write to him complaining about the vulnerability of Russian logistics in the east bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson Oblast and 2km from the Dnipro River) to Ukrainian drone strikes.[8] The milblogger also agreed with another Russian milblogger’s previous claims that Russian forces in this area struggle with unit coordination as well as commanders’ negligence at the company and battalion levels.[9] The milblogger suggested that Russian forces near Krynky should create a separate anti-drone company staffed by personnel of the separate reconnaissance battalion of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division to protect Russian GLOCs.[10] Russian GLOCs on left bank Kherson Oblast, such as the E58 Antonivka-Sahy highway (about 5-8km away from the Dnipro River), are located close to the Dnipro River shoreline, making them vulnerable to Ukrainian interdiction. ISW previously reported that Russian milbloggers have repeatedly complained about Russian forces near Krynky suffering from problems, such as insufficient fire support, unit coordination, electronic warfare (EW), counterbattery, and air defense, but has observed that these reported problems do not always translate into significant battlefield effects.[11] Russian sources have continually claimed that Russian forces are unable to push Ukrainian forces out of Krynky and that Ukrainian forces are currently unable to make operationally significant advances in the east bank area.

Russia continues to face skilled and unskilled labor shortages amid inconsistent and contradictory Kremlin policies that disincentivize Russians who fled Russia and migrant workers from working in Russia while simultaneously trying to increase Russian industrial capacity and force generation. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed on November 25 that many Russians who left Russia because of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine are returning to Russia because they could not find work abroad.[13] Volodin warned that Russia is not “waiting with open arms” to accept returning Russians and claimed that they “committed treason against Russia, relatives, and friends.”[14] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger agreed with Volodin’s statements on November 26 but noted that Russia continues to face severe skilled labor shortages and characterized the number of returning Russians as “catastrophically small.”[15] The milblogger added that the labor shortages have increased the number of migrants seeking jobs in Russia and criticized Russian authorities for their “open door policy” on migration.[16] The Russian government appears to be struggling to reconcile incoherent and competing objectives by prioritizing crypto-mobilization efforts to send manpower to the frontline at the expense of Russia’s national labor force while simultaneously enforcing policies that restrict migrants’ prospects to work in Russia.[17] Russian law enforcement agencies are also coercing migrants both with and without Russian citizenship into Russian military service, further reducing the migrants’ ability to augment Russia’s labor force.[18] The Kremlin’s incoherent and contradictory policies seek to achieve mutually exclusive objectives of reducing negative shocks to Russia’s domestic labor force, while disincentivizing migrants from working in Russia and enticing Russians to return from abroad while not providing them opportunities to work and trying to recruit them into a war they fled. The poor implementation of these policies has not generated any apparent or imminent threats to the Russian economy or war effort at this time, however.


Key Takeaways:

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed drone strikes on Ukraine on the night of November 25-26.
The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a large-scale drone strike on Russian territory, and Russian occupation officials accused Ukrainian forces of launching a strike on occupied Donetsk Oblast that resulted in widespread power outages.
Russian forces reportedly complained about the vulnerability of Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities on the east bank.
Russia continues to face skilled and unskilled labor shortages amid inconsistent and contradictory Kremlin policies that disincentivize Russians who fled Russia and migrant workers from working in Russia while simultaneously trying to increase Russian industrial capacity and force generation.
Russian forces continued attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
The Russian Supreme Court ruled that certain Russian mobilized individuals have the right to serve in the Russian Alternative Civil Service (AKS) rather than on the front lines.
Russian occupation officials continue to establish programs aimed at indoctrinating Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine into Russian national and cultural identities.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 11/29/23 03:22 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 28, 2023
Nov 28, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 28, 2023

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Mason Clark

November 28, 2023, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated a two-part conception of Russian identity in a speech on November 28: a “Russian nation” – claimed to include Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians – at the center of Russian identity; and a wider “Russian world” including other non-East Slavic ethnicities in both modern Russia and the former territory of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire.
Putin made a lengthy speech on Russian identity at the World Russian People’s Council on November 28. Putin reiterated his previous false claims that the “Russian nation” and people are composed of ethnic Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians who were artificially and violently divided via policy miscalculations during and after the fall of the Soviet Union, arguing Russia (the state) should unify this “Russian nation.”[1] Putin defined the concept of the Russkiy Mir as a union of people who feel a spiritual connection to the “Motherland,” consider themselves to be native Russian speakers, and are carriers of Russian history and culture regardless of their national or religious affiliation. Putin, however, pointed out that there cannot be Russia (as a state) or the Russkiy Mir without ethnic Russians and implied that current Russian citizens and “all other peoples who have lived and are living in [Russia]” make up Russia. Putin geographically defined the Russkiy Mir as the Ancient Rus’ (Kyivan Rus), the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation, indicating that the Kremlin’s concept likely also includes “Russian compatriots” in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Putin also expanded his definition of “Western Russophobia” to include claimed aggression against other ethnicities such as Tatars, Chechens, Yakuts, and Buryats, in addition to ethnic Russians. Putin also called on Russian federal subjects to strengthen and protect Russia’s cultural and religious diversity. Putin previously outlined similar definitions of “ethnically Russian people” in his “Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” essay in July 2021.[2] Putin’s November 28 speech draws a clear distinction between Putin’s vision of the Russian nation as a “triune people“ composed of Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians, while other regional identities in Russia make up Russia as a country and shared “Russian world.“ Putin’s articulation of a Russian nation (including Ukrainians and dominated by Moscow) reiterates longstanding Kremlin justifications for its invasion of Ukraine and aggression toward its neighbors, and Putin’s claim that “western Russophobia” affects all the ethnicities in the Russian state is likely intended to rally support among Russian citizens who are not ethnically Russian for Putin’s war.

Head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill of Moscow stated that Russia needs to “significantly adjust” its migration policies for the “preservation of Russian culture,” highlighting the perceived superiority of ethnic Russians to other regional ethnicities
. Kirill argued during a speech at the World Russian People’s Council on November 28 that Russia’s current migration policies allow self-segregated migrant communities in Russia to create “closed ethnic enclaves” that “are a breeding ground for corruption, organized ethnic crime, illegal migration, terrorism, extremism, and tension within Russian society.”[3] Kirill stated that a migrant’s economic productivity or Russian citizenship does not free them from the requirement to respect Russian society, people, and traditions. Kirill warned that migrants are “changing the appearance of Russian cities” and “deforming” Russia’s singular linguistic, cultural, and legal traditions. Kirill added that Russian companies’ profits cannot be more important than the values of the Russian state. Kirill’s remarks follow several weeks of increasingly frequent anti-migrant rhetoric within Russian society and presentations of anti-migrant legislation by Russian officials.[4] Patriarch Kirill’s anti-migrant and xenophobic rhetoric is more closely aligned with Russian government policies towards migrants and non-Russian ethnicities in Russia than Putin’s claimed inclusivity under the ”Russian world.”

Russian officials appear to be attempting to further disenfranchise migrants living in Russia, likely to support ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into military service while also appeasing increasingly xenophobic Russian ultranationalists. Kremlin news wire TASS reported on November 28 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) drafted a proposed bill that would create a “controlled stay” regime in Russia for migrants who do not have legal grounds for staying in the country, including those with expired or nullified migration documents and those who have illegally entered Russia.[5] The bill will reportedly propose the following restrictions on migrants in Russia on the controlled stay regime: a ban on the migrants’ ability to register legal entities and as individual entrepreneurs, engage in real estate transactions, purchase and sell vehicles, drive a car, obtain a driver’s license, open a bank account, transfer money, or get married.[6] The draft bill will reportedly require migrants living under the regime to notify authorities about their residence and travel from Russia and will subject migrants who violate the restrictions to deportation or detention in a special facility.[7]

The restrictions of the proposed migration status likely aim to further alienate large numbers of migrants from economic and social life in Russia and make military service one of the few avenues for remaining in the country. Russian authorities are engaged in an ongoing widespread effort to coerce both migrants and naturalized Russian citizens into signing military contracts by threatening deportation and loss of citizenship.[8] Russian authorities are also engaged in a parallel effort to compel migrants to fight in Ukraine in exchange for Russian citizenship.[9] The proposed bill also likely aims to appease Russian ultranationalists who have increasingly called for harsh crackdowns on migrant communities and have bemoaned Russian migration policies.[10] One Russian ultranationalist called the restrictions half-measures and urged Russian authorities to enact even more restrictive policies on migrants.[11] The Kremlin appears to be continuing to struggle to reconcile efforts to increase Russian industrial capacity while also coercing migrants into military service and disincentivizing them from working in Russia.[12] Efforts to appease Russian ultranationalists may explain the increasingly inconsistent and contradictory Kremlin policies concerning the coercion of migrants into military service and the growing strains on the Russian domestic labor force.

The Kremlin continues to focus heavily on setting informational conditions for the upcoming 2024 Russian presidential elections and will likely formally commence Putin’s “campaign” on December 14. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 28 that Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko held a closed meeting in November 2023 with the heads of occupation administrations and unspecified Russian federal subjects during which he delivered directives for strengthening preparations for elections.[14] These directives reportedly include allocating social assistance to voters from regional budgets and the intensifying rhetoric about supposed positive trends in the Russian economy.[15] This reported focus on economic well-being is consistent with previous reports that the Kremlin intends to downplay the Russian war in Ukraine ahead of the elections.[16] Kiriyenko reportedly ordered occupation heads to issue Russian passports to 85 percent of residents in occupied Ukraine before the presidential elections in March 2024, likely to support efforts to falsely claim large voter turnout and legitimize the Kremlin’s control of occupied territories.[17] Russian Communist Party Head Gennady Zyuganov stated on November 28 that the Russian Federation Council will officially announce the start of the Russian presidential campaign on December 13, 2023.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14, and the official start of the campaign on December 13 further suggests that the Kremlin plans to use the tandem event as the rollout for Putin’s presidential campaign.

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on November 28 that unspecified actors poisoned GUR Head Kyrylo Budanov’s wife Marianna Budanova. Yusov stated that Budanova is currently undergoing treatment and could not confirm or deny reports of the poisoning of GUR employees.[21] Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported, citing unspecified sources, that unspecified actors also poisoned other GUR employees who are now undergoing treatment.[22] An unspecified Ukrainian special services official told Ukrainian outlet RBK-Ukraine that Budanov had not been poisoned.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law significantly increasing Russian federal expenditures in 2024, reportedly including a record level of defense spending. Putin signed the law on the 2024 federal budget and the planned budgets for 2025 and 2026 on November 27.[24] The 2024 federal budget accounts for 36.66 trillion rubles ($412.5 billion) in state expenses and a budget deficit of 1.6 trillion rubles ($9.5 billion).[25] The Russian Finance Ministry estimated in October 2023 that 2023 budget expenditures amounted to 32.5 trillion rubles ($365.7 billion), suggesting that the 2024 budget will account for a roughly 13 percent increase in overall expenditures.[26] Russian business journalists Farida Rustamova and Maksim Tovkalyo stated on November 15 that Russian authorities plan to spend 14 trillion rubles ($157.5 billion) on defense and law enforcement, representing 39 percent of all federal government spending.[27] Reuters reported on October 2 that the 2024 budget would allocate 10.78 trillion rubles ($121.3 billion) to national defense, representing 29.4 percent of the national budget.[28] The Russian Finance Ministry reportedly allocated 6.41 trillion rubles ($72.1 billion) to defense in 2023, although this number is likely higher given that a substantial portion of the Russian federal budget is still classified.[29] The roughly third or more of the federal budget going to defense spending, if true, will represent a record level of Russian defense spending.[30] The federal budget does not amount to the entirety of Russian spending on defense, however, as the Kremlin has relied on regional budgets and private business entities to augment funding for the ongoing war effort.[31] The draft budgets for 2025 and 2026 have roughly just as large expenditures as the 2024 budget, 34.38 trillion rubles ($387.9 billion) and 35.59 trillion rubles ($400.4 billion) respectively, and suggests that the Kremlin is planning to allocate large portions of its expenditures to support a long war effort in Ukraine.

A prominent Russian milblogger continued to highlight mid-level command problems among Russian forces operating on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities and the vulnerability of Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) on the east bank. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian personnel in smaller units such as the 1822nd Battalion did not know their commanding officers or details about their supervisory structure “for a long time.”[33] The Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified company commanders in the 1822nd Battalion continually ordered units to capture islands in the Dnipro River Delta despite suffering heavy losses and conducting minimal casualty evacuations and that the 1822nd Battalion’s personnel could not contact a higher-level commander to address their complaints.[34] The milblogger noted that the Russian military command ordered elements of the 1822nd Battalion to capture islands in the Dnipro River as a punishment while contract soldiers remain on the east bank, suggesting that the 1822nd is mainly staffed with mobilized personnel.[35] The milblogger claimed that ”respected authorities” are investigating problems in the 1822nd Battalion and that mid-level Russian commanders are attempting to identify the personnel who originally voiced their complaints.[36] The milblogger concluded that Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky “inherited a difficult legacy” in reference to persistent problems among Russian forces operating in the east bank of Kherson Oblast.

A Russian insider source claimed on November 28 that Russian authorities detained at least three additional Moscow-based Federal Security Service (FSB) employees in connection with a 5-billion-ruble ($55.6 million) bribery case. The insider source claimed that Russian authorities detained “Ushakov” and two unnamed “Directorate M” employees.[38] The source claimed that Russian authorities are also holding two of the FSB’s “Directorate T” employees in a pre-trial detention center and are investigating other senior FSB employees as part of the same investigation. ISW reported on November 17 that Russian authorities detained several FSB employees on November 10 and 16 for accepting a bribe to dismiss a corruption case against the Merlion Group of Companies, a Russian IT company and technology distributor.[39] ISW cannot confirm the most recent detentions, but they are consistent with the previously reported detentions.

Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Brigadier General Mehdi Farhi announced on November 28 that Russia and Iran finalized the purchase of Russian aircraft.[40] Iranian news agency Tasnim, citing Farhi, reported that Russia will provide Iran with an unspecified number of Su-35 fighter jets, Mi-28 attack helicopters, and Yak-130 combat training aircraft. Iranian media and the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technology reported in early September that the Iranian Air Force had received Russian Yak-130s based on social media footage.[41] Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty observed that Iran last bought foreign aircraft from the Soviet Union in 1990.


Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated a two-part conception of Russian identity in a speech on November 28: a “Russian nation” – claimed to include Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians – at the center of Russian identity; and a wider ‘Russian world” including other non-East Slavic ethnicities in both modern Russia and the former territory of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire.
• Head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill of Moscow stated that Russia needs to “significantly adjust” its migration policies for the “preservation of • • • Russian culture,” highlighting the perceived superiority of ethnic Russians to other regional ethnicities.
• Russian officials appear to be attempting to further disenfranchise migrants living in Russia, likely to support ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into military service while also appeasing increasingly xenophobic Russian ultranationalists.
• The Kremlin continues to focus heavily on setting informational conditions for the upcoming 2024 Russian presidential elections and will likely formally commence Putin’s “campaign” on December 14.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on November 28 that unspecified actors poisoned GUR Head Kyrylo Budanov’s wife Marianna Budanova.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law significantly increasing Russian federal expenditures in 2024, reportedly including a record level of defense spending.
•A prominent Russian milblogger continued to highlight mid-level command problems among Russian forces operating on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities and the vulnerability of Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) on the east bank.
• A Russian insider source claimed on November 28 that Russian authorities detained at least three additional Moscow-based Federal Security Service (FSB) employees in connection with a 5-billion-ruble ($55.6 million) bribery case.
• Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Brigadier General Mehdi Farhi announced on November 28 that Russia and Iran finalized the purchase of Russian aircraft.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kupyansk and Avdiivka.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov announced on November 27 that Chechnya formed two new regiments and one battalion subordinated under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and an operational battalion subordinated under Rosgvardia.
• Occupation administrations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts signed an agreement to develop closer economic ties with Rostov and Voronezh oblasts on November 28.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/01/23 09:00 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 30, 2023
Nov 30, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 30, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, George Barros, and Frederick W Kagan

November 30, 2023, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:40pm ET on November 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A recent Russian opinion poll indicates that the number of Russians who fully support the war in Ukraine has almost halved since February 2023 and that more Russians support a withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine than do not.
Independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles stated that data from its October 17-22, 2023, telephone survey indicates that respondents who are “consistent” supporters of the war - those who expressed support for the war, do not support a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war aims, and think that Russia should prioritize military spending - decreased from 22 percent to 12 percent between February 2023 and October 2023.[1] Chronicles stated that 40 percent of respondents supported a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war aims, and that this number has remained consistent at about 39 to 40 percent throughout 2023. Chronicles stated that 33 percent of respondents did not support a Russian withdrawal and favored a continuation of the war and noted that this number has been consistently decreasing from 47 percent in February 2023 and 39 percent in July 2023. Recent polling by the independent Russian polling organization Levada Center published on October 31 indicated that 55 percent of respondents believed that Russia should begin peace negotiations whereas 38 percent favored continuing the war.

The Russian war in Ukraine has created new social tensions and exacerbated existing ones within Russia, which remain highly visible in the Russian information space despite ongoing Kremlin censorship efforts. Relatives of mobilized personnel continue making widespread complaints and appeals for aid for mobilized personnel despite reported Russian efforts to censor such complaints.[3] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on November 29 that Russians have sent over 180,000 complaints about issues concerning the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to the Russian Presidential Office for Working with Citizens’ Appeals since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[4] The majority of these complaints reportedly concern payments to soldiers, mobilization status, missing persons, and poor medical care.[5] The Kremlin has also been capitalizing on recent ethnic tensions in Russia to support ongoing force generation measures and appeal to Russian ultranationalists, establishing a cycle that keeps these tensions at the forefront of ultranationalist dialogue.[6] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that protest activity and social tension are increasing in Russia, particularly in western Russia, due to the war in Ukraine and that the top echelons of Russian leadership are discussing these tensions.[7] The GUR noted that increasing crime, alcohol abuse, inflation, and high consumer goods prices also contribute to rising social tensions, and many of these factors are likely exacerbated by the continued Russian war in Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin has consistently failed to place Russian society on a wartime footing to support the Russian war effort, and the shifting poll numbers and exacerbated social tensions indicate that this failure is having a tangible effect on Russian society ahead of the 2024 Russian presidential elections.

The Kremlin is likely concerned about how changing Russian perceptions of the Russian war in Ukraine will affect the outcome of the March 2024 Russian presidential election and is implementing measures to ensure that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actual electoral support does not rest on Russian battlefield successes. Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly center his presidential campaign on Russia’s alleged domestic stability and increased criticism of the West instead of focusing on the war.[10] Putin and other Russian government officials have already signaled their intention to intensify censorship efforts by claiming that some Russian citizens who left Russia and others still in Russia have begun efforts to discredit the upcoming Russian presidential elections and that Russia will do “everything necessary” to prevent election meddling.[11] Russian authorities have also attempted to consolidate control over the Russian information space and have intensified measures encouraging self-censorship.[12] Russian milbloggers suggested that Russian political officials financing Telegram channels ordered milbloggers to cease debates and criticisms about the Russian military prior to the Russian presidential elections.[13] The Kremlin has likely attempted to shore up popular support for Putin throughout Russia by establishing a network of “proxies” to campaign on Putin’s behalf.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov confirmed on November 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14.[15] Putin will likely use the tandem event to roll out his still unannounced presidential campaign following the official start of the Russian presidential campaign season on December 13.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably did not promote Kremlin information operations feigning interest in negotiations during his speech at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in North Macedonia on November 30, and instead promoted escalatory rhetoric about Moldova. Lavrov claimed that the OSCE is turning into an appendage of NATO and the European Union (EU) and said that the organization is "on the brink of an abyss.”[17] Lavrov’s speech notably did not include a long-standing Russian information operation aimed at portraying Russia as willing to negotiate with Ukraine.[18] Lavrov previously claimed on November 27 that the West is currently trying to "freeze" the war to gain time and rearm Ukraine for future attacks on Russia.[19] The OSCE is meant to serve as a neutral platform in negotiations, among other functions, and would have provided an appropriate diplomatic forum for Lavrov to promote negotiations with the West, but Lavrov notably made no such overture. Russia previously weaponized the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine to support Russian information operations to obfuscate Russia’s participation in its initial hybrid war against Ukraine, which Russia began in 2014, and to support Russian operations.[20] Russian forces reportedly commandeered OSCE off-road vehicles to support Russian combat operations in Luhansk Oblast in January 2023.[21] Lavrov’s criticism of the OSCE reflects Russia’s continuing unwillingness to engage in serious cooperation with the OSCE that would be necessary to start meaningful negotiations. Lavrov used his speech to threaten Moldova by claiming that it would become the “next victim in the West’s hybrid war against Russia.”[22]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov also argued that negotiations with Ukraine would be disadvantageous to Russia on November 29 due to Russia’s more "strategically and economically advantageous position.”[23] Kadyrov claimed that Russia must make Ukraine’s leadership surrender. Kadyrov does not speak for the Kremlin, but his statement reflects a wider shift in Russian rhetoric portraying a pause in Russian offensive operations as detrimental to the prospects for a Russian victory in Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted multiple series of missile and drone strikes on Ukraine that struck civilian infrastructure on November 29 and 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched eight S-300 missiles and 20 Shahed-131/136 drones on the night of November 29-30.[24] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces downed 14 of the drones.[25] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed the first wave of Shahed drones over Odesa Oblast and that Russian forces then launched drones in several directions towards northern and western Ukraine, including Khmelnytskyi Oblast.[26] Ihnat continued to praise the work of Ukrainian mobile fire groups in shooting down Russian drones.[27] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that a Russian drone damaged a historic preserved building in Odesa Oblast.[28] Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko stated that S-300 missiles struck residential buildings and police departments in Pokrovsk, Novohrodivka, and Myrnohrad in Donetsk Oblast.[29] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on November 29 that there were several explosions near the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant within a 20-minute period and warned that several nuclear sites in Ukraine are exposed to Russian strikes.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces launched seven Shahed drones during the day on November 30 and that Ukrainian forces shot down five of the drones.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian military bureaucracy is impeding Russian drone usage and acquisition among Russian forces operating on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities on the east bank. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) warehouses storing various types of drones and electronic warfare (EW) equipment are full despite drone shortages among Russian forces operating on the left bank of Kherson Oblast.[32] The milblogger claimed that Russian authorities are not interested in reading through applications and filling out the paperwork associated with sending new drones to the frontline.[33] The milblogger also complained that Russian personnel have to “go through seven circles of hell” in order to request a replacement drone.[34] Another prominent milblogger outlined the seven pieces of information that Russian units need to submit to the Russian military to record the destruction of a drone and request a replacement, which include proving that the drone had been destroyed during normal weather conditions and that Russian forces were not using electronic warfare systems at the time of the drone’s destruction.[35] Other Russian milbloggers recently complained on November 25 that military bureaucracy at the brigade and division level is preventing Russian frontline soldiers from applying for drones directly from the MoD.[36] ISW has previously reported that Russian milbloggers have complained about various problems among Russian forces operating on the east bank of Kherson Oblast but has observed that these alleged problems do not necessarily translate into significant battlefield effects.[37] The founder of a Ukrainian drone company, Maksym Sheremet, told Forbes Ukraine in an article published on November 29 that Russian companies manufacture approximately 300,000 first-person viewer (FPV) drones per month.

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) was reportedly involved in an explosion that caused disruptions on a section of the East Siberian Railway connecting Russia and China on the night of November 29. Russian Railways and the East Siberian Transport Prosecutor’s Office stated that a freight train caught fire in the Severomuysky Tunnel on the Itykit-Okusikan section of the East Siberian Railway in the Republic of Buryatia on the night of November 29.[39] Russian Railways stated that the fire did not interrupt train traffic, but Russian opposition outlet Baza stated that 10 trains were delayed.[40] Baza reported that two railway cars carrying diesel fuel detonated, igniting six total railway cars.[41] Several Ukrainian outlets reported that Ukrainian intelligence sources stated that four explosive devices detonated on the railway as part of an SBU operation and that the railway line, which is the only major railway line between Russia and China and is used to transport military supplies, is “paralyzed.”[42] Russian opposition outlet Astra stated that Russia uses the railway to transport weapons from North Korea.[43] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that disruptions in railway lines in Russia are becoming more frequent and are causing serious logistics complications due to the resulting delays.

The Kremlin continues to advance its strategic slow-burn effort to absorb Belarus through the Union State structure. The Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Belarusian Ministry of Economy agreed to a new package of Union State integration measures for 2024-2026 to advance the Kremlin’s effort to absorb Belarus through the Union State on November 29.[45] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will likely sign the integration package during an upcoming Union State Supreme State Council meeting, possibly in 2024.[46] Lukashenko has previously resisted the Kremlin’s efforts to further integrate Belarus into the Union State, although recent events, including the death of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and the collapse of the June 24, 2023 agreement between Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko that gave Wagner sanctuary in Belarus, have likely degraded Lukashenko’s ability to resist further Union State integration efforts.[47] Lukashenko recently portrayed himself as the guarantor of Belarusian statehood ahead of Belarusian parliamentary elections in 2024 and presidential elections in 2025, stating on November 10 that incoming young Belarusian leaders should ascend to office with the goal of “saving the country [Belarus].”


Key Takeaways:

• A recent Russian opinion poll indicates that the number of Russians who fully support the war in Ukraine has almost halved since February 2023 and that more Russians support a withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine than do not.
• The Russian war in Ukraine has created new social tensions and exacerbated existing ones within Russia, which remain highly visible in the Russian information space despite ongoing Kremlin censorship efforts.
• The Kremlin is likely concerned about how changing Russian perceptions of the Russian war in Ukraine will affect the outcome of the March 2024 Russian presidential election and is implementing measures to ensure that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actual electoral support does not rest on Russian battlefield successes.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov confirmed on November 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably did not promote Kremlin information operations feigning interest in negotiations during his speech at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in North Macedonia on November 30, and instead promoted escalatory rhetoric about Moldova.
• Russian forces conducted multiple series of missile and drone strikes on Ukraine that struck civilian infrastructure on November 29 and 30.
• Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian military bureaucracy is impeding Russian drone usage and acquisition among Russian forces operating on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities on the east bank.
• The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) was reportedly involved in an explosion that caused disruptions on a section of the East Siberian Railway connecting Russia and China on the night of November 29.
• The Kremlin continues to advance its strategic slow-burn effort to absorb Belarus through the Union State structure.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances.
• A Ukrainian military observer stated that Russian authorities’ plan to form two tank battalions in about four months using equipment from two long-term weapons and equipment stores indicates a lack of combat-ready weapons and military equipment.
• Occupation and Russian government officials continue efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth in occupied Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-30-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/03/23 04:44 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 2, 2023
Dec 2, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 2, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 2, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:45pm ET on December 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Poor weather conditions continue to slow the pace of Ukrainian and Russian combat operations across the entire frontline but have not completely halted them.
Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that Russian forces actively use aviation in the Bakhmut direction when the weather permits it.[1] Fityo added that weather does not significantly affect Russian artillery fire in the Bakhmut direction. Russian milbloggers, claimed on December 1 that strong winds near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast prevented Russian forces from using drones and artillery over the past two days, however.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed that although light rain allows Russian forces to conduct aerial reconnaissance near Verbove (9km east of Robotyne) the muddy terrain makes it challenging for infantry and wheeled vehicles to advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[3] The milblogger added that Russian forces can only move on tracked vehicles and that Ukrainian forces continue intense artillery fire despite the poor weather conditions in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov amplified footage on December 2 that shows muddy roads on the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line in western Zaporizhia Oblast and claimed that these conditions have practically immobilized Ukrainian wheeled vehicles, forcing Ukrainian troops to conduct infantry-only attacks.[4] Rogov amplified additional footage showing an infestation of rats and mice in a Ukrainian trench in Zaporizhia Oblast, which he claimed was the result of the cold weather in the region.

Russian forces launched another series of Shahed 136/131 drone and missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine overnight on December 1-2. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 11 Shahed drones from Cape Chauda in occupied Crimea and a Kh-59 cruise missile from the airspace over occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[6] The Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 10 Shahed drones over Odesa Oblast and the Kh-59 cruise missile over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[7] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that a Russian Shahed drone struck an unspecified infrastructure object in Odesa Oblast.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Shahed drones targeted the Chornomorsk and Kiliya ports in Odesa Oblast.[9] The milblogger added that Russian forces also conducted missile strikes, including at least one Iskander ballistic missile strike, in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. ISW cannot verify the milblogger’s claims.

Ukrainian and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials reported that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) completely disconnected from all external power sources for five and a half hours on the night of December 1 to 2, marking the plant’s eighth complete black out — all under Russian occupation. The Ukrainian Energy Ministry and the IAEA reported on December 2 that the ZNPP lost connection with both of its operable external power lines from 0230 to around 0800 local time on December 2. The ZNPP, during the black out, automatically switched to diesel generators to cool its reactors and power essential functions.[10] The IAEA reported that the power loss disrupted the coolant pumps of reactor no. 4 and that the ZNPP is currently bringing the reactor back to a hot shutdown state to continue generating steam for ZNPP operations and provide heat for Enerhodar. Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom President Petro Kotin stated that Russia is not interested in the safety of the ZNPP, as evidenced by Russian authorities' failure to follow the norms and rules of nuclear and radiation safety.[11] The IAEA stated that an external grid failure far away from the ZNPP caused the power failure.[12] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that this most recent power outage is “yet another reminder” about the plant’s precarious nuclear safety and security situation.[13]

The ZNPP’s complete power outage occurred as Russia continued longstanding efforts to compel the IAEA and the international community to normalize Russia’s occupation of the ZNPP.[14] Russian state nuclear energy company Rosatom claimed on December 2 that Rosatom Head Alexey Likhachev and Grossi agreed on the sidelines of the United Nations (UN) Climate Conference to hold full-scale consultations about the safety and security of the ZNPP in early 2024.[15] Neither the IAEA nor Grossi have confirmed Rosatom’s claim of future consultations as of this publication.

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three third party entities involved in the transport of Russian crude oil above the G7 price cap. OFAC announced on December 1 that it imposed sanctions on two United Arab Emirates-based and one Liberian-based shipping companies that own vessels that carried Russian crude oil above $70 barrel after the G7’s $60 price cap took effect in December 2022.[16] Russia relies on a “shadow fleet” of oil tankers without insurance from Western countries to skirt the G7’s price cap on Russian crude oil and petroleum products.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) signaled that it likely intends to continue relying on crypto-mobilization recruitment schemes for any potential increase in the size of the Russian military. The Russian MoD responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s December 1 decree increasing the size of the Russian military and stated that the Russian military is implementing the increase in stages “on account of citizens who express a desire to perform military service under a contract.”[18] This language may refer to volunteers, whom the MoD has courted through a widespread crypto-mobilization effort in Russia, and suggests that the MoD may use volunteer recruitment for long-term force generation.[19] The MoD clarified that Putin’s decree does not portend a significant increase in the number of conscripted Russians nor a second wave of mobilization.[20] Putin‘s decree, which formally increased the size of the Russian military from 2.039 million personnel to 2.209 million personnel and total Russian combat personnel from 1.15 million to 1.32 million, is likely an official acknowledgment of the actual end strength of the Russian military and not an order for an immediate increase.[21] Partial mobilization, ongoing widespread crypto-mobilization efforts, the number of Russian personnel concluding military service, and Russian casualties in Ukraine can plausibly account for the net gain of 170,000 Russian combat personnel between the August 22 decree on the size of the Russian military and the December 1 decree.

The Kremlin’s policy towards the role of migrants in bolstering Russia’s industrial capacity continues to be inconsistent. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 2 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) is preparing a bill that will require Russian authorities to fingerprint and identify foreigners immediately upon entry to Russia and again upon exit.[22] Russian MVD Migration Affairs Head Valentina Kazakova previously stated that Russian officials will begin a trial run of fingerprinting and photographing migrants arriving at Moscow airports.[23] Russia already fingerprints and photographs migrants, although not immediately upon entry.[24] These new measures are not unusual immigration and travel policies but are notable in this case because they are likely a part of a wider set of anti-migration policies.[25] A Russian economic news aggregator claimed on December 2 that the Russian government has set a quota of 155,900 visa permits for skilled migrant workers in 2024, a 32,000 increase from 2023.[26] The economic news aggregator claimed that the Russian government is sending invitations and work permits to migrant workers, primarily those working in mining and construction.[27] This reported increase in migrant workers is at odds with a series of federal and regional policies in Russia that restrict migrants’ prospects for work.[28] The Kremlin increasingly appears to be pursuing mutually exclusive goals of relying on migrants to strengthen Russia’s strained industrial capacity while also pursuing force generation efforts and politically motivated anti-migration policies that reduce migrants’ ability to augment Russia’s labor force.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s November 30 threat against Moldova may have emboldened certain pro-Russian actors to attempt to sow political instability and division in Moldova.[30] The pro-Russian head of Moldova’s Gagauzia region, Yevgenia Gutsul, claimed on December 1 that Moldovan state energy company Moldovagaz blocked Gagauzia from receiving gas from a Turkish supplier that the pro-Russian Gagauzia regional government had negotiated outside of state contracts.[31] Gutsul claimed that Moldovagaz sells gas at a higher price per cubic meter than the Turkish partner and accused Moldova of ignoring Gaguazia’s calls to provide its residents with cheap gas for the upcoming winter. Moldovan President Maia Sandu notably denied Gutsul’s request for a spot in her cabinet on November 13 because Gutsul is a member of the banned Shor political party, which Russia used to promote pro-Russian interests and political instability in Moldova until the Moldovan Constitutional Court banned the party in June 2023.[32] Shor Party head Ilhan Shor used the party to spark protests in September 2022-June 2023 ultimately aimed at toppling the current Moldovan government.[33] Moldovagaz Head Vadim Ceban stated that Moldovagaz does not have the physical or legal ability to block gas supplies at the Gagauzia border and that Moldovagaz has not received the necessary documentation to switch Gagauzia’s natural gas suppliers.[34] Sandu stripped Moldovan Party of Regions head Alexander Kalinin of his Moldovan citizenship on November 27 due to his extensive support of the Russian war in Ukraine, and Kalinin announced efforts on December 1 to recruit Moldovan volunteers to fight alongside the Russian military in Ukraine.[35] Russia conducted a likely campaign to destabilize Moldova in early 2023, and Russia may seek to revamp these efforts to distract international attention from the war in Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

• Poor weather conditions continue to slow the pace of Ukrainian and Russian combat operations across the entire frontline but have not completely halted them.
• Russian forces launched another series of Shahed 136/131 drone and missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine overnight on December 1-2.
• Ukrainian and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials reported that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) completely disconnected from all external power sources for five and a half hours on the night of December 1 to 2, marking the plant’s eighth complete black out - all under Russian occupation.
• The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three third party entities involved in the transport of Russian crude oil above the G7 price cap.
• The Russia Ministry of Defense (MoD) signaled that it likely intends to continue relying on crypto-mobilization recruitment schemes for any potential increase in the size of the Russian military.
• The Kremlin’s policy towards the role of migrants in bolstering Russia’s industrial capacity continues to be inconsistent.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s November 30 threat against Moldova may have emboldened certain pro-Russian actors to attempt to sow political instability and division in Moldova.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka.
Radio Svoboda’s “Schemes” and “Systems” investigative projects published a joint investigation on December 1 detailing how the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) created the “Redut” private military company (PMC) to recruit thousands of Russians for irregular combat service in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian partisans reportedly conducted a partisan attack against Russian military personnel in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, on December 1.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/05/23 04:26 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 4, 2023
Dec 4, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 4, 2023, 5:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invawasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on December 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia continues to reckon with the economic ramifications of labor shortages partially resulting from the war in Ukraine.
Russian state media outlets reported on December 4 that Russian consulting company Yakov and Partners has recorded increased labor shortages in domestic production that will likely grow to a deficit of two to four million workers by 2030, 90 percent of whom are likely to be semi-skilled workers in critical industries.[1] Yakov and Partners noted that this supply shortage will place upward pressure on workers’ wages that will outpace GDP growth and make Russian companies even less attractive to foreign investment.[2] Russian outlet RBK cited Russian economic experts who stated that this problem can only be resolved through improved interactions between Russian businesses and the state, including through dedicated programs to repatriate Russians who fled the country due to the war and programs to attract "highly-qualified" migrants from other countries.[3] ISW previously assessed that Russia continues to face shortages in both skilled and unskilled labor, a problem that is further compounded by the Kremlin's inconsistent and often inflammatory messaging about Russians who fled Russia because of the war and against migrant workers within Russia.[4] The Russian economy will likely continue to grapple with the Kremlin's competing desires to bolster Russia's force generation and industrial capacity while simultaneously disenfranchising key labor groups, which is likely to lead to continued concerns over Russian economic output and potential resulting social grievances.

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 3 to 4. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched 23 Shahed-131/136 from Cape Chauda in occupied Crimea and one Kh-59 cruise missile from occupied Kherson Oblast and stated that Ukrainian forces shot down 18 Shaheds and the Kh-59 missile.[5] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that the Russian military has increased its production of Shahed drones, which are likely to be the main systems that Russian forces will use to target Ukrainian energy infrastructure throughout winter 2023-2024.[6] Ihnat also reported that Russian forces are increasing their "strategic stockpile" of missiles.

Ukraine's Western partners continue efforts to provide Ukraine with military and economic support. German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced on December 3 that it won a contract to provide Ukraine with €142 million worth of 155mm artillery rounds, which Germany will deliver to Ukraine in 2025.[8] Rheinmetall stated that it will deliver around 40,000 rounds to Ukraine from a separate order in 2024. British outlet The Times highlighted Ukraine's use of British-provided Martlet lightweight missiles to deter a large-scale Russian Shahed drone strike on Kyiv City in late November 2023.[9] The Times noted that the British Army trained Ukrainian operators on Martlet systems in the UK earlier this year. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov additionally met with his Belgian counterpart, Ludivine Dedonder, on December 4 to further develop the bilateral Ukrainian-Belgian relationship, particularly in regard to building out Ukraine's defense industrial base with Belgian support.[10] Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Andriy Yermak spoke with US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan about the upcoming Ukrainian-American conference on arms production that will take place on December 6 and 7 in Washington, DC.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko discussed deepening Belarusian-Chinese relations with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, China on December 4. Lukashenko stated that the “historical increase in the level of [Belarusian-Chinese] relations” has created an impetus for further deepening bilateral cooperation.[12] Lukashenko reiterated Belarus’ role as a “reliable” partner to China and expressed support for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Chinese Community of a Common Destiny concept.[13] Lukashenko and Xi discussed strengthening strategic and economic cooperation, and their meeting reportedly lasted three times longer than planned.[14] Xi stated that he opposes unspecified external interference in Belarusian internal affairs and expressed support for strengthening cooperation with Belarus through the UN and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).[15] Chinese news outlet Xinhua stated that Lukashenko and Xi “exchanged views on the Ukraine crisis.“[16] Lukashenko and Xi signed several documents promoting industrial, technical, and scientific cooperation that may have facilitated Russian sanctions evasion by channeling Chinese aid to Russia through Belarus during Lukashenko’s previous visit to China in March 2023.

Kremlin-backed United Russia State Duma deputies and Federation Council senators proposed a bill to introduce criminal punishments for leaking personal data, likely as part of ongoing efforts to control the Russian information space ahead of the March 2024 Russian presidential elections. The United Russia legislators proposed a bill that would allow Russian authorities to sentence individuals to up to four years in prison for storing, transferring, or collecting personal data “obtained illegally,” and up to five years if the information contains unspecified “special categories of data” or personal biometric data.[18] The bill also stipulates that Russian authorities could punish someone with up to six years in prison for ”illegal use of personal data for selfish interest” and could punish someone with up to eight years in prison and a two million ruble (about $21,850) fine for transferring ”illegally acquired” personal data abroad.[19] Russian opposition outlet Agentstvo Novosti reported that the bill’s definition of personal data includes an individual’s first name, surname, patronymic, address, phone number, address, and email.[20] Agentstvo Novosti noted that the bill’s implementation would criminalize database analysis – one of the few tools left to independent Russian investigative journalists.[21] The Russian government has been prosecuting Russian internet service companies Yandex and Google under laws about illegal storing of personal data of Russian users likely to gain further control over internet companies operating in Russia to better track Russians’ personal information and online data ahead of the Russian 2024 presidential election.[22] The bill is also likely part of ongoing Russian government efforts to restrict Russian citizens’ access to information on the internet and the activities of opposition figures and media outlets.

The Kremlin likely continues efforts to insert itself into power vacuums in several African countries as Wagner Group elements continue to operate in the Central African Republic (CAR). Nigerien state media stated that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Nigerien junta Defense Minister Lieutenant General Salifou Modi signed a document strengthening defense cooperation on December 4 after meeting on December 3 in Niamey, Niger.[24] Reuters reported on December 4 that the Nigerien junta also revoked its military partnership with the European Union (EU), further isolating post-coup Niger from the EU.[25] Yevkurov previously met with Malian junta head Assimi Goita, Malian junta Defense Minister Sadio Camara, and Modi on September 16 and with Burkinabe junta head Ibrahim Traore on September 1.[26] Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali previously created the Alliance of Sahel States, a collective defense pact, on September 16, following Yevkurov's visits with the junta heads in September.[27] A French open-source intelligence project assessed on December 4 that Russia is using two structures – the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled ”Africa Corps” and the newly formed, pseudo local media outlet called “African Initiative” that employs former Wagner Group fighters – to establish a foothold in Burkina Faso.[28] ISW previously reported that the Russian MoD has begun to publicly recruit for the ”Africa Corps,” which is aimed at subsuming Wagner operations in Africa after the MoD made failed attempts to directly recruit former Wagner personnel.[29] The New York Times also reported on November 26 that Wagner maintains a major presence in the Central African Republic (CAR) and controls the largest gold mine and over 1,000 personnel in the country, including personnel likely working as security for CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadera and other senior personnel running the Russia House cultural center in Bangui.[30] The Kremlin is likely attempting to expand Russian MoD-controlled “Africa Corps” operations in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, as well as to expand Russian information operations on the continent in part to counter Wagner operations in the CAR.

Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev confirmed on December 4 the death of Russian 14th Army Corps Deputy Commander Major General Vladimir Zavadsky in Ukraine.[31] Various Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed on November 28 and 29 that Zavadsky died after stepping on a mine in Kherson Oblast on November 28.


Key Takeaways:

• Russia continues to reckon with the economic ramifications of labor shortages partially resulting from the war in Ukraine.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue efforts to provide Ukraine with military and economic support.
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko discussed deepening Belarusian-Chinese relations with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, China on December 4.
• Kremlin-backed United Russia State Duma deputies and Federation Council senators proposed a bill to introduce criminal punishments for leaking personal data, likely as part of ongoing efforts to control the Russian information space ahead of the March 2024 Russian presidential elections.
• The Kremlin likely continues efforts to insert itself into power vacuums in several African countries as Wagner Group elements continue to operate in the Central African Republic (CAR).
• Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev confirmed on December 4 the death of Russian 14th Army Corps Deputy Commander Major General Vladimir Zavadsky in Ukraine.
•Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on December 4.
• Select Russian Duma deputies appear to be at odds over the issue of extending Russian conscript service.
• Russian Presidential Administration Head for Domestic Policy Andrei Yarin reportedly visited occupied Ukraine as part of ongoing efforts to legitimize Russian authority over occupied Ukraine ahead of the March 2024 Russian presidential election.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/06/23 02:19 AM


Russia Loses Over 9,000 Troops to Capture Ukraine Wasteland

https://www.newsweek.com/russia-loses-9000-troops-capture-ukraine-wasteland-1849786
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/07/23 02:57 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 6, 2023
Dec 6, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF







Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 6, 2023

Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 6, 2023, 6:50pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on December 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov credited Western security assistance for empowering Ukrainian forces to liberate half of the territory that Russia occupied since February 24, 2022.[1]
Umerov credited Western security assistance for previous Ukrainian counteroffensive success during an interview with Fox News on December 5 and stated that the Ukrainian forces have a plan for 2024.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 8 that the Ukrainian forces have planned for several paths of future advance in 2024 to liberate more of the occupied territories.[3] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine must liberate strategically vital areas still under Russian occupation to ensure Ukraine’s long-term security and economic viability.[4] Umerov also stated that Ukraine plans to conduct all calculations for procurement, acquisition, planning, and operations according to NATO standards and that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) first priority is Ukraine’s accession to NATO.[5] The adoption of NATO standards throughout the Ukrainian military and defense establishment will facilitate NATO oversight of current and future Western security assistance to Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a notably large series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 5 to 6. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 50 Shahed-131/136 from Kursk Oblast and Cape Chauda in occupied Crimea and that Ukrainian air defenses downed 41 Shaheds.[6] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down Russian drones in Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, and Zhytomyr oblasts.

Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to meet with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman in a series of bilateral meetings on December 6 Putin and Al Nahyan discussed Russia’s role in OPEC+, the construction of a Russian school in the UAE, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas war, and other bilateral issues during a meeting in the UAE.[8] Putin stated during his meeting with Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia that Russian-Saudi relations reached a new level over the past seven years under the guidance of Mohammed bin Salman and his father.[9] Putin noted the “very good” political and economic relations between the two countries and the need to “exchange information and assessments” about what is happening in the region, likely referring to the Israel-Hamas War. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Putin and Mohammed bin Salman met for three hours and paid particular attention to the North-South transport corridor and energy issues.[10] Putin’s meetings in the UAE and Saudi Arabia and upcoming meeting with Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi on December 7 are likely focused on strengthening Russia’s position with the Gulf States while continuing to solidify the deepening Russian-Iranian security partnership.

Russian oil revenues continue to increase due to a concerted Russian effort to skirt the G7 price cap on Russian crude oil and petroleum products. Bloomberg reported on December 6 that Russia made $11.3 billion in revenue from the sale of crude oil and petroleum products in October 2023, the highest level of Russian oil and petroleum revenue since May 2022 and above the monthly Russian oil and petroleum revenues in the year before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[11] The October 2023 oil and petroleum revenues reportedly represented 31 percent of revenues in the Russian federal budget for the month.[12] The G7 and the EU introduced a $60 price cap on Russian crude oil and price caps for other Russian petroleum products in December 2022, and the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air reported on December 5, 2023, that this cap immediately led to a 45 percent decrease in Russian oil and petroleum revenues in January 2023.[13] Russian officials undid the impacts of the G7 price cap in 2023 by increasingly relying on aging oil tankers with obscure ownership and insurance from unknown or non-Western sources in order to build a “shadow fleet” to transfer and sell crude oil and petroleum products above the price cap.[14] Bloomberg reported that Russia’s domestic oil tanker fleet and “shadow fleet” transferred over 70 percent of Russian oil cargoes in the first nine months of 2023, allowing Russian officials to exert more control over oil exports and progressively increase prices.[15] The Kremlin likely hopes that engagement with OPEC+ on agreed upon output cuts can allow Russian officials to further increase oil prices and continue to buoy federal budget revenues in an effort to manage the increasing Russian federal deficit associated with the war in Ukraine.[16]

Bloomberg added that ships with Greek ownership have transferred roughly 20 percent of Russian oil shipments in 2023, but did so under the G7 price cap.[17] Greek officials reportedly lobbied the EU to water down measures that would have resulted in more stringent restrictions on shipping companies' ability to trade with Russia.[18] Three major Greek shipping firms stopped transporting Russian oil in November 2023 following the initial imposition of US sanctions on third party shipping firms helping Russia to skirt the G7 price cap in October 2023.

Russian society appears interested in discussing the outcome of the war in Ukraine despite the Kremlin’s increasing aversion to more in-depth public discussions of the war. Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center released a poll on December 5 detailing the questions Russians want to ask Russian President Vladimir Putin during the upcoming “Direct Line” forum on December 14. The Levada Center found that 21 percent of all questions in the open-ended poll pertained to the end and outcome of the war in Ukraine.[20] Levada Center reported that questions in this category included questions about the timeframe for an end to the war, the end of mobilization, and the possibility of peace or a Russian victory.[21] Levada Center noted that the second and third most frequent questions asked, accounting for 8 percent of responses each, pertained to pensions and social programs.[22] The poll indicates that the Russian public continues to have questions about the end and outcome of the war despite the Russian government’s attempts to silence anti-war rhetoric and protests to mobilization. The Russian public’s continued questions about the timeline for an end to the war and mobilization and the prospects for peace are consistent with recent independent Russian polling indicating that Russians increasingly support a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine and showing that over half of Russian respondents believe that Russia should begin peace negotiations with Ukraine.[23] Putin will reportedly center his presidential campaign on Russia’s alleged domestic stability and increased criticism of the West instead of focusing on the war, so it is unclear if Putin intends to address questions about the war during the “Direct Line” event, which will likely serve as the launch of Putin’s 2024 presidential campaign.[24] The Kremlin also appears to be increasingly implementing measures to ensure that Putin’s actual electoral success does not depend on battlefield successes and domestic force generation efforts.

Unspecified actors killed former pro-Russian Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada deputy Ilya Kiva in Moscow Oblast on December 6. The Russian Main Investigative Directorate for Moscow Oblast stated on December 6 that unspecified actors killed Kiva in Suponevo, Odintsovo urban raion, Moscow Oblast.[26] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on December 6 that its sources in Ukrainian law enforcement agencies stated that the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) conducted the operation that killed Kiva.[27] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov confirmed Kiva’s death and stated that “a similar fate will befall other traitors to Ukraine and henchmen of the Putin regime.”[28] Kiva, who defected to Russia at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, likely aided a Kremlin-backed COVID-19 disinformation campaign in Ukraine in 2020.[29] A Russian milblogger criticized Russian intelligence services for not preventing alleged SBU personnel from assassinating someone in Russia.

Moscow’s 2nd Western Military District Court convicted two Russian air defense officers for negligence for failing to prevent a Ukrainian strike on Russian territory in April 2022, likely to set an example to improve discipline across the Russian military. Russian outlet Kommersant reported on December 5 that the court sentenced Russian Lieutenant Colonel Anatoly Bondarev and Major Dmitry Dmitrakov to four years in prison for violating article 340 of the Russian Criminal Code (violation of the rules of combat duty to repel a surprise attack on the territory of the Russian Federation).[31] Violations of the Russian rules of combat duty include unauthorized abandonment of a combat post or transfer of such post to anyone; performing combat duties without the permission of the commander on duty; reducing the readiness of military equipment and weapons; and consuming alcohol on duty.[32] The court tried the servicemen in connection with a Ukrainian Tochka-U strike against a Russian ammunition depot in Belgorod Oblast in April 2022, a relatively obscure strike that the Russian command may have chosen to litigate to avoid recalling attention to more high-profile Ukrainian strikes on Russian targets in occupied Ukraine and Russia.[33] Ukrainian forces conducted several drone strikes on Moscow City in July and August 2023, which likely resulted in the detention of the commander of the 1st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense Army on corruption and bribery charges instead of dereliction of duty charges.[34] Kommersant, citing unspecified sources, reported that Russian authorities are conducting large-scale investigations into every successful Ukrainian strike on Russian territory since 2014 and any negligence on the part of the Russian servicemen involved in defending against these strikes.[35] The Russian military command likely intends for the case to set a precedent across the Russian military, and not just for Russian air defenders, to improve discipline among the Russian forces in Ukraine.

Russian officials are reportedly attempting to funnel migrants who have ended up in Russia due to Russia’s failed hybrid war tactics on the Russian-Finnish border into ongoing force generation efforts. BBC Russia Service reported on December 6 that Russian military officials are attempting to recruit migrants from the Middle East and Africa whom Russian authorities detained en masse along the Russian-Finnish border in mid-November following the closure of Russian-Finnish border crossings.[36] Russian officials are reportedly offering to stay deportations for these migrants if the migrants fight in Ukraine.[37] One migrant reportedly stated that Russian officials immediately transferred migrants who signed military contracts to the Russian-Ukrainian border.[38] Russia artificially created a migrant crisis on the Finnish border as a hybrid warfare tactic meant to destabilize NATO and the EU, but the Finnish response quickly caused the effort to fail.[39] Russian officials appear to be trying to salvage some benefit from the failed effort by recruiting migrants as a part of the widespread crypto-mobilization effort targeting migrants in Russia.


Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov credited Western security assistance for empowering Ukrainian forces to liberate half of the territory that Russia occupied since February 24, 2022.
• Russian forces conducted a notably large series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 5 to 6.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to meet with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman in a series of bilateral meetings on December 6.
• Russian oil revenues continue to increase due to a concerted Russian effort to skirt the G7 price cap on Russian crude oil and petroleum products.
• Russian society appears interested in discussing the outcome of the war in Ukraine despite the Kremlin’s increasing aversion to more in-depth public discussions of the war.
• Unspecified actors killed former pro-Russian Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada deputy Ilya Kiva in Moscow Oblast on December 6.
• Moscow’s 2nd Western Military District Court convicted two Russian air defense officers for negligence for failing to prevent a Ukrainian strike on Russian territory in April 2022, likely to set an example to improve discipline across the Russian military.
• Russian officials are reportedly attempting to funnel migrants who have ended up in Russia due to Russia’s failed hybrid war tactics on the Russian-Finnish border into ongoing force generation efforts.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka.
• The Russian State Duma will reportedly consider a bill allowing Russian conscripts to serve in the Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Border Service.
• Ukrainian partisans may have conducted an attack in occupied Luhansk City on December 6 that killed Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Council Deputy Oleg Popov.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/09/23 04:15 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 8, 2023
Dec 8, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 8, 2023

Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 8, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on December 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his presidential bid for 2024 on December 8 in an obviously staged effort to seem that he was running at the request of Russian servicemen.
Putin announced that he would run for president in the 2024 elections in conversation with Russian military personnel after the presentation of Gold Star medals in the Grand Kremlin Palace on December 8.[1] Putin quietly announced his presidential campaign after Artem Zhoga, commander of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Sparta” Battalion, claimed that the people of Donbas want him to run in the elections.[2] Zhoga specifically emphasized that Russia needs Putin as president to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories and restore peace. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov absurdly claimed that Putin’s announcement was ”completely spontaneous” and was ”a reaction to people’s appeal.”[3] Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matvienko similarly framed Putin’s announcement as a response to requests from Russians.[4] Russian State Duma Deputy Chairman of the Federal Assembly Sergey Neverov stated that the leading United Russia party ”unconditionally supports” Putin’s nomination as a presidential candidate and ”will do everything for his victory.”[5] Russian ”Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky responded to Putin’s announcement, claiming that although the results of the elections are already known, the ”process needs to be arranged appropriately.”[6] Khodakovsky claimed that new Russian political energies are emerging - implying that some Russians want to oust Putin - but that Russia does not need such “political games“ during wartime. One Russian milblogger claimed that Russians are more concerned about the rising price of eggs than Putin’s announcement.

Putin’s announcement of his presidential bid in a military setting indicates that his campaign may focus on Russia’s war in Ukraine more than ISW previously assessed, although the extent of this focus is unclear at this time. ISW previously assessed that Putin’s presidential campaign would likely not focus on the war in Ukraine and instead would focus on domestic stability and criticisms of the West.[8] Putin’s presidential bid announcement at a ceremony rewarding Russian military personnel fighting in Ukraine in a conversation with a DNR combatant suggests that the war in Ukraine may play a more significant role in his campaign strategy. These staged circumstances were possibly directed a very important constituency: Russians directly affected by the war in Ukraine including the roughly 2.2 million military personnel the Kremlin claims are currently under arms, personnel previously wounded, and their relatives (as well as relatives of those killed in action).[9] Relatives of Russian mobilized personnel have recently appealed to the Russian government and military for the release of their relatives from military service and for better treatment of mobilized servicemen in the Russian military, and the Kremlin has repeatedly attempted to censor these groups.[10] These Kremlin censorship attempts suggest that the Kremlin is concerned about the possible negative effects of these protests on Putin‘s image during the presidential campaign.[11] The Kremlin may be using Putin’s military-focused announcement in an attempt to convince this large group of voters that the Russian military writ large supports Putin. Putin’s announcement may alternatively aim to demonstrate that he has the support of the Russian military in order to make any further discussion of the war in Ukraine during his campaign unnecessary. The Kremlin may have tasked the Russian military with capturing Avdiivka, and possibly Kupyansk, before the March 2024 elections, and this exhibition of the military’s support for Putin’s candidacy is possibly meant as a hedging strategy should the Russian military be unable to meet these given deadlines.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on December 8 that Russian forces launched seven Shahed-131/136 drones and six S-300 missiles on the night of December 7 to 8 and 19 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles against Kyiv Oblast and infrastructure facilities in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the morning of December 8.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces also launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile against an unspecified target.[13] Ukrainian forces downed five Shahed drones and 14 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles.[14] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian S-300 missiles struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City, Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck targets in Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[15] Kyiv City Military Administration Head Serhii Popko stated that the December 8 strike was the first Russian cruise missile strike launched from a Tu-95MC strategic bomber against Kyiv City since September 20, 2023 -- 79 days ago.[16] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russia has ”somewhat restored” its cruise missile stockpiles by not launching large-scale strikes during the fall months.

Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin forecasted on December 7 that there will be “no agreement” between Russia and Ukraine to end the war and ”no freeze” of the frontlines in Ukraine, marking a notable shift from Girkin’s prior claims that the Russian military intended to “freeze the frontline” until after the Russian presidential elections. Girkin stated during an interview with Russian news outlet Baza published on December 7 that the situation in Ukraine has ”radically worsened” and that Russia has entered a period of ”acute instability.”[18] Girkin added that Russia’s tactical successes during summer and fall 2023 do not “eliminate or balance” the facts that the war is entering its 21st month and that there is no end in sight. Girkin’s interview with Baza was almost certainly approved by the Kremlin, and the Kremlin thus likely put constraints on what Girkin could and could not say about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and other topics such as his criminal case, his patron within the siloviki, and the assassination of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Girkin claimed in a letter on October 9 that he was ”99 percent” certain that the Kremlin will decide to ”freeze the frontline” until after the 2024 presidential elections and that Russian forces would continue conducting a strategic defense on the existing frontline.[19] Girkin has repeatedly claimed and expressed great concern that there is a faction within the Kremlin in favor of freezing the current frontline in Ukraine competing with another faction in favor of continued Russian offensive operations for influence over Russian President Vladimir Putin.[20]

Girkin may be adjusting his forecast in response to private and/or public indications that Putin has sided with the latter faction. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on November 27 that the West is trying to “freeze” the war in Ukraine to rearm Ukraine for future attacks against Russia and advocated against negotiations, a likely Kremlin-sanctioned acknowledgement of the prolonged Russian war effort.[21] Lavrov also did not promote previous Kremlin information operations feigning interest in negotiations with Ukraine and freezing the war during his speech at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Council of Foreign Ministers on November 30.[22] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin may have strategically allowed Russian opposition party Yabloko founder Grigory Yavlinsky to advocate for a ceasefire in Ukraine during an interview on December 5 to deter factions within the Kremlin that may want to freeze the frontline in Ukraine from publicly or privately voicing their opinions.[23] Girkin’s adjusted forecast is yet another indication that Putin retains his maximalist objectives and is unlikely to enter peace negotiations with Ukraine, except to buy time to reconstitute for future offensive operations.

The Russian military has reportedly banned the use of civilian cars for military purposes likely as part of ongoing formalization efforts, sparking criticisms from Russian milbloggers Russian milbloggers and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Deputy Information Minister Daniil Bezsonov circulated an image of a putative Russian military order stating that the Russian military command prohibited Russian forces from using personal and humanitarian vehicles and that any vehicles from civilian government entities need to be logged on a military unit’s balance sheet.[25] The order also allegedly bans Russian soldiers who are not mechanics or who lack driver’s licenses from driving the vehicles. This measure, if reports are accurate, likely supports Russian formalization efforts to centralize administrative control over Russian military supplies, especially those not provided by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). This measure would also impact grassroots Russian efforts to provide Russian frontline soldiers with supplies, including civilian or dual-use vehicles.

The Russian information space largely criticized these alleged reforms as unnecessary and harmful. Bezsonov and Russian milbloggers claimed that this order will hinder Russian military movement, supplies and ammunition deliveries, and casualty evacuations, and will thus ultimately demoralize military personnel. Bezsonov claimed that this order is unreasonable because some DNR personnel have been trying to register their cars with the Russian MoD for a year and instead called for the Russian military to eliminate bureaucracy to make solders’ lives easier.[26] A milblogger claimed that Russian military personnel do not want to register their cars with the Russian military because the command will not allow a soldier to deregister a car and will then commandeer the car as MoD property.[27] Russian milbloggers have resisted prior Russian formalization efforts that impose greater rules on Russian military personnel, including requiring soldiers to register personal cars with their units and establishing grooming standards about beards.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is expanding its ability to guard Russian officials and entities abroad likely to better surveil Russian and international actors outside of Russian territory. The FSB published amendments to its regulations on December 8 that allow it to offer protection services for various Russian representative offices and Russian companies in addition to the Russian diplomatic institutions to which the FSB already offers service.[29] The FSB would guard such entities, which could include trade and commercial entities, through a mutual agreement and at the entity’s expense.[30] The FSB claimed to have made the amendments in response to the “growing number of protests and demonstrations” in front of Russian government and business offices abroad.

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to artificially alter the demographic composition of occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union on Human Rights – a union composed of 26 human rights-focused nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) – reported on December 6 that Russian authorities have resettled up to 800,000 Russian citizens in occupied Crimea and forced around 100,000 Ukrainian citizens to leave Crimea since 2014.[32] The Union reported that Russian authorities relied on policies such as preferential mortgage lending, relocation of Russian officials and their families, expulsion of Ukrainian citizens to mainland Ukraine, and ”encouragement” of Ukrainian citizens to move to Russia to free up residences in Crimea and encourage Russian citizens to resettle.[33] The Union reported that Russian occupation authorities in other areas are implementing similar repopulation efforts. The Union reported that Russian authorities are currently struggling to encourage Russians to resettle in occupied Crimea due to the high intensity of hostilities near Crimea, however.

Ukraine’s partners continued to announce military and financial aid packages to Ukraine recently. Germany announced on December 7 that it delivered aid to Ukraine, including 1,750 155mm artillery shells, 10 reconnaissance drones, 70 grenade launchers, and 100,000 first aid kits.[35] Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida also pledged $4.5 billion to Ukraine, including $1 billion in humanitarian aid to support Ukraine’s recovery efforts and $3.5 billion to fund credit guarantees for World Bank loans to Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his presidential bid for 2024 on December 8 in an obviously staged effort to seem that he was running at the request of Russian servicemen.
• Putin’s announcement of his presidential bid in a military setting indicates that his campaign may focus on Russia’s war in Ukraine more than ISW previously assessed, although the extent of this focus is unclear at this time.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 7 to 8.
• Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin forecasted on December 7 that there will be “no agreement” between Russia and Ukraine to end the war and ”no freeze” of the frontlines in Ukraine, marking a notable shift from Girkin’s prior claims that the Russian military intended to “freeze the frontline” until after the Russian presidential elections.
• The Russian military has reportedly banned the use of civilian cars for military purposes likely as part of ongoing formalization efforts, sparking criticisms from Russian milbloggers.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is expanding its ability to guard Russian officials and entities abroad likely to better surveil Russian and international actors outside of Russian territory.
• Russian occupation officials continue efforts to artificially alter the demographic composition of occupied Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s partners continued to announce military and financial aid packages to Ukraine recently.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Udmurt Republic Head Alexander Brechalov announced on December 7 that the region formed and will soon deploy four new units to fight in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 8 that Russia is trying to destroy Ukrainian children’s connection to Ukraine and that swift intervention is necessary to maintain this connection during a speech at the first meeting of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-8-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/11/23 04:15 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 10, 2023

Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 10, 2023, 6pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on December 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized that Russia's maximalist objectives in Ukraine have not changed, repeating the Kremlin’s demand for full Ukrainian political capitulation and Kyiv’s acceptance of Russia’s military and territorial demands rather than suggesting any willingness to negotiate seriously.
In a written interview with AFP on December 9, Zakharova claimed that a "comprehensive, sustainable, and fair resolution" in Ukraine can only happen if the West stops "pumping up the Armed Forces of Ukraine with weapons" and that Ukraine surrenders Russia’s claimed Ukrainian territory and "withdraws its troops," presumably from Ukrainian territory Russia claims to have annexed.[1] Zakharova emphasized the Kremlin's longstanding claim that Russia invaded Ukraine for "de-militarization," "denazification," and to "ensure the rights of Russian-speaking citizens" in Ukraine.[2] The Kremlin has consistently used the term “denazification” as code for the removal of the elected government of Ukraine and its replacement by some government the Kremlin regards as acceptable—i.e., regime change.[3] “De-militarization” would obviously leave Ukraine permanently at Russia’s mercy. Zakharova's comments clearly highlight the fact that the initial goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as set out by Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 24, 2022, have not changed, and that Putin does not intend to end the war unless his maximalist objectives have been accomplished.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia does not intend to engage in serious negotiations with Ukraine in good faith and that negotiations on Russia's terms are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender.

Zakharova's demand that Ukraine withdraw its troops from "Russian territory" as a necessary prerequisite for the resolution of the war suggests that Russia's maximalist objectives include controlling the entirety of the four oblasts it has illegally annexed parts of. Russian forces currently militarily control portions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, but Russia formally (and illegally) annexed the entirety of these oblasts in September of 2022.[6] Zakharova's suggestion that Ukrainian forces must entirely withdraw from territory that Russia has claimed through its sham annexation suggests that the Russian demands include the surrender of additional Ukrainian territory that Russian forces do not currently control up to the administrative borders of the four occupied oblasts. Calls for Ukraine's capitulation under the current circumstances of Russian control of Ukrainian territory up to the current frontline are already unacceptable from the standpoint of vital Ukrainian and Western national security interests, as ISW has previously assessed.[7] The Russian demand for an even more expansive surrender of Ukrainian-held territory that Russian forces could likely conquer only at the cost of tremendous additional blood, treasure, and time, if they can do it at all, indicates that Russia’s aims far transcend keeping the territory Russian forces have already seized. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that Russian forces continue to conduct offensive operations in eastern Kharkiv Oblast, which Russia has not claimed to have annexed, suggesting that Russia’s territorial aims may be even more expansive than those Zakharova laid out.

The Kremlin continues to express an increasingly anti-Israel position in the Israel–Hamas war despite feigning interest in being a neutral arbitrator in the conflict. NOTE: A version of this text appears in ISW-CTP's December 10 Iran Update. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a telephone conversation on December 10, which reportedly lasted for 50 minutes and heavily focused on the Israel–Hamas war.[8] Putin reportedly noted that there is a “disastrous humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip” and stressed that avoiding consequences for the civilian population while countering terrorist threats is just as important as rejecting and condemning terrorism.[9] Putin’s comments are noteworthy in light of the devastation the Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought to the civilian population there and Russia’s deliberate efforts to inflict suffering on Ukrainian civilians by attacking energy infrastructure going into winter. Putin reportedly reiterated the Kremlin’s initial rhetorical position on the Israel–Hamas war by claiming that Russia is ready to alleviate civilian suffering and de-escalate the conflict.[10] Putin has increasingly shifted away from this more neutral rhetoric to a much more anti-Israel position in recent weeks, notably claiming that the war is leading to the “extermination of the civilian population in Palestine.”[11] Netanyahu reportedly expressed dissatisfaction with Russian positions towards Israel that Russian officials have articulated at the United Nations (UN) and other multilateral organizations.[12] Netanyahu also reportedly criticized Russia for its “dangerous cooperation” with Iran, notably following Putin’s meeting with Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in Moscow on December 7.[13] Putin likely aimed to assuage Israeli concerns about Russian support for Hamas and the deepening Russian–Iranian security partnership, but Israeli and Russian rhetoric surrounding the conversation suggests that Putin likely failed to do so.[14] The Kremlin’s increasingly non-neutral framing of the Israel–Hamas war signals potential increasing support for Iranian interests in the region and increased willingness to antagonize Israel.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky traveled to Latin America on December 10 likely in order to secure Latin American support for Ukraine. Zelensky met with Paraguayan President Santiago Peña Palacios, Uruguayan President Luis Lacalle Pou, and Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa to discuss Latin America’s involvement in the Ukrainian Peace Formula and a future Ukraine–Latin America summit.[16] Zelensky thanked all the presidents for their vocal support for Ukraine and condemnation of Russia’s full-scale invasion.[17] Zelensky noted Uruguay’s prior participation in the Ukrainian Peace Formula and expressed hope that Uruguay and other Latin American countries will participate in the Peace Formula’s fourth meeting of national security and foreign policy advisors in January 2024.[18] Zelensky stated that it is important for Ukraine to have the support of Latin America during its fight for freedom and democracy.

Russian military authorities in Armenia are likely attempting to maintain military power over Armenia amidst the continued deterioration of Armenian-Russian relations. The international human rights organization Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly’s Armenian branch in Vanadzor reported on December 8 that Russian military police at the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, Armenia, detained Russian citizen Dmitri Setrakov on December 6 or 7 for desertion.[20] The Russian 519th Military Investigation Department, located in Armenia, subsequently opened a criminal case against Setrakov for unauthorized abandonment of his unit.[21] Setrakov reportedly served as a contract soldier in the Russian military before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine but refused to participate in Russian operations in Ukraine and moved to Armenia.[22] Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly-Vanadzor Head Artur Sakunts told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Armenian Service Radio Azatuntyun that Armenian law enforcement was not involved in Setrakov’s arrest and stated Russian law enforcement does not have the right to arrest people, including Russian citizens, on Armenian territory.[23] Sakunts called the arrest an “attack on the Armenian legal system and against Armenia as a sovereign state.”[24] Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly-Vanadzor called on the Armenian government, Prosecutor General’s Office, and other law enforcement agencies to protect Setrakov under Armenian law and initiate criminal proceedings against Russian military police in Armenia to prevent Setrakov's extradition.[25] Armenian government officials have not responded to Setrakov’s arrest or Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly-Vanadzor’s statement at the time of this publication. Russian authorities’ arrest of Setrakov may generate criticism of Russia’s military presence in Armenia at the 102nd Military Base despite recent statements from Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Safaryan that Armenia is not considering leaving the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or discussing the withdrawal of Russia’s 102nd Military Base.[26] Armenia has effectively abstained from participation in the CSTO by not attending four recent high-level CSTO events and exercises.

Russian forces conducted a small series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on December 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Kh-29 missile and Shahed-136 drone on December 9 and that Russian forces struck Velykyi Burluk, Kharkiv Oblast with two S-300 missiles on December 10.[28] The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense (UK MOD) assessed on December 10 that Russian forces likely conducted the first missile strike series of the anticipated winter strikes campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of December 7.[29] ISW has observed preparations for Russia’s anticipated winter strikes campaign since October 2023 and has also noted relatively larger drone and missile strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure so far in December before the night of December 7.[30] ISW is not currently prepared to forecast a start date of the anticipated winter strike campaign.


Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized that Russia's maximalist objectives in Ukraine have not changed, repeating the Kremlin’s demand for full Ukrainian political capitulation and Kyiv’s acceptance of Russia’s military and territorial demands rather than suggesting any willingness to negotiate seriously.
• Zakharova's demand that Ukraine withdraw its troops from "Russian territory" as a necessary prerequisite for the resolution of the war suggests that Russia's maximalist objectives include controlling the entirety of the four oblasts it has illegally annexed parts of.
• The Kremlin continues to express an increasingly anti-Israel position in the Israel–Hamas war despite feigning interest in being a neutral arbitrator in the conflict.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky traveled to Latin America on December 10 likely in order to secure Latin American support for Ukraine.
• Russian military authorities in Armenia are likely attempting to maintain military power over Armenia amidst the continued deterioration of Armenian-Russian relations.
• Russian forces conducted a small series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on December 9 and 10.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• Russian milbloggers continue to criticize the purported Russian military ban on the use of civilian vehicles for military purposes.
• Russian authorities continue long-term efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian students in occupied Ukraine by directing funding to educational institutions in occupied Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/12/23 01:10 PM

'Putin is preparing for future war against NATO with new nuclear submarines'
5 min agoabroad _
MOSCOW - The Russian Navy has commissioned two new nuclear submarines. President Vladimir Putin arrived on site in the city of Severodvinsk to view the ships. According to the American think tank Institute for the Study of War, Russia is preparing for a large-scale war with NATO.

The construction of the Imperator Aleksandr III and Krasnoyarsk took six years, but on Monday Russian President Putin was finally able to admire both ships in the northern city of Severodvinsk. The two nuclear submarines are to become part of the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean. “With such ships and such weapons, Russia will feel safe,” Putin said in a speech.

The Krasnoyarsk is equipped with long-range missiles that, according to Putin, can hit targets on land and sea with high precision. The Imperator Aleksandr III is part of a new fleet of Russian nuclear-powered submarines, each armed with sixteen intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Large-scale war
During his visit, Putin also did not fail to emphasize that Russia is working on eight more similar submarines: five of the Krasnoyarsk type and three of the Imperator type. He stated that Russia plans to quantitatively strengthen its naval forces, in the Arctic and Far East, and in the Black, Baltic and Caspian Seas.

Putin's push to expand Russian naval power in all areas where Russia has naval bases indicates, according to the renowned American think tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW), that he wants to prepare "for a future large-scale war with NATO." According to ISW, the fact that the very expensive ships will also operate in areas outside Ukraine and Eastern Europe indicates that Russia plans to threaten NATO and its allies "in several regions".

According to the ISW, a reinforcement in the Far East should make Russia and China equal defense partners. The increased activity in the Arctic can be seen as a response to the accession of Finland (and soon also Sweden) to NATO. “It is unclear whether Russian naval manufacturers will be able to produce strategic naval vessels at the Kremlin's desired scale and quality in the coming years,” the ISW said.

Provocations
Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia's ties with many Western countries have deteriorated. Moscow now says it is fighting what it calls “the collective West in Ukraine.” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov emphasized at the end of November that it depends on NATO whether the conflict will escalate further.

The Imperator Aleksandr III, one of the two new nuclear submarines, is armed with sixteen intercontinental ballistic missiles.
© AFP
The Imperator Aleksandr III, one of the two new nuclear submarines, is armed with sixteen intercontinental ballistic missiles.

“We will not succumb to provocations, but we can guarantee that we will guarantee our safety, we are ready,” he said firmly in the daily Izvestia . “If the US expects to win the next arms race, the Americans are wrong.”

Putin also called the invasion of Ukraine a response to Western attempts to threaten Russia.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/12/23 01:28 PM

New Polish PM to demand 'full mobilisation' of West behind Ukraine
New Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has left Ukraine in no doubt as to his feelings on the war - saying he will "demand full mobilisation" of the West.

Relations between the two neighbours have appeared to sour slightly in recent months during a tense election campaign.

There was a ban on Ukrainian grain imports in September, in a bid by the Law and Justice party to get farmers on side. Now-defeated PM Mateusz Morawiecki then went further, announcing Poland would end the supply of arms to Ukraine and focus on domestic rearmaments. The remarks were later caveated but would have been viewed with concern in Kyiv amid talk of the potential for war fatigue in the West.

Now, Mr Tusk has moved to reaffirm his country's backing for the war effort, tweeting: "We will demand the full mobilisation of the West to help Ukraine.

"I can't listen any more to politicians who talk about being tired of the situation in #Ukraine... attack on Ukraine is an attack on us all."
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/12/23 01:32 PM

Many Ukrainians in my town now, but no problems they are well educated and many have already jobs in catering, supermarkets etc..

Over four million Ukrainian refugees seeking asylum in EU - which countries have taken most?
More than 4.2 million refugees from Ukraine have sought temporary asylum in the EU by the end of 31 October, according to a report by Eurostat.

In its latest data, Eurostat found a total of 1,215,365 people were seeking refuge in Germany and 960,620 in Poland.

Meanwhile, the Czech Republic had taken in 364,450 refugees and Italy 161,660 people.

The data also shows that 46.4% of the refugees were women and 33.4% were children.

While the Eurostat report does not include UK data, statistics from The Migration Observatory in August reported around 174,000 people had moved to the UK under the Ukraine Family Scheme and Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme as of 9 May this year.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/13/23 12:05 AM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/13/23 04:18 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 12, 2023
Dec 12, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 12, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 12, 2023, 7:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 5:30pm ET on December 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US intelligence reportedly assessed that Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in fall 2023 and through the upcoming winter aim to weaken Western support for Ukraine instead of achieving any immediate operational objectives.
The US intelligence community reportedly shared a declassified intelligence assessment with Congress on December 12 wherein US intelligence assessed that Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine aim to weaken Western support for Ukraine but have only resulted in heavy Russian losses and no operationally significant Russian battlefield gains.[1] This assessment of high Russian losses and lack of operationally significant Russian gains is consistent with ISW’s assessment. US National Security Council Spokesperson Andrienne Watson reportedly stated that Russian forces have suffered more than 13,000 casualties and lost 220 combat vehicles along the Avdiivka-Novopavlivka axis (Avdiivka direction through western Donetsk Oblast) since launching offensive operations in October 2023.[2] Watson added that Russia appears to believe that a military “deadlock” through the winter will drain Western support for Ukraine and give Russian forces the advantage despite high Russian losses and persistent Russian shortages of trained personnel, munitions, and equipment.[3] ISW has assessed that Russian forces have been trying to regain the theater-level initiative in Ukraine since at least mid-November 2023 and have now likely committed to offensive operations in multiple sectors of the front during a period of the most challenging weather of the fall-winter season in an effort to seize and retain the initiative.

Russian forces may be conducting costly offensive operations at a time unfavorable for ground maneuver to time the potential shift in battlefield initiative with ongoing conversations in the West about continued support to Ukraine. Russian forces launched a large offensive effort to capture Avdiivka on October 10 and subsequently intensified localized offensive operations elsewhere in eastern Ukraine while Ukrainian forces started to scale back counteroffensive operations on their own accord.[5] The Russian military command decided against waiting to prepare for offensive efforts later this winter or in spring 2024 following the decreased tempo of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, as they had done between the successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in summer and fall 2022 and the failed Russian winter-spring 2023 offensive.[6] The Russian military command’s decision to launch offensive efforts in fall 2023 may have been an opportunistic reaction to a perceived wavering of Western support for Ukraine. The increased Western discussions about continuing military assistance to Ukraine following the relatively successful Russian defensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast was predictable and may have factored into the Russian command’s calculations. The Kremlin has been orchestrating long running information operations aimed at deterring Western security assistance to Ukraine, and the Russian command may have determined that those information operations were yielding increasing returns and that Russian military efforts to seize the initiative could prompt further Western debates about aid to Ukraine.[7]

Russian forces have routinely conducted military operations in Ukraine aimed at shaping Western behavior instead of achieving operational battlefield objectives, and the US intelligence assessment that ongoing Russian offensive operations do not have an immediate operational military objective is entirely plausible.[8] Russian forces have yet to seize the initiative throughout Ukraine, but Russian forces may attempt to pursue an immediate operational objective if they do seize the initiative. The Russian military command has also reportedly conducted offensive operations with domestic political goals in mind, and internal Kremlin dynamics may be influencing Russian military decisions about ongoing Russian offensive operations.[9] ISW is not offering an assessment of the primary intent of ongoing Russian offensive operations at this time but concurs with the US intelligence community assessment that Russia has absorbed very high losses without making operationally significant gains or setting conditions to make such gains.

US intelligence also assessed that the war in Ukraine has devastated the pre-war Russian military, although Russia has partially offset these losses and continues to prepare for a long war in Ukraine. The declassified intelligence assessment reportedly stated that Russian forces have lost 87 percent of the total number of their pre-war active-duty ground troops and two-thirds of the tanks in their inventory before February 24, 2022.[10] The declassified intelligence assessment reportedly stated that Russian forces lost 315,000 personnel out of the 360,000 personnel, 2,200 out of 3,500 tanks, and 4,400 out of 13,600 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers that participated in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[11] The assessment reportedly stated that Russian ground forces have lost over a quarter of their pre-invasion stockpiles of military equipment as of late November 2023, reducing the complexity and scale of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine.[12]

The Russian leadership has undertaken extensive force generation measures to offset manpower losses, however, and Ukrainian intelligence reported in September 2023 that Russian forces had 420,000 personnel in occupied Ukraine.[13] Partial mobilization began in September 2022 and ongoing Russian crypto-mobilization efforts have very likely offset the Russian losses reported by US intelligence, although new Russian personnel likely have lower combat capabilities than those they replaced.[14] The Russian military command is also pursuing long-term restructuring and expansion efforts to form strategic reserves and prepare for a potential future large-scale conventional war against NATO, although short-to-medium-term manpower requirements in Ukraine are likely undermining these efforts.[15] Russia has been gradually mobilizing its defense industrial base (DIB) to address materiel losses in Ukraine and sustain a prolonged war effort, although there are no indications that Russia has made significant progress in offsetting armored vehicle losses in Ukraine.[16] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 11 during a speech at the US National Defense University that Russian President Vladimir Putin is shifting the Russian economy and society to a war-time footing.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with various US officials, including President Joe Biden, and spoke to Congress about US military assistance to Ukraine in Washington, DC on December 12. Zelensky met with Biden, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Brown, House Speaker Mike Johnson, and other US officials.[18] Zelensky stated at a press conference with Biden that Ukraine has had important battlefield successes and thanked the US for its support and for fostering an effective partnership.[19] Biden announced that he approved a military assistance package valued at $200 million for Ukraine including air defense and artillery ammunition and reiterated continued US support for Ukraine.[20] Zelensky also met with various US defense manufacturers about joint Ukrainian-US production of artillery and air defense munitions and systems.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes targeting Ukraine on December 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 15 Shahed-131/136 drones from occupied Balaklava Raion, Crimea, and two Kh-59 missiles at targets in Ukraine, and that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed nine of the drones and both missiles.[22] Ukrainian military officials reported that the missiles targeted Zaporizhia Oblast and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[23] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that a Russian drone strike damaged an administrative building in Odesa City.

Ukrainian officials stated that Russian special services may have conducted the major cyberattack on Ukrainian mobile operator Kyivstar on December 12. Kyivstar CEO Oleksandr Komarov stated that a powerful cyberattack targeted Kyivstar on the morning of December 12 and caused technical failures but did not compromise subscribers’ personal data.[25] Komarov stated that the cyberattack partially destroyed Kyivstar’s IT infrastructure and that it is unclear how long restoration will take.[26] Ukrainian officials stated that the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office opened criminal proceedings and that the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) is investigating the possible involvement of Russian security services in the attack.[27] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that the cyberattack did not cause any major problems for Ukrainian forces on the front.[28] The cyberattack disrupted Kyivstar’s national roaming services in Ukraine; the ATMs of two major Ukrainian banks, PrivatBank and Oschadbank; streetlights in Lviv City; air raid warning systems in Sumy City, Kyiv Oblast, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast; and municipal hotlines in Rivne City and Dnipro City.

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that GUR cyber units recently conducted a successful cyber operation against the Russian Federal Tax Service (FNS). The GUR stated on December 12 that GUR cyber units broke into the FNS’s central servers and 2,300 regional services throughout Russia and occupied Crimea and conducted two cyberattacks on unspecified dates, eliminating the configuration files that allowed the Russian tax system databases to function.[30] The GUR reported that Russian authorities have been unsuccessfully attempting to restore the FNS for four days.[31] The GUR, citing unspecified experts, stated that the effects of the attack will continue to paralyze the FNS until at least January 2024 and that Russian authorities may not be able to fully resuscitate the tax system.[32] The FNS denied the GUR’s report that Ukrainian cyber units hacked the FNS and claimed that all tax services are operating normally.[33] Russian opposition outlet Meduza noted that the FNS reportedly informed a Russian Telegram channel that users may have problems accessing its online services but that the FNS refused to explain the reasons for the problems.

Russian news outlet RBK reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin has designated prominent Russian milbloggers as “trusted persons” in his presidential election campaign for the first time. RBK reported on December 12 that Putin has designated Russian ultranationalist Komsomolskaya Pravda reporter and Kremlin Human Rights Council member Alexander “Sasha” Kots as a “trusted person,” and is also considering designating milblogger Alexander Sladkov and WarGonzo Telegram channel founder Semyon Pegov as “trusted persons.”[35] Russian law allows presidential candidates to designate up to 600 individuals as “trusted persons” to campaign on behalf of a certain candidate and sometimes act on behalf of the candidate in certain cases.[36] RBK noted that Putin’s “trusted persons” will also include Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) ”Sparta” Battalion Commander Artem Zhoga, whom the Kremlin portrayed as asking Putin to run for re-election in 2024, as well as individuals from organizations that support the Russian war in Ukraine, including the state-run “Defenders of the Fatherland” Foundation and the Families of Soldiers of the Fatherland Committee.[37] ISW has previously observed Putin rewarding the loyalty of Kots, Sladkov, and Pegov, and Putin is likely using this “trusted persons” designation to further reward ultranationalist milbloggers who are loyal to him.[38] The Kremlin will likely use the March 2024 presidential election to leverage these and likely other milbloggers to reestablish Kremlin dominance over the information space and conduct information operations about Putin and the election.

A St. Petersburg court sentenced three underage Uzbek migrants and their parents to deportation for extinguishing the Eternal Flame in St. Petersburg amid ongoing tension between Central Asian communities in Russia and Russian authorities. Russian authorities detained the three minors in St. Petersburg on December 10 and circulated footage of the children extinguishing the Eternal Flame, a memorial to Soviet servicemen killed in the Second World War, in St. Petersburg with snow.[40] Russian news outlet RBK reported on December 12 that Russian authorities are holding one of the children in a temporary detention center for juvenile offenders and will also fine and deport the children’s parents for failing to register with Russian migration authorities.[41] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that Russian authorities regularly detain people on administrative offenses for crimes against Eternal Flame memorials throughout Russia, but that criminal cases are not uncommon.[42] The Russian State Duma approved amendments allowing Russian courts to fine or assign compulsory work to migrants convicted of a crime in place of deportation on December 11, suggesting that the Kremlin’s migrant policy has yet to be defined clearly.


Key Takeaways:

• US intelligence reportedly assessed that Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in fall 2023 and through the upcoming winter aim to weaken Western support for Ukraine instead of achieving any immediate operational objectives.
• Russian forces may be conducting costly offensive operations at a time unfavorable for ground maneuver to time the potential shift in battlefield initiative with ongoing conversations in the West about continued support to Ukraine.
• US intelligence also assessed that the war in Ukraine has devastated the pre-war Russian military, although Russia has partially offset these losses and continues to prepare for a long war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with various US officials, including President Joe Biden, and spoke to Congress about US military assistance to Ukraine in Washington, DC on December 12.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes targeting Ukraine on December 12.
• Ukrainian officials stated that Russian special services may have conducted the major cyberattack on Ukrainian mobile operator Kyivstar on December 12.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that GUR cyber units recently conducted a successful cyber operation against the Russian Federal Tax Service (FNS).
• Russian news outlet RBK reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin has designated prominent Russian milbloggers as “trusted persons” in his presidential election campaign for the first time.
• A St. Petersburg court sentenced three underage Uzbek migrants and their parents to deportation for extinguishing the Eternal Flame in St. Petersburg amid ongoing tension between Central Asian communities in Russia and Russian authorities.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 12 and advanced in some areas.
• The Russian State Duma adopted a series of laws on December 12 to help further bolster Rosgvardia’s and the Federal Security Service’s (FSB) force generation capacity.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to use the Kremlin-funded pseudo-volunteer “Dvizheniye Pervykh” (Movement of the First) youth organization to indoctrinate Ukrainian youth in occupied Ukraine with Russian and cultural national identities.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/15/23 01:26 PM

THE HIGH PRICE OF LOSING UKRAINE
Dec 14, 2023 - ISW Press

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The High Price of Losing Ukraine

Military-Strategic and Financial Implications of Russian Victory

Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Mitchell Belcher,
Noel Mikkelsen, and Thomas Bergeron

December 14, 2023



The United States has a much higher stake in Russia's war on Ukraine than most people think. A Russian conquest of all of Ukraine is by no means impossible if the United States cuts off all military assistance and Europe follows suit. Such an outcome would bring a battered but triumphant Russian army right up to NATO’s border from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean. The Ukrainian military with Western support has destroyed nearly 90% of the Russian army that invaded in February 2022 according to US intelligence sources, but the Russians have replaced those manpower losses and are ramping up their industrial base to make good their material losses at a rate much faster than their pre-war capacity had permitted.[1]

A victorious Russian army at the end of this war will be combat experienced and considerably larger than the pre-2022 Russian land forces. The Russian economy will gradually recover as sanctions inevitably erode and Moscow develops ways to circumvent or mitigate those that remain. Over time it will replace its equipment and rebuild its coherence, drawing on a wealth of hard-won experience fighting mechanized warfare. It will bring with it advanced air defense systems that only American stealth aircraft—badly needed to deter and confront China—can reliably penetrate. Russia can pose a major conventional military threat to NATO for the first time since the 1990s in a timeframe set to a considerable extent by how much the Kremlin invests in its military. Since Moscow has already committed to an ambitious post-war military expansion program the US cannot be confident that the timeframe will be very long.[2]

The overall military potential of the United States and its NATO allies is so much greater than that of Russia that there is no reason to doubt the West’s ability to defeat any conceivable Russian military even assuming that Russia fully absorbs Ukraine and Belarus. But as Americans consider the costs of continuing to help Ukraine fight the Russians in the coming years, they deserve a careful consideration of the costs of allowing Russia to win. Those costs are much higher than most people imagine.

To deter and defend against a renewed Russian threat following a full Russian victory in Ukraine the United States will have to deploy to Eastern Europe a sizable portion of its ground forces. The United States will have to station in Europe a large number of stealth aircraft. Building and maintaining those aircraft is intrinsically expensive, but challenges in manufacturing them rapidly will likely force the United States to make a terrible choice between keeping enough in Asia to defend Taiwan and its other Asian allies and deterring or defeating a Russian attack on a NATO ally. The entire undertaking will cost a fortune, and the cost will last as long as the Russian threat continues—potentially indefinitely.

Almost any other outcome of the Ukraine war is preferable to this one. Helping Ukraine keep the lines where they are through continuous Western military support is far more advantageous and cheaper for the United States than allowing Ukraine to lose. “Freezing” the conflict is worse than continuing to help Ukraine fight—that would simply give Russia time and space to prepare for a renewed war to conquer Ukraine and confront NATO. Helping Ukraine regain control of all or most of its territory would be much more advantageous, as it would drive Russian forces even further to the east. Best of all, supporting Ukraine to its victory and then helping it rebuild would put the largest and most combat-effective friendly military on the European continent at the forefront of the defense of NATO—whether Ukraine does or does not ultimately join the alliance.

In all these scenarios Americans should keep in mind that Ukraine is not Afghanistan. Afghanistan in 2001 was one of the poorest countries in the world with no industry to speak of and a poorly-educated population. Ukraine is highly industrialized with a modern, urban, and highly educated population. Restored to its 1991 borders Ukraine’s economy is large enough to support its own military. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has recently committed his country to establishing its own military industry including by establishing joint ventures with Western firms to benefit Ukraine and its partners.[3] A victorious Ukraine would not be a permanent ward of the West. It can instead be truly independent and contribute greatly to NATO’s security and the West’s economy.

The following maps illustrate four military situations related to this war and its outcomes and consider their military-strategic and financial implications for the United States.

Situation 1: Pre-February 2022

Before the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022 non-Baltic NATO states faced no serious conventional military threat from Russia. The Russian ground forces had one airborne division and a mechanized infantry brigade near the Estonian and Latvian borders and the equivalent of a division in the exclave of Kaliningrad, which is physically separated from Russia and a poor launching pad on its own for an attack on Poland and Lithuania, which it borders.[4] The next closest Russian forces to Poland were about 360 miles to the east on the far side of Belarus. No Russian troops threatened Slovakia, Hungary, or Romania.

The Russians had been building an air defense network relying on their advanced S-300 and S-400 long-range anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems to hinder NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic States. They had been expanding that network over much of the Black Sea using their bases in occupied Crimea. However, their network suffered from a large gap across southern Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania because they could not base their systems in Ukraine. Even their air defense coverage over Poland relied heavily on systems in Kaliningrad, the most vulnerable and exposed part of Russian territory. Kaliningrad’s small size deprives Russian air defense systems of one of the important elements of their survivability, in fact. The systems are fully mobile with all of their components mounted in trucks. They are designed to be able to move around and thereby make it harder for an adversary to locate and destroy them. Trapping these systems in a small exclave reduces that advantage and facilitates NATO efforts to disrupt and defeat them.

Map 2: Current situation as of December 12, 2023

Ukraine’s defeat of the initial Russian invasion in 2022 has kept the eastern borders of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania free of the threat of major Russian ground attack. Ukraine’s liberation of western Kherson Oblast has kept the nearest effective Russian troops about 220 miles and a large river away from the Romanian border. Most of Russia’s troops are more than 350 miles from Romania and further still from Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. The war is fully occupying nearly half a million Russian troops—just about all of Russia’s available ground combat power. The Russians are steadily completing their long-running efforts to secure control over Belarus and to base Russian forces there, but Russia still poses no conventional ground threat to NATO today because its military is tied up in Ukraine.

Map 3: Hypothetical situation if Russia fully occupies Ukraine

NB: The following estimate of the forces Russia might deploy in Ukraine and Belarus if Moscow intended to be prepared for a short-notice serious attack on NATO is very conservative. It assumes that the Russians move to the NATO borders two armies newly-created for the current war, one of which is already designated to be stationed in Crimea, and two others that were deployed on the eastern borders of Ukraine and Belarus and whose stationing at those locations would lose its strategic purpose following a full Russian victory in Ukraine. It assumes that most of the Russian army currently in Ukraine will return to bases within the current boundaries of the Russian Federation after the war. Most of the Russian army’s home stations are Soviet-era garrisons whose locations are not optimized for Russia’s current strategic context. The Russians could well bring considerably more combat power toward the NATO frontiers than is discussed below and depicted on this map following a victory over Ukraine without any strategic cost if they were willing to pay the financial price.

The sudden collapse of Western aid would likely lead sooner or later to the collapse of Ukraine’s ability to hold off the Russian military. Russian forces could push all the way to the western Ukrainian border in such a scenario and establish new military bases on the borders of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The Russians are preparing occupation military forces to handle the almost inevitable Ukrainian insurgency while leaving front line troops free to threaten NATO.

The Russians have expanded their army’s structure to fight the war and have indicated their intention of retaining the larger structure after the war.[5] They could readily station three full armies (the 18th Combined Arms Army and the 25th Combined Arms Army newly created for this war and the 8th Guards Combined Arms Army) on the borders of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania.[6] They would likely build out the component divisions in those armies to normal complements of three regiments each, drawing on formations further in the rear to bring these frontline units to nearly their full strength of roughly 6 mechanized divisions (18 regiments) in Ukraine.[7] They could move divisions that had been stationed on the eastern Ukrainian borders into Ukraine itself as reserves for the front-line divisions. The Kremlin has made great strides in its long-term project to gain control of the Belarusian military, and victory in Ukraine would likely get it the rest of the way.[8] The Russians would thus likely deploy either permanently or in a nominally rotational way an airborne division (three regiments) and a mechanized infantry division (likely three regiments) in southwestern and northern Belarus as well. They would be able to threaten a short-notice mechanized offensive against one or several NATO states with at least 8 divisions (21 mechanized or tank regiments and brigades and three airborne regiments), backed by significant reserves including the 1st Guards Tank Army, which would be reconstituted around Moscow and was always intended to be the premier strike force against NATO. They could make such an attack and still threaten the Baltic States and Finland with the forces already present there and reinforcements they have announced they intend to station along the Finnish borders.[9] Russian ground forces would be covered by a dense air defense network of S-300, S-400, and S-500 long range anti-air and anti-missile systems with overlapping coverage of the entire front.

NATO would be unable to defend against such an attack with the forces currently in Europe. The United States would need to move large numbers of American soldiers to the entire eastern NATO border from the Baltic to the Black Sea to deter Russian adventurism and be prepared to defeat a Russian attack. The United States would also need to commit a significant proportion of its fleet of stealth aircraft permanently to Europe. NATO defense strategy relies on air superiority not merely to protect NATO troops from enemy attack but also to use air power to offset smaller NATO ground forces and limited stocks of NATO artillery. The United States would have to keep large numbers of stealth aircraft available in Europe to penetrate and destroy Russian air defense systems—and keep the Russians from re-establishing effective air defense—so that non-stealthy aircraft and cruise missiles can reach their targets. The requirement to commit a significant stealth aircraft fleet to Europe could badly degrade America’s ability to respond effectively to Chinese aggression against Taiwan since all Taiwan scenarios rely heavily on the same stealth aircraft that would be needed to defend Europe.

The cost of these defensive measures would be astronomical and would likely be accompanied by a period of very high risk when US forces were not adequately prepared or postured to handle either Russia or China, let alone both together.

Map 4: Full Ukrainian Victory

Re-establishing Kyiv’s control over all Ukraine’s territory including Crimea is important for the United States and NATO as well as Ukraine. Russia’s possession of Crimea makes Russia the dominant power in the Black Sea and allows Russian aircraft to threaten the southeastern NATO flank as well as to deploy long-range air defenses on the peninsula. The positions in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast that Russia currently controls provide bases even further west of Crimea. NATO will have to meet these challenges whenever the war ends if those areas remain in Russian hands. If Ukraine regains its 1991 borders, however, the pressure on NATO eases dramatically. The nearest Russian troops to Romania would be almost 500 miles away. The Black Sea would become very nearly a NATO lake. Moscow would likely complete its military control of Belarus and base its forces there even in this scenario. The threat to NATO of such bases, however, would take on a very different cast in a scenario in which Belarus is a large salient with NATO forces on two sides and a large and powerful independent Ukraine all along its southern border. The task of defending northeastern Poland and the Baltic States from Russian troops operating out of Belarus, Kaliningrad, and Russia itself is a much more manageable and less costly proposition than that of defending the entire NATO line from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean.

Conclusion

This brief paper evaluates only the narrow question of some of the military-strategic and financial tradeoffs of various possible outcomes of the Russian war in Ukraine. We have considered elsewhere the important question of possible Russian escalations in the face of defeat and we do not minimize those considerations.[10] We have argued strongly that American values align with American interests in Ukraine and that there is a strong and cogent values-based argument for helping Ukraine liberate all its land and its people.[11] We still believe that that is true.

But the American people are being asked to spend a lot of money helping Ukraine fight Russia, and it is not unreasonable for them also wonder what the financial cost of not helping Ukraine would be. This essay is meant solely to serve as a departure point for a data-driven and realistic discussion answering that question.

Note on the maps:

Map 1 depicting the pre-2022 deployments of Russia and NATO reflects publicly-available reports of the locations of NATO units of brigade/regiment echelon and above and ISW’s assessment of the locations of Russian units at those echelons and above.[12]

Map 2 depicts ISW’s best current assessment of the locations of Russian units of brigade/regiment echelon and above fighting in Ukraine.[13] ISW does not currently assess that Russia retains combat effective ground forces maneuver units outside of Ukraine beyond those engaged in training at this time.

Map 3 depicts a hypothetical array of Russian units following a complete Russian conquest of Ukraine. The text accompanying the map explains why we chose to show the Russians stationing the number of armies, divisions, and brigades on our map and why we chose the particular Russian formations to move around. The Russians could and almost certainly would make other concrete choices at every level, including the precise tactical dispositions of individual regiments and brigades. We placed many of those in locations previously used by the Soviet Union or Ukraine; others in locations that seem suitable as jumping-off points for an attack on one or more NATO countries. The purpose of the illustration is to show a conservative estimate of a Russian force disposition intended to threaten NATO with a credible invasion, not to argue for any specific Russian unit array or that the Russians would deploy in precisely such a pattern.

Map 4 depicts a hypothetical Russian disposition following a full Russian defeat in Ukraine. We assume that Moscow would adjust its pre-2022 permanent deployment to one arrayed to pose a constant threat to Ukraine, and so would be much more heavily concentrated around Ukraine’s borders. It is already apparent that the Russian Black Sea Fleet will withdraw to Novorossiisk if Russia loses Crimea, and so we have stationed it there on this map along with most of the ground forces currently stationed in Crimea. This map is also, of course, notional, and Moscow would almost certainly make different choices.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/19/23 03:17 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 18, 2023
Dec 18, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 18, 2023

Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 18, 2023, 6pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on December 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A combination of artillery ammunition shortages and delays in the provision of Western security assistance is likely causing Ukrainian forces to husband materiel and may delay future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated in an interview with Reuters published on December 18 that Ukrainian forces have shortages of 122mm and 152mm shells along the entire frontline.[1] Tarnavskyi stated that the shortages are prompting Ukrainian forces to redistribute artillery ammunition and replan military tasks.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister General Ivan Havrylyuk also acknowledged on December 18 that Ukrainian artillery ammunition shortages will continue.[3] Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces are also having issues with artillery ammunition, although Ukrainian and Western officials have reportedly assessed that the Russian forces are currently conducting artillery fire at a rate five to seven times greater than the Ukrainian forces.[4]

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have likely expended large portions of their Soviet-era stocks of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells, forcing both to look abroad for other stocks of this artillery ammunition. Russia has recently received large quantities of these shells from North Korea, and Ukraine and its Western partners have engaged in efforts to source these shells from foreign stocks.[5] It is unclear what delays or impediments there may be in Ukrainian and Western efforts to source 122mm and 152mm shells and how any such delays may be contributing to current Ukrainian shortages. Ukrainian forces are increasingly using Western-provided 155mm artillery systems along the front, and possible delays in Western security assistance may impact available supplies of 155mm shells, although US assistance packages have recently included 155mm shells.[6] Havrylyuk stated that Ukraine is currently focusing on the domestic production of drones to offset artillery shortages and is planning to produce 155mm ammunition in Ukraine with Western companies in 2024.[7]

Artillery shortages and delays in Western security assistance will create uncertainty in Ukrainian operational plans and likely prompt Ukrainian forces to conserve resources, which may force Ukrainian forces to make tough decisions about prioritizing certain sectors of the front over sectors where limited territorial setbacks are least damaging. BBC’s Russian service reported that Ukrainian officials said that they make periodic changes to what could be considered rough operational plans for 2024 based on the situation at the front.[8] A Ukrainian official reportedly stated that it is difficult to make military calculations for these plans due to the significant reduction in Western aid to Ukraine since September 2023.[9] Tarnavskyi stated that Ukraine is preparing reserves for further large-scale actions.[10] Artillery shortages and delays in Western aid will very likely decrease Ukraine’s ability to plan and prepare for these actions. Delays in concrete Ukrainian operational planning and the materiel necessary for counteroffensive preparations will likely in turn delay 2024 counteroffensive operations.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi declined to comment on recent Western reporting about Ukrainian counteroffensive and Russian offensive plans for 2024. Zaluzhnyi stated on December 18 that he would not comment on Ukraine’s military plans for 2024 and responded to BILD’s recent article about Russia’s strategic goals in Ukraine through 2026 by stating that German intelligence officers have a right to their opinion.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on December 18 that Russian forces have enough drones to launch daily strikes against Ukraine from different directions.[12] Ihnat stated that Russian forces are also stockpiling cruise and ballistic missiles, including Iskander, S-400, Kh-101, and Kh-555 missiles.[13] Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed five Russian-launched Shahed-131/136 drones and a Kh-39 missile over Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly forming four new military transport aviation (VTA) regiments, although these efforts are likely aimed at reorganizing existing VTA units in support of Russia’s force posturing rather than adding new capability in the short term. Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia, quoting an unnamed Russian MoD official, claimed that the MoD decided to create and deploy four new VTA regiments to operate in the northern, southern, and western strategic directions and has already created the first of these regiments in the Russian Far East.[15] Izvestia claimed that Russian officials held an event in Ulan Ude, Republic of Buryatia on December 1 celebrating the reactivation of the 600th VTA Regiment.[16] The Soviet Union originally formed the 600th VTA in 1963, which was based in Shadrinsk, Kurgan Oblast until the regiment relocated to the Lithuanian Soviet Republic in 1965. Russia disbanded the 600th VTA in 1998 by merging the regiment with the 8th Guards VTA Regiment alongside other VTA formations. The reactivation of this unit suggests that the Russian MoD is restructuring its existing VTA forces more along Soviet-era lines. Izvestia added that the Russian MoD plans to base another VTA regiment in Tambov, Tambov Oblast by the end of 2023 and has been expanding local airfield infrastructure to support this basing. The Russian MoD source claimed that the VTA command will task the new regiments with transporting personnel, weapons, and military equipment, as well as supporting landings for airborne (VDV) troops and reconnaissance units. The Russian MoD source also claimed that the new VTA regiments will receive new and modernized Il-76 airlifters, An-26 transport aircraft, and possibly Mi-26 helicopters to help improve Russian logistics. Izvestia claimed that the Russian MoD began working on creating new VTA regiments in 2021 and aims to allocate more than 100 new and modernized Il-76s to the new regiments by the end of the decade – a goal that the Russian defense industrial base may struggle to fulfill. Izvestia also claimed that Russian An-124 and Il-76 aircraft conducted over 10,000 sorties since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian Government Commission on Legislative Activity supported a bill that would criminalize “Russophobia” abroad, likely as part of ongoing efforts to maintain and increase Russian influence in post-Soviet countries. Russian State Duma Deputy from the United Russia party, Irina Yarovaya, proposed a draft bill that would punish foreign citizens and stateless individuals who do not permanently reside in Russia for “Russophobia” outside of Russia.[17] The current law can only punish foreign officials, foreign citizens employed by international organizations, and foreign citizens using their official positions for spreading “Russophobia” publicly or committing “Russophobic” acts.[18] The law defines “Russophobia” as acts or public calls to commit discriminatory actions against Russian citizens or “compatriots.”[19] Russia has intentionally and broadly defined “compatriots” as ethnic Russians and Russian speakers and does not limit the definition to those holding Russian citizenship or residing in the Russian Federation.[20] Russian officials have routinely criticized efforts in the South Caucasus and Central Asia that promote indigenous languages and education at the perceived expense of Russian language and education.[21] Russian officials may use the proposed bill to threaten foreign officials with criminal proceedings for promoting indigenous language and education programs by labeling these initiatives “Russophobic.” Russian authorities may use this new bill to intensify criticisms against foreign citizens and officials by initiating criminal proceedings as part of ongoing efforts to enforce foreign compliance with Russian-supported and pro-Russian initiatives, programs, and narratives.

Russian officials simplified requirements to obtain Russian citizenship for Belarusian, Kazakh, and Moldovan citizens amid continued hostility towards migrants in Russian society. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on December 18 allowing Belarusian citizens to submit a citizenship application without proof of a prior long-term permanent residence in Russia or proficiency in Russian language, history, and civics.[22] Kazakh and Moldovan citizens must still provide proof of Russian language proficiency.[23] This distinction in requirements is in line with the fallacious Kremlin assertions that Belarusians and Ukrainians are actually Russians and that neither Belarus nor Ukraine has a distinctive language or culture.[24] Belarusians, Kazakhs, and Moldovans are also required to submit identifying documents and proof of their current residence in Russia.[25] Russian efforts to simplify citizenship for migrants appear hypocritical and inconsistent with ongoing migrant crackdowns aimed at coercing migrants into Russian military service and placating the xenophobic Russian ultranationalist community.[26] The simplification of Belarusian citizens’ citizenship requirements may be related to long-term efforts to absorb Belarus into Russia through the Union State structure and to pursue other objectives in Kazakhstan and Moldova.

The European Union (EU) adopted its 12th sanctions package in connection with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The European Council (EC) adopted a sanctions package on December 18 that aims to weaken sources of funding for Russia’s war effort and degrade Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB).[28] The sanctions include measures banning the import of Russian diamonds, prohibiting the re-export of dual use goods and technologies, instituting strict export restrictions on 29 legal entities that directly support the Russian DIB, enforcing a transit ban for all goods that Russian forces use on the battlefield in Ukraine, and strengthening compliance rules for the G7 price cap on Russian oil and petroleum products.

Key Takeaways:

• A combination of artillery ammunition shortages and delays in the provision of Western security assistance is likely causing Ukrainian forces to husband materiel and may delay future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi declined to comment on recent Western reporting about Ukrainian counteroffensive and Russian offensive plans for 2024.
• Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on December 18 that Russian forces have enough drones to launch daily strikes against Ukraine from different directions.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly forming four new military transport aviation (VTA) regiments, although these efforts are likely aimed at reorganizing existing VTA units in support of Russia’s force posturing rather than adding new capability in the short term.
• The Russian Government Commission on Legislative Activity supported a bill that would criminalize “Russophobia” abroad, likely as part of ongoing efforts to maintain and increase Russian influence in post-Soviet countries.
• Russian officials simplified requirements to obtain Russian citizenship for Belarusian, Kazakh, and Moldovan citizens amid continued hostility towards migrants in Russian society.
• The European Union (EU) adopted its 12th sanctions package in connection with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made a confirmed advance southwest of Donetsk City.
• Former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia Spokesperson Eduard Basurin claimed that more than 25,000 Russian personnel are serving with Cossack volunteer formations in Ukraine as of December 18.
• Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continues to deny Russian and Belarusian involvement in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied areas.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/21/23 03:51 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 20, 2023
Dec 20, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 20, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 20, 2023, 6pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on December 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill made a series of anti-migrant and xenophobic remarks that directly contradict Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing efforts to reestablish the inclusive Russian World (Russkiy Mir) ideology.
During the Moscow Diocesan Assembly on December 20, Kirill blamed migrants for increasingly threatening interreligious and interethnic peace in Russia by refusing to integrate into Russian society and forming criminal and extremist organizations.[1] Kirill added that life for the ethnically Russian “indigenous population” is almost unbearable in some areas, including Moscow, claiming that if such trends continue then the Russian Orthodox people will “lose Russia.” Kirill’s statements contrast with Putin’s recent efforts to present himself as a centrist figure and to reestablish the concept of the Russian World, which includes all people of different ethnicities and religious affiliations who have lived or are living in geographical areas that belonged to Ancient Rus (Kyivan Rus), the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation.[2] Putin notably also stated during the Meeting of the Council of Legislators on December 20 that the Russian constitution and government are trying to ensure harmony in a diverse and large Russia – reemphasizing his efforts to present Russia as an inclusive and harmonious multicultural Russian state.[3]

Putin, on the one hand, has been increasingly reimagining himself as a modern tsar who is defending Russian sovereignty to justify his war in Ukraine and to appease his ultranationalist constituencies who tend to have more intolerant views on religion and Russian identity.[4] But Putin has, on the other hand, been trying to seem to be an inclusive leader to incentivize all religious and ethnic groups to support his regime and war efforts. ISW assessed on November 28 that Kirill’s anti-migrant and xenophobic rhetoric is more closely aligned with Russian government policies towards migrants and non-Russian ethnicities in Russia than Putin’s more inclusive rhetoric in the context of the Russian World.[5] These narratives and policies are thus contradictory and may ultimately complicate Putin’s efforts to appease different constituency groups in Russia and may trigger further interethnic and interreligious conflicts.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov explicitly stated that the Kremlin is uninterested in negotiations with Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin is moving away from its information operation meant to feign interest in negotiations. Peskov responded to a question on December 20 about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s December 19 statement that the issue of negotiations with Russia is currently “irrelevant,” stating that the Kremlin has repeatedly said that there is no “basis” or “foundation” for negotiations with Ukraine.[6] Peskov also stated that the “prerequisites” for negotiations are absent, likely referring to Russia‘s unchanged maximalist objectives in Ukraine - which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender.[7] ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin does not intend to engage in serious negotiations with Ukraine or the West in good faith.[8] The Kremlin previously pushed information operations feigning interest in negotiations with Ukraine in order to cast itself as a responsible party and blame Ukraine for refusing “reasonable” Russian negotiations, but the Kremlin appears to be moving away from this information operation, as ISW suggested on December 15.

Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 19 to 20. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched 19 Shahed-131/136 drones at Ukraine from Chauda and Balaklava, occupied Crimea, and that Ukrainian forces shot down 18 of the drones over Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force also reported that Russian forces launched two S-300 missiles at Kharkiv Oblast from Belgorod Oblast.[11] The Kyiv City Military Administration noted that this is the fifth Russian air attack against Kyiv Oblast in the month of December.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled Africa Corps announced a recruitment campaign targeting former and current Wagner Group personnel and people with combat experience in the war in Ukraine. The Africa Corps, a Russian MoD initiative to expand Russian military presence in the Middle East and Africa, announced that it started recruitment on December 20.[13] Africa-focused Russian media outlet African Initiative stated that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is “supervising” the new unspecified leadership of the Africa Corps.[14] The Africa Corps claimed that its command staff consists of former combat commanders of elite units in the Russian military and unspecified private military companies (PMCs) - possibly referring to the Redut PMC (affiliated with the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]).[15] The Africa Corps advertised an unspecified “high salary,” but noted that interested applicants who are currently fighting in the war in Ukraine cannot transfer to serve in the Africa Corps, though active-duty Russian military personnel not fighting in the war can transfer to serve in the Africa Corps.[16] The Africa Corps also clarified that an individual cannot transfer from Rosgvardia to the Africa Corps before completing their Rosgvardia contract.[17] The Africa Corps’ desire to clarify eligibility for service suggests that its advertisement campaign has successfully generated interest among former Wagner personnel given that some Wagner fighters signed contracts with the Russian MoD or Rosgvardia after the death of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023.[18] The Africa Corps suggested that it would operate in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso - areas consistent with ISW’s previous assessment of the Africa Corps' area of operations.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin discussed bilateral economic cooperation with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on December 20. Mishustin stated that the previous two Russian-Chinese summits in March and October 2023 indicated the importance of further strengthening the “comprehensive partnership” and “strategic interaction” between the two countries.[20] Mishustin and Xi highlighted increased Russian-Chinese trade in 2023, which has reportedly already surpassed its goal of $200 billion, and Mishustin continued to claim that Russian and Chinese transactions are almost entirely done in national currencies (the yuan and ruble). China and Russia issued a joint communique on December 20 which stated that the “comprehensive strategic partnership” between the two countries is in line with the two states’ interests, not aimed at third parties, and not subject to external influence.[21] The communique highlighted Russian-Chinese energy and investment cooperation and the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The communique included Russian statements about Taiwan but did not mention Ukraine, which suggests that the Kremlin continues to be concerned with China’s reticence to participate fully in the no-limits partnership that Russia wants to establish, and that China continues to hold the upper hand in the Russian-Chinese relationship.

Moscow State University (MGU) is reportedly ending its master's program in “information and hybrid warfare” aimed at teaching students how to create information operations and conduct hybrid warfare, generating outrage from Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov. MGU Higher School of Telecommunications Dean Vitaly Tretyakov defended MGU’s decision to discontinue the master’s program on Solovyov’s show on December 18 because students graduating from the program would face difficulties finding employment abroad.[23] Tretyakov also argued that the master’s program, which offers a course in “special propaganda” (a Russian term for information and psychological operations), would threaten MGU’s reputation.[24] Solovyov dismissed Tretyakov’s explanations and questioned the patriotism of MGU’s students and faculty.[25] Solovyov praised the now-closing master’s program and noted that Russian universities need to teach “special propaganda” and combat Western narratives of history.[26] Former Duma Deputy Elena Panina echoed Solovyov’s support for the program and claimed that the Russian government should fund similar programs at various universities.[27] MGU announced the creation of the master’s program in 2022, the same year it admitted its first class of students, reportedly to teach and promote Russian objectives for the war in Ukraine.[28] MGU also is reportedly closing the program due to the low salaries of the professors teaching its courses and an ongoing scandal regarding faculty bribery.

The Kremlin continues to set conditions to create a veneer of legitimacy over the upcoming March 2024 presidential election. Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) Chairperson Ella Pamfilova reported on December 20 that the CEC has already received applications for 16 individuals who are running as presidential candidates and that 29 Russian federal subjects will use remote electronic voting for the first time during the presidential election.[30] ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin uses the remote electronic voting system to manipulate election results.[31] Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed that Russia has developed all the necessary legal frameworks to ensure that the election is "competitive, open, and legitimate."[32] By contrast, a Russian insider source claimed that the CEC has been tasked with ensuring a voter turnout of 75 percent, 80 to 85 percent of which will reportedly vote for Putin.[33] While ISW cannot independently verify the veracity of the insider source's claim, the insinuation that the Kremlin is interested in creating the guise of Putin's legitimate election is consistent with ISW's assessment that Putin remains interested in engaging in legal theater to legitimize his regime.

Key Takeaways:

• Head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill made a series of anti-migrant and xenophobic remarks that directly contradict Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing efforts to reestablish the inclusive Russian World (Russkiy Mir) ideology.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov explicitly stated that the Kremlin is uninterested in negotiations with Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin is moving away from its information operation meant to feign interest in negotiations.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled Africa Corps announced a recruitment campaign targeting former and current Wagner Group personnel and people with combat experience in the war in Ukraine.
• Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin discussed bilateral economic cooperation with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on December 20.
• Moscow State University (MGU) is reportedly ending its master's program in “information and hybrid warfare” aimed at teaching students how to create information operations and conduct hybrid warfare, generating outrage from Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov.
• The Kremlin continues to set conditions to create a veneer of legitimacy over the upcoming March 2024 presidential election.
• Russian forces made a confirmed advance north of Bakhmut and continued positional meeting engagements along the entire line of contact.
• Russian officials issued military summonses to migrants at a naturalization ceremony on December 20 as part of ongoing efforts to target naturalized migrants for crypto-mobilization efforts and to placate the Russian ultranationalist community.
• Russian occupation administrators continue to use educational organizations to facilitate the temporary deportation of Ukrainians to Russia.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/23/23 10:43 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/25/23 04:25 PM

Christmas Moves to Dec. 25 in Ukraine, Another Rebuff of Russia
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church formally changed the main date for the festivities, departing from the Russian tradition of celebrating on Jan. 7, according to the Julian calendar.

By Andrew E. Kramer
Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine

Dec. 25, 2023
Updated 9:56 a.m. ET
Christmas lights flickered on ahead of schedule. Families sang carols a little sooner. And the first presents of the season — by tradition hidden under a pillow or in a boot — appeared two weeks early.

Of Ukraine’s many Western-oriented changes, put in place bit by bit since independence and accelerated during the war, one brought special joy this year: Christmas came early.

After centuries of marking the holiday on Jan. 7 under the Julian church calendar, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church this year formally switched to celebrating on Dec. 25 with most of the rest of Europe — and pointedly not with Russia.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/28/23 02:44 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 27, 2023
Dec 27, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 27, 2023

Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 27, 2023, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on December 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian drone footage published on December 27 showed another Russian execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[1]
The geolocated video shows Russian servicemen shooting three Ukrainian soldiers whom Russian forces captured in a tree line west of Verbove (east of Robotyne). The video later depicts one Russian soldier shooting an already dead Ukrainian serviceman again at close range.[2] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General‘s Office announced that it opened an investigation into Russian forces violating the laws and customs of war in addition to premeditated murder.[3] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office stated this incident occurred on an unspecified date in December 2023.[4] ISW previously reported observing drone footage of Russian servicemen using Ukrainian POWs as human shields near Robotyne on December 13.[5] The killing of POWs violates Article III of the Geneva Convention on the laws of armed conflict.

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and retook positions that Ukrainian forces had captured during the summer 2023 counteroffensive, likely after Ukrainian forces withdrew to more defensible positions near Robotyne for the winter. Geolocated footage published on December 14 and 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[7] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated in an interview with BBC published on December 27 that Russia’s leadership wants to retake Avdiivka at a minimum but has a more ambitious goal of capturing all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and recapturing the territory Russian forces lost in Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[8] ISW assessed that the Ukrainian capture of nearby positions in August 2023 was tactically significant because it could have allowed Ukrainian forces to begin operating past the densest Russian minefields and subsequent Russian defensive layers but does not assess that the recapture of these positions by Russian forces is particularly significant at this time.[9] Recent Russian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast nevertheless support ISW’s assessment that the current positional war in Ukraine is not a stable stalemate because the current balance can be tipped in either direction by decisions made in the West or in Russia, and limited Russian gains could become significant especially if the West cuts off military aid to Ukraine.

The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam on June 6, 2023, reportedly postponed a Ukrainian crossing of the Dnipro River that was likely intended to support Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. The Associated Press published an interview with Ukrainian Special Operations Forces personnel on December 26 wherein Ukrainian personnel stated that they were prepared to conduct a crossing of the Dnipro River to the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast in late May 2023 but that the destruction of the KHPP dam and subsequent flooding postponed these plans.[11] The Ukrainian personnel reportedly conducted limited crossing attempts in July, August, and September 2023, but Ukrainian forces did not launch a larger crossing aimed at establishing a bridgehead on the east bank until mid-October 2023.[12]

Ukrainian operations in the east bank of Kherson Oblast in October 2023 drew Russian forces from other sectors of the front and would have likely had a similar or even more pronounced effect in June 2023 at the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[13] Russian forces also transferred elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division from Kherson Oblast following the destruction of the KHPP dam and proceeded to rely on them as critical elements of the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[14] It is unlikely that the Russian command would have transferred these elements away from Kherson in the event of a Ukrainian crossing in June 2023. Significant Ukrainian ground operations in the left bank of Kherson Oblast coordinated with Ukrainian counteroffensive operations throughout southern Ukraine and near Bakhmut would have placed greater pressure on Russian forces and would likely have limited the Russian military’s ability to balance manpower and materiel requirements for defensive operations in four directions. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam thus likely played a role in the outcome of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi described continued Ukrainian battlefield challenges and requirements for future territorial advances during an interview with BBC published on December 27. Tarnavskyi stated that well-prepared Russian defenses, including superior Russian minefields, were one of the main factors that impacted the results of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, but noted that he does not believe that the front is at an impasse.[15] Tarnavskyi reiterated that Ukrainian forces are facing ammunition shortages, particularly shortages of 122mm and 152mm shells and that Ukrainian forces need additional supplies of air defense missiles and electronic warfare (EW) systems to defend against Russian drones.[16] Tarnavskyi also reiterated the need for Ukrainian air superiority.[17] Tarnavskyi noted that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are adjusting their tactics to increasingly include radio-electronic operations, drone operations, and surveillance.

Ukrainian officials highlighted the Ukrainian defense industrial base’s (DIB) increased production in 2023 and offered projections of Ukraine’s domestic drone production capabilities on December 27. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine produced three times as much equipment and weapons in 2023 as in 2022.[19] Zelensky added that Ukraine is systematically expanding its production of ordnance for drones and has significantly increased its production of projectiles and missiles.[20] Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin stated that Ukraine also increased the production of mortar rounds by a factor of 42, the production of artillery shells by a factor of 2.8, and the production of armored personnel carriers by a factor of five in 2023.[21] Kamyshin stated that Ukraine is capable of producing over one million first-person viewer (FPV) systems, over 10,000 medium range strike drones, and over 1,000 drones with a range of 1,000 kilometers within an unspecified timeframe, presumably within the next year.[22] Kamyshin added that Ukraine is also developing hybrid air defense systems and that so-called FrankenSAM systems that merge advanced Western air defense missiles with modified Soviet launchers or other missile launchers are already operating on the battlefield.

Russian forces launched another series of Shahed-136/131 drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on December 27. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 46 Shaheds in several waves from the directions of Balaklava (occupied Crimea) and Primorsko-Akhtarsk (Krasnodar Krai, Russia).[24] Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down 32 Shaheds, and Ukrainian air defense systems activated over Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhia, Khmelnytskyi, and Kirovohrad oblasts. Ukrainian military officials reported that most of the drones that Ukrainian forces could not shoot down hit frontline areas, especially in Kherson Oblast.[25] Several Shaheds also fell without any consequences. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk reported that Russian forces have changed their tactics and are now attempting to direct Shaheds through residential areas, where Ukrainian forces reportedly cannot maintain stationary air defense systems.

Satellite imagery from the successful December 26 Ukrainian strike on a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessel in occupied Feodosia, Crimea indicates that the strike damaged the surrounding port infrastructure. Satellite imagery published on December 27 taken on December 26 indicates that the Ukrainian strike on the BSF’s Novocherkassk Ropucha-class landing ship also damaged a pier at the Feodosia port and a nearby warehouse.[27] The satellite imagery shows that most of the ship is heavily burned and mostly submerged.[28] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmitry Pletenchuk stated on December 27 that the strike may have killed up to 80 Russian personnel.[29] Russian opposition news outlet Astra reported that there were 77 Russian military personnel aboard the Novocherkassk at the time of the strike of whom 33 are missing and 19 are wounded.[30] A Russian sailor who reportedly served on the Novocherkassk told Astra that conscripts and contract servicemen (kontraktniki) were on the ship at the time of the strike.[31] Russian military officials have repeatedly stated that Russian conscripts would not deploy to Ukraine.[32] Russian conscripts were also aboard the BSF‘s flagship Moskva missile cruiser when Ukrainian forces destroyed it in April 2022.

Russia maintains its maximalist objectives in Ukraine and is uninterested in good faith negotiations despite reports that Western officials are becoming more amenable to eventual Ukrainian negotiations with Russia to end the war. An unspecified Biden administration official and a European diplomat told Politico in an article published on December 27 that the Biden administration and European officials are shifting their focus from supporting Ukraine’s total victory over Russia to improving Ukraine’s position in presumed eventual negotiations with Russia to end the war.[34] Politico noted that such negotiations would likely force Ukraine to cede territory to Russia.[35] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on December 27 that the West intends to freeze the war in Ukraine then frame it as a victory and rhetorically asked what victories the United States achieved in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq after having attempted the same thing.[36] Lavrov’s references to US involvement in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq suggest that Lavrov views the Western discussion about freezing the war and preparing for eventual Ukrainian negotiations with Russia as a Western willingness to accept Ukraine’s defeat. Lavrov’s statement is also consistent with recent Russian officials’ statements that Russia is not interested in freezing the war or engaging in honest negotiations and will continue to pursue its expansionist territorial goals and efforts to “demilitarize” Ukraine.[37] ISW previously assessed that a temporary ceasefire would likely provide the Russian military time to prepare for renewed aggression against Ukraine and that Russia would still ultimately maintain the same maximalist objectives for that renewed aggression.

The Russian state-owned Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) found that Russians are increasingly less trusting of Russian state TV and are turning to social media and the internet for news.[39] VCIOM conducted a study in December, which found that Russian public trust in state TV channels had declined from 46 percent to 26 percent in a span of seven years. VCIOM concluded that the TV audience in Russia has also shrunk from 42 percent to 40 percent since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. VCIOM observed that the Russian audience that reportedly trusts the internet as its primary source of information constituted 44 percent of respondents and exceeded the number of Russians who relied on state TV for the first time. VCIOM specified that of Russians who prefer the internet as their primary source 19 percent rely on news sites, 14 percent get their news from social media networks, and 11 percent prefer instant messaging platforms including Telegram. The study found that over the past two years Russians’ use of instant messaging platforms as their primary source of information increased almost threefold – likely reflecting the growing popularity of Russian milbloggers on Telegram over the nearly two years of Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. VCIOM also observed an increase in the number of Russians who do not trust any media or social networks from three percent prior to the full-scale invasion to eight percent in December 2023. These Russians reported preferring “kitchen conversations” for their information, which the Russian outlet The Moscow Times compared to information learning practices in the Soviet Union.

The decrease in Russian trust and reliance on state TV is likely partially reflected in changing technology and generational shifts, as well as public disillusionment with Russian TV propaganda since the start of the full-scale invasion. ISW previously reported on statistics that showed that the number of Russian bloggers on Telegram increased by 58 percent and that Telegram saw the highest percent increase of daily published content in the first eight months of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[40] ISW assessed on November 20, 2022, that this increase of Telegram use for information purposes likely highlighted growing Russian distrust of Kremlin media.[41] The Kremlin, however, continues to support the expansion of the Russian ultranationalist online community and is attempting to lure key voices in the Russian information space to amplify state narratives to the growing internet-based audience.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on December 27 in a likely effort to maintain Russia’s critical trade relationship with India.[43] Putin told Jaishankar that Russia knows Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s position on Russian-Indian relations and attitude towards complex processes and the “situation in Ukraine.”[44] Jaishankar stated that Modi intends to visit Russia in 2024. Lavrov stated that he and Jaishankar discussed Russian-Indian military-technical cooperation and the launch of the North-South International Transport Corridor.[45] Lavrov also stated that Russia is ready to help India produce military equipment in the framework of the Make India program.[46] Indian banks and officials have routinely insisted on settling payments for Russian oil and military goods in rupees, but Russia and India suspended a months-long effort to address the issue in May 2023.[47] The Kremlin likely seeks to reassure India about this dispute in their bilateral trade relationship due to India’s increasing importance as a customer for Russian oil exports and its potential as a partner in defense production. Russian oil exports to India rapidly grew in 2023 with India becoming the second largest buyer of Russian crude oil.[48] Bloomberg reported on December 20 that roughly five million barrels of Russian crude oil that were scheduled to reach Indian refiners in the past four weeks had not done so for unspecified reasons, however.[49] Oil revenues have buoyed Russian budgets in recent months, and the Kremlin continues to search for new ways to expand defense industrial cooperation with other countries in an effort to relieve pressures on Russia’s heavily sanctioned defense industrial base (DIB).


Key Takeaways:

1. Ukrainian drone footage published on December 27 showed another Russian execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
2. Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and retook positions that Ukrainian forces had captured during the summer 2023 counteroffensive, likely after Ukrainian forces withdrew to more defensible positions near Robotyne for the winter.
3. The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam on June 6, 2023, reportedly postponed a Ukrainian crossing of the Dnipro River that was likely intended to support Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
4. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi described continued Ukrainian battlefield challenges and requirements for future territorial advances during an interview with BBC published on December 27.
5. Ukrainian officials highlighted the Ukrainian defense industrial base’s (DIB) increased production in 2023 and offered projections of Ukraine’s domestic drone production capabilities on December 27.
6. Russian forces launched another series of Shahed-136/131 drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on December 27.
7. Satellite imagery from the successful December 26 Ukrainian strike on a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessel in occupied Feodosia, Crimea indicates that the strike damaged the surrounding port infrastructure.
8. Russia maintains its maximalist objectives in Ukraine and is uninterested in good faith negotiations despite reports that Western officials are becoming more amenable to eventual Ukrainian negotiations with Russia to end the war.
9. The Russian state-owned Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) found that Russians are increasingly less trusting of Russian state TV and are turning to social media and the internet for news.
10. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on December 27 in a likely effort to maintain Russia’s critical trade relationship with India.
11. Russian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Verbove as positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact.
12. A Russian insider source claimed that Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin has created his own private military company (PMC).
13. The Ukrainian “Cyber Resistance” movement obtained information about a Russian deputy commander of the 171st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (51st Air Defense Division) committing sexual crimes against minors in occupied Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2023
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/30/23 02:04 AM

Putin is going full force now he knows his fleet has been weakened.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/30/23 02:42 PM

Two or three spies work at the Russian embassy in The Hague. This is what Erik Akerboom, head of the AIVD intelligence and security service, told the German magazine Der Spiegel. “We use them as possible channels to Moscow.”
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 12/31/23 03:03 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 30, 2023
Dec 30, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 30, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 30, 2023, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on December 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a large series of strikes against targets in Russia on the night of December 29 to 30 and on December 30.
Ukrainian security sources told Western and Ukrainian media that Ukrainian forces launched more than 70 drones on the night of December 29 to 30 at Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial facilities near Moscow, Belgorod, Tula, Tver, and Bryansk cities.[1] The Ukrainian security sources reportedly characterized these strikes as a response to the Russian strikes on December 29, which was the largest series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 32 Ukrainian drones in Bryansk, Orel, Kursk, and Moscow oblasts on the night of December 29 to 30.[3] The discrepancy between these Russian and Ukrainian figures may suggest that Ukrainian forces struck many of their intended targets, as Ukrainian security sources suggested to Western and Ukrainian media.[4] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Kreminy El Plant in Bryansk City, which is Russia’s second largest producer of microelectronics, 90 percent of whose manufactured products are reportedly components of Russian military equipment and systems.[5] Geolocated footage published on December 30 shows explosions over Bryansk City.[6] The Russian MoD stated that Russian air defenses shot down 12 Ukrainian MLRS rockets in Belgorod Oblast on December 29 and several more Ukrainian MLRS rockets near Belgorod City during the day on December 30.[7] Ukrainian security sources reportedly told Western and Ukrainian media that the Ukrainian strikes on December 30 targeted Russian military targets near Belgorod City.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a large series of strikes against targets in Russia on the night of December 29 to 30 and on December 30. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 10 Shahed-136/-131 drones at targets in southern Ukraine, an Iskander-M missile at Zaporizhzhia City, an unspecified number of Kh-59 missiles at Dnipro and Odesa cities, and six unspecified missiles at Kharkiv City.[9] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted five of the drones, the Iskander-M missile, and one of the Kh-59 missiles.[10] Russian forces reportedly struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City, an enterprise in Odesa City, and the office of the Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner in Kherson City.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 30 that the December 29 Russian strike series killed 39 people and wounded 159 and impacted hundreds of civilian objects.[12] The Economist reported on December 29 that a source in Ukraine’s defense industry stated that Russian strikes on December 29 predominately targeted defense industrial facilities in Ukraine, including those connected to Ukrainian missile and drone production.[13] Russian strikes against Ukrainian defense industrial facilities likely mean to prevent Ukraine from developing key capacities to sustain operations for a longer war effort and disrupt Ukrainian efforts to seek Western partnerships for joint production in Ukraine.

Russian officials continued to clearly state that Russia is not interested in negotiating with Ukraine or the West in good faith and intends to achieve its maximalist objectives in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Galuzin stated in an interview with Russian state outlet RIA Novosti on December 30 that Russia will agree to a settlement when Ukraine is “neutral, non-aligned, and nuclear-free,” “demilitariz[ed],” and “denazi[fied]” — long-standing Russian demands for Ukraine’s exclusion from NATO and EU membership, the removal of Ukraine’s ability to defend its land and its people, and the replacement of the current elected Ukrainian government with a Kremlin-accepted government.[15] Galuzin also reiterated the Kremlin narrative that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — and not Russian President Vladimir Putin — is to blame for the absence of negotiations and claimed that Zelensky’s proposed peace plan “has nothing to do with peace” but “justif[ies] the continuation of hostilities.” Galuzin claimed that Russia has never refused to engage in dialogue with Ukraine, but that Russia has “no choice” but to complete all its "assigned tasks” — Russia’s maximalist objectives — in Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s recent public rhetoric about its maximalist objectives and imperial designs in Ukraine are permeating the Russian information space. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on December 30 that Western media is disseminating “rumors” about negotiations that would end the war in Ukraine by giving Russia unspecified parts of Ukrainian territory.[16] The milblogger stated that Russia is not interested in such “limited proposals,” suggesting that the milblogger believes that Russia’s war objectives extend beyond its currently occupied territory. The milblogger also claimed that Ukraine is not yet sufficiently demoralized and “exhausted” to accept a “catastrophic capitulation,” suggesting that the milblogger believes that Russia should only accept such a "catastrophic [Ukrainian] capitulation" and is calling on Russia to achieve these maximalist objectives in part through psychological means. Russian sources specifically amplified Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev’s labelling of Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Kyiv as “Russian cities” on December 28. The prominent milblogger claimed on December 30 that the war will end when Ukraine allows Russia to take Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and other Ukrainian oblasts.[17] Former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia Spokesperson Eduard Basurin claimed on December 30 that Russia’s task for the war in Ukraine was previously “blurry” and ”there was no understanding of where [Russian] borders should stop” but Medvedev’s statement makes it clear that Russia has determined that its borders should allow for ”complete [Russian] control“ of the Black Sea and should include Kyiv.[18] Basurin called Kyiv “the capital of [Russia’s] large empire” and the birthplace of Russian Orthodoxy and the word “Rus” (in reference to Kyivan Rus). Basurin’s statements echo those of Putin, who featured similar claims in his July 2021 “Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” essay and who has recently reverted to narratives about Kyivan Rus as part of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) to frame Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a historically justified imperial reconquest.

Russia continues to set information conditions aimed at destabilizing Moldova by framing Russia as a protector of allegedly threatened Russian-language speakers in Moldova. Russian state news wire TASS reported on December 27 that 19.1 percent of school children in Moldova choose to receive educational instruction in the Russian language.[20] TASS claimed that the Moldovan government’s refusal to recognize Russian as a state language in 1989 led to the war in Transnistria and the conflict with Gagauzia.[21] TASS further claimed that the ruling pro-European Moldovan Party of Action and Solidarity is exacerbating these alleged long-standing language divides by failing to grant Russian language the status of "a language of interethnic communication.”[22] Russian forces have occupied Transnistria since 1992, and Russia has continually supported pro-Russian actors in Moldova to promote political instability and division.[23] Claims that the Party of Action and Solidarity is threating Russian speakers in Moldova allow Russia to frame any potential Russian support for pro-Kremlin actors in Moldova as a humanitarian attempt to protect Russian speakers instead of an attempt to politically destabilize Moldova itself. The Kremlin used exactly this line of argument as one of the bases for its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[24] Russia is likely attempting to justify any future actions in Moldova as an attempt to protect its “compatriots abroad,” a term that Russia has broadly defined to mean ethnic Russians and Russian speakers outside of Russia regardless of their citizenship. Russia continues to justify its invasion of Ukraine, in part, by claiming Russia is protecting its “compatriots” in Ukraine and their right to use Russian language and will likely continue to use this narrative when discussing any future Russian attempts at imperial reconquests.

Russia continues attempts to actively shape the Western information space to support Russian positions and undermine support for Ukraine while portraying these efforts as endogenous to the West. The Washington Post reported on December 30 that it obtained Kremlin documents from an unspecified European security service that show that Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko oversees Kremlin operations to undermine support for Ukraine and NATO in the French information space and through French politicians and activists.[26] The Kremlin documents reportedly listed specific narratives that the Kremlin sought to promote in France including arguments that Western sanctions against Russia have harmed the French economy, that the provision of French weapons supplies to Ukraine has degraded France’s ability to defend itself, that continuous support for Ukraine would lead to World War III, and that France should not fund a foreign war.[27] The Kremlin documents also reportedly show that Kremlin political strategists instructed a Russian troll farm employee to write a “200-character comment by a middle-aged French person” arguing that European support for Ukraine is a “stupid adventure” and that continued support for Ukraine is increasing inflation and lowering living standards.[28]

The Washington Post also reported that a six-month French government inquiry found that “Russia is conducting a long-term disinformation campaign in [France] to defend and promote Russian interests and to polarize [French] democratic society.”[29] The inquiry highlighted French far-right party National Rally’s links to the Kremlin and National Rally Party member and French politician Thierry Mariani's continued pro-Russian positions.[30] Mariani, previously under investigation for Russia-related corruption, is the Co-Chair of the Russian government-founded French think tank, the Franco-Russian Dialogue Association.[31] Russia reportedly employs similar information tactics in Ukraine, the West, and worldwide. The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Laboratory (DFRLab) and the BBC’s Verify project recently found that Russian actors created thousands of fake accounts aimed at defaming former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov and connected the effort to a previous Russian information campaign to discredit Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi in early 2023.[32] Independent social media monitor Graphika also found that Russian actors generated online content designed to appear as domestically generated to reduce Western support for NATO ahead of the July 2023 NATO summit.

The Russian Ministry Foreign Affairs (MFA) emphasized Russia’s improving diplomatic relations with non-Western countries in way that suggests that the Kremlin is insecure about the possibility of diplomatic isolation against the backdrop of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The Russian MFA published a list on December 30 outlining its accomplishments in gaining political and diplomatic support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and expanding cooperation with countries and associations of the “world majority.”[34] Russia has previously defined the “world majority” as “a civilizational and cultural community that objectively opposes” the West and alleged that the world is divided into two camps: countries that support the United States and Ukraine and countries that are neutral or support Russia.[35] The MFA cited several accomplishments, such as improving relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America; having Sino-Russian relations reach an “unprecedented level”; bringing the Russian–North Korean relations to a new level; and developing Russian–Iranian relations. The MFA also claimed that Russia thwarted Western attempts to isolate Russia, responded to NATO’s and the European Union’s expansion, and withdrew from a series of treaties. It notably did not identify the expansion of NATO and the EU as the defeats for Russian diplomacy that they were. The Russian MFA has been trying recently to establish new diplomatic relations with African countries and even reopened its embassy in Burkina Faso for the first time since 1992 on December 28.[36] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a bill in August committing Russia to reopen its embassy in Equatorial Guinea.[37] MFA Deputy Minister Yevgeny Ivanov announced on December 25 that Russia is planning to open additional embassies and diplomatic missions and claimed that while Western countries sent hundreds of Russian diplomats home, these diplomats were able to find other jobs within the MFA network.


Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a large series of strikes against targets in Russia on the night of December 29 to 30 and on December 30.
• Russian forces conducted a lower number of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on December 30 following the large Russian strike series on December 29.
• Russian officials continued to clearly state that Russia is not interested in negotiating with Ukraine or the West in good faith and intends to achieve its maximalist objectives in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin’s recent public rhetoric about its maximalist objectives and imperial designs in Ukraine are permeating the Russian information space.
• Russia continues to set information conditions aimed at destabilizing Moldova by framing Russia as a protector of allegedly threatened Russian-language speakers in Moldova.
• Russia continues attempts to actively shape the Western information space to support Russian positions and undermine support for Ukraine while portraying these efforts as endogenous to the West.
• The Russian Ministry Foreign Affairs (MFA) emphasized Russia’s improving diplomatic relations with non-Western countries in way that suggests that the Kremlin is insecure about the possibility of diplomatic isolation against the backdrop of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Russian forces made confirmed gains near Kreminna, Bakhmut and Avdiivka as positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact.
• The Russian military command reportedly continued the dissolution of the “Kaskad” operational combat tactical formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) to support its efforts to formalize control over Russian irregular forces.
• Russia continues efforts to integrate education systems in occupied Ukraine and expand education programs aimed at eliminating Ukrainian identity in occupied territories.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2023
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/03/24 02:46 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 2, 2024
Jan 2, 2024 - ISW Press









Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2, 2024

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 2, 2024, 8:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30 pm ET on January 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin identified the West as Russia’s “enemy” and implied that Russia is fighting in Ukraine in order to defeat the West.
Putin responded to a Russian serviceman’s question about Western aid to Ukraine during a meeting at a military hospital in Moscow Oblast on January 1, stating that Russia’s issue is not necessarily that the West is aiding Ukraine, but rather that the West is Russia's "enemy."[1] Putin added that “Ukraine by itself is not an enemy for [Russia],” but that Western-based actors “who want to destroy Russian statehood” and achieve the “strategic defeat of Russia on the battlefield” are Russia’s enemies. Putin claimed that Western elites are trying to break Russia into five parts and are trying to do so using Ukraine, but that the situation on the frontlines is changing and that Russia will “deal with the [West] faster” than the West can deal with Russia on the battlefields in Ukraine. Putin added that the problem is not in Western aid deliveries to Ukraine and noted that Ukraine has already been “completely destroyed,” that there is “nothing left” of the country, and that it “exists only on handouts.”

Putin implied that Russia is fighting an existential war against the West in Ukraine and noted that Western rhetoric has recently refocused on how to “quickly end the conflict.” This phrasing implies that Putin sees a conflict and potential negotiations between Russia and the West – not a conflict and potential negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Putin added that Russia also wants to end the Russia-West conflict but only on the Kremlin’s terms and emphasized that Russia will not give up its positions. Putin does not view Ukraine as an independent actor and is thus portraying his full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a confrontation between Russian and West – deliberately misrepresenting the reality that Russia invaded Ukraine to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Putin’s emphasis on changing narratives in the West may indicate that he will perceive and/or frame any wavering in Western support for Ukraine and any Ukrainian defeats on the battlefield as a Russian victory in this supposed Russian-Western confrontation.

Putin’s framing of his war in Ukraine as a Russian struggle against the West – and not Ukraine – indicates that he does not intend to negotiate in good faith with Ukraine and is setting information conditions aimed at convincing the West to betray Ukraine through negotiations. Putin is likely deliberately and falsely framing Ukraine as pawn without agency in the Russia-West conflict to mask his expansionist and maximalist goals of establishing full effective Russian control of Ukraine. Putin’s January 1 discussion of negotiations refers to his intent to negotiate solely with the West about Ukraine’s future within the Russian sphere of influence and only about Western abandonment of Ukraine. It does not signal that Putin is interested in negotiating with Ukraine as an autonomous actor. Putin previously adopted a similar line when issuing two ultimatums to the United States and NATO in December 2021, which were intended to force the West to recognize Russia’s sphere of influence in Eastern Europe by surrendering essential elements of Ukraine’s sovereignty in the name of de-escalating the conflict between the West and Russia that Putin was inflaming.[2] Any Western commitment to negotiations about Ukraine's future that bypass Ukraine will signal to Russia that it can impose its will upon countries that it deems to be in its sphere of influence – even countries beyond Ukraine, and potentially including Finland and Moldova, about which various Russian actors have begun setting informational conditions for future campaigns.

Putin may be expanding his war aims in Ukraine to include confrontation with the West in an effort to set conditions for permanent Russian military buildup and to justify high battlefield sacrifices. Russia gained almost no meaningful ground in 2023 at a high manpower cost, despite Putin’s January 1 absurd claims that he only orders Russian servicemen to launch offensives that will not generate significant casualties.[4] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD), however, stated on December 30 that “the average daily number of Russian casualties in Ukraine has risen by almost 300 during the course of 2023” and that Russian casualties could rise to over half a million by the end of 2024.[5] A declassified US intelligence assessment shared with Congress on December 12 stated that Russian forces have lost 315,000 personnel since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[6] Such high casualties for small territorial gains are likely prompting Putin to present a strong and ideological justification to continue the prolonged war of choice on which he has launched Russia. Ukraine needs no such contorted justifications for the high losses and suffering that Putin’s invasion is inflicting on its people, even when Ukraine’s military operations do not produce the desired results. The war really is existential for Ukraine as it is not for Russia.

Putin notably concluded his observations about the Russian-West conflict by telling one wounded serviceman in the hospital that the serviceman did not get wounded for Russia to give up everything and surrender. Putin also addressed several domestic concerns about the lack of housing and compensations to servicemen who have received injuries on the battlefield, thereby attempting to posture himself as an empathetic and involved wartime leader even while seemingly raising the stakes to support his demands for increasing sacrifices by his people. Putin’s statements likely suggest that he is preparing a long-term justification to keep forces mobilized and engaged in combat for the perpetual defense of Russia’s sovereignty against the West.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed Ukraine’s need for urgent Western support to protect both Ukraine and the rest of Europe in an interview with the Economist published on January 1.[7] Zelensky warned that the West has lost its sense of urgency and that some Ukrainians have lost a sense of the existential threat that Russia poses to Ukraine. Zelensky emphasized that Europe needs to support Ukraine not solely to protect Ukraine but also to protect Europe, as Russian President Vladimir Putin will continue fighting further west if Ukraine loses. Zelensky added that the speed of Ukrainian military success depends on Western military assistance. Zelensky noted that the idea that Putin is "winning" the war is false and that there are no indications that Russia is willing to engage in meaningful peace negotiations, citing recent massive Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure as evidence of Putin's continued pursuit of his maximalist objectives. Zelensky assessed that Crimea and the Black Sea will be the center of gravity for military operations in 2024 and noted that a successful Ukrainian operation in Crimea, particularly an operation that would isolate Crimea and degrade Russian military operations there, would have a significant effect on Russia.

Russian forces conducted another massive series of drone and missile strikes against deep rear areas in Ukraine between December 31 and January 2, one of which used a strike package similar to that used on December 29, and to which Ukrainian forces appear to be adapting. Ukrainian military officials stated that overnight on December 31 to January 1 Russian forces launched 90 Shahed-136/131 drones from Cape Chauda and Balaklava (occupied Crimea); Kursk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down 87 of the drones.[8] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces also launched four S-300 missiles, three Kh-31P missiles, and one Kh-59 missile from occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts on January 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that later in the afternoon on January 1, Russian forces later launched an additional 10 Shahed drones and one Kh-59 missile, and that Ukrainian forces shot down nine of the drones and the missile.[9] Ukrainian officials stated that the Russian strikes damaged a museum and part of the Lviv National Agrarian University in Lviv City and residential buildings in Odesa City and Esma, Sumy Oblast.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the Russian strikes on December 31 targeted unspecified Ukrainian airfields, although ISW has not yet been able to confirm strikes against Ukrainian airfield infrastructure.[11] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on January 1 that Russian strikes on January 2 would target military infrastructure in Ukraine like the strikes on January 1.[12]

Russian forces then conducted another massive series of missile and drone strikes overnight on January 1-2 and during the day on January 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 35 Shahed drones; 10 Kh-47 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles; 70 Kh-101/555/55 missiles; 12 Iskander-M, S-300, and S-400 ballistic missiles; four Kh-31P anti-radar missiles; and three Kalibr missiles at Ukraine on the night of January 1-2 and the morning of January 2 and that Ukrainian forces shot down 59 of the Kh-101/555/55 missiles and all of the drones, Kinzhal missiles, and Kalibr missiles.[13] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated on January 2 that Ukrainian forces shot down a record number of 10 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles with Western-provided Patriot systems.[14] Ukrainian officials stated that the Russian strikes caused damage in Kyiv and Kharkiv cities.[15] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian weapons storage sites and defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises, including those that produce missiles and drones and repair military equipment in Kyiv City and its suburbs, and Zaluzhnyi confirmed that there were hits to civilian, critical, and military infrastructure.

Western provision of air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine remains crucial for Ukraine as Russian forces will likely attempt to adapt to Ukrainian air defense capabilities. Ukrainian military officials largely characterized the weapons composition of munitions used and the number of Russian strikes on January 1-2 as comparable to those on December 29, 2023.[17] Ukrainian forces notably shot down more Shahed drones and Kinzhal missiles on January 1-2 than on December 29, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may have adapted to the type of strike package Russian forces employed on December 29, likely after months of experimentation and testing Ukrainian air defenses using various weapons systems, strike routes, and air defense mitigation tactics.[18] Russian strikes on Ukraine are part of an ongoing tactical and technological offense-defense race wherein both sides are constantly experimenting and adapting to the other, particularly in the realm of long-range strikes and air defense. Western aid to Ukraine remains crucial as Russian forces will likely continue to experiment and innovate new ways to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. ISW continues to assess that the end of Western aid to Ukraine would likely set conditions for an expanded Russian air campaign in Ukraine and eventually result in significant Russian advances further west, likely all the way to the western Ukrainian border with NATO member states.[19] UK outlet the Telegraph cited analysts on January 1 who stated that Ukraine may have to ration its air defense missiles in the face of decreasing Western aid in order to protect targets it deems to be the most important, which would likely expose critical frontline areas if Ukraine is forced to withdraw air defense systems to cover critical population centers.[20] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called on Western countries to expedite deliveries of air defense systems and ammunition to Ukraine and provide Ukraine with combat drones and long-range missiles.[21] Several Western officials condemned the Russian strikes on January 2 and noted Ukraine’s need for air defenses.

Russian officials publicly defined the goals for Russia’s 2024 chairmanship of both BRICS and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), articulating how the Kremlin may intend to use these organizations to fulfill its foreign policy objectives this year. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a speech on January 1 that Russia will promote political, economic, and cultural cooperation during its BRICS chairmanship and prioritize “strengthening multilateralism for equitable global development and security."[23] Putin stated that the accession of Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia to BRICS demonstrates the organization’s “growing authority” in the world and that BRICS is attracting ”like-minded” countries that respect sovereign equality and desire a multipolar world order.[24]

The Russian government also published a list of priorities for its CIS chairmanship on January 1, which includes increased military cooperation, sanctions evasion, and joint “military-patriotic education and the popularization of common spiritual and moral values.”[25] The CIS’ rotating chairmanship is something of a formality due to Russia's outsized influence on the CIS generally.[26] Russia’s emphasis on unspecified “common spiritual and moral values” in the CIS follows Putin’s emphasis in his annual New Year’s address on December 31, 2023, on ideological concepts such as Russian “multinationalism” and family values that fit into his wider ideology of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir).[27] ISW previously assessed that Putin is trying to re-establish the conception of the Russian World as the backbone of Russian domestic and foreign policy and is working to create an international order, through organizations such as BRICS and CIS, that will readily accept Russian principles, including the Kremlin’s claimed right to own Ukraine.

The Norwegian government announced on January 1 that it is permitting Norwegian defense companies to sell weapons and defense-related products directly to the Ukrainian government. The new policy, which went into effect on January 1, allows Norwegian defense industrial base (DIB) companies to apply to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for export licenses to sell these products to Ukraine, and the Norwegian MFA will consider each application on a case-by-case basis.[29] Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide reiterated the need for ongoing support to Ukraine to defend against Russia’s war of aggression.

The Turkish government announced on January 2 that it will not allow the United Kingdom (UK) to transport two mine hunting ships to Ukraine via the Turkish Straits “as long as the war continues.”[31] Turkey cited Article 19 of the Montreux Convention Regulating the Regime of the Turkish Straits, which stipulates that “vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not...pass through the Straits.”[32] Turkey has used the Montreux Convention to deny access to Russian warships wishing to pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits since February 28, 2022.[33] UK Defense Minister Grant Shapps announced on December 11 that the UK transferred two Sandown-class minehunter vessels to Ukraine as part of a plan that predated Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Russian society continues to reckon with the impacts of increasing anti-migrant sentiment amid Russian authorities’ ongoing efforts to systematically disenfranchise migrant communities within Russia. Several Russian milbloggers and sources amplified footage posted on January 1 that shows a small group of apparently intoxicated adolescents, reportedly the children of Central Asian migrants, cursing at and later fighting with demobilized Russian veterans of the "special military operation" in Chelyabinsk.[35] The Russian Investigative Committee later detained three suspects—two 18-year-olds and a 17-year-old—and referred to them as "foreign citizens."[36] Russian milbloggers seized on the incident and called for harsh and dehumanizing punishment for the adolescents while fixating on their Central Asian ethnicities and whether they and their parents are Russian citizens.[37] Russian outlet Fontanka additionally reported on January 1 that law enforcement in central St. Petersburg detained nearly 3,000 migrants during document checks on New Year's Eve, 600 of whom were reportedly residing in Russia in some violation of migration law and 100 of whom now face deportation.[38] Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta claimed that up to 1,500 of the detainees have already been coerced to sign contracts with the Russian MoD, which is consistent with a general increase in mobilization raids against migrant communities in Russia, as ISW has previously reported.[39] Russian information space actors, particularly the ultranationalist milblogger community, tend to fixate on singular incidents that implicate migrant communities in acts of violence or resistance in order to weaponize xenophobic and anti-migrant rhetoric, often to suggest that migrant communities should face wider rates of mobilization and fight in Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin identified the West as Russia’s “enemy” and implied that Russia is fighting in Ukraine in order to defeat the West.
• Putin’s framing of his war in Ukraine as a Russian struggle against the West – and not Ukraine – indicates that he does not intend to negotiate in good faith with Ukraine and is setting information conditions aimed at convincing the West to betray Ukraine through negotiations.
• Putin may be expanding his war aims in Ukraine to include confrontation with the West in an effort to set conditions for permanent Russian military buildup and to justify high battlefield sacrifices.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed Ukraine’s need for urgent Western support to protect both Ukraine and the rest of Europe in an interview with the Economist published on January 1.
• Russian forces conducted another massive series of drone and missile strikes against deep rear areas in Ukraine between December 31 and January 2, one of which used a strike package similar to that used on December 29, and to which Ukrainian forces appear to be adapting.
• Western provision of air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine remains crucial for Ukraine as Russian forces will likely attempt to adapt to Ukrainian air defense capabilities.
• Russian officials publicly defined the goals for Russia’s 2024 chairmanship of both BRICS and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), articulating how the Kremlin may intend to use these organizations to fulfill its foreign policy objectives this year.
• The Norwegian government announced on January 1 that it is permitting Norwegian defense companies to sell weapons and defense-related products directly to the Ukrainian government.
• The Turkish government announced on January 2 that it will not allow the United Kingdom (UK) to transport two mine hunting ships to Ukraine via the Turkish Straits “as long as the war continues.”
• Russian society continues to reckon with the impacts of increasing anti-migrant sentiment amid Russian authorities’ ongoing efforts to systematically disenfranchise migrant communities within Russia.
• Russian forces made marginal confirmed advances along the Svatove-Kreminna line, northwest and southwest of Bakhmut, northwest of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.
• The Russian military command may be seeking avenues to re-pardon recidivists who previously fought in the war in Ukraine in an apparent effort to maintain Russia's ability to leverage convict recruits as a manpower resource.
• Russian occupation authorities are restricting and likely monitoring internet communications ahead of the March 2024 presidential elections.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2024
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/05/24 03:22 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 4, 2024
Jan 4, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 4, 2024

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 4, 2024, 5:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:10pm ET on January 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces struck at least one Russian military target in occupied Crimea, while Russian officials and milbloggers claimed that the Ukrainian strike was unsuccessful.
Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated on January 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post near Sevastopol in the afternoon.[1] Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk implied that Ukrainian strikes against Sevastopol and Yevpatoria may have targeted the locations of Russian military leaders.[2] Oleshchuk also amplified footage of a smoke plume geolocated to the eastern outskirts of Uyutne and a report by a Crimean source, which stated that a projectile reportedly struck a Russian air defense unit near Uyutne (just west of Yevpatoria).[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down 10 Ukrainian missiles over Crimea.[4] Russian sources, including the MoD and Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev, claimed that Russian air defenses repelled the Ukrainian strike.

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 4 that Russia has already launched ballistic missiles acquired from North Korea at targets in Ukraine and continues efforts to acquire similar missiles from Iran. Kirby stated that North Korea provided Russia with ballistic missile launchers and an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and that Russian forces launched at least one of the North Korean missiles into Ukraine on December 30, 2023.[6] Kirby also stated that Russian officials continue efforts to buy ballistic missiles from Iran. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported earlier on January 4 that unspecified US officials stated that Russia could receive Iranian short-range ballistic missiles as early as spring 2024 but that the officials do not believe that Russia and Iran have yet completed a deal.

Russia may be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad because these missiles appear to be more effective at striking targets in Ukraine in some circumstances. Russian forces routinely use short-range ballistic missiles to strike Ukrainian cities closer to the frontline, and these missiles appear to be more effective at penetrating or avoiding Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian air defenses have intercepted 149 of a reported 166 Russian cruise missiles in intensified attacks since December 29, 2023, but have only intercepted a handful of the ballistic missiles that Russia has launched at Ukraine in the same period, for example.[8] Russian forces have repurposed S-300 and S-400 air defense missiles for conducting strikes against surface targets in Ukraine, and Ukrainian officials have acknowledged that Ukrainian air defenses struggle to intercept these unorthodox missile attacks using their own S-300 and S-400 systems.[9] Ukrainian forces have also appeared to be less successful in intercepting Iskander ballistic missiles during recent strikes, although Ukrainian forces did intercept an Iskander-M missile during a less intense series of Russian missile and drone strikes on December 30.[10] Ukrainian forces reportedly intercepted all Iskander-M or S-300/S-400 missiles that Russian forces launched at Kyiv on December 12.[11] Ukrainian forces reportedly also intercepted all 10 Kinzhal missiles that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on January 2 with Western-provided Patriot systems.[12] The effectiveness of Russian ballistic missiles thus appears to depend in part on the configuration of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella in the target area and the strike package of which the missiles are part.

The relative success that Russian forces have had in striking targets in Ukraine with ballistic missiles in combination with cruise missiles and drones may be prompting an intensification of Russian efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad. Russia can reportedly produce roughly 42 Iskander missiles and four Kinzhal missiles per month, although it is unclear how many S-300/S-400 missiles Russia can produce.[13] Russia‘s defense industrial base (DIB) likely cannot produce ballistic missiles at the scale required for a persistent strike campaign in Ukraine that relies on regularly expending a large volume of ballistic missiles, and Russia likely has to source ballistic missiles from abroad if it wishes to maintain large-scale missile strikes against Ukraine.

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby dismissed recent Western reporting of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to engage in peace negotiations with Ukraine as “ballyhoo” during a press conference on January 3.[14] Kirby stated that Putin “sure doesn’t act like a guy who’s willing to negotiate,” referring to Russia’s recent large-scale strikes against Ukraine from December 29, 2023, to January 2.[15] Kirby added that Putin is doing everything possible to put Ukraine in a disadvantageous position and reiterated the importance of continued Western support for Ukraine.[16] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated during an interview with CNN on January 3 that Ukraine is confident that Western aid to Ukraine will continue and that Ukraine does not have a “plan B.”[17] Kuleba noted that a theoretical Russian victory in Ukraine would embolden other world leaders with predatory expansionist objectives and cited recent Russia’s missile strikes against Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities as a clear indication of Putin’s unwillingness to negotiate with Ukraine.[18] ISW has long assessed that Putin does not intend to negotiate with Ukraine in good faith and that Russia’s goals in Ukraine — which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender — remain the same.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree strengthening procedures for granting foreign citizens Russian citizenship in exchange for Russian military service in Ukraine, likely as part of ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into the Russian military. The January 4 decree grants Russian citizenship to foreign citizens who have signed at least a year-long contract with the Russian military or “military formations,” likely referencing volunteer formations and private military companies (PMCs), during periods of “special military operations.”[20] The decree also grants Russian citizenship to the spouses, children, and parents of the foreigners serving with the Russian military.[21] The decree reduces the time it takes for these foreigners to receive and be considered for Russian citizenship from three months to one month.[22] Putin previously signed a decree in September 2022 simplifying the process of obtaining Russian citizenship and dropping some prerequisites for foreigners who signed contracts with the Russian military.[23] The January 4 decree likely aims to further streamline and simplify the citizenship application process while formalizing migrant recruitment efforts following increased raids on migrant communities since summer 2023 in which Russian officials have issued military summonses to migrants with Russian citizenship.[24]

Russian State Duma’s Information Policy Committee Head Alexander Khinshtein noted that the January 4 decree would “solve the problem” of foreign countries’ extradition requests for their citizens who fought in Ukraine.[25] Khinshtein prevented the deportation of an Uzbek citizen who allegedly fought in the Wagner Group and successfully requested that Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) grant the Uzbek citizen asylum in Russia in December 2023.[26] Russian authorities have routinely offered Russian citizenship to migrants in exchange for Russian military service in Ukraine and have threatened to revoke Russian citizenship from naturalized migrants if they refuse to serve in the Russian military.[27] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin does not have a clearly defined policy regarding migrants as Russian authorities continue to pursue incoherent and competing efforts to restrict them working in Russia, coerce them into the Russian military, and leverage them to offset Russian labor shortages caused by the war. Putin’s January 4 decree suggests that the Kremlin may be prioritizing coercing migrants into the military over relying on migrants to offset domestic labor shortages.

Kyrgyzstan sentenced a Kyrgyz citizen to five years in prison for participating in the war in Ukraine as a member of the Wagner Group. A court in Kyrgyzstan announced on January 4 that it sentenced Beknazar Borugul uulu, a Kyrgyz citizen, to five years in prison on December 7, 2023, under the article for participation “in armed conflicts or military operations on the territory of a foreign state or undergoing training to commit a terrorist act.”[28] Wagner reportedly recruited Borugul uulu while he was in a Russian prison. Kyrgyzstan previously sentenced another Kyrgyz citizen who joined a Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) military unit to 10 years in prison on charges of mercenarism in May 2023, and the case was sent to a retrial in August 2023 after an appeal to replace the mercenarism charge with charges of participating in a military conflict in a foreign country.[29] Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have also recently sentenced some of their citizens on mercenarism charges after those citizens fought with Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Wagner forces in Ukraine.[30] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s continued use of Central Asian populations in Central Asia and Russia for force-generation purposes will likely create friction between Russia and its Central Asian neighbors.[31] Central Asian countries are charging and detaining their citizens for fighting in Ukraine upon their return to Central Asia, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decree granting foreigners expedited Russian citizenship in exchange for Russian military service may be aimed at combatting this issue.

Russia has begun negotiations with Algeria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia to open Russian cultural centers (Russkii dom) abroad, likely aimed at increasing Russian influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) Deputy Head Pavel Shevtsov told Kremlin newswire Tass on January 4 that Russia has begun similar negotiations with other unnamed countries and noted that he is confident that the agreements will be completed “quickly enough” due to mutual interest between parties.[32] Russian media previously reported that Russia is also in negotiations to open additional Russkii dom centers in Brazil, South Africa, Angola, and Mali by 2025.[33] Russia currently has over 80 Russkii dom centers concentrated in Europe, Africa, and Central and Southeast Asia aimed at promoting Russian culture, strengthening the influence of the Russian language, supporting “compatriots abroad,” and preserving historical sites abroad with significance to Russia.[34] Moldovan and Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russian officials use Russkii dom centers to promote Russian propaganda and conduct “subversive work” abroad.


Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces struck at least one Russian military target in occupied Crimea, while Russian officials and milbloggers claimed that the Ukrainian strike was unsuccessful.
• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 4 that Russia has already launched ballistic missiles acquired from North Korea at targets in Ukraine and continues efforts to acquire similar missiles from Iran.
• Russia may be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad because these missiles appear to be more effective at striking targets in Ukraine in some circumstances.
• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby dismissed recent Western reporting of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to engage in peace negotiations with Ukraine as “ballyhoo” during a press conference on January 3.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree strengthening procedures for granting foreign citizens Russian citizenship in exchange for Russian military service in Ukraine, likely as part of ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into the Russian military.
• Kyrgyzstan sentenced a Kyrgyz citizen to five years in prison for participating in the war in Ukraine as a member of the Wagner Group.
• Russia has begun negotiations with Algeria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia to open Russian cultural centers (Russkii dom) abroad, likely aimed at increasing Russian influence in the Middle East and North Africa.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Kreminna and Avdiivka as positional engagement continued along the entire frontline.
• Ukrainian sources reported that Russian authorities are planning to mobilize Ukrainian teenagers living in occupied Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on January 4 streamlining the process for certain Ukrainians to receive Russian citizenship.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/08/24 04:26 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 7, 2024
Jan 7, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 7, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 7, 2024, 5:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on January 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to court Russian servicemen and their families ahead of the March 2024 presidential election during a meeting with family members of deceased Russian servicemen on January 6.
Putin met with family members of Russian servicemen who died in Ukraine at his residence in Novo-Ogaryovo to celebrate Orthodox Christmas.[1] Putin highlighted the heroism of the deceased Russian servicemen who “defend[ed] the interests of [Russia].” Putin repeatedly reiterated the Russian government’s support for the families of Russian servicemen and delegated responsibility for the continuous support of these families to Russian officials at all levels throughout Russia. Putin has recently attended similar events during which he presented himself as a gracious leader who cares about the well-being of Russian military personnel and paraded his power to fulfill servicemen's requests and deal with issues.[2] Putin is likely using these recurring, publicized meetings as part of his election campaign, as Russian servicemen and their family members comprise a sizable constituency, and their public support for Putin is vital for the Kremlin’s ability to present the Russian population as largely in support of the war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin appears to have chosen the families that attended Putin’s meeting carefully, likely to minimize the risk that they might say or ask inconvenient things.[3] The Kremlin has shown itself to be sensitive to recent public complaints from family members of Russian servicemen and is continuing its efforts to censor these complaints in the public domain.[4] Russian opposition outlet Agentstvo Novosti stated on January 7 that the relatives of five deceased Russian servicemen attended the meeting and that many of those relatives themselves have ties to the Russian government and military.[5] Agentstvo Novosti stated that attendees included a former Rosgvardia serviceman’s widow, who currently serves as the head of the Committee of Families of Soldiers of the Fatherland in Balashikha and advisor to the head of Balashikha; the widow of a Russian serviceman, who currently works as the head of the Tambov branch of the Kremlin-created Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation; and family members of the former rector of the church at the headquarters of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, who previously participated in conflicts in Chechnya and Syria and was known as the “paratroopers’ priest.” Agentstvo Novosti stated that all five deceased servicemen whose families attended the meeting posthumously received the Hero of Russia and Order of Courage awards and that two of the children present had also attended an event with Putin on November 4 in Moscow. The Kremlin practice of carefully selecting those who attend public events with Putin and sometimes having the same individuals appear at multiple events seems to be standard Kremlin practice, however.[6] Putin similarly misrepresented a meeting with 18 hand-picked women holding influential positions in the Russian political sphere as an open discussion with mothers of mobilized personnel on November 25, 2022.

Head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill of Moscow stated that Russia cannot reject Russian citizens who “understand they made a mistake” by fleeing Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and now want to return home. Kirill stated during an interview with TASS CEO Andrei Kondrashov on January 7 that it is not necessary to reject “sinners if they repent” and referenced the biblical story of the prodigal son, in which, Kirill observed, a son wrongs his father by demanding his inheritance early to go out into the world, only to return home after squandering his wealth and opportunity.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin called the trend of Russians returning from abroad “very good” and “very important” during a speech on September 12, 2023.[9] Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin had publicly threatened returning Russians in October and November 2023, however, openly contradicting the Kremlin’s position.[10] Kirill’s comment is more in line with the Kremlin’s position and indicates that the Kremlin may be more successfully coordinating its narrative regarding returning Russians ahead of the March 2024 presidential election.[11]

Kirill also emphasized the role of “spiritual strength” and “revival” in Russia’s claimed success in Ukraine, echoing Putin’s January 6 emphasis on the importance of Russian Orthodoxy and Russia’s other “traditional” and “fraternal” faiths (Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism) to Russian society.[12] The Russian government has used the 2016 “Yarovaya Law” to prosecute any religious organizations and churches in Russia, including Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, that are not members of the four “fraternal” faiths.[13] Kirill denied Western reports that the Russian Orthodox Church carries out Russian state policy abroad, despite sending Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban a holiday greeting on January 7.[14] Putin added on January 6 that the Russian government “helps... but does not interfere in the affairs” of the Russian Orthodox Church and claimed that the Russian Orthodox Church “wants to be separate from the state.”[15] ISW has previously reported on the Russian Orthodox Church’s role in solidifying the Kremlin’s control over occupied Ukraine through a systematic campaign of religious persecution against other faith communities and punishing members of the Russian Orthodox Church who do not support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Two Russian government officials defended migrants’ continued presence in Russia amid ongoing migrant crackdowns, generating heavy milblogger criticism and indicating that the Russian government likely still lacks a unified policy toward migrants in Russia. Russian Presidential Commissioner for the Protection of Entrepreneurs’ Rights Boris Titov stated on January 7 that Russian fears that migrants are taking Russian jobs are “completely unfounded” and claimed that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) statistics show that Russian citizens commit many more crimes than migrants.[17] Russian outlet Kommersant reported that foreign citizens committed two percent of the total number of crimes in Russia from January to November 2023 citing MVD statistics.[18] Russian milbloggers heavily criticized Titov’s statements, called him out of touch with ordinary Russian life, and accused him of wanting to replace the ethnic Russian population of Russia with migrants.[19] Another milblogger claimed that unspecified ”specific diasporas” control entire sectors of the Russian economy and claimed that many migrants who receive Russian citizenship commit crimes and therefore, are not reflected in the low statistic of crimes committed by foreigners in Russia.[20] Russian milbloggers also attacked the Nizhny Tagil (Sverdlovsk Oblast) Police Department Deputy Head Colonel Taras Bulgakov for claiming that people “made a big deal out of nothing” regarding a December 29 incident wherein two migrant teenagers beat a presumably ethnically Russian child in Nizhny Tagil.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian authorities should send Bulgakov to fight in Ukraine and claimed that migrants pose a counterintelligence threat since Russia‘s largest tank production factory, Uralvagonzavod, is in Nizhny Tagil.[22]

Titov’s statement attempting to dispel fears of migrants’ involvement in the Russian economy is likely part of an effort to build Russian public support for continued reliance on migrant labor to offset domestic labor shortages induced by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia reportedly faced a domestic labor shortage of about 4.8 million people in 2023, likely including both skilled and unskilled labor.[23] ISW continues to assess that the Russian government is pursuing competing and incoherent efforts to coerce migrants into the Russian military, leverage them to offset Russian labor shortages caused by the war, and restrict them from working in Russia, in part, to appease the xenophobic pro-war Russian ultranationalist community. Titov’s statements defending migrants’ contributions to the Russian economy likely reflect the view of the parts of the Russian government that seek to sustain the Russian economy through migrant labor. Russian military and security elements - particularly the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), MVD, Rosgvardia, Investigative Committee, and the Federal Security Service (FSB) — appear to be spearheading efforts to coerce migrants into the Russian military. These Russian government organs have consistently conducted raids on migrant communities to issue military summonses to naturalized migrants, recruited migrants from migrant detention facilities, offered Russian citizenship in exchange for military service, and advertised Russian military contract service in Central Asian languages.[24] The MVD has also submitted laws to the Russian government aimed at restricting migrant labor, likely to coerce them into military service.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 6 to 7. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched 28 Shahed-136/131 drones and three S-300 missiles and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 21 of the Shahed drones over Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, and Cherkasy oblasts.[26] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian S-300 missiles struck a civilian building in Rivne, Donetsk Oblast on the evening of January 6, killing 12 people including five children.[27] US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink stated that the strike is a reminder of the daily reality of Russian strikes across Ukraine.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat refuted media reports that the Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) is delaying its first delivery of six F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine for up to six months.[29] Ihnat stated that there are no official announcements on the Danish MoD’s websites that would confirm the claimed delays in F-16 provisions. Ihnat urged Ukrainians to only trust official sources and noted that this is a “sensitive” topic for Ukraine given that Ukrainian pilots are undergoing F-16 training in extremely fast time frames.


Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to court Russian servicemen and their families ahead of the March 2024 presidential election during a meeting with family members of deceased Russian servicemen on January 6.
• Head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill of Moscow stated that Russia cannot reject Russian citizens who “understand they made a mistake” by fleeing Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and now want to return home.
• Two Russian government officials defended migrants’ continued presence in Russia amid ongoing migrant crackdowns, generating heavy milblogger criticism and indicating that the Russian government likely still lacks a unified policy toward migrants in Russia.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 6 to 7.
• Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat refuted media reports that the Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) is delaying its first delivery of six F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine for up to six months.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances west and southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the front.
• Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 7 that Russia has pushed back the deadline for the establishment of the new Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts (MMD and LMD) for at least the second time due to weapons and personnel shortages and bureaucratic issues.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on January 4 that will allow Russia to forcibly grant citizenship to deported Ukrainian children.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2024
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/12/24 04:12 AM

Update from the Institute for the Study of War


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on January 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The reported concentration of the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force in Ukraine and ongoing Russian force generation efforts appear to allow Russian forces to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on January 11 that Russian forces have 462,000 personnel in Ukraine and that this represents the entire land component of the Russian military.[1] Skibitskyi stated that most Russian units in Ukraine are manned at between 92 and 95 percent of their intended end strength and that the size of the Russian grouping in Ukraine allows Russian forces to conduct rotations throughout the theater.[2] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces withdraw units that are at 50 percent or less of their intended end strength to rear areas and return them to the front following recovery and replenishment.[3] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on January 11 that the Russian military has successfully replenished Russian forces in Ukraine through an ongoing crypto-mobilization effort that generated over 500,000 new personnel in 2023.[4]

ISW previously observed routine Russian struggles to conduct operational level rotations from the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 through Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive.[5] The apparent Russian ability to generate forces at a rate equal to Russian losses likely provides Russian forces the ability to replenish units that the Russian command has withdrawn from the line due to degradation and later return these replenished units to the front.[6] Russian forces maintain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine, and the absence of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations likely removes pressure on operational deployments that had previously partially restrained the Russians‘ ability to conduct rotations.[7] Russian forces have not seized the battlefield initiative in Kherson Oblast, however, and appear to be degrading units and formations operating near the Ukrainian bridgehead on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River without making apparent efforts to conduct operational level rotations (although they do appear to conduct tactical-level rotations).[8] Russian forces have conducted several regroupings during localized offensive operations in the Avdiivka, Bakhmut, Lyman, and Kupyansk directions since early October 2023, which likely provided Russian forces time to conduct the rotations Skibitskyi described.[9] ISW has not observed widespread Russian complaints about a lack of rotations throughout the theater since summer 2023, and the overall tempo of Russian operations is consistent with Skibitskyi’s reporting.

Russia’s ability to conduct operational level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to maintain the overall tempo of their localized offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the near term, but it is unclear if Russian forces will be able to conduct effective rotations in the long term or in the event of intensified Russian offensive efforts or a significant Ukrainian counteroffensive operation. Russian operational rotations in principle mitigate the degradation of attacking Russian forces that over time could cause Russian offensive efforts to culminate. Several other operational factors have previously contributed to the culmination of Russian offensive efforts in Ukraine, but constraints on available manpower and combat effective formations have often been a primary factor.[11] Russian forces are largely conducting infantry-heavy assaults in Ukraine with assault groups that do not necessarily require large amounts of equipment or high levels of training.[12] The Russian force generation apparatus appears to be replenishing losses in Ukraine with poorly trained and relatively combat ineffective personnel whom the Russian command has deemed to be sufficient for routine attritional frontal assaults.[13] These assaults have yet to result in more than marginal Russian gains in Ukraine since early October 2023, and it is unlikely that Russian forces can continue them indefinitely in a way that will allow the Russians to convert tactical successes into operationally significant results. Successful Russian operational-level offensives in Ukraine will require the Russian command to commit relatively combat effective and well-equipped units and formations to offensive operations at scale, and it is unclear if replenishment through these Russian operational rotations will suffice to maintain these units’ combat capabilities. Overall Russian combat capabilities in Ukraine may still degrade over time, therefore, despite the rotations, hindering the Russian military’s ability to sustain several significant offensive operations at once.

The Russian military may also incur losses greater than Russia’s ability to generate new forces if the Russian command decides to intensify offensive efforts in Ukraine, thereby limiting the manpower available to replenish degraded units and formations. The intensification of Russian offensive efforts would commit more elements to the frontline and place pressure on the number of available forces that could assume control over a degraded unit’s area of responsibility while that unit underwent rest and restoration. It is unclear if the current Russian crypto-mobilization campaign, which relies heavily on volunteer recruitment and the coercive mobilization of convicts and migrants, would be able to provide the increased number of personnel required to conduct rotations during an intensified Russian offensive effort.

Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian efforts to expand Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) have yet to fulfill operational requirements in Ukraine and that munitions shortages will continue to prompt Russia to source supplies from abroad. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce two million rounds of 122mm and 152mm shells annually, which resulted in a deficit of 500,000 shells in 2023 and will likely result in a similar deficit in 2024.[15] Skibitskyi stated that Russia plans to increase its ammunition production in 2024 but lacks the necessary components, qualified personnel, and production capabilities.[16] Skibitskyi noted that Russia has previously purchased shells from Belarus, Iran, and North Korea and assessed that Russia will likely seek to procure additional shells from abroad in 2024 and beyond.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on January 11 that Russia will use any "pause” or temporary ceasefire agreement to stockpile drones, artillery, and missiles and address its large materiel shortages ahead of future aggression against Ukraine.[18] Zelensky added that Russia is currently negotiating the acquisition of additional missiles and ammunition from other countries and noted that Russia has already received more than one million shells from North Korea.[19] Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin also confirmed recent Western reports that Russian forces have already launched at least one North Korean missile against Ukraine.[20]

Politico, citing a report by the Kyiv School of Economics and Yermak-McFaul International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, reported on January 11 that despite Western sanctions, Russia imported $8.77 billion worth of goods and components necessary to produce missiles, drones, armored vehicles, and other military equipment between January and October 2023.[21] The report states that Russia’s capacity to manufacture missiles and drones appears to have increased in 2023 despite Western sanctions, and Politico stated that Russia increased its production of missiles to 115 per month by the end of 2023.[22] The report noted that sanctions have strained Russia’s supply chains and have caused “unparalleled losses” in Russia’s overall production of military aviation and equipment, however.[23]

Ukrainian and Western sources have previously reported on Russia‘s sanctions evasion schemes to acquire foreign components and noted that Russia’s reliance on foreign components has constrained Russia’s domestic production of aircraft, missiles, and drones.[24] An unnamed Russian drone manufacturer also drew Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attention to the fact that a “large percentage” of electronics, particularly drones, produced in Russia require foreign components during a campaign event in Russia’s Far Eastern Federal District on January 11, prompting Putin to acknowledge the importance of this issue and the need to address Russia’s reliance on foreign components.[25] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s current missile and drone reserves and production rates likely do not allow Russian forces to conduct regular large-scale missile strikes, but likely do allow for more consistent drone strikes due to Russia’s ability to produce drones at a much higher rate (roughly 1,400 Shahed-136/131 drones between February and October 2023).[26] The Russian government is likely attempting to develop domestic substitutions for foreign components to sustain and even increase its domestic drone and missile production despite Western sanctions.

Freezing temperatures in Ukraine are likely constraining operations along the front but will likely create more favorable terrain for mechanized maneuver warfare as the ground freezes in the coming weeks. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are using fewer loitering munitions in the Kupyansk direction due to cold weather.[27] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on January 11 that Russian forces did not launch as many drones against Ukraine in the past two nights because ice can freeze drones.[28] A Ukrainian officer in a brigade operating near Bakhmut stated on January 10 that the temperature drops to –18 Celsius (about –1 Fahrenheit) at night, making it “impossible” for personnel to stay at observation posts for more than a few hours.[29] The officer reported that the intensity of Russian infantry assaults decreased in the Bakhmut direction likely due to the freezing temperatures.[30] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the freezing temperatures coupled with the potential for deep snow may limit maneuverability but that the frozen ground will improve “cross-country movement” throughout January and into February.[31] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely try to sustain or intensify localized offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in an attempt to seize and retain the initiative regardless of winter weather and terrain conditions.

Latvia and Estonia announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on January 11. Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics stated that Latvia will provide a new aid package to Ukraine, which includes howitzers, 155mm ammunition, anti-tank weapons, rockets, grenades, all-terrain vehicles, helicopters, drones, and other equipment.[32] Estonian President Alar Karis stated that Estonia will provide a military aid package worth 1.2 billion euros (about $1.32 billion) in 2024 to 2027, amounting to 0.25 percent of Estonia’s annual GDP.[33] The Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industry and the Estonian Defense and Aerospace Industry Association signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at supporting the development and production of drones and electronic warfare systems.

Russia may be setting information conditions for future escalations against Latvia by threatening to punish Latvia for closing a likely base of Russian informational influence in Latvia. The Latvian parliament adopted a bill on January 11 to transfer the “Moscow House” business and cultural center in Riga, owned by the Russian government, to Latvian state ownership in order to “guarantee Latvia’s security.”[35] The Latvian parliament reported that the Russian government has been using the “Moscow House” to support Russian influence operations in Latvia.[36] The Russian Embassy in Latvia responded to the transfer by claiming that this “hostility” will result in ”serious consequences.”[37] The Russian Embassy in Latvia also accused the Latvian government of systematically oppressing “Russian speakers“ in Latvia due to a recent Latvian law requiring Russian citizens with Latvian residence permits to pass a Latvian language exam.[38] The Russian accusation likely deliberately equates all Russian speakers in Latvia with Russian citizens residing in Latvia in an attempt to exacerbate tensions between local Russian speakers and ethnic Russians and Latvian speakers. Russian officials have been increasingly asserting Russia’s right to protect “compatriots abroad,” intentionally loosely defined as ethnic Russians and Russian speakers and not limited to Russian citizens. Russia may be setting conditions aimed at destabilizing Latvia by exacerbating linguistic tensions and framing itself as a protector of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers.

European Commission (EC) Defense Industry Spokesperson Johanna Bernsel clarified on January 11 that European Union (EU) member states will be able to produce a million shells per year by spring 2024 but that the delivery of the shells to Ukraine will depend on individual member states.[39] Bernsel stated that there are no updates on whether EU member states will deliver the promised one million artillery shells to Ukraine by spring 2024. EU Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton stated on January 10 that the EU will be able to supply Ukraine with the one million artillery shells by spring 2024.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspector General published a report on January 11 that states that the failure to document certain aid provided to Ukraine in a timely manner is largely due to DoD limitations but that does not suggest that any of the material aid has been misappropriated.[41] The report stated that the DoD’s Office of Defense Cooperation–Ukraine (ODC-Ukraine) failed to adequately inventory defense articles within the 90 days required by law due to manpower shortages, the absence of protocols for maintaining a monitoring database in a hostile environment until December 2022, and a lack of internal controls for validating data in the database. DoD Inspector General Robert Storch noted that this report does not mean that these inventories are “not there” or “not being used,“ and the report noted that Ukrainian forces do provide “raw” numbers to the ODC-Ukraine and that Ukraine is working to implement a system better utilizing the serial numbers.[42] The report also stated that Ukraine has conducted inventories that have not been uploaded to the designated database.[43] The report noted that while the DoD’s delinquency rate – the rate of US-provided defense articles for Ukraine not properly documented within 90 days of arrival – is still not in compliance with federal regulations, revised protocols for both the DoD and Ukrainian personnel contributed to an improved delinquency rate from February 10, 2023 to June 2, 2023. The report noted that the “diversion” of US military assistance from the Ukrainian military is outside the scope of its report, and that the report offers no evidence that any of the US defense articles allocated to Ukraine have been misused.

The DoD Office of the Inspector General’s report places the onus for ensuring compliance with the DoD’s reporting standards on the ODC-Ukraine, and Ukraine’s struggle to implement these standards appears to be related to manpower and logistics issues rather than malign intent.[44] The Office of the Inspector General’s report noted that Ukrainian personnel only have 10 barcode scanners to record serial numbers - none of which are on the front line - and that Ukrainian personnel sometimes struggle to report losses within the required 90 days due to the serial numbers becoming lost or unreadable from use and battle damage. The report also stated that Ukraine occasionally did not provide written reports of losses in a timely manner due to a difference between Ukraine’s and the DoD’s loss classification standards. The report noted that ODC-Ukraine lacks enough personnel at logistics hubs to ensure compliance with DoD reporting standards due to significant personnel limitations.

Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk announced on January 11 that the Verkhovna Rada withdrew a draft law on mobilization for revisions after discussions between Ukrainian legislators and political and military leadership.[45] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is prepared to introduce a new version of the draft law that accounts for various unspecified proposals and emphasized the importance of rotations and leave for Ukrainian servicemen.[46] ISW previously reported on several provisions made in the now returned draft law, and it is currently unclear what provisions will be made in the new version.

A Ukrainian official indicated that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) may struggle to compensate for the loss of base infrastructure after allocating naval assets away from the BSF’s main base of Sevastopol in occupied Crimea.[48] Ukrainian Navy Commander Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa stated to Ukrainska Pravda in an interview published on January 11 that the Russian naval base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, is a poorer base than Sevastopol due to its vulnerability to poor weather conditions and a lack of nearby airfields, large repair facilities, or weapons storage facilities. Neizhpapa noted that Ukrainian strikes have forced Russian forces to reduce their use of Sevastopol as a main naval base, as ISW has recently observed.[49] Neizhpapa stated that Ukrainian strikes are compelling Russian forces to disperse their naval assets to ports in Novorossisyk and in Russian-backed separatist Abkhazia and that Russian forces are also reducing their use of the port of Feodosia, Crimea.

Key Takeaways:


• The reported concentration of the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force in Ukraine and ongoing Russian force generation efforts appear to allow Russian forces to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine.
• Russia’s ability to conduct operational level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to maintain the overall tempo of their localized offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the near term, but it is unclear if Russian forces will be able to conduct effective rotations in the long term or in the event of intensified Russian offensive efforts or a significant Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.
• Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian efforts to expand Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) have yet to fulfill operational requirements in Ukraine and that munitions shortages will continue to prompt Russia to source supplies from abroad.
• Freezing temperatures in Ukraine are likely constraining operations along the front but will likely create more favorable terrain for mechanized maneuver warfare as the ground freezes in the coming weeks.
• Latvia and Estonia announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on January 11.
• Russia may be setting information conditions for future escalations against Latvia by threatening to punish Latvia for closing a likely base of Russian informational influence in Latvia.
• European Commission (EC) Defense Industry Spokesperson Johanna Bernsel clarified on January 11 that European Union (EU) member states will be able to produce a million shells per year by spring 2024 but that the delivery of the shells to Ukraine will depend on individual member states.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspector General published a report on January 11 that states that the failure to document certain aid provided to Ukraine in a timely manner is largely due to DoD limitations but that does not suggest that any of the material aid has been misappropriated.
• Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk announced on January 11 that the Verkhovna Rada withdrew a draft law on mobilization for revisions after discussions between Ukrainian legislators and political and military leadership.
• A Ukrainian official indicated that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) may struggle to compensate for the loss of base infrastructure after allocating naval assets away from the BSF’s main base of Sevastopol in occupied Crimea.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces continued positional engagements along the entire front.
• Kremlin newswire TASS reported on January 10 that Russian forces will deploy additional aircraft and vessels and increase the production of hypersonic Kinzhal and Zircon missiles in 2024.
• The Belarusian Ministry of Emergency Situations stated on January 10 that it sponsored a trip for 35 Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Mogilev for the New Year holiday during which soldiers taught children “the basics of life safety” and how to behave in “extreme situations.”

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/15/24 02:20 AM

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 14, 2024
Jan 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 14, 2024

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 14, 2024, 5:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on January 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW has added a new section on Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) efforts to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to track the development of Ukraine’s DIB and the international support for Ukraine’s DIB efforts. ISW will be publishing its assessments in this section based on public announcements, media reporting, and official statements.

Click here to read ISW’s new analysis on Ukrainian long-term efforts to develop a self-sufficient DIB with US and European support.

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are preparing to launch a new offensive in the coming weeks once the ground freezes in eastern and southern Ukraine.
Russian literary critic and alternative historian Sergey Pereslegin claimed on January 12 that Russian forces will launch a large-scale offensive effort in Ukraine sometime between January 12 and February 2 after the ground freezes and likely after Ukrainian forces grow “exhausted” of defending their positions in Avdiivka and east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[1] Pereslegin claimed that Russians should be more concerned about Russia launching its offensive at the wrong time or making the same “mistakes” that Ukraine made during its 2023 counteroffensive than of a renewed Ukrainian offensive effort in 2024.[2] Pereslegin also expressed concern that Russia does not have enough manpower to conduct the large-scale offensive effort he is anticipating.[3] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on January 14 that the number of Russian military personnel on the frontline allows Russian forces to conduct localized tactical maneuvers but is unlikely to support operationally significant ”breakthroughs.”[4] The milblogger claimed that freezing weather is impacting Russian and Ukrainian ground activity and artillery and drone systems throughout the front, particularly in the Kherson direction.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 that freezing weather conditions are preventing Russian forces from conducting ground operations and advancing north of Verbove in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[6] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian aviation is unable to operate in southern Ukraine due to freezing weather conditions.[7] Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin claimed on January 14 that the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast is “buzzing like a bee hive” due to the large number of Ukrainian drones operating, however.[8] Rogozin claimed that Ukrainian forces devote half a dozen drones to striking each valuable target in western Zaporizhia Oblast and that intense Ukrainian drone use is complicating Russian personnel rotations.[9] ISW previously assessed that freezing temperatures in Ukraine are likely currently constraining operations along the front but will likely create more favorable terrain for mechanized maneuver warfare as the ground freezes in the coming weeks.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely try to sustain or intensify localized offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in an attempt to seize and retain the initiative regardless of winter weather and terrain conditions.[11] ISW also assesses, however, that Russian forces will be unable to make operationally significant breakthroughs.

Russian forces likely continue to experiment and adapt their missile and drone strike packages against Ukraine in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have recently been launching strikes against Ukraine using a variety of missile types, including hypersonic Kh-47 Kinzhal ballistic missiles.[12] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched unspecified air decoys and Shahed drones in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems so that Russian forces could conduct successful missile strikes.[13] ISW has observed Russian forces experimenting with various combinations of drone and missile strikes in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defense systems as Ukrainian forces have adapted to Russian strike patterns.[14] ISW previously assessed that Russia may be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad because ballistic missiles may be more successful in striking targets in Ukraine in some circumstances.[15] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on January 14 that sanctions are likely reducing the quality of Russian missiles.[16] The reported decrease in quality of Russian missiles may further hinder Russia’s ability to conduct successful strike series against Ukraine.

Representatives from 83 countries met to discuss the implementation of Ukraine’s Peace Formula on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 14.[17] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak also met with Romanian State Secretary Julian Fota to discuss bilateral security guarantees pursuant to the G7’s July 2023 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, making Romania the 9th country to begin bilateral security negotiations with Ukraine.[18] Swiss Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis and Yermak noted the importance of involving China in peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.[19] Cassis argued that the West “must find a way to include Russia” in the peace process and stated that “there will be no peace if Russia does not have its say.”[20] It is unclear what Cassis meant by the call for Russia to “have its say.” ISW has long assessed that Putin does not intend to negotiate with Ukraine in good faith and that Russia’s goals in Ukraine — which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender — remain unchanged.

The Kremlin continues to undertake measures to undermine the Republic of Tatarstan’s autonomy within the Russian Federation and cultural heritage despite the republic’s sacrifices on behalf of the Russian war in Ukraine. Russian Tatar activist and political scientist Ruslan Aisin reported that Russian officials cut funding for the state program for preservation, study, and development of Tatarstan’s state languages by 12.5 percent in 2023.[22] Aisin stated that officials originally planned to spend 126.8 million rubles (around $1.4 million) on the program but cut the funding by 15.8 million rubles (about $180,000). Aisin argued that these cuts are likely related to the Kremlin’s efforts to finance the war effort in Ukraine and undermine Tatarstan’s identity. Aisin observed that Tatarstan backed away from its state policy on strengthening its identity alongside the country-wide Russian identity in the fall of 2023 and argued that the Kremlin likely had seen an opportunity to save money on Tatarstan’s efforts to preserve its culture, language, and identity. Aisin also implied that the Kremlin is favoring an all-Russian identity. The Kremlin directed Tatarstan officials in January 2023 to abolish the title of the republic’s president and refer to Tatarstan’s leader as “glava” (regional head).[23] Tatarstan has been supporting the Russian war effort by forming and financing the recruitment of regional volunteer battalions, some of which suffered tremendous losses on the battlefield in 2022 and 2023.[24] BBC’s Russian Service and independent Russian outlet Mediazona also confirmed that at least 922 servicemen from Tatarstan died in Ukraine — a number that is likely significantly higher — as of January 11.

The Russian Investigative Committee will officially open a case into the fire that destroyed a large Wildberries warehouse in St. Petersburg. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin ordered the Investigative Committee to look into the fire and investigate Wildberries managers for abuse of power and violations of fire safety compliance rules.[26] St. Petersburg–based outlet Fontanka reported that Wildberries has been unable to establish contact with at least 66 employees who were at the warehouse during the fire.[27] Russian authorities have otherwise not offered additional information about the circumstances of the fire, which some Russian sources suggested may have broken out the day after a fight between migrant workers and a subsequent mobilization raid on the warehouse.


Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are preparing to launch a new offensive in the coming weeks once the ground freezes in eastern and southern Ukraine.
• Russian forces likely continue to experiment and adapt their missile and drone strike packages against Ukraine in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.
• Representatives from 83 countries met to discuss the implementation of Ukraine’s Peace Formula on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 14.
• The Kremlin continues to undertake measures to undermine the Republic of Tatarstan’s autonomy within the Russian Federation and cultural heritage despite the republic’s sacrifices on behalf of the Russian war in Ukraine.
• The Russian Investigative Committee will officially open a case into the fire that destroyed a large Wildberries warehouse in St. Petersburg.
• Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut and Avdiivka, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Moscow-based international exhibition-forum “Russia” opened the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) “Army of Children” exhibit on January 14 to educate children about the military and careers in the Russian Armed Forces.
• Swedish Defense Materiel Administration announced on January 14 that it had signed an agreement with Nordic Ammunition Company (Nammo) to increase the production and deliveries of 155mm artillery ammunition to support Ukraine’s needs.
• The Kremlin is funding select non-profit organizations operating in occupied areas that propagate Kremlin social narratives.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2024
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/15/24 05:00 AM

Female saboteurs who poisoned 46 Russian soldiers in Crimea are on the run after shoot-out with police, reports say

https://www.businessinsider.com/2-w...4-1?international=true&r=US&IR=T
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/18/24 03:43 AM

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 17, 2024
Jan 17, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 17, 2024

Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 17, 2024, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on January 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note:ISW has added a new section on Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) efforts to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to track the development of Ukraine’s DIB and the international support for Ukraine’s DIB efforts. ISW will be publishing its assessments in this section based on public announcements, media reporting, and official statements.

A Ukrainian intelligence official reported that Russian forces lack the necessary operational reserves to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts in more than one direction in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on January 17 that Russia does not have enough reserves to conduct large-scale offensive operations in several directions at the same time.[1] Skibitskyi stated that it is impossible for Russian forces to conduct strategically or operationally significant offensive operations without “powerful” reserves and implied that Russia does not have such reserves.[2] Skibitskyi noted that mobilization measures are ongoing in Russia, likely referring to the current Russian crypto-mobilization campaign that relies heavily on volunteer recruitment and the coercive mobilization of convicts and migrants.[3] It is unclear if Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign has provided or would be able to provide the increased number of personnel that an intensified Russian offensive effort would require. Skibitskyi reported on January 15 that Russia recruits about 30,000 personnel per month, which the Russian military uses to replenish losses and form reserve regiments, and that Russia would need to conduct “mobilization” (likely referring to another “partial mobilization” like Russia conducted in September 2022 or a large-scale general mobilization) to establish a “powerful strategic reserve.”[4] Skibitskyi’s statements suggest that although the Russian military is able to generate enough manpower to conduct routine operational-level rotations in Ukraine, Russian forces may not necessarily be able to generate manpower at a rate that would allow Russian forces to quickly re-establish the operational reserves necessary for simultaneous offensive efforts in several directions.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated on January 17 that the elimination of Ukrainian statehood and independence remains one of Russia’s core war aims. Medvedev claimed that “the presence of an independent state on historical Russian territories” is a “constant reason for the resumption of hostilities” and that Ukraine’s very existence as an independent state is therefore “mortally dangerous” for Ukrainians.[6] Medvedev claimed that an independent Ukraine will never be a legitimate state regardless of who leads the government and that a future conflict for Ukrainian territory is inevitable whether or not it is a new conflict or the continuation of the current Russian war in Ukraine.[7] Medvedev’s January 17 statement is one of many recent signals from senior Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, that Putin and the Kremlin have no interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and that Putin’s maximalist war aims in Ukraine remain unchanged.[8] Medvedev attempted to portray Russia’s commitment to these maximalist objectives as unwavering by claiming that Ukrainian accession to the European Union (EU) or NATO will not prevent future conflict.[9] Medvedev notably did not define what he considers to be historical Russian territories, but Putin has defined historical Russian lands as the territory of the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union.[10] Medvedev’s opacity may be intentional, as the Kremlin’s loosely defined concept of “historical Russian territories” allows the Kremlin to pursue expansionist objectives wherever and whenever it so determines in a broad area including Central Asia, the Caucuses and parts of Eastern Europe.[11] Medvedev’s emphasis on the destruction of any Ukrainian state on these “historical Russian territories” could indicate that some actors in the Kremlin prioritize expansionist objectives over the identified objective of regime change under calls for the “de-nazification” of Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes largely targeting Odesa and Kharkiv cities on the night of January 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched two S-300 missiles from Belgorod Oblast towards Kharkiv City and 20 Shahed-136/-131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down 19 of the drones over Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[12] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian drones largely targeted Odesa City.[13] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles damaged residential buildings in Odesa and Kharkiv cities.

Ukraine successfully employed a Ukrainian-refurbished hybrid air defense system (FrankenSAM) for the first time. Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on January 17 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Shahed drone with a hybrid air defense system — referring to the so-called FrankenSAM systems that merge advanced Western air defense missiles with modified Soviet launchers or other missile launchers — for the first time.[15] Kamyshin noted that the full development of Ukraine’s own air defenses will take years, so Ukraine is creating home-made air defense systems using Soviet components and Western missiles. ISW continues to assess that Western provisions of air defense systems and missiles remain crucial as Ukraine develops its defense industrial base (DIB).[16] Kamyshin also stated that Ukraine has doubled its ammunition production for NATO-caliber artillery systems.[17] Ukraine began domestically producing 155mm shells, which are a NATO-standard used by Western-supplied guns that Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) had never produced before, no later than September 2023.

Germany and France announced additional military assistance to Ukraine on January 16. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on January 16 that Germany will provide Ukraine with military goods worth more than seven billion euros (roughly $7.62 billion) in 2024.[19] The German government announced that the aid package includes ammunition for Leopard tanks, armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance drones, and Marder infantry fighting vehicles.[20] Germany provided 5.4 billion euros ($5.89 billion) worth of military assistance to Ukraine in 2023.[21] French President Emmanuel Macron announced on January 16 that he would finalize a bilateral security agreement with Kyiv during a visit to Ukraine in February 2024.[22] Macron also stated that France will send 40 SCALP long-range missiles and “several hundred” unspecified bombs to Ukraine in the coming weeks.

Western officials highlighted Ukraine’s battlefield successes at the Davos World Economic Forum on January 16 and 17. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted that Ukraine has opened a corridor to export grain in the Black Sea, weakened the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF), and liberated more than half of its territory that Russian forces captured since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion.[23] Sullivan also highlighted Ukraine’s efforts to develop its own defense industrial base (DIB).[24] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia is unlikely in the near future — in line with ISW’s long-standing assessment that Russia is not interested in engaging in meaningful, good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.[25] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Ghanan President Nana Akufo-Addo and called on them to support Ukraine’s peace formula.[26] Zelensky also met with Polish President Andrzej Duda and discussed bilateral relations, the situation on the battlefield in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s accession to the European Union (EU).

The Russian ultranationalist community will likely concretize xenophobia and insecurities about Russia’s ethnic composition as key shared principles within the community in 2024, as Russian ultranationalists continue to seize on incidents involving migrants and non-ethnic Russian groups to call for anti-migrant policies and express growing hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia.
Russian information space actors within the ultranationalist milblogger community have increasingly fixated on singular incidents that implicate migrant communities in acts of violence or resistance in 2023 and have weaponized this rhetoric to call on Russian officials to more widely mobilize migrants to fight in Ukraine, curtail migrants’ access to social and economic opportunities, and substantively change Russia’s existing migration policies.[28] Russian ultranationalists have also increasingly advocated for ethnic Russians to receive more domestic power in Russia and continue to promote hyper-nationalist ideologies that are generating domestic tensions between ethnic minority communities and ethnic Russians.[29] s may malign the nominal rights to autonomy that many non-ethnic Russian communities have through their respective federal Russian republics and are likely to react harshly to discussions centering on the political, economic, and social concerns of non-ethnic Russians.

The Kremlin’s ongoing attempt to court the Russian ultranationalist community will likely generate increasing friction between the Kremlin’s desired rhetoric and policies concerning migration and interethnic relations and those of Russian ultranationalists. Russian officials appear to have tolerated or even endorsed ultranationalists’ increasing anti-migration rhetoric since it likely generated social pressures that have augmented Russian efforts to coerce migrants into military service in Ukraine.[31] The Kremlin now appears to be struggling to reconcile efforts to increase Russian industrial capacity while also coercing migrants into military service and disincentivizing them from working in Russia.[32] Any efforts to appease Russian ultranationalists will likely only exacerbate inconsistent and contradictory Kremlin policies concerning migrants. Hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia directly contradicts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s effort to promote the concept of a wider and ethnically inclusive “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) that encompasses non-ethnic Russians in both modern Russia and the former territory of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire.[33] The Kremlin continues to rely on the ultranationalist community in its effort to solidify pro-war sentiments, hyper-nationalism, Russian orthodoxy, and “traditional” social values as core tenets of the Russian state.[34] The Kremlin will likely struggle to balance these parallel efforts as Russian ultranationalists display increasing animus to non-ethnic Russians in Russia and in neighboring countries.

Significant protests erupted in Baymak, Bashkortostan Republic, following a Russian court’s guilty verdict for a prominent Bashkort activist, prompting a swift Russian government response as well as backlash from the Russian ultranationalist community. Bashkortostan’s Baymaksky Court found prominent Bashkort activist Fail Alsynov guilty on January 11 of inciting ethnic hatred and sentenced him to four years in prison, which the court announced publicly on January 17 following a closed-door trial.[35] Alsynov allegedly gave a speech on April 28, 2023, that insulted ethnic groups from the Caucasus.[36] Hundreds of Alsynov’s supporters had gathered at the courthouse ahead of his January 17 verdict announcement, and protests involving hundreds to thousands of supporters lasted for hours following the verdict. Some Russian opposition sources reported that 2,000-5,000 people protested in support of Alsynov and that responding Russian authorities detained anywhere from five to several dozen protestors.[37] The reported scale of the Baymak protest appears comparable to if not larger than that of the antisemitic riots in Dagestan in October 2023.[38] Footage shows Russian riot police using tear gas and stun grenades to dispel the protestors, two of whom Russian police beat with batons and 20-40 of whom sought medical attention following the protests.[39] Russian law enforcement reportedly detained around 20-40 protestors, and Alsynov’s supporters negotiated with Russian law enforcement to cease protests for the day in exchange for the release of the detained protestors.[40] The protests have dispersed as of this publication, though it is unclear whether activists are planning for further protests on subsequent days. Hundreds to thousands of activists gathered outside the Baymaksky Court in the days leading up to the public announcement of Alsynov’s sentence, suggesting that the size of the protests on January 17 was not necessarily spontaneous.[41]

Russian authorities appear to be better equipped to handle the Bashkortostan protests than the October 2023 Dagestan protests. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on January 17 that it is opening a criminal investigation into the protest for the organization of and participation in “mass riots” and for the use of violence against authorities.[42] Multiple Telegram channels that the Bashkort activists reportedly used to coordinate and spread news of the protest became temporarily unavailable on January 17, a possible Russian government censorship attempt to limit the protest from growing or spreading.[43] The Russian ultranationalist community latched onto the Bashkortostan protest in anger despite the swift government response. Some criticized Alsynov’s supporters as “extremists” and “wolves in sheep’s clothing” who only aim to separate Bashkortostan from Russia.[44] Others amplified footage of military personnel in Bashkortostan’s “Minigali Shaimuratov” Battalion disavowing the protesters and Alsynov as “traitors,” “extremists,” and “separatists.”[45] The Russian government and Bashkort military personnel’s swift response suggest that the Russian government may intensify efforts to ensure that non-ethnic Russian communities support the war in Ukraine. Russian sources’ characterization of the protesters as “separatists” organized by outside forces suggests that Russian ultranationalists will continue to label any notable unrest from non-ethnic Russians as a hybrid warfare attack against Russia.

Widespread Russian milblogger complaints about an Uzbek community leader in Russia prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open a criminal investigation, suggesting that the Russian government may feel increasing pressure to respond to milblogger demands as the ultranationalist information space coalesces around xenophobic and anti-migrant ideals. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on January 17 that it opened a criminal investigation into Interregional Uzbek Community "Vatandosh" President Usman Baratov for a social media post allegedly “insulting the participants of the special military operation” after unspecified Russian military correspondents appealed to Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin.[47] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers widely criticized Baratov’s social media posts and called for Baratov to leave Russia.[48] The Investigative Committee’s swift response to milbloggers’ requests may prompt them to make future demands of the Russian government. The Investigative Committee’s prompt announcement also suggests that the Russian government is monitoring and potentially responding to demands of the Russian ultranationalist community — a subsection of the Russian information space that it routinely attempts to cultivate and co-opt to advance government narratives. Russian milbloggers also widely criticized an allegedly naturalized Russian citizen of Azeri ethnicity against whom the Investigative Committee opened a case for “attempted murder and incitement of hatred based on ethnicity” on January 17.[49] Russian milbloggers increasingly fixate on crimes that non-ethnic Russians reportedly commit, and some milbloggers have claimed that unspecified non-ethnic Russian diasporas control entire sectors of the Russian economy.[50] The Russian ultranationalist community’s framing of non-ethnic Russian diaspora communities as an internal threat to Russian security and economic interests are irreconcilable with the Kremlin’s portrayal of Russia as a harmonious multiethnic society. The Russian ultranationalist community may increasingly pressure the Russian government to take actions against migrant and non-ethnic Russian diaspora communities, which may exacerbate the fracture between the ultranationalist community and the government.

The Russian military command continues to convict Russian officers in cases associated with Ukrainian strikes as part of a likely effort to improve discipline across the Russian military.
Moscow’s Second Western District Military Court sentenced the former head of Rosgvardia’s maritime department, Colonel Sergei Volkov, to six years in prison on January 16 for allegedly supplying low-quality radar systems to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge in occupied Crimea and a gas pipeline from Krasnodar Krai to occupied Crimea from Ukrainian drone strikes.[51] The court found Volkov guilty of “abuse of office with grave consequences” for his participation in a 400 million ruble ($4.5 million) corruption scheme involving the acquisition of two radar systems that Volkov reportedly knew could not properly defend against Ukrainian drones.[52] The Second Western District Military Court convicted two Russian air defense officers on December 6, 2023, for negligence in failing to prevent a Ukrainian strike on Russian territory.[53] Russian authorities also previously detained the commander of the 1st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense Army on corruption and bribery charges, likely for failing to prevent drone strikes against Moscow City in July and August 2023.[54] The Russian military command likely intends to set a precedent across the Russian military concerning possible punishment for failures to defend against Ukrainian strikes — particularly strikes against high-value targets — regardless of whether the cases explicitly allege that these officers violated Russian rules of combat duty or tangentially associate the officers’ dereliction of duties with corruption schemes.[55] The Russian command likely hopes that these precedents will improve discipline writ large among Russian forces in Ukraine, although ISW has not observed such an effect.

The Kremlin continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence in Africa through the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoD-controlled Africa Corps. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Russian military is forming squads of “military instructors” to deploy to African countries, likely referring to the Africa Corps, and that Russia is recruiting these squads in Russia and occupied Ukraine, particularly in Crimea.[56] ISW previously reported that the Africa Corps aims to subsume the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa after the Russian MoD failed to directly recruit former Wagner personnel.[57] Russian officials have routinely referred to Wagner personnel operating in Africa as “military instructors” and “advisors” since 2018 despite Wagner’s combat roles in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali.[58] The GUR reported that Russia is particularly focused on recruiting Russian reservists who specialized in maintaining air defense systems, former sailors, and other specialists and that Russian reservists are attracted to this opportunity due to high salaries and the hope of avoiding fighting in Ukraine.[59] ISW has previously observed the Africa Corps advertising “high salaries” beginning at 110,000 rubles ($1,240) but stipulating that interested applicants who are currently fighting in the war in Ukraine cannot transfer to serve in the Africa Corps.[60] The Russian MoD announced on January 17 that Russian Deputy Defense Ministers Colonel General Alexander Fomin and Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov met with Nigerien National Defense Minister Major General Salifou Modi to discuss bilateral military and military-technical cooperation.[61] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely attempting to expand the Africa Corps’ operations in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali.

The threat of US secondary sanctions is reportedly having a large-scale effect on Turkish–Russian financial ties. Russian outlet Kommersant stated on January 17 that Turkish banks have “universally” begun to refuse to work with Russian banks.[63] Kommersant reported that sources indicated that Turkish banks’ fear of secondary sanctions sharply increased after the United States authorized secondary sanctions on financial institutions on December 22, 2023, that facilitate Russian sanctions evasion and support the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on January 16 that at least two state-owned Chinese banks ordered reviews of their business with Russian clients and will sever ties with sanctioned Russian entities and entities tied to the Russian defense industry following the US’ December 2022 secondary sanctions authorization.

The Russian government likely continues efforts to gain access to data on Russian citizens.
Kremlin newswire TASS stated on January 17 that a Moscow court fined Amazon Cloud Services more than 200 million rubles (about $2,256,400) for not having a representative office in Russia.[65] Russian law stipulates that Russian authorities can fine entities that operate in Russia without opening a branch or representative office in Russia a penalty amounting to one-fifteenth to one-tenth of their total revenue for the year. Russia previously fined Google for a similar law that requires foreign internet-based services to localize databases of Russian users as of July 1, 2021.[66] Russia also previously fined Yandex for failing to adhere to Russian laws regarding the disclosure of users’ personal data to the Russian government.


Key Takeaways:

• A Ukrainian intelligence official reported that Russian forces lack the necessary operational reserves to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts in more than one direction in Ukraine.
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated on January 17 that the elimination of Ukrainian statehood and independence remains one of Russia’s core war aims.
• Ukraine successfully employed a Ukrainian-refurbished hybrid air defense system (FrankenSAM) for the first time.
• Germany and France announced additional military assistance to Ukraine on January 16.
The Russian ultranationalist community will likely concretize xenophobia and insecurities about Russia’s ethnic composition as key shared principles within the community in 2024, as Russian ultranationalists continue to seize on incidents involving migrants and non-ethnic Russian groups to call for anti-migrant policies and express growing hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia.
• The Kremlin’s ongoing attempt to court the Russian ultranationalist community will likely generate increasing friction between the Kremlin’s desired rhetoric and policies concerning migration and interethnic relations and those of Russian ultranationalists.
• Significant protests erupted in Baymak, Bashkortostan Republic, following a Russian court’s guilty verdict for a prominent Bashkort activist, prompting a swift Russian government response as well as backlash from the Russian ultranationalist community.
• Widespread Russian milblogger complaints about an Uzbek community leader in Russia prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open a criminal investigation, suggesting that the Russian government may feel increasing pressure to respond to milblogger demands as the ultranationalist information space coalesces around xenophobic and anti-migrant ideals.
• The Russian military command continues to convict Russian officers in cases associated with Ukrainian strikes as part of a likely effort to improve discipline across the Russian military.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence in Africa through the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoD-controlled Africa Corps.
• The threat of US secondary sanctions is reportedly having a large-scale effect on Turkish-Russian financial ties.
• Positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact on January 17.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov confirmed that Russian authorities are increasing the size of the Rosgvardia contingent in occupied Ukraine to strengthen occupational control.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/20/24 03:58 AM

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 19, 2024
Jan 19, 2024 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2024

Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 19, 2024, 8:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on January 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW has added a new section on Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) efforts to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to track the development of Ukraine’s DIB and the international support for Ukraine’s DIB efforts. ISW will be publishing its assessments in this section based on public announcements, media reporting, and official statements.

Russia is conducting an information operation to misrepresent NATO’s defensive "Steadfast Defender 2024" exercises – a response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Russian threats directed towards NATO members - as provocative.
NATO’s Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises begin this week and will continue through May 2024.[1] NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Chris Cavoli stated on January 18 that 90,000 personnel from all 31 NATO member states and Sweden will participate in "Steadfast Defender."[2] The exercises will reportedly include over 50 ships; over 80 fighter jets, helicopters, and drones; and at least 1,100 combat vehicles, including 133 tanks and 533 infantry fighting vehicles.[3] Cavoli stated that NATO ”will demonstrate its ability to reinforce the Euro-Atlantic area via trans-Atlantic movement of forces from North America...during a simulated emerging conflict scenario against a near-peer adversary.”[4] Chair of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Rob Bauer stated on January 18 that NATO must prepare for a conflict with Russia as NATO cannot take peace as ”a given” and must ”expect the unexpected.”[5] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated on January 19 that Germany must consider that Putin may try to attack a NATO member in five to eight years, given threats from the Kremlin ”almost every day.”[6]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded to the initial announcement of the Steadfast Defender exercises in September 2023 and misleadingly claimed that NATO exercises have been increasingly provocative and aggressive in nature.[7] The Russian MFA claimed that NATO is continuing a ”demonstration of force” on Russia’s ”doorstep.” The Russian MFA claimed that Russia had regularly proposed de-escalation initiatives to NATO, called for NATO to abandon its provocative actions, and transferred Russian military exercises to the country’s interior. Russian sources claimed that NATO is using exercises to “wind up“ and incite the Baltic states to prepare for war with Russia and characterized such exercises as a "series of provocations."[8] Yulia Zhdanova, a member of the Russian delegation at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 1066th plenary meeting, similarly claimed on January 17 that NATO exercises on the Russian and Belarusian borders ”provoke a game of nerves” and ”compress the spring of escalation even more.”[9] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger dismissed Pistorius’ comments about a possible future Russian attack on NATO, claiming that European officials regularly make statements about the ”concept of the ’Russian threat’” and that few Germans actually agree with these statements.[10] The milblogger implied that the German government is attempting to artificially create a threat from Russia that doesn’t actually exist by paying experts to ”say the right words.”

The Russian information operation aimed at painting defensive NATO actions in response to real Russian aggression on NATO’s eastern flank as provocative seeks to deflect from recent aggressive Russian rhetoric and behavior towards NATO. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, recently threatened Finland and the wider NATO alliance.[11] Putin identified the West as Russia’s “enemy” and implied that Russia is fighting in Ukraine in order to defeat the West.[12] Kremlin officials and Kremlin-affiliated actors have also repeatedly attempted to set information conditions for future aggressive action against NATO member states and their neighbors.[13] Russian electronic warfare (EW) exercises in Kaliningrad may have caused unprecedently high levels of GPS jamming across northern and central Poland and the southern Baltic region on December 25-27, 2023 and January 10 and 16, 2024.[14] ISW continues to assess that Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022 not to defend Russia against a nonexistent threat from NATO but rather to weaken and ultimately destroy NATO – a goal he still pursues.

Russian forces will be able to determine the location, tempo, and operational requirements of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024 as some US officials are reportedly pressing Kyiv to do. The Financial Times (FT) reported on January 19 that US officials are advocating for Ukraine to take a more “conservative” operational approach focused on holding current territory and generating materiel and forces in 2024 for future counteroffensive operations in 2025.[16] One US official reportedly argued that a strategy of “active defense” would allow Ukraine to build out operational requirements and prepare for a counteroffensive in 2025.[17] US military doctrine defines an active defense as the ”employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the enemy.”[18] Ukrainian officials have stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting active defensive operations in areas where Russian forces are engaged in localized offensive efforts.[19] An active defense throughout the theater, however, would require routine and widespread Ukrainian counterattacks and therefore still demand that Ukrainian forces commit considerable offensive capabilities to the front. FT reported that US officials believe that Ukrainian forces still could opportunistically exploit weak spots in the Russian defense while conducting a theater-wide active defense.[20] Limited opportunistic counterattacks - especially when not resourced adequately- are unlikely to result in gains commensurate with the resources they will inevitably consume, however.

A theater-wide defensive posture would cede the strategic initiative to Russia and permit Russia to launch major attacks at times of its choosing, forcing Ukraine to burn scarce resources it would supposedly be generating during a period of “active defense.” Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Andriy Zahorodnyuk stated to FT that focusing on defense without any offensive component would be ”a mistake of historic proportions” for Ukraine as it would hand Russian President Vladimir Putin the initiative and allow Putin to double down on ongoing efforts to convince the West and the rest of the world that Ukraine cannot win the war.[21] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov similarly stated that Ukrainian forces need to continue to press Russian forces, particularly through operations that target Russian logistics in occupied Crimea.[22] A Ukrainian ”active defense” into 2025 would cede the theater-wide initiative to Russian forces for at least a year and possibly longer, allowing the Russian command to determine where, when, and at what scale fighting occurs over that period. This extended period of theater initiative would also give the Russian command significant control over determining what resources both Ukrainian and Russian forces must bring to bear. The Russian command would therefore have an ample operational window to conduct a series of campaigns of differing intensities across the theater in Ukraine that could be specifically designed to constrain and degrade critical Ukrainian operational capacities needed for a future counter-offensive.

Offensive and defensive operations place similar requirements and constraints on Ukrainian materiel and personnel, and Ukrainian defensive operations do not necessarily present Ukraine with more opportunities to husband materiel and expand reserves for future counteroffensive operations. Russian and Ukrainian forces rely on the same weapons and equipment to conduct both defensive and offensive operations. Equipment such as armored vehicles, artillery, and drones are just as critical for defending positions as they are for capturing positions. Defensive operations do not eliminate manpower requirements or losses, moreover, as holding positions and counterattacking can produce significant force requirements and losses, particularly when the aggressor can set the terms of battle each time. The stability of a defensive line relies in part on the ability of defending forces to conduct sufficient rotations, rapidly reinforce weakened sectors of the frontline, establish physical fortifications, and when necessary, conduct orderly withdrawals from threatened positions, all of which require significant resources and a significant amount of committed and immediately available manpower. Offensive operations have required more materiel and manpower than defensive operations in Ukraine as in most wars, but both Russian and Ukrainian forces have regularly suffered significant losses on the defensive as well.

Just as defensive operations do not guarantee that Ukraine will be able to amass resources for future counteroffensives, offensive operations do not necessarily preclude Russia from continuing efforts to build out stockpiles of equipment and establish operational reserves. ISW currently assesses that the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign is enabling Russian forces to conduct regular operational-level rotations but that Russian forces are unlikely to be able to rapidly establish operational reserves.[24] Russian forces have recently expended considerable amounts of equipment on failed offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine and are currently consuming artillery ammunition far faster than Russia’s gradually mobilized defense industrial base (DIB) can produce.[25] Ukrainian officials have indicated that Russian forces are funneling newly produced weapons and ammunition to the frontline for immediate use and not for expanding stockpiles for future operations.[26] These constraints on Russian materiel and manpower are not inevitable characteristics of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, however. Russian forces could ease these constraints while still conducting offensive operations if the Russian command changed the intensity or tactics of these operations, intensified force generation efforts, or significantly expanded efforts to mobilize Russia’s DIB. Granting Russia a year or more of holding the theater-wide initiative would allow the Russian command to choose freely between prioritizing its own offensive efforts and operational requirements, amassing its own resources for future use, and forcing Ukraine to expend the resources Kyiv would be seeking to amass for future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.

Russian forces will likely choose to conduct localized offensive operations as well as larger offensive efforts throughout the theater in order to force Ukraine to commit scarce materiel and manpower to defensive efforts. Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on January 19 that the entire eastern front from Kupyansk to Bakhmut is active and reported intensified Russian assaults in the Kupyansk-Lyman and Bakhmut directions.[27] Fityo warned that while Ukrainian forces are destroying Russian tanks and armored vehicles, Russian forces have “a large reserve of resources.“[28] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces have recently ”switched to the offensive” in certain areas of the Lyman direction, particularly west of Svatove and west and southwest of Kreminna.[29] Mashovets noted that Russian forces are likely preparing for larger-scale actions in the Lyman direction in the near future.[30] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also claimed that Russian forces have begun a ”massive offensive” in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[31] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may intensify efforts to capture Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast in the coming weeks.[32] Russian sources have repeatedly acknowledged Russia’s intent to continue active operations throughout Ukraine intended to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[33]

FT also reported, citing unspecified Ukrainian officials, that Russian forces are planning to conduct a large-scale offensive in Ukraine in the summer of 2024 and will attempt to capture the rest of the four illegally annexed oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts).[34] FT’s unspecified Ukrainian sources did not rule out the possibility of Russian forces attempting to recapture Kharkiv of Kyiv cities.[35] German outlet BILD reported similar Russian plans on December 14, 2023, and ISW noted at the time that Russia’s reported plans for the war are generally consistent with ongoing localized offensive operations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[36] Russian offensive operations in Ukraine will likely not have to achieve significant territorial advances to force Ukraine to expend valuable and limited resources on defensive efforts. Ukrainian forces will likely be unable to husband materiel and personnel while defending against Russian offensive operations, localized or large-scale, that are meant to prevent them from doing so. Ukraine would risk consuming resources it hoped to conserve for its own counteroffensive operations in efforts to stop continuing Russian attacks, likely while losing ground, if it went over to the strategic defensive as some US officials are apparently recommending. The side in war that holds the initiative generally has the advantage, and it is unwise to suggest that Ukraine should cede that advantage to Russia for longer than is absolutely necessary.

US officials reportedly assess that Ukraine will have to fight a long war and continue efforts to secure as much security assistance as possible for Ukraine before 2025 while expecting that positional fighting may continue in Ukraine until 2026. CNN reported on January 19 that US President Joe Biden, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines met with US lawmakers on January 17 to urge lawmakers to support additional security assistance to Ukraine.[37] Biden Administration officials highlighted air defense systems and artillery ammunition as key Ukrainian capabilities that could be depleted without additional US aid, ending Ukraine‘s ability to conduct long-range strikes against occupied Crimea and Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.[38] An unspecified US official told CNN that getting as much aid to Ukraine approved as possible before 2025 is “on the minds of a lot of folks.“[39] CNN reported that unspecified US intelligence officials assess that the war will last at least two more years, with some assessing there may be up to five years of fighting. CNN reported that unspecified US officials do not believe that a short-term ”drop-off” in US assistance to Ukraine will have a major battlefield impact, but that a long-term lack of US assistance could allow Russia to regain momentum by stockpiling weapons produced domestically and by Iran and North Korea, however.[40] ISW continues to assess that the positional war in Ukraine is not a stable stalemate and could be tipped in either direction by decisions made in the West and Russia and that the collapse of Western aid to Ukraine would likely lead to the eventual collapse of Ukraine’s ability to hold off the Russian military and significant Russian advances further west, likely all the way to the western Ukrainian border with NATO member states.

Russia is trying to mend its relationship with South Korea to mitigate the impacts of its growing reliance on North Korea. Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev stated on January 18 that Russia would "welcome" South Korea into the circle of Russia’s “friendly countries” and suggested that South Korean businesses should invest in the restoration of occupied Donbas.[42] Zinoviev claimed that South Korea does not want to see Russia strategically defeated in Ukraine and warned South Korea against supplying military aid to Ukraine. Zinoviev also falsely claimed that Russian-North Korean cooperation is not violating any international sanctions. Recent direct signaling from South Korean officials suggests that South Korea is increasingly at odds with the Kremlin, particularly due to growing Russian cooperation with Pyongyang. South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol stated on September 17, 2023 that Seoul believes that Russian and North Korean military-technical agreements may violate UN Security Council sanctions, and South Korean officials have recently warned that North Korea is increasing weapons and ammunition transfers to Russia.[43] Ukraine-based open-source organization Frontelligence Insight published a report on January 19 mapping the logistics routes along which North Korea is transferring ammunition to Russia for use in Ukraine, highlighting the dramatic impact of North Korean ammunition deliveries on the Russian war effort.[44] Continued Russian cooperation with North Korea is likely further driving South Korea away from Russia, and the Kremlin likely fears the impacts of these shifting dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Protests in support of an imprisoned prominent Bashkort activist continued in the Republic of Bashkortostan, but Kremlin mouthpieces denied reports that the protests are significant in scale. Russian opposition sources reported that anywhere from “hundreds” to 1,500 supporters of imprisoned Bashkort activist Fail Alysnov protested in Bashkhortostan’s capital Ufa on January 19 and that Russian Special Purpose Mobile Units (OMON) detained at least 10 demonstrators.[45] Russian authorities sentenced Alysnov to four years imprisonment on January 11 for "inciting hatred" and publicized the ruling on January 17, prompting mass protests outside the courthouse in Baymak, Bashkortostan.[46] Footage published on January 19 shows dozens to hundreds of Alysnov’s supporters demonstrating in the center of Ufa, and footage published later in the day suggests that the protests concluded for the day.[47] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on January 19 that there were no mass riots in Bashkortostan and that local law enforcement is handling ”individual” local demonstrations.[48] A Russian political blogger, who reported on the initial protests and denounced Alysnov as a ”separatist” with ”neo-fascist” values, claimed that no more than 50 people protested in Ufa and that half had dispersed by midday – a claim inconsistent with footage of the actual protests.

The Russian government continues efforts to codify legal oversight of the activities of migrants living in Russia. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved an action plan for the State Concept of Migration Policy, which the Russian government will implement throughout 2024-2025.[50] The action plan includes six sections that address the entry of foreign citizens to Russian territory; the assimilation of foreigners into Russian society; the free movement of students, scientific personnel, and teaching staff between Russia and other countries; and the prevention of violations to Russian migration laws.[51] The action plan also requires the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) to submit proposals by March 20, 2024 to the Cabinet of Ministers on how to strengthen punishments for foreigners who violate Russian laws.[52] The plan also includes several provisions to facilitate the integration of migrants into Russia's domestic sphere including Russian language proficiency assessments and assimilation courses to help foreigners internalize Russian "traditional spiritual and moral values."[53] Migrants will also have to create a "digital profile" by the end of 2024, which will allow the Russian government to track arrivals of those coming from countries that have a visa-free entry regime with Russia, as well as to expand the collection of biometric data of foreigners who arrive at Moscow airports.[54] ISW previously assessed that Russia was using similar digital surveillance technologies to expand its societal control toolkit during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, and it appears that the Kremlin is applying such surveillance and control measures to monitor the activities of foreigners in Russia.[55] The Kremlin likely seeks to quickly enact this action plan in order to gain more oversight over foreigners and manage growing tensions with some migrant communities within Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allocating funds for the search, registration, and legal protection of Russian property abroad, which includes property in former territories of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.[57] The decree directs the Russian Presidential Administration’s Foreign Property Management Enterprise and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with power and funds to search for, register, and legally protect “property,” though the exact parameters of what constitutes current or historical Russian property are unclear. The Kremlin may use the “protection” of its claimed property in countries outside of its internationally recognized borders to forward soft power mechanisms in post-Soviet and neighboring states ultimately aimed at internal destabilization.[58] A prominent milblogger responded to the decree by implausibly calling for Russia to start enacting the law in "Alaska" and throughout a significant portion of eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.


Key Takeaways:

• Russia is conducting an information operation to misrepresent NATO’s defensive Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises – a response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Russian threats directed towards NATO members - as provocative.
• Russian forces will be able to determine the location, tempo, and operational requirements of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024 as some US officials are reportedly pressing Kyiv to do.
• US officials reportedly assess that Ukraine will have to fight a long war and continue efforts to secure as much security assistance as possible for Ukraine before 2025 while expecting that positional fighting may continue in Ukraine until 2026.
• Russia is trying to mend its relationship with South Korea to mitigate the impacts of its growing reliance on North Korea.
• Protests in support of an imprisoned prominent Bashkort activist continued in the Republic of Bashkortostan, but Kremlin mouthpieces denied reports that the protests are significant in scale.
• The Russian government continues efforts to codify legal oversight of the activities of migrants living in Russia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allocating funds for the search, registration, and legal protection of Russian property abroad, which includes property in former territories of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Kupyansk, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions southeast of Kupyansk amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact.
• The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion stated on January 19 that it will resume fighting on the frontlines in Ukraine when the period of positional fighting ends and will “continue to serve” after the war, presumably subordinated to Rosgvardia.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to leverage the provision of social benefits and healthcare to augment passportization efforts in occupied Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/22/24 02:30 AM

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 21, 2024
Jan 21, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 21, 2024

Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 21, 2024, 3:55pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on January 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against targets in Leningrad and Tula oblasts, where repeated Ukrainian drone strikes may fix Russian short-range air defense systems defending potentially significant targets along expected flight routes.
Ukrainian media, citing unnamed sources within Ukrainian special services, reported that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against the Shcheglovsky Val Plant in Tula City, Tula Oblast and the “Novateka” plant and gas terminal near the port of Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.[1] The Shcheglovsky Val Plant reportedly manufactures Pantsir-S and Pantsir-S1 air defense systems, and the Ust-Luga complex reportedly processes stable gas condensate into light and heavy naphtha, diesel, kerosene, and naval fuel.[2] Russian sources amplified footage claiming to show explosions in Tula City and Ust-Luga, presumably the results of successful Ukrainian strikes.[3] Geolocated footage published on January 20 shows additional explosions over Smolensk City, indicating possible Ukrainian strikes in the area.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed five drones over Tula, Oryol, and Smolensk oblasts.[5] Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a successful drone strike on Russian military facilities in Leningrad Oblast on January 18.[6]

A Russian insider source claimed on January 21 that Russian air defense coverage over Leningrad Oblast is poor and indicated that Russian air defenses in Leningrad Oblast are likely not arrayed to defend against strikes from the south.[7] Russian air defense systems in Leningrad Oblast are most likely positioned to defend against strikes from the northwest and west, as Russia has historically arrayed its air defense in the area to defend against hypothetical NATO attacks.[8] The Russian military is currently reforming the Leningrad Military District (LMD) with the expressed intent to prepare for a potential future conventional war against NATO and may be arranging military assets in a way to posture along the border with NATO members.[9] Ukrainian strikes in Leningrad Oblast may prompt Russian forces to reposition short-range air defense systems along expected flight routes of Ukrainian drones to defend potential targets of strategic value. Russian forces using short-range systems such as the Pantsir may not be able to cover all important potential targets in Leningrad Oblast without bringing additional systems into the area, and continued Ukrainian strikes in deep rear areas in Russia may thus increase pressure on Russia’s air defenses overall.

Moldovan authorities accused Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria of numerous violations, including the improper use of drones, while conducting exercises in late December 2023, prompting an information attack by a pro-Kremlin mouthpiece. Members of the Moldovan delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Joint Control Commission (JCC) demanded during a JCC meeting on January 18 that the JCC conduct an investigation into Russian peacekeepers for using small arms, drones, and imitation weapons during an exercise allegedly repelling a sabotage attack on the peacekeepers’ outpost in the Moldovan security zone on December 22, 2023.[10] The Moldovan authorities stated that the Russian peacekeeping forces’ presence and use of these weapons inside the security zone violates JCC protocols and that the Russian peacekeeping forces had not properly disclosed some of these weapons and drones as part of their arsenal. A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed in response on January 21 that Moldovan authorities have been increasingly pressuring Russian-backed breakaway republic Transnistria by calling for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers and through economic pressure.[11] The milblogger claimed that the Moldovan government imposed “double” duties on Transnistrian businesses that amount to roughly $16 million over an unspecified timeframe and that will raise the cost of living in Transnistria. Recent changes to the Moldovan Customs Code require Transnistrian businesses to pay import customs duties to the Moldovan government, whereas previously Transnistrian businesses only paid duties to the Transnistrian government.[12] The milblogger claimed that this pressure supports the “forceful reintegration” of Transnistria into Moldova and that Russia should prepare for further escalation, reminiscent of recent accusations from Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky.[13] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger’s claims and Krasnoselsky’s accusations are likely part of an information operation aimed at destabilizing Moldova, which borders NATO member Romania, and justifying any future Russian escalation in the region.

Russia is likely intensifying relations with North Korea as part of an effort to procure more artillery ammunition from abroad amid Russian munition shortages. The North Korean Foreign Ministry stated on January 20 that Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his willingness to visit North Korea “at an early date” (presumably in 2024) during his recent meeting with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow.[15] Putin last visited North Korea in 2000, and his renewed interest in deepening Russian–North Korean relations is likely part of increasing Russian efforts to procure munitions from abroad.[16] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated in a January 21 interview that North Korea provided a “significant amount of artillery ammunition,” which allowed Russia to “breathe a little.”[17] Budanov suggested that Russian forces would likely experience operationally significant artillery ammunition shortages without North Korean–provided ammunition.[18] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that North Korea delivered one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Russia from September to November 2023 and that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce in total two million rounds of 122mm and 152mm shells annually, which resulted in a deficit of 500,000 shells in 2023 and will likely result in a similar deficit in 2024.


Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against targets in Leningrad and Tula oblasts, where repeated Ukrainian drone strikes may fix Russian short-range air defense systems defending potentially significant targets along expected flight routes.
• Moldovan authorities accused Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria of numerous violations, including the improper use of drones, while conducting exercises in late December 2023, prompting an information attack by a pro-Kremlin mouthpiece.
• Russia is likely intensifying relations with North Korea as part of an effort to procure more artillery ammunition from abroad amid Russian munition shortages.
• Russian forces advanced near Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the front.
• Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on January 21 that likely Russian military commanders are mistreating troops at a training ground in Volgograd Oblast.
• Russian federal subjects continue to foster patronage networks in occupied Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/28/24 06:38 AM

NOS News

Today, 02:23
Ukrainian secret service discovers fraud case involving mortar grenades

The Ukrainian secret service SBOe says it has discovered a fraud case in its own army. Officials from the Ministry of Defense are suspected of having embezzled approximately 37 million euros together with an arms supplier.

In August 2022, six months after the start of the war, officials signed an agreement with little-known arms supplier Lviv Arsenal, according to the Secret Service. 100,000 mortar shells were to be delivered to the army, but Defense did not receive a single shell from that order.

According to the SBOe, the money was diverted to foreign accounts. Presumably, high-ranking officials from the ministry and the management of Lviv Arsenal enriched themselves.

Five suspects
Five people are suspected of fraud. One of them was stopped while trying to cross the Ukrainian border. The rest are still being sought. They risk a prison sentence of up to twelve years.

Corruption within the military can be a problem for morale in wartime. The news will also not go down well with the European Union, with which Ukraine may hold accession talks.

In September, Defense Minister Reznikov was replaced by President Zelensky. It is believed that Reznikov has done too little to tackle corruption within the ministry and the armed forces.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/29/24 03:12 AM

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 28, 2024
Jan 28, 2024 - ISW Press











Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 28, 2024

Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 28, 2024, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on January 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW added a new section on Russian air, missile, and drone campaigns to track Russian efforts to target Ukrainian rear and frontline areas, grow its drone and missile arsenals, and adapt its strike packages.

Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continue to set information conditions to destabilize Moldova, likely as part of efforts to prevent Moldova’s integration into the EU and the West among other objectives.
Alexei Polishchuk, the director of the Second Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Countries at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on January 28 that Moldova has begun to “destroy its ties” with CIS member states and the Russia-led CIS organization as a whole and that there are rumors that Moldova plans to leave the CIS by the end of 2024.[1] Polishchuk claimed that this decision would not benefit Moldovan interests or citizens and would be unprofitable for the Moldovan economy. Polishchuk also claimed that the settlement of the Transnistria issue in Moldova is in a “deep crisis” and that Moldova’s economic pressure on Transnistria since the beginning of 2024 has “further delayed” any solution.[2] Polishchuk claimed that Russia is ready to fix deteriorating relations between Moldova and Transnistria “as a mediator and guarantor” to the settlement.[3] Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Serebrian stated on January 28 that Moldova would not return to the 5+2 Transnistria negotiating process that included Russia as long as Russian-Ukrainian relations do not improve and Russia’s war in Ukraine continues.[4]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger, who has recently fixated on the Moldova-Transnistria conflict, continued to highlight alleged discontent in Moldova’s breakaway and autonomous regions. The milblogger claimed that about 50,000 people in Transnistria participated in a rally protesting against Moldovan economic pressure on Transnistria on January 24.[5] The milblogger also stated that Sergei Ibrishim, the Head of the Main Directorate of Agro-Industrial Complex of Gagauzia, sent a request recently to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov for Russia to send fertilizer to Gagauzia as humanitarian aid.[6] Ibrishim also reportedly claimed that Gagauzia’s agricultural producers are unable to sell their products to Russia after Moldova’s decision in July 2023 to leave the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly and asked Lavrov to abolish excise taxes and customs duties for Russian imports from Gagauzia.[7] Polishchuk’s and the milblogger’s comments are likely aimed at dissuading Moldova from leaving the CIS and Russia’s wider sphere of influence, setting information conditions to create economic discontent within Moldova, and posturing Russia as an economic and security guarantor in Moldova.

Russia notably accused Ukraine of abandoning and disregarding the Minsk Agreements that had largely frozen the conflict after Russia’s 2014 invasion in the lead up to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Russia may be setting information conditions to make similar claims against Moldova.[8] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely setting information conditions to justify future Russian aggression in Moldova under the guise of protecting its “compatriots abroad” and the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) - concepts that are purposely based on vague definitions of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in foreign countries.[9] Russia may attempt to justify its aggression or destabilization efforts in Moldova by claiming that Transnistrian residents are in danger due Moldova’s alleged abandonment of the Transnistria settlement process. ISW recently observed suggestions that the Kremlin may be turning to rhetorical narratives that appeal to a wider audience beyond the “Russian World.”

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin reiterated that the Kremlin is not interested in any settlements short of the complete destruction and eradication of the Ukrainian state, likely in an ongoing effort to justify the long-term and costly Russian war effort to domestic audiences. Naryshkin told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin during a televised “impromptu” interview on January 28 that the Ukrainian state and government have “a very sad fate” and that “Russia will not stop halfway,” presumably in its efforts to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[11] Naryshkin made a similar statement on January 27 during the opening of a memorial to the Soviet victims of Nazi genocide in Leningrad Oblast, claiming that “Russia will not stop halfway” in its fight with the current followers of Nazi ideology.[12] The similarity of both statements suggests that Naryshkin may be using pre-approved Kremlin rhetoric to signal to Russian citizens that the Kremlin is not open to negotiating with Ukraine or compromising in any settlement of the war Russia started, despite recent Western reports to the contrary.[13] Russian officials have consistently reiterated Russia‘s commitment to its maximalist objectives in Ukraine - which are tantamount to complete Ukrainian and Western capitulation- and statements by Russian officials suggesting that Russia is or has always been interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine are very likely efforts to feign interest to prompt preemptive Western concessions regarding Ukraine’s sovereignty or territorial integrity.[14]

Naryshkin was notably involved in setting domestic information conditions in the lead-up to the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including furthering Russian claims that perceived Ukrainian aggression prompted by Ukraine’s Western ‘puppet masters’ forced Russia to invade Ukraine and claims that the Ukrainian government is comparable to Nazi Germany.[15] Russian President Vladimir Putin ostentatiously humiliated Naryshkin during a televised Russian Security Council meeting on February 22, 2022, demanding that Naryshkin “speak plainly” when Naryshkin declared his support for the independence of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[16] Putin likely humiliated Naryshkin in February 2022 due to Naryshkin‘s failure to set the informational conditions to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the Russian domestic and international information spaces that Putin desired. Naryshkin’s return to the Russian information space to further the perception of the Kremlin’s commitment to the war in Ukraine could indicate that Putin has given Naryshkin another chance to prove his ability to set informational conditions, this time setting conditions domestically for a long war effort. If this hypothesis is correct, then Naryshkin will presumably be determined not to disappoint Putin again. Zarubin has also previously been involved in a number of Kremlin informational efforts, including filming and conducting interviews wherein Putin threatened Finland and the wider NATO alliance and attempted to portray himself as a gracious leader who cares about the well-being of Russian military personnel and an effective Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armed forces.

The Kremlin also continues to frame and justify a long-term Russian war effort as part of an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West and Nazism. Alexei Polishchuk, the director of the Second Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Countries at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), also stated during his interview with TASS that “the West incited neo-Nazi sentiments in Ukraine” and “made [Ukraine] anti-Russia.”[18] Putin, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Naryshkin, and Russian State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin during the 80th anniversary of the breaking of the siege of Leningrad on January 27 claimed that Russia is fighting “Nazis” in Ukraine and that a number of Western countries have adopted Nazi ideology.[19] Polishchuk‘s claim that the West incited “neo-Nazi” ideals in Ukraine is likely part of the same coordinated Kremlin informational effort intended to justify geopolitical confrontation with the West and suggests that the Kremlin may increasingly label any perceived adversary and possibly the entire West as “Nazi.”[20] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin may have decided that the simple narrative that Russia and other states are fighting a geopolitical “Nazi” force is a more effective immediate narrative than Putin’s attempt to appeal to Russian citizens and Russian speakers in the territory of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire with the ideology of the ”Russian World” (Russkiy Mir), which is based on purposefully amorphous ethnic identities that are not agreed upon and that are at odds with Russia’s multi-ethnic composition.[21] Polishchuk also reiterated long-standing Russian claims that the West controls Ukraine and that Russia has “always remained” open to peace negotiations.

Ukrainian Navy Commander Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s ability to technologically adapt and develop as Russian forces continue to adapt to Ukrainian operations in a January 27 Sky News interview.[23] Neizhpapa’s statement is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are adapting and learning on certain sectors of the front.[24] Neizhpapa also reiterated the Ukrainian assertion that Ukrainian forces should be able to use Western-provided systems to strike legitimate military targets in Russia.[25] Neizhpapa stated that the Ukrainian Navy would be “very happy” to accept two UK Type 23 frigates that the UK is considering decommissioning due to a shortage of sailors.[26] The Turkish government announced on January 2 that it would not allow the UK to transport two mine hunting ships to Ukraine via the Turkish Straits citing Article 19 of the Montreux Convention Regulating the Regime of the Turkish Straits, which stipulates that “vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not...pass through the Straits.” Turkey would likely continue to use the Montreux Convention to prevent the UK from potentially transferring these two frigates through the Turkish Straits to Ukraine.[27] Turkey has used the Montreux Convention to deny access to Russian warships wishing to pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits since February 28, 2022, to Ukraine’s benefit.

The Kremlin will likely use the withdrawals of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to continue efforts to expand Russian influence in Francophone Africa. The Malian, Burkinabe, and Nigerien juntas announced their immediate withdrawals from ECOWAS in a joint statement on January 28.[29] ECOWAS stated that it had not received “any direct formal notification” from Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger about their intent to withdraw.[30] Kremlin newswire TASS cited the frustration of these states with ECOWAS’ ”Western influence” as a reason for their withdrawal.[31] Russian milbloggers also celebrated the announcement as evidence of rapidly decreasing French influence in the Sahel.[32] The first contingent of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled Africa Corps reportedly arrived in Burkina Faso on January 24, and Kremlin officials recently met with Chadian junta officials in Moscow.[33] ISW continues to assess that Russia is attempting to expand its influence in western and central Africa, particularly focusing on Francophone African countries in the Sahel.

Unnamed Indian government sources stated that India wants to distance itself from Russia, its largest arms supplier, because the war in Ukraine has limited Russia’s ability to provide India with munitions. The unnamed Indian government sources told Reuters in a January 28 article that India will act carefully in order to avoid pushing Russia closer to China.[36] Indian think tank Observer Research Foundation’s Russia expert Nandan Unnikrishnan told Reuters that India is unlikely to sign “any major military deal” with Russia because it would cross a red line with the United States.[37] Indian government-run think tank Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses Eurasia expert Svasti Rao stated that the war in Ukraine has caused India to question Russia’s ability to supply India with spare parts.[38] ISW has routinely observed reports that Russia continues to face challenges repairing aircraft and other equipment and has not been able to produce missiles and artillery ammunition at pre-war levels for its own forces to use, making it highly unlikely that Russia will be able to export military equipment to India or its other customers at pre-war levels any time soon.[39] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently highlighted Russian-Indian economic and military-technical cooperation in a meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar likely in an effort to emphasize positive Russian-Indian relations amid Russian concerns that India is attempting to diversify its defense partners.[40]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continue to set information conditions to destabilize Moldova, likely as part of efforts to prevent Moldova’s integration into the EU and the West among other objectives.
• Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin reiterated that the Kremlin is not interested in any settlements short of the complete destruction and eradication of the Ukrainian state, likely in an ongoing effort to justify the long-term and costly Russian war effort to domestic audiences.
• The Kremlin also continues to frame and justify a long-term Russian war effort as part of an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West and Nazism.
• Ukrainian Navy Commander Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s ability to technologically adapt and develop as Russian forces continue to adapt to Ukrainian operations in a January 27 Sky News interview.
• The Kremlin will likely use the withdrawals of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to continue efforts to expand Russian influence in Francophone Africa.
• Unnamed Indian government sources stated that India wants to distance itself from Russia, its largest arms supplier, because the war in Ukraine has limited Russia’s ability to provide India with munitions.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting throughout the theater.
• A Russian source claimed that Rosgvardia is forming the 1st Volunteer Corps with remaining Wagner Group personnel and newly recruited volunteers (dobrovoltsy) following the Kremlin adoption of the law allowing Rosgvardia to form its own volunteer formations in December 2023.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on January 28 that Ukraine and Russia will conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange in the near future.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 01/31/24 01:14 AM

Both sides are going nowhere so many soldiers die on both sides they should begin with peace talks.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/05/24 10:34 AM

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 4, 2024
Feb 4, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 4, 2024

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Fredrick W. Kagan

February 4, 2024, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on February 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia's reported reserve concentrations throughout Ukraine largely align with Russia’s assessed priorities along the front, although they are not necessarily indicative of future Russian operations.
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces currently have 17 regiments, 16 battalions, and two regiment-battalion level tactical detachments in reserve.[1] Mashovets stated that there are about 60,000-62,000 total Russian personnel in reserve units, but Russian forces have only equipped about 20,000 tactical and operational-tactical level reserve personnel with weapons and equipment. Mashovets stated that Russia’s reserves are concentrated in the greatest numbers in the operational zone of the Southern Grouping of Forces, followed by the Western Grouping of Forces, Dnepr Grouping of Forces, the Zaporizhia Grouping of Forces, the Eastern Grouping of Forces, and the Central Grouping of Forces. The Southern Grouping of Forces is responsible for the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions, and Mashovets noted that the reserve concentration in this area aligns with the areas where Russian forces are concentrating their offensive efforts. Mashovets observed that it is not surprising that the Dnepr Grouping of Forces — which operates in occupied Kherson Oblast — has the third highest number of reserves given that Russian forces may be concerned over a Ukrainian threat in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian officials have recently indicated that Russian forces have more than 70,000 personnel on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, but that many are concentrated deeper in the rear.[2] The Dnipro Grouping of Forces’ reserves would likely be able to easily move to the Zaporizhia direction if circumstances so required. Mashovets assessed that the Central Grouping of Forces, which is responsible for the Lyman direction, has the lowest concentration of reserves due to its smaller operational zone that requires fewer troops.[3] ISW additionally assesses that the Central Grouping of Forces has a lower concentration of reserves because Russian operations in the Lyman direction are likely meant to support the Western Grouping of Forces’ operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, as ISW will soon outline in an upcoming operational analysis of the Russian offensive on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis. Russian forces will be able to move their reserve concentrations freely between different sectors of the front as long as Russia holds the strategic initiative across the theater. ISW continues to assess that an active Ukrainian defense throughout the theater in 2024 would cede the strategic initiative to Russia allowing Moscow to determine where, when, and at what scale fighting occurs in Ukraine and to allocate Russian resources appropriately while forcing Ukraine to respond.[4] Ukraine would be able to deny Russia this ability,however, if Ukraine were able to contest the initiative.

The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is unlikely able to fully support Russia’s reserve manpower despite Russia’s ability to sustain its current tempo of operations and ongoing efforts to expand the Russian DIB. Mashovets stated that the operational and strategic reserves are generally not combat-ready, yet the Russian command tends to view its reserve component as a “bottomless barrel.”[5] Mashovets stated that the Russian DIB is able to produce about 250-300 “new and thoroughly modernized” tanks per year. Mashovets stated that Russian forces can also overhaul about 250-300 tanks that have been in long-term storage or sustained battlefield damage per year. Mashovets stated that the situation is similar for armored combat vehicles, suggesting that the Russian DIB can more or less cover Russian forces’ annual vehicle losses. Mashovets stated that the Russian DIB, however, cannot produce enough materiel to equip large Russian reserves should the need suddenly arise. The Latvian Defense Ministry’s State Secretary Janis Garisons stated on December 13 that Russia can “produce and repair” about 100-150 tanks per month.[6] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev claimed in March 2023 that Russia’s DIB could produce 1,500 main battle tanks in 2023, which suggests an average production of 125 tanks per month.[7] Even with these higher estimates the Russian DIB remains unlikely able to support a larger mobilization of manpower and would likely need to expand dramatically to support larger offensive operations that would require the use of more manpower reserves. ISW continues to assess that Russia would have the opportunity to expand its DIB and amass resources if it maintains the theater-wide initiative throughout 2024 although not likely to an extent sufficient to supply great masses of mobilized reservists or conscripts this year.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the frontline near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast and the Ukrainian Eastern Air Command in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on February 4. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi and Ukrainian Commander of the Zaporizhia Group of Forces Brigadier General Volodymyr Horbatyuk reported to Zelensky about Ukrainian defensive operations in the Avdiivka direction, the situation near Robotyne and other areas of the front, and the arrangement of Ukrainian defensive lines.[9] Zelensky also visited the Ukrainian Eastern Air Command and discussed measures to strengthen mobile fire groups and electronic warfare (EW) systems to repel Russian drone strikes, the use of Western and hybrid (Western-Ukrainian) air defense systems, and prospects for strengthening the capabilities of Ukrainian Eastern air defense groups.

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize Russian authorities’ failure to properly equip Russian forces with drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems in response to a recent unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on February 4 that Russian drone production is poorly managed, limiting Russia’s ability to innovate.[11] One milblogger claimed that poor management leads to unjustified Russian losses and will be the “scourge” of Russia’s victory against Ukraine.[12] Moscow Duma Deputy Andrei Medvedev previously criticized Russia’s mass production of drones as leading to the production of a large number of drones that lack the technological adaptations necessary to compete with Ukrainian drones on the battlefield.[13] Another Russian milblogger responded to the January 30 footage of Ukrainian drones striking advancing Russian armored vehicles and tanks near Novomykhailivka by claiming that it was “negligent” for Russian commanders to allow Russian armored vehicles to go into battle without proper EW equipment.[14] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces should “abandon” the idea of deep mechanized breakthroughs until Russian forces are adequately equipped with EW systems and should conduct small infantry-led assaults with drone support in the meantime.[15] Russian milbloggers have recently fixated on this event as indicative of the Russian military’s struggle to innovate and break out of the current positional warfare in Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to face the authoritarian’s dilemma, whereby his authoritarian regime is itself systematically preventing him from receiving accurate information about military-political realities in Russia. A prominent Russian milblogger — who previously appeared on state media outlets and was temporarily detained in March 2022 — published a rant accusing the Russian bureaucracy and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) of deliberately withholding information from Putin, likely in response to recent Russian propagandists’ efforts to conceal Russian military failures near Novomykhailivka.[17] The milblogger claimed that Russia has a culture in which local authorities closely work with regional media outlets to censor and conceal from the Kremlin any negative reports. The milblogger argued that Putin created a consultative civil society institution called the Russian Civic Chamber in 2004 whose members would monitor local governments' activities in order to provide negative, but accurate, information “to the top,” but the chamber failed to do so because the chamber’s representatives decided to remain silent — just like the officials that they were elected to monitor. The milblogger observed that Putin then created the All-Russian People’s Front in 2011 to target the same problem and that the initiative was successful until representatives began to follow in the Russian Civic Chamber’s footsteps. The milblogger argued that the Russian MoD engages in similar, secretive efforts to those of regional officials to conceal its failures from Putin and resents voices that undermine these efforts. The milblogger stated that the Russian MoD made it nearly impossible for milbloggers and government officials to visit frontlines and claimed that there are rumors that the Russian military command deploys generals to Syria if they start to have frequent communication with Putin. The milblogger argued that the Kremlin can only see honest discussions about Russia’s battlefield realities from the milblogger and volunteer accounts outlined in its media monitoring reports and noted that the lack of transparency is a systematic problem among Russian government structures. The milblogger later forecasted that bureaucrats will attempt to block Telegram and arrest milbloggers following the Russian presidential election in March 2024 in response to another milblogger’s observation that Russian Telegram channels remain the only source of constructive opposition in Russia.[18]

Putin’s recent efforts to address milbloggers’ concerns over Russian drone shortages and failures to repel Ukrainian forces from east (left) bank Kherson Oblast indicate that he continues to see value in having milbloggers serve as a constructive opposition that checks Russian government and military officials.[19] Putin’s past creations of the All-Russian People’s Front and the Russian Civic Chamber, and his relatively lenient treatment of milbloggers throughout the full-scale invasion, indicate that he is unlikely to decisively censor the milblogger and volunteer communities because he likely values the ability to check on his government. Putin is unlikely to pursue a mass censorship campaign against milbloggers on his own unless select factions within the Kremlin successfully convince him that milbloggers pose an immediate threat to his regime’s stability. Kremlin officials appear to have been successful in convincing Putin to eliminate and neutralize some milbloggers and information space actors such as former Russian officer Igor Girkin and media networks affiliated with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Kremlin officials, however, have likely been unsuccessful in turning Putin against a vast community of milbloggers that criticizes the bureaucracy while avidly supporting Putin and his war effort in Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:

• Russia's reported reserve concentrations throughout Ukraine largely align with Russia’s assessed priorities along the front, although they are not necessarily indicative of future Russian operations.
• The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is unlikely able to fully support Russia’s reserve manpower despite Russia’s ability to sustain its current tempo of operations and ongoing efforts to expand the Russian DIB.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the frontline near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast and the Ukrainian Eastern Air Command in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on February 4.
• Russian milbloggers continued to criticize Russian authorities’ failure to properly equip Russian forces with drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems in response to a recent unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to face the authoritarian’s dilemma, whereby his authoritarian regime is itself systematically preventing him from receiving accurate information about military-political realities in Russia.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
• Kremlin newswire TASS reported on February 4 that Vladimir Oblast will be a patron of the new Knyaz Pozharsky Borei-A class nuclear submarine.
• Ukrainian officials continue international efforts aimed at returning Ukrainian citizens whom Russian authorities illegally deported to Russia.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2024
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/08/24 03:09 AM

Dramatic drone video of two US supplied Bradley's ambushing a Russian T90 two weeks ago.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/08/24 11:02 PM

Interesting move the new leader seems to be more ruthless.


NOS News

Yesterday, 5:46 PM

Amendedyesterday, 8:37 PM
Ukrainian President Zelensky replaces top general Zaluzhny

General Valery Zaluzhny is no longer the highest commander of the Ukrainian army, Ukrainian President Zelensky wrote on Telegram. Zelensky reports that he has appointed commander of the army Oleksandr Syrsky as the new top boss.

In a message on It looks like a coordinated farewell, accompanied by a photo of the two, in which both are smiling.

In his daily video message, Zelensky explains his choice:

Zelensky says he has offered Zaluzhny to remain part of the military leadership. It is not clear whether the general will respond to this.

The Ukrainian Minister of Defense also reports that it has been decided to change the composition of the army leadership. "The war does not stay the same. A war is constantly changing and requires adjustments. New tactics and strategies are needed," said Minister Umerov.

Zaluzhny does not explicitly confirm his departure on Telegram. He does write that he "accepts that everyone must adapt to a new reality" and that there is indeed a need for a new approach to the war with Russia.

Neither Zaluzhny nor President Zelensky said anything about what that new approach or strategy is.

Opinion pieces
Zaluzhny's position had become more shaky recently . After writing an opinion piece in the fall about the stalemate on the battlefield that caused a stir in Ukraine, he published an article on the CNN website last week. In it, he criticized, among other things, the Ukrainian mobilization policy. It was a sign that Zelensky and Zaluzhny could not agree on how to conduct the war against Russia.

The top general is still popular with the Ukrainian troops and has good contact with foreign military leaders. Some military analysts fear his dismissal will disrupt the Ukrainian military and possibly spark disagreement between the army and the Zelensky government. That could deter Western allies, while Kyiv desperately needs military support packages from the EU and the US, among others.

Experienced, but not loved
The new top military official, Syrsky, previously led the defense of Kyiv and the counter-offensive at Kharkiv. He is experienced, but not liked by all Ukrainians, because he would sacrifice soldiers too easily on the battlefield.

The US State Department said in response to his appointment that it was a "sovereign choice" by the Ukrainian government. A White House spokesman said the Americans "will work with whoever is in charge of the Ukrainian military."
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/09/24 07:37 AM

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...-ukraine-impossible-in-rare-us-interview

When asked if Moscow would consider invading other countries in the region – NATO members Poland and Latvia – or generally across the European continent, Putin said that was "out of the question."

"We have no interest in Poland, Latvia or anywhere else. Why would we do that? We simply don't have any interest.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/09/24 12:35 PM

Originally Posted by U talkin' da me ??
https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...-ukraine-impossible-in-rare-us-interview

When asked if Moscow would consider invading other countries in the region – NATO members Poland and Latvia – or generally across the European continent, Putin said that was "out of the question."

"We have no interest in Poland, Latvia or anywhere else. Why would we do that? We simply don't have any interest.


There is a big Russian minority in Estland and Letland so ofcourse they want influence there, but they know if they invade them art. 5 says NATO has to defend the countries.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/09/24 02:16 PM

Ukraine needs more troops fighting Russia.
Hardened professionals from Colombia are helping

https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-...oldiers-07b5cb7949bd10234e7456f9c1c20b08
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/10/24 01:11 PM

Many people say it was wrong to interview Putin. I disagree it shows how a dictator thinks and speaks.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/10/24 02:31 PM

As the second year of the Ukraine war draws to a close, the stalemate continues. The much-vaunted Ukrainian counter-offensive has failed. However, Russia’s goals haven’t been met either as the US and other NATO member states continue to fill Ukraine’s coffers and restock its armory.

On top of that, NATO’s ongoing military exercise Steadfast Defender 2024 is shaking the ground in Europe reaching Russia’s land border from Norway to its maritime border with Romania. The massive drill threatens a continent-wide escalation of the conflict.

According to reports, more than 90,000 troops, 50 warships, and several squadrons of fighter jets, from 31 member countries and Sweden, are participating in the Steadfast Defender 2024 which started on January 22, making it the largest NATO exercise in Europe since the end of the Cold War.

Under the banner of the NATO exercise, with its 12,000 Bundeswehr soldiers, Germany is also flexing its muscles in the “Quadriga 2024” maneuver to increase its military presence in Scandinavia region and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic. The NATO exercise simulating a defensive operation to protect a member nation from an enemy attack, specifically a Russian attack, is scheduled to last till May 31, 2024.

Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova has warned that NATO’s Steadfast Defender drills are “provocative”, and could potentially lead to “tragic consequences” for Europe.

https://peoplesdispatch.org/2024/02...europe-as-nato-drill-goes-full-throttle/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/10/24 04:10 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/10/24 04:17 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/10/24 04:43 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/10/24 04:47 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/11/24 08:59 PM

NATO: Trump's statements endanger American and European soldiers

Any suggestion that NATO allies would not defend each other undermines the security of the alliance and endangers American and European soldiers, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg said. He responds to statements by former American president Donald Trump that NATO countries must pay enough if they want protection.

According to Stoltenberg, any attack on NATO will be met with a "unified and strong response." He thus rejects Trump's comment that NATO allies who do not pay enough will not be helped in the event of an attack. One of NATO's core principles is that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all members.

But according to Trump, who wants to become president again, Russia can "do whatever it wants" with NATO countries that spend less on defense than the alliance's agreed guideline of 2 percent of gross domestic product. At an election rally, he emphasized that under his leadership the United States will not help those countries. The White House calls Trump's statements "reprehensible and unhinged."
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/12/24 02:38 AM

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 11, 2024
Feb 11, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2024

Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Fredrick W. Kagan

February 11, 2024, 6:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on February 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk as Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander, replacing current Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi.[1]
Zelensky also made several other service head appointments on February 11. Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Yuriy Sodol as Joint Forces Commander replacing Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev.[2] Zelensky appointed Brigadier General Ihor Skybyuk Air Assault Forces Commander replacing Major General Maksym Myrhorodskyi.[3] Zelensky appointed Major General Ihor Plahuta Territorial Defense Forces Commander replacing Major General Anatoliy Barhylevych, who was appointed Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff on February 10.

Russian forces appear to have constructed a 30-kilometer-long barrier dubbed the “tsar train” in occupied Donetsk Oblast, possibly to serve as a defensive line against future Ukrainian assaults. Satellite imagery dated May 10, 2023, and February 6 and 10, 2024 shows that Russian forces constructed a long line of train cars stretching from occupied Olenivka (south of Donetsk City) to Volnovakha (southeast of Vuhledar and north of Mariupol) over the past nine months.[5] A Ukrainian source reported on February 11 that Russian forces have assembled more than 2,100 freight cars into a 30-kilometer-long train.[6] The source reported that Russian forces began assembling the train in July 2023 and suggested that Russian forces intend to use the train as a defensive line against future Ukrainian assaults.[7] The railway line between Olenivka and Volnovakha is roughly six kilometers from ISW’s current assessed frontline southeast of Novomykhailivka at its closest point and is in an area of the front that was relatively inactive when Russian forces reportedly began construction.[8] Russian forces have recently made marginal territorial gains in this area.[9] The Russians could have assembled the train for other purposes as well.

Ukrainian military observers indicated that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is not as productive as Russian authorities portray it to be, but that the Russian DIB is still capable of sustaining Russia’s war effort. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 11 that the Russian Security Council’s own DIB production data for 2023 indicates that the Russian DIB reached a peak output in September 2023 that was 38.9 percent higher than its average 2022 monthly output and has steadily declined in the following months.[10] Mashovets stated that the Russian DIB is struggling to compensate for moderately- and highly-skilled labor shortages and Russia’s inability to obtain the necessary industrial production equipment, spare parts, and servicing to sustain the pace and breadth of DIB production efforts.[11] Mashovets noted that Chinese companies in particular are less willing to provide Russia with equipment and spare parts, as ISW previously reported, and that Russia purchased many industrial production systems from Western states before the full-scale invasion but that Western companies are now unwilling to service or supply parts for these machines due to sanctions.[12]

Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko stated that Russia’s reported tank production numbers in recent years largely reflect restored and modernized tanks drawn from storage rather than new production.[13] Kovalenko stated that Uralvagonzavod, Russia’s primary tank manufacturer, can produce roughly 60-70 T-90 tanks per year under perfect conditions and assessed that Uralvagonzavod is likely only producing between three and six new T-90 tanks per month.[14] Kovalenko noted that tank manufacturers Uralvagonzavod, Omsktransmash, and the 103rd Armored Tank Repair Plant in Chita, Zabaykalsky Krai are primarily focused on restoring, repairing, and modernizing Russian tanks and that Uralvagonzavod is the only manufacturer producing new tanks.[15] Kovalenko stated that Russia is only modernizing T-54/55 and T-62 tanks and assessed that these may be Russia’s main battle tanks in the future. Kovalenko added that Russian manufacturers very rarely modernize T-72 and T-80 tanks. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitri Medvedev previously stated that Russian forces received 1,600 tanks in 2023, and Kovalenko attributed this number primarily to restored and modernized rather than serially produced tanks.

Russia’s current limited DIB production capacity and insufficient serial tank production lines are not guarantees that Russia will struggle to produce enough materiel to sustain its war effort at its current pace or in the long term. Russia’s ability to modernize and use tanks retrieved from storage still gives Russian forces an advantage on the battlefield in the overall number of available tanks. Mashovets noted that some newly-produced tanks such as the T-14 Armada are poorly produced whereas older tanks such as T-72s (which Russia actively repairs) are more reliable.[17] Russia has consistently attempted to adapt to the limitations resulting from Western sanctions and to circumvent sanctions and will persist in these efforts. Russia’s DIB may struggle in the near term and increasing sanctions evasion measures and partnerships with states including China and North Korea may help compensate for existing DIB shortcomings in the medium to long term.


Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk as Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander, replacing current Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi.
• Russian forces appear to have constructed a 30-kilometer-long barrier dubbed the “tsar train” in occupied Donetsk Oblast, possibly to serve as a defensive line against future Ukrainian assaults.
Ukrainian military observers indicated that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is not as productive as Russian authorities portray it to be, but that the Russian DIB is still capable of sustaining • Russia’s war effort.
• Russia’s current limited DIB production capacity and insufficient serial tank production lines are not guarantees that Russia will struggle to produce enough materiel to sustain its war effort at its current pace or in the long term.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
• CNN reported on February 11 that Russia has recruited as many as 15,000 Nepalis to fight in Ukraine, many of whom complained about poor conditions and lack of adequate training before their deployment to the most active frontlines in Ukraine.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to solidify social control over youth and students in occupied Ukraine and to culturally indoctrinate them into Russian identity and ideology.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2024
Posted By: Toodoped

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/12/24 02:12 PM

This long lasting conflict reminds me of the one in Bosnia which occurred during the 1990's and they wanted or hoped the conflict to go on for decades, meaning I personally also "smell" a lot of money coming from all types of weapons being sold from both sides or from every corner during the Russia/Ukraine conflict. These days lots of "enemies" are selling weapons to each other, but the problem is that the ordinary citizen is always the so-called "collateral damage". One French reporter recently said that sooner or later the people will rise against the "elite" and the whole world will burn. I agree with him since it comes from man who lives in country where most of the world's revolutions started from.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/12/24 09:49 PM

Originally Posted by Toodoped
This long lasting conflict reminds me of the one in Bosnia which occurred during the 1990's and they wanted or hoped the conflict to go on for decades, meaning I personally also "smell" a lot of money coming from all types of weapons being sold from both sides or from every corner during the Russia/Ukraine conflict. These days lots of "enemies" are selling weapons to each other, but the problem is that the ordinary citizen is always the so-called "collateral damage". One French reporter recently said that sooner or later the people will rise against the "elite" and the whole world will burn. I agree with him since it comes from man who lives in country where most of the world's revolutions started from.


The Western elites are def to blame in the rise of Putin as well as Xi. But the alternative is a autocracy/dictatorship.


NATO chief urges European allies to boost weapons to wartime levels
12h
©Anadolu via Getty Images / TCN
The secretary-general of NATO has warned that Europe must shift to wartime levels of weapons production in order to counter the threat from Russia. Jens Stoltenberg (pictured left) said that 'we need to reconstitute and expand our industrial base'to increase deliveries to Ukraine and refill weapons stocks. He pointed to Russia's invasion of Ukraine as proof that 'peace in Europe cannot be taken for granted'. Although he said NATO doesn't 'seek war' with Russia, 'we need to brace ourselves for potentially decades of confrontation'.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/13/24 12:15 AM

Don't forget the global trade the west needed China (production) and Russia (oil, gas) and made them very wealthy now that is back firing.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/13/24 12:52 AM

The US Military was in Afghanistan 20 years. It has been in Iraq, in one form or another since The Gulf War, and was in Viet Nam for almost thirty years. Perpetual war is what the US military does best, and Putin has put his military through the meat grinder at an unsustainable rate. As a result, Putin's axis of rogue states, ( Iran, N.Korea) have supported Russia directly with weapons, and are supporting proxy military organizations, such as the Houthi rebels, Hamas and Hezbollah, in order to distract focus by the West from the war in Ukraine.
Posted By: Toodoped

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/13/24 09:34 AM

Two sides of the same coin, right?! Thats how I look at the current situation...
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/13/24 11:16 PM

NEWS
DEFENSE
Russia can sustain war effort for ‘two or three years,’ finds defense study
The war in Ukraine is prompting a huge jump in global military spending, finds the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Free article usually reserved for subscribers
TOPSHOT-UKRAINE-RUSSIA-CONFLICT-WAR
A defense study shows that Russia can sustain a war effort for another 2 to 3 years, but might have to value quantity over quality | Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images
FEBRUARY 13, 2024 5:34 PM CET
BY GIOVANNA COI

LONDON — Russia is spending around one-third of its budget on defense, but is burning through arms, ammunition and troops at an unsustainable pace, says a report published today.

Russia will be able to sustain its war effort in Ukraine for "two to three more years," says International Institute for Strategic Studies Director General Bastian Giegerich. "But in doing so, it will have to sacrifice quality for quantity."

The Military Balance report by the IISS, a London-based think tank, shows that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has unleashed a deluge of defense spending around the world — most of it from Russia's rivals.

Global defense spending increased by 9 percent in 2023 to exceed $2.2 trillion; NATO countries spent over half of that amount, with the U.S. leading the pack by a vast margin.

In Europe, countries ramped up spending to assist Ukraine, whose domestic defense industry has been severely damaged by the war.

But the ongoing war has "laid bare the challenges of scaling up production to keep pace with the conflict's demands" and is showing the cracks in European military preparedness, according to Giegerich.

Despite all the new spending, there is a problem in ramping up the West's military production capacity. In its report, the IISS noted the EU is on track to miss its target of delivering Ukraine 1 million 155-millimeter artillery shells by March.

Despite those shortcomings, Russia's continued war against Ukraine has pushed more European countries to meet their NATO defense target of spending at least 2 percent of GDP on the military. According to the report, 10 European NATO allies hit that goal last year, up from just two in 2014.

Ukraine is also in a desperate plight, but — for now — is getting crucial aid from its allies.

"Ukraine's losses also have been heavy and replenished largely through Western support," said Giegerich. "The effect has been to improve the quality of Ukrainian equipment, although at the cost of greater logistical complexity."

He added that continued Russian missile and drone attacks "are taking a toll on Ukraine."

The West "must decide whether to furnish Kyiv with enough weapons to deliver a decisive blow rather than merely enough not to lose," he said.

While Russia is continuing to throw men and equipment against Ukraine's defenses, the cost is enormous, the think tank noted.

Henry Boyd, senior fellow for defense and military analysis at IISS, said that Russia was "increasingly dependent on Soviet-era legacy stores to meet the demand for new armored fighting vehicles and artillery pieces" and was "sacrificing training" to offset its troop losses on the battlefield.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/14/24 10:04 PM

Europe

Russia refits old tanks after losing 3,000 in Ukraine - research centre

By Mark Trevelyan and Greg Torode
February 13, 20249:52 AM ESTUpdated a day ago


Summary

• Russia mainly replacing lost tanks with refitted spares - IISS
• Ukraine faces major manpower and equipment challenges
• Think-tank sees no early end to military stalemate


LONDON, Feb 13 (Reuters) - Russia has lost more than 3,000 tanks in Ukraine - the equivalent of its entire pre-war active inventory - but has enough lower-quality armoured vehicles in storage for years of replacements, a leading research centre said on Tuesday.
Ukraine has also suffered heavy loses since Russia invaded in February 2022, but Western military replenishments have allowed it to maintain inventories while upgrading quality, the International Institute for Strategic Studies said.

Even after the loss of so many tanks - including an estimated 1,120 in the past year - Russia still has about twice as many available for combat as Ukraine, according to the IISS's annual Military Balance, a key research tool for defence analysts.
Henry Boyd, the institute's senior fellow for military capability, said Russia had been roughly "breaking even" in terms of replacements. He estimated that it had put around 1,000 to 1,500 more tanks into service in the past year.

But of these, he said, 200 at most were newly built, and the large majority were refurbished older models.
"Moscow has been able to trade quality for quantity... by pulling thousands of older tanks out of storage at a rate that may, at times, have reached 90 tanks per month," said the report.
Russia's stored inventories meant Moscow "could potentially sustain around three more years of heavy losses and replenish tanks from stocks, even if at lower-technical standard, irrespective of its ability to produce new equipment".

Russia's defence ministry declined to comment.


TOUGH CHOICES FOR UKRAINE AND WEST


Nearly two years into the conflict, Ukraine and its Western partners face very difficult choices, the report said.
IISS senior land warfare analyst Ben Barry said Ukraine had tried to shield some of its younger troops - the average age of its infantry soldiers is reported to be in the early 40s - but may struggle to continue to do so.
"They have deliberately protected their youth, but the extent to which they can do that in future is doubtful if they are going to sustain their frontline strength," he said.

Ukraine, which failed to make progress in a counter-offensive last year and has just replaced its popular commander Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, is also in urgent need of new artillery supplies and air defence systems, while awaiting a major new U.S. aid package that has been held up by Republican opposition.
"Western governments find themselves once again in a position where they must decide whether to furnish Kyiv with enough weapons to deliver a decisive blow, rather than merely enough not to lose," IISS Director-General Bastian Giegerich said.

Russia, for its part, has placed its economy on a war footing and moved defence factories to round-the-clock production in three shifts.
"It's an astounding figure," said Singapore-based defence analyst Alexander Neill, referring to the estimate of 3,000 tanks lost.
"Some of those could have been older tanks, so one of the big questions is how many of its most advanced tanks does it have left for any major future offensives," added Neill, an adjunct fellow at Hawaii's Pacific Forum think-tank.
Given the losses sustained by both sides and the attritional character of the trench warfare, IISS experts said the current stalemate was likely to persist.
"Neither side can do a large-scale attack without incurring very heavy casualties, and that's likely to continue for the foreseeable future," IIIS land warfare analyst Barry said.
Reporting by Mark Trevelyan in London and Greg Torode in Hong Kong Editing by Gareth Jones
https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...nks-ukraine-leading-military-2024-02-13/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/14/24 11:47 PM

Putin would rather have a 'more predictable' Biden than Trump

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in an interview on Wednesday that he prefers Joe Biden to Donald Trump but is willing to work with any US president.

Putin was asked by Russian interviewer Pavel Zarubin who is "better for us", Democrat Biden or Republican Trump? Although Putin said in his recent interview with American journalist Tucker Carlson that it does not matter for American foreign policy who is president, he still appeared to have a preference: "Biden. He is a more experienced, predictable person, a politician of the old school. But we will work with any American president in whom the American people have confidence."
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/16/24 01:35 PM

RIP Navalny !

West holds Russia responsible for Navalny's death, Kremlin finds conclusions premature.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/17/24 03:02 PM

Klitschko: Putin would attack Alaska, Ukraine will not be the last
Former Ukrainian world boxing champion Wladimir Klitschko (47) told Bild that Russia would attack Alaska if the United States were weak enough.

SOURCE: TANJUG SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2024 | 23:23

He spoke about the interview of American journalist Tucker Carlson with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"I saw the interview. Putin wants to take back history and rewrite it. If the US was weak enough, Putin would also want to attack the state of Alaska, and he would have a reason to do so: Alaska used to be part of Russia. That will probably have to go back to Russia "Putin's Russia is evil. If Ukraine falls, we will not be the last country to fall victim to the Russian invasion," Klitschko warned, adding that Germany also often forgets that the East was part of the Soviet empire.

He pointed out that Russian propaganda is persistent in lies, which can be seen in mass media sponsored by the Russian state, not only in Russia but also abroad.

"Unfortunately, this can be seen in Germany, in Europe, in the USA, it is a war not only with drones, but also in the media. The media is one of the most dangerous and strongest weapons that exists," concluded Klitschko, whose brother Vitaliy, also multiple world boxing champion, is current mayor of Kyiv.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/17/24 09:35 PM

Vladimir Putin, riding high before Navalny’s death, seems unstoppable

By Catherine Belton
Updated February 17, 2024 at 2:41 p.m. EST|Published February 17, 2024 at 10:47 a.m. EST

Russian President Vladimir Putin talks to students and industry workers Friday at the Stankomash machinery plant in Chelyabinsk, Russia, just as the death of opposition leader Alexei Navalny was being announced. (Alexander Ryumin/Pool/AFP/Getty Images)
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5 min


When Russian prison authorities announced the death of Alexei Navalny, Vladimir Putin’s most potent political opponent, the Russian president appeared to be overflowing with cheer.

Addressing a group of workers and students at a machinery plant in the Russian industrial city of Chelyabinsk on Friday, a smiling Putin, unsurprisingly, made no mention of Navalny’s death in a faraway Arctic prison and instead professed himself to be satisfied at the technological progress he had just seen.

“Forward! Success! To new borders!” Putin declared to one young worker who had proclaimed her admiration for the president.

With Navalny’s demise at age 47, further military assistance for Ukraine still blocked in Congress and Ukrainian forces retreating on the battlefield, a lot seems to be going Putin’s way, a month ahead of a presidential election in Russia that he is certain to win.

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Before the trip to Chelyabinsk, Putin was already riding high off an obsequious interview last week with former Fox News host Tucker Carlson. Even sanctions imposed by “our quasi-partners,” Putin boasted Friday, had resulted in a boost in orders for the plant that he was visiting.

Putin is now “outside of any competition,” said Andrei Kolesnikov, a Moscow-based senior research fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.

Navalny’s death not only removes a major — if distant — political thorn. It also is one more development that puts Putin’s potential detractors on notice.

Last summer, the swift and demonstrative downing of a jet carrying Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the Wagner mercenary commander who led a mutiny against Russia’s military leadership, sent a chilling signal to any opponents of the Kremlin’s current course.

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And earlier this month, Russian election authorities rapidly blocked a liberal antiwar candidate, Boris Nadezhdin, from the presidential ballot, claiming irregularities with the signatures required for candidacy. Nadezhdin stood virtually no chance of winning, but the Kremlin will not tolerate even the slightest show of dissent.

“Putin now remains alone,” Kolesnikov said. “He is solus rex, the lonely king. No one can stop him triumphing.”

Some still cautioned that Putin could overreach. They pointed to Navalny’s stature among some members of the Russian elite and the possibility that he will be viewed as a martyr, as well as the risk that the West could toughen its resolve against Putin’s regime — and perhaps even increase assistance to Ukraine.


Putin talks to students and industry workers at a plant in Chelyabinsk on Friday. (Alexander Ryumin/Pool/AFP/Getty Images)
Tatiana Stanovaya, founder of R.Politik, a Russian political consultancy now based in France, said it seemed clear Putin would crack down further on the remnants of Russia’s opposition, motivated by fears the West could exploit Navalny’s death to stir more unrest.

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“In Putin’s eyes, the risk of Western interference remains very serious,” she said.

But for Russia’s beleaguered opposition, there’s little left for Putin to do to completely cripple the movement.

In January, Navalny had called for a nationwide protest on the day of the March presidential election and for voters to gather at the polls at noon as a sign of dissent against Putin.

But analysts and opposition politicians said it wasn’t clear how many would have responded to the call given fears over Putin’s increasingly repressive tactics. Still, they said, Navalny’s death may be a sign that the Kremlin didn’t want to leave anything to chance.

Authorities in Moscow “are very sensitive now to any details,” Kolesnikov added.

The muted display of mourning for Navalny in Moscow, with few willing to dare challenge the authorities by leaving flowers, was a sign of Russia’s transformation since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

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Thousands had taken to Moscow’s streets to protest Navalny’s arrest on his return to Russia in January 2021 in scenes that some observers likened to the August 2020 protests in Minsk that threatened to topple the Belarusian president.

But any protesters in Moscow today would face “an enormous mass of armed people,” said Gennady Gudkov, a senior Russian opposition politician now in exile in Paris.

“Street protests can only work if millions come out,” Gudkov said. “But because people are not organized and don’t have any resources, or newspapers, or political leaders or parties or trade unions, there is nothing.”

Others said the death in jail of such a prominent and admired political figure could still create an array of problems for Putin.

Navalny’s “unmatched recognition, significance to the elites and involvement in domestic politics distinguished him from any other opposition figure,” Stanovaya posted on X, previously known as Twitter. “This creates a significant political problem for the regime — they will have to deal with Navalny’s legacy,” she said.

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And in Moscow, some Russian business executives were nervously watching whether inroads made in winning over part of the U.S. Republican Party to Russia’s point of view could come undone as a result of the death.

Already on Friday, GOP members began denouncing members of the party who had recently sided with Putin, while President Biden railed against Republicans for blocking passage of a bill that included billions in aid for Ukraine.

“Putin does not need this now,” said one Moscow business executive, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. “It will now be very difficult for the Republican Party to object.”

Opposition politicians called for the West to strengthen its response to the Putin regime. “The world should understand that Putin is not a human being. He is a threat to civilization,” Gudkov said. “Without the collapse of the Putin regime, the world will not be able to live peacefully.”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/17/vladimir-putin-russia-alexei-navalny/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/17/24 09:46 PM

Russia Ukraine conflict
Putin calls capture of Avdiivka an ‘important victory’
Russia
AFP
Published: 18 February ,2024: 12:19 AM GST
Updated: 18 February ,2024: 12:39 AM GST

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Saturday hailed his army’s capture of the eastern Ukrainian town of Avdiivka as an “important victory,” following a hasty withdrawal by Kyiv’s forces.

The capture of the town marks the most significant territorial gain for Russia’s forces since the seizure of Bakhmut last May.

“The President congratulated our military and fighters on such an important victory, on such a success,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told state news agencies.

For the latest updates on the Russia-Ukraine war, visit our dedicated page.

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu informed Putin about the seizure of the town in a meeting at the Kremlin, his ministry said in a statement.

Avdiivka was a “powerful defensive hub” for Ukraine’s armed forces and its capture would “move the front line away from Donetsk (city),” reducing Ukraine’s ability to shell the Russian stronghold, the defense ministry said.

Ukraine’s Donetsk region is one of four Russia claims to have annexed.

Moscow launched an intense assault to capture Avdiivka, which lies around 10 kilometers (6 miles) north of Donetsk city, last October, throwing massive resources of equipment and manpower at the town.

The battle for Avdiivka became one of the bloodiest episodes in the two-year conflict.

Kyiv had earlier announced its withdrawal from the town, which it said was taken to reduce military casualties at a time of stretched resources.

“At the moment, measures are being taken to finally clear the town of militants and to block the Ukrainian units that have left the town and are holed up in the Avdiivka coke plant” to the north, Russia’s defense ministry said.

Moscow is back on the offensive in eastern Ukraine, with Kyiv suffering from a shortage of ammunition and manpower amid hold-ups to much-needed Western aid and a difficult drive to recruit more soldiers.

For all the latest headlines follow our Google News channel online or via the app.

The front lines have barely moved in more than a year -- with the exception of Russia’s capture of Bakhmut last May.

But concern is growing in Kyiv and the West about Ukraine’s ability to hold out against Russian forces for much longer without unlocking a $60-billion military aid package from the United States.

Read more:

Ammunition shortage hurting Ukraine, Zelenskyy tells Munich meeting

Ukrainian, Russian troops fighting ‘fierce battles’ inside Avdiivka: General

Special Coverage Live session with German Chancellor Scholz from Munich Security Conference
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/18/24 02:21 AM

In the long term Democracies will always be victorious over Autocracies.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/18/24 02:27 PM

Putin Says Ukraine 'Matter of Life and Death' for Russia

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024...tter-of-life-and-death-for-russia-a84134
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/19/24 03:38 AM

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 18, 2024
Feb 18, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF






















Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2024



Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan



February 18, 2024, 8pm ET



Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.



Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.



Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.



Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on February 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.



Ukrainian forces will likely be able to establish new defensive lines not far beyond Avdiivka, which will likely prompt the culmination of the Russian offensive in this area.
Avdiivka and the subsequent Russian claim of control over the entirety of Avdiivka, ISW, and several Ukrainian and Western sources assessed that delays in Western security assistance, namely artillery ammunition and critical air defense systems, inhibited Ukrainian troops from defending against Russian advances in Avdiivka.[5] Critical Ukrainian shortages in Western-provided equipment and fears of the complete cessation of US military aid have forced Ukrainian troops to husband materiel along the entire front, which has likely encouraged Russian forces to exploit the situation and launch limited offensive operations outside of the Avdiivka area, which they have done along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area since early January 2024 and in western Zaporizhia Oblast over the past 48 hours. These Russian offensive efforts will likely hinder Ukrainian forces from preparing personnel and materiel for renewed counteroffensive operations, emphasizing the operational disadvantages that Ukraine will suffer if it simply digs in and attempts to defend for the rest of 2024 as some Western states and analysts advocate.

Russian forces are likely seeking to take advantage of two windows of opportunity with the recent initiation of their simultaneous offensive operations—the period before the upcoming spring thaw and the nuanced dynamics of Western aid provision. Ukraine is heading into its rasputitsa season, the Spring period in which the frozen winter ground thaws and makes mechanized movement more difficult throughout the theater, thereby slowing (but notably not entirely stopping) offensive operations along the frontline. Some Russian milbloggers are already reporting that mud in southern Ukraine is inhibiting Ukrainian forces from bringing new reserves to Zaporizhia Oblast to reinforce against Russian offensive efforts, and these conditions will also likely slow Russian offensive momentum as the weather continues to warm.[7] Russian forces are likely trying to secure tactical advances throughout the theater while the terrain and weather generally favor offensive movement in order to exhaust and attrit defending Ukrainian forces as well as to secure favorable positions for future operations before the rasputitsa begins in earnest. The Russian military command, furthermore, likely realizes that security assistance from Ukraine’s European partners, particularly promised European deliveries of artillery ammunition, will begin to have effects in the medium term, likely before Fall 2024, and is trying to take advantage of Ukraine’s current shell hunger to pressure Ukrainian troops throughout the theater while Ukraine experiences a relative (but likely temporary) artillery disadvantage.[8] The eventual provision of more European security assistance to Ukraine, however, will not fill the gap in critical equipment that the full cessation of US military assistance would create, particularly with advanced air defense systems such as Patriot surface-to-air missiles. The scaling-up of European security assistance is necessary but not sufficient for Ukrainian forces to stabilize the front, let alone to regain the initiative in areas where Russian forces are pressing.

The Russian capture of Avdiivka after four months of intensified offensive operations exemplifies the way that Russian forces pursue offensive operations that do not necessarily set conditions for wider operational gains but still force Ukraine to commit manpower and materiel to defensive operations. Russian forces have been fighting near Avdiivka for most of the full-scale invasion thus far and intensified operations to capture the city in mid-October 2023.[9] In the subsequent four months since October, Russian forces managed to advance nearly nine kilometers in Avdiivka according to Russian estimates.[10] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated on February 18 that during this four month period, Russian forces lost over 47,000 personnel, 364 tanks, 248 artillery systems, 748 armored fighting vehicles, and five aircraft.[11] Russian forces were also unable to complete a full operational encirclement of Avdiivka within that four-month window, and Ukrainian forces appear to have been able to withdraw in mainly good order. A Russian milblogger and volunteer with the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) remarked on the rate of Russian losses compared with the territory gained on February 17, suggesting that even some Russian sources are cognizant of the extremely high price these limited Russian gains have cost.[12] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces suffered 16,000 “irretrievable losses” (likely those killed in action, whereas Tarnavskyi’s estimate may have also included wounded) in the Avdiivka direction since October 2023.[13] The milblogger also sardonically noted that the tank regiments and tank divisions that were operating near Avdiivka “distinguished” themselves by advancing a few kilometers in four months and taking massive personnel losses.[14] By contrast, according to the milblogger, Ukrainian forces suffered far fewer losses and were able to withdraw to prepared defensive positions mostly on their own terms, meaning that exhausted and attrited Russian forces will now have to once again fight Ukrainian troops on new lines. Russian forces succeeded in drawing Ukrainian forces to Avdiivka and away from other areas of the front and forcing Ukrainians to use up already limited Ukrainian stores of critical equipment but did so without securing major operational gains. This outcome is likely to recur in ongoing offensive operations on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border line and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian forces have not yet demonstrated an ability to secure operationally significant gains or conduct rapid mechanized maneuver across large swaths of territory, and the capture of Avdiivka should not be taken as demonstrating this capability. ISW distinguishes between tactical gains, relevant at the tactical level of war in the near vicinity of the fighting, and operational gains which are significant at the operational level of war and affect large sectors of the entire front line When ISW assesses that a given advance has or has not made “operationally significant” gains we are referring to this distinction. Since the intensification of Russian offensive efforts in Avdiivka in October 2023, Russian forces managed to traverse fewer than 10 kilometers through and around Avdiivka. Avdiivka is nearly 60 kilometers from the Donetsk Oblast border, however. Russian forces would need to conduct widespread and competent cross-country maneuvers to reach the borders of the oblast in a period of less than years and would have to go even further and through more fortified territory to reach the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk area in northern Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have not displayed the capability to conduct such maneuvers, either near Avdiivka or in any other sector of the front. Russian offensive efforts to take Kupyansk could plausibly force Ukrainians to the left bank of the Oskil River, but Russian forces in this area have remained largely impaled on small tactical positions in the Kupyansk direction for months.[15] Russian offensive efforts south of Orikhiv are unlikely to advance past Orikhiv itself or even to reach Orikhiv quickly, given the climatological challenges discussed above.

Ukrainian officials are investigating two instances of apparent Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Prosecutor’s Office reported that it is investigating footage published on February 18 showing Russian forces executing six injured Ukrainian POWs near Avdiivka and footage showing Russian forces executing two Ukrainian POWs near Vesele (northwest of Bakhmut).[16] The killing of POWs violates Article III of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of POWs.

Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to recognize 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps (DNR AC) Commander Lieutenant General Sergei Milchakov and the “Veterany” Assault Brigade (Volunteer Corps) for aiding in the Russian capture of Avdiivka, highlighting continued tension between Russian regular and irregular forces. A prominent Russian milblogger complained that Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated Russian Central Grouping of Forces commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev for capturing Avdiivka, but not Milchakov, who the milblogger claimed has led the 1st DNR AC since its previous commander’s death in Popasna, Luhansk Oblast.[18] Russian milbloggers also complained that Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu did not credit the “Veterany” Assault Brigade with the Russian capture of Avdiivka, although noted that the Russian MoD later edited its statement to credit the “Veterany” Assault Brigade.[19] The Russian MoD may have edited its statement to credit the ”Veterany” Assault Brigade in an effort to prevent wider complaints from spreading in the Russian ultranationalist information space and appeal to Russian volunteer servicemen (dobrovoltsy). Tension between Russian regular and irregular forces – especially the 1st DNR Army Corps and DNR-affiliated formations – has continued throughout the war despite, and likely in part because of, ongoing Russian efforts to formalize irregular formations.

The Washington Post reported that the Kremlin has been orchestrating a large-scale effort to spread disinformation in the Ukrainian media since January 2023, corroborating recent Ukrainian official reports about Russian information operations that use fake Telegram channels to infiltrate the Ukrainian information space. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced on February 18 that Denmark is donating its “entire artillery” to Ukraine.[24] The Danish government had not issued an official statement with details of the announcement at the time of this writing, and it is unclear if Denmark will give Ukraine all of its artillery guns, all of its artillery ammunition stocks, or both.

The US is reportedly turning to India and China to engage Russia about Russia’s reported intent to launch an unspecified anti-satellite nuclear weapon into space. The New York Times (NYT) reported on February 17 that US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken spoke with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar at the Munich Security Conference about the possibility of Russia deploying a nuclear weapon into space that would, if detonated, disrupt American, Chinese, and Indian satellites and affect global communications systems. Blinken reportedly urged Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to speak to Russian President Vladimir Putin about the matter. The NYT reported that Wang reiterated the importance of the peaceful use of outer space for China. The NYT stated that US officials agree that if Russia deployed a nuclear weapon into orbit in space, Russia would likely not detonate it but would keep it in low orbit as a deterrence measure. Reuters reported on February 15, however, that analysts following Russian space programs indicated that Russia is likely trying to deploy a nuclear powered-device to carry out attacks against satellites and not a weapon with a nuclear warhead.[25] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba met with Wang on February 17 to discuss Chinese-Ukrainian trade and the need for stable peace in Ukraine, suggesting that China is hesitant to support Russia‘s war in Ukraine at the level Russia desires, as ISW continues to assess.


Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces will likely be able to establish new defensive lines not far beyond Avdiivka, which will likely prompt the culmination of the Russian offensive in this area.
• Delays in Western security assistance to Ukraine are likely helping Russia launch opportunistic offensive operations along several sectors of the frontline in order to place pressure on Ukrainian forces along multiple axes.
• Russian forces are likely seeking to take advantage of two windows of opportunity with the recent initiation of their simultaneous offensive operations—the period before the upcoming spring thaw and the nuanced dynamics of Western aid provision.
• The Russian capture of Avdiivka after four months of intensified offensive operations exemplifies the way that Russian forces pursue offensive operations that do not necessarily set conditions for wider operational gains but still force Ukraine to commit manpower and materiel to defensive operations.
• Russian forces have not yet demonstrated an ability to secure operationally significant gains or conduct rapid mechanized maneuver across large swaths of territory, and the capture of Avdiivka should not be taken as demonstrating this capability.
• Ukrainian officials are investigating two instances of apparent Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to recognize 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps (DNR AC) Commander Lieutenant General Sergei Milchakov and the “Veterany” Assault Brigade (Volunteer Corps) for aiding in the Russian capture of Avdiivka, highlighting continued tension between Russian regular and irregular forces.
The Washington Post reported that the Kremlin has been orchestrating a large-scale effort to spread disinformation in the Ukrainian media since January 2023, corroborating recent Ukrainian official reports about Russian information operations that use fake Telegram channels to infiltrate the Ukrainian information space.
• Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced on February 18 that Denmark is donating its “entire artillery” to Ukraine.
• The US is reportedly turning to India and China to engage Russia about Russia’s reported intent to launch an unspecified anti-satellite nuclear weapon into space.
• Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance in western Zaporizhia amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on February 18.
• Russian occupation officials continue to use educational programs as means of Russifying occupied Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024
Posted By: Toodoped

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/19/24 05:30 PM

Originally Posted by Hollander
RIP Navalny !

West holds Russia responsible for Navalny's death, Kremlin finds conclusions premature.


Dont get me wrong but if I had an enemy who is known for killing political opponents, maybe Im going to kill one of them myself so I can blame my enemy....just my two cents
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/19/24 07:45 PM

Russia's sudden transition from communism to free market capitalism was brutal, that formed Russia's reality today. Yeltsin did well in the Russian countryside, but Moscow politics were a size too big for him.
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/19/24 09:49 PM

Only a top-tier drinker could gulp down a fucking pint within 15 seconds. Respect!

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/19/24 10:49 PM

LMAO I remember that clip !

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/19/24 11:46 PM

Russian pilot who defected to Ukraine shot dead in Spain -reports

https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...aine-shot-dead-spain-reports-2024-02-19/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/20/24 01:04 AM

Originally Posted by Toodoped
Originally Posted by Hollander
RIP Navalny !

West holds Russia responsible for Navalny's death, Kremlin finds conclusions premature.


Dont get me wrong but if I had an enemy who is known for killing political opponents, maybe Im going to kill one of them myself so I can blame my enemy....just my two cents



It's just that "Mafia", "KGB" mentality that runs already the biggest country in the world and they still want to expand to neighbouring countries who want to live in freedom lol

Navalny was no saint but to many Russians he's now a Martyr.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/20/24 01:20 AM

Originally Posted by Hollander
Russian pilot who defected to Ukraine shot dead in Spain -reports

https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...aine-shot-dead-spain-reports-2024-02-19/


Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/20/24 01:25 AM

Spain is one of the countries heavily infiltrated by wealthy Russians legit and obscure lol.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/20/24 01:44 PM

Dramatic video of Russian troops raising the Russian flag over the coke plant at Avdiivka, Ukraine after months of brutal fighting.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/20/24 09:08 PM

It's funny Putin always points to the CIA, he's living since his days as an agent in Eastern Germany in the "Cold War"
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/20/24 09:47 PM

Originally Posted by Toodoped
Two sides of the same coin, right?! Thats how I look at the current situation...


Different ideology , but indeed same modus operandi.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/22/24 07:00 PM

THE RUSSIAN WINTER-SPRING 2024 OFFENSIVE OPERATION ON THE KHARKIV-LUHANSK AXIS
Feb 21, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF








The Russian Winter-Spring 2024 Offensive Operation on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Axis

Riley Bailey and Fredrick W. Kagan with Nicole Wolkov and Christina Harward

February 21, 2024

Russian forces are conducting a cohesive multi-axis offensive operation in pursuit of an operationally significant objective for nearly the first time in over a year and a half of campaigning in Ukraine. The prospects of this offensive in the Kharkiv-Luhansk sector are far from clear, but its design and initial execution mark notable inflections in the Russian operational level approach.
Russian efforts to seize relatively small cities and villages in eastern Ukraine since Spring 2022 have generally not secured operationally significant objectives, although these Russian operations led to large-scale fighting and significant Ukrainian and Russian losses.[1] Russian forces likely pursued more operationally significant objectives during their Winter-Spring 2023 offensive, but that effort was poorly designed and executed and its failure to make any substantial progress precludes drawing firm conclusions about its intended goals.[2] Russian offensives to this point have generally either concentrated large masses of troops against singular objectives (such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka) or else have consisted of multiple attacks along axes of advance that were too far away to be mutually supporting and/or divergent. The current Russian offensive in the Kharkiv-Luhansk sector, by contrast, involves attacks along four parallel axes that are mutually supporting in pursuit of multiple objectives that, taken together, would likely generate operationally significant gains. The design of this offensive operation is worth careful consideration regardless of its outcome as a possible example of the Russian command’s ability to learn from and improve on its previous failures at the operational level. Russian tactical performance in this sector, however, does not appear to have improved materially on previous Russian tactical shortcomings, a factor that may well lead to the overall failure even of this better-designed undertaking.

Russia’s Western Grouping of Forces has recently intensified operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and is focusing on four directions of advance. Russian forces are currently pursuing offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk, northwest of Svatove, southwest of Svatove, and west of Kreminna. The Russian Western Grouping of Forces (likely comprised almost entirely of elements of the Western Military District [WMD]) has had responsibility for much of the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis since the stabilization of the frontline following Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast in fall 2022.[3] The Central Grouping of Forces (primarily comprised of elements of the Central Military District [CMD]) had responsibility for the southern portion of this axis in the Lyman direction between Fall 2022 and Fall 2023, but the WMD appears to have taken over responsibility for the northern portion of the Lyman direction after the Russian command transferred significant elements of the CMD to support the offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast in early October 2023.[4] The WMD‘s 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and 1st Guards Tank Army (1st GTA) resumed a localized offensive effort northeast of Kupyansk on October 6, 2023 and sporadically intensified operations elsewhere in the Kupyansk direction.[5] This localized Russian offensive effort to advance towards Kupyansk from the northeast had resulted in only marginal tactical gains by January 2024, however. Ukrainian officials increasingly began to report in January 2024 that Russian forces were setting conditions for a larger offensive effort in both the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[6] WMD elements began to intensify operations in four directions of advance along the line in early January, and Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov announced by January 30 that the Russian 2024 winter-spring effort on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis was underway.[7] The Russian offensive campaign is currently proceeding along four axes, from north to south: 1) around Kupyansk and Synkivka; 2) from Tabaivka toward Kruhlyakivka; 3) from Makiivka toward Raihorodka and/or Borova; and 4) from near Kreminna to Drobysheve and/or Lyman.

Kupyansk-Synkivka Axis

Elements of the 6th CAA are currently conducting offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka in an ongoing effort to advance towards east bank Kupyansk.
Elements of the 6th CAA and 1st GTA began a localized offensive operation to push towards east bank Kupyansk and northern Kupyansk Vuzlovy in October 2023 that primarily focused on areas surrounding Synkivka as well as Vilshana and Petropavlivka.[8] Russian aviation supported this effort by conducting a series of strikes on bridges crossing the Oskil River from September through October 2023 that likely aimed to isolate the Ukrainian defenses northeast of Kupyansk while also setting conditions for the current wider Russian offensive operation.[9] Synkivka is located along a railway line and a road leading into Kupyansk and Kupyansk Vuzlovy, and Ukrainian military officials have identified the Synkivka area as providing the most rapid route for Russian forces to reach the two settlements on the east bank of the Oskil River.[10] Likely elements of the 6th CAA’s 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 128 Motorized Rifle Brigade conducted relatively large company-sized mechanized assaults in the Synkivka area in December 2023 that resulted in significant Russian armored vehicle losses and no notable tactical gains, and Russian forces have since heavily relied on infantry assaults with limited armored vehicle support in the area.[11] Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade are currently conducting assaults on Synkivka, and elements of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating in the Vilshana area.[12] Russian forces have reportedly made tactical gains in the Synkivka area in intensified assaults in late January, although ISW has not seen confirmation of any recent notable tactical gains near the settlement.[13] Ukrainian officials continue to assess that Russian assaults near Synkivka aim to facilitate Russian advances to Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzlovy, where there are two bridges crossings over the Oskil River.[14]

Elements of the 1st GTA are reportedly still operating near Synkivka, although it is unclear if they are conducting assaults in the area.[15] Elements of the 1st GTA’s 2nd Motorized Rifle Division reportedly conducted attacks near Orlyanka (east of Kupyansk) in early January 2024, although it is unclear if some of these elements are still in the area.[16] Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division participated in offensive efforts near Stepova Novoselivka (south of Orlyanka) in early February 2024 suggesting that they may have shifted their focus to the Russian effort further south.

Tabaivka-Kruhlyakivka Axis

Elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army, primarily its 47th Tank Division, have intensified operations northwest of Svatove, have recently made tactical gains around Tabaivka, and appear to be pushing west toward the Oskil Reservoir in the direction of Kruhlyakivka and northwest along the P07 highway toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovy.
Russian forces intensified operations northwest of Svatove in January 2024 more than anywhere else along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Elements of the 47th Tank Division began what Russian sources described as a “massive offensive” in the direction of Krokhmalne and Tabaivka on January 19.[18] Geolocated footage published on January 20 indicated that Russian forces had quickly captured Krokhmalne, and elements of the 47th Tank Division reportedly captured Tabaivka as early as January 27, although ISW has still not observed confirmation of Russian forces capturing the settlement as of February 20.[19] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also entered Ivanivka (north of Tabaivka) and advanced closer to Kyslivka (immediately north of Tabaivka) as of February 1.[20] Russian sources have claimed that Russian forces may have captured Kotlyarivka (immediately north of Tabaivka), and elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) have reportedly advanced near Berestove (just south of Krokhmalne).[21] Russian forces have also resumed assaults near Stelmakhivka (south of Krokhmalne) and near Pishchane (immediately southwest of Tabaivka).[22]

Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division's 1st Tank Regiment and 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment unsuccessfully attempted to encircle Ukrainian forces near Stepova Novoselivka (north of Kyslivka) in early February as elements of the 4th Tank Division (1st GTA) reportedly tried to push through Ukrainian defenses near Kyslivka.[23] Elements of the 47th Tank Division appear to be the main force committed to the effort northwest of Svatove, but the participation of elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, and the 4th Tank Division in offensive operations in the area suggests that the wider 1st GTA is responsible for offensive operations this area of the line and is not actively committed to the effort northeast of Kupyansk.

Russian operations around Tabaivka appear to be pushing along diverging axes to the northwest and west-southwest, and it is not yet clear which is the main effort. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are currently developing an offensive in the direction of Pishchane from Tabaivka in an effort to reach the Oskil River.[24] Pishchane and Berestove are located along a country road connecting the P07 highway to Kruhlyakivka, where one of the six bridges crossing the Oskil River is located. There is also a country road that begins west of Kyslivka and Kotlyarivka and connects the P07 highway to Kurylivka and southern Kupyansk-Vuzlovy, where a railway and roadway bridge across the Oskil River are located. The Russian tactical effort to seize settlements along the P07 highway likely aims to open routes of advance for Russian forces to reach Kurylivka, southern Kupyansk Vuzlovy, and Kruhlyakivka and threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting the east and west banks of the Oskil River in the area.

Makiivka/Raihorodka-Borova Axis:

Elements of the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division are attacking southwest of Svatove, although they are currently conducting a lower tempo of operations in the area than Russian forces elsewhere along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces attacked southwest of Svatove, particularly near Makiivka on the Zherebets River, in January 2024, although at a slower tempo than other areas along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[25] Geolocated footage published on January 27 indicates that Russian forces have recently advanced east of Makiivka, and elements of the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division have reportedly recently increased efforts to advance near the settlement.[26] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported positional engagements in the area throughout January 2024.[27] Russian and Ukrainian sources also stated that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Makiivka throughout December 2023, but ISW did not observe visual confirmation of any Russian advances in the area during this time.[28]

Russian forces consisting mostly of elements of the 2nd CAA (CMD) previously conducted offensive operations southwest of Svatove along the Raihorodka-Karmazynivka-Novovodyane line further north of Makiivka in the summer and early fall of 2023, with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stating in August 2023 that the Raihorodka area was one of the most intense sectors of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[29] ISW has not observed reports of the CMD’s 2nd CAA operating southwest of Svatove in 2024, however, suggesting that the transfer of elements of the CMD‘s 2nd CAA from the area and subsequent transfer of elements of the WMD’s 20th CAA may be part of an effort to cohere a large effort around WMD forces along the entire Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated the Russian forces intended to reach Borova before the start of winter 2023-2024 during localized Russian offensive operations in the area in early Fall 2023.[30] The CMD forces failed to achieve that goal, but there is no reason to assess that WMD elements in the area have shifted their goal away from Borova. Makiivka and Raihorodka are located on country roads that connect the P66 Svatove-Kreminna highway to Borova where there is a crossing over the Oskil River. The route from Raihorodka to Borova, however, is more direct than the route from Makiivka to Borova, suggesting that Russian forces may choose to resume offensive operations near Raihorodka aimed at advancing to Borova. Alternatively, country roads from Makiivka lead southeastward to Lyman, and current Russian activity near Makiivka could additionally be aimed at supporting offensive efforts to cross the Zherebets River west of Kreminna. Country roads from Makiivka also lead to several settlements south of Borova along the Oskil River and Oskil City, and Russian efforts near Makiivka may be ultimately aimed at securing the southern edge of the Oskil Reservoir (before it narrows at the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant).

Kreminna-Drobysheve/Lyman Axis

Elements of the 20th CAA’s 144th Motorized Rifle Division have intensified an effort to push Ukrainian forces off the left bank of the Zherebets River west of Kreminna while non-WMD elements continue routine positional fighting elsewhere in the Lyman direction.[31]
Russian and Ukrainian sources have stated that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division were pursuing this effort as early as November 2023, although ISW did not observe a concerted offensive effort to push towards the Zherebets River until early January 2024.[32] Likely elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division notably intensified this effort around January 20 with reports of Russian forces using a significant number of tanks, BMPs, and armored vehicles in a relatively large number of assaults in the area.[33] Geolocated footage published on January 21 showed at least 20 new Russian vehicle losses following unsuccessful assaults near Terny (west of Kreminna).[34] The most recent intensified Russian assaults have focused on Terny, Yampolivka, and Torske — three settlements on the Zherebets River with nearby crossings — and Russian forces have made recent minor marginal tactical gains in the area.[35] Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces have advanced close to the outskirts of Torske, although ISW has yet to observe confirmation of these claims.[36] Russian forces have advanced within two kilometers of the eastern outskirts of Terny as of February 12.[37]

Elements of the newly created 25th CAA (CMD) have also conducted localized offensive operations in the area since October 2023, and elements of the 25th CAA’s 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly supporting the 144th Motorized Rifle Division’s current efforts near Yampolivka.[38] Elements of the 25th CAA’s 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating southwest of Kreminna with other elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division.[39] It is unclear how involved the 25th CAA is in the 144th Motorized Rifle Division's intensification of offensive operations in the northern portion of the Lyman direction or if the Russian command intends for these elements to stabilize the surrounding frontline as the 144th Motorized Rifle Division continues its push towards and across the Zherebets River.

Elements of the 90th Tank Regiment (41st CAA, CMD) were reportedly participating in positional engagements southwest of Kreminna in December 2023, but ISW has not observed indications that the 90th Tank Regiment or other CMD elements except the 25th CAA are currently committed to the Russian offensive effort in the Lyman direction.[40] Significant portions of the CMD’s 41st CAA and 2nd CAA transferred from the Lyman direction to the Avdiivka direction around early October 2023 and participated in the completion of the seizure of Avdiivka.[41] Elements of the 90th Tank Division‘s 80th and 239th Tank Regiments are currently operating near Avdiivka, although other elements may still remain in the Kreminna area.[42] It is unclear what elements of the CMD may still be deployed in rear areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast, although any remaining elements likely represent only a fraction of the combat power that the CMD had previously deployed in the area.

Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps (AC) elements and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces are operating around Kreminna and have reportedly intensified operations south of Kreminna, but are likely not directly participating in the concerted Russian effort in the Lyman direction.[43] Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) in mid-January 2024 and have made tactical advances in the area, although ISW did not observe evidence of any Russian advances in the area until early February and has not observed a significant intensification of the tempo of Russian operations near Bilohorivka.[44] LNR 2nd AC and Akhmat Spetsnaz elements are likely engaged in tactical efforts that have little relevance to the wider operational effort in the Lyman direction.

Reaching the Zherebets River and pushing Ukrainian forces across to the right bank of the river is only an immediate tactical objective, and Russian forces likely have more ambitious subsequent operational objectives in the area. Russian forces may have attempted to recapture Lyman, Donetsk Oblast during the failed Russian Winter-Spring 2023 offensive campaign in Luhansk Oblast, although the Russian failure to make any meaningful advances makes determining the ultimate objective of the offensive difficult.[45] Recapturing Lyman is the most likely operational objective for Russian forces in the area as the settlement opens routes of Russian advance both to the northwest towards Oskil City (southeast of Izyum) and to the southwest towards Slovyansk. Russian forces may alternatively intend to advance north of Lyman towards Drobysheve in an effort to support planned advances towards the Oskil River and set conditions for the later seizure of Lyman.

Russian Operational Planning and Objectives

The apparent coordination of Russian offensive efforts along the four axes on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line is likely reflective of a wider operational objective and higher-level operational planning.
Russian objectives in each direction of advance appear to add up to a wider cohesive operational objective to seize the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian operations on each axis share similarities in design and support one another in ways that suggest that the command of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces has planned a larger operation in pursuit of this cohesive operational objective.

These four directions of Russian advance along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and the apparent Russian objectives in those directions suggest that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is undertaking a larger months-long cohesive operational effort to seize the east bank of the Oskil River from Kupyansk to Oskil City. The fact that these directions of advance all fall under the operational responsibility of a cohesive Russian grouping of forces suggests that the Russian command has tasked the Western Grouping of Forces to pursue a coordinated operational objective on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis. The clear delineation of those directions among elements of the 6th CAA, the 1st GTA, the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, and the 20th CAA’s 144th Motorized Rifle Division suggests that the Western Grouping of Forces deployed relatively cohesive formations in distinct areas of operation well in advance of this effort. The intensification of Russian offensive operations along these axes of advance at the same time suggests that this activity is part of a wider operation and not four separate localized offensive efforts. The likely planned Russian objectives of advancing to and seizing east bank Kupyansk, Kupyansk-Vuzlovy, Kurylivka, Kruhlyakivka, Borova, settlements south of Borova, and areas near or north of Lyman would all support a coordinated objective of pushing Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian advances to and the seizure of these settlements would otherwise only have limited tactical significance.

An operation to push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River offers the Russian military an attainable goal that would generate operationally significant effects. The seizure of east bank Kupyansk, Kupyansk-Vuzlovy, Kurylivka, Kruhlyakivka, Borova, settlements south of Borova, and areas near or north of Lyman as well as corresponding areas where there are river crossings would likely create conditions that would make continued Ukrainian operations on the east bank of the Oskil River untenable. This operation would also allow Russian forces to safely consolidate after the offensive’s planned culmination as there would be little risk of serious Ukrainian counterattacks back across the river. It would be surprising if the Russian command did not plan this operation with this relatively attainable objective and favorable conditions for consolidation but rather chose a less cohesive, less favorable, and less attainable effort--but Russian commanders have made similarly poor choices repeatedly throughout the war.

The Kremlin has often prioritized military efforts to achieve informational or political objectives over those with wider operational significance in Ukraine, but an operation to reach the Oskil River offers Russia opportunities for both kinds of gains.[47] Ukrainian military officials have noted that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations to take territory ahead of Russia’s March 2024 presidential elections, suggesting that Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to secure an informational victory in Ukraine to bolster his reputation as a capable war-time leader amid his certain re-election.[48] Operations northwest of Svatove, southwest of Svatove, and near Kreminna offer the Russian military the opportunity to seize the remainder of unoccupied Luhansk Oblast, and the Kremlin has long pursued the seizure of all of Luhansk Oblast as one of its main objectives in eastern Ukraine.[49] The more operationally significant effort to reach the Oskil River would achieve this informational objective and more. But seizing the remainder of Luhansk Oblast could still be an attainable objective even if the wider operation fails since Ukrainian forces only control a small sliver of Luhansk Oblast south of Kreminna and west and southwest of Svatove. The seizure of all of Luhansk Oblast may be a subordinate objective, but three of the axes of the Russian offensive effort are focused on territory in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts, suggesting that the primary objective is reaching the Oskil River and possibly taking Kupyansk. The Kremlin could settle for this secondary objective for its informational benefits, but only if it appears unable to achieve its primary goals.

The Western Grouping of Forces appears to be conducting the initial stages of an intensified cohesive offensive operation to reach the Oskil River on a broad front, but the Russian command could decide to pursue other objectives that diverge from this cohesive effort. Potential Russian advances towards Lyman would divert Russian forces along diverging axes of advance towards separate operational objectives that are not necessarily mutually supporting. The Russian command could decide to break the Lyman effort off from the overall operation to reach the Oskil River if the wider operation makes little progress or if the capture of Lyman and advances south of the settlement look more attractive than trying to advance all the way towards Oskil City. The terrain south of Lyman would likely be less favorable to Russian advances, however. Lyman also offers a less attractive position either to consolidate gains or to resume subsequent attacks because of the forest belts around it and the open flanks it would offer to Ukrainian counterattacks. Lyman’s position on a seam between groupings of forces would also pose greater command and control challenges to Russian efforts to consolidate and defend or exploit its seizure.

Planning

Russian forces appear to be attacking along mutually supporting axes, something Russian forces have often failed to do in the past, which suggests possible improvements in Russian operational planning at least in this sector of the front.[50]
The areas in which Russian forces are trying to advance are mutually supporting because they are roughly parallel with one another and close enough together to generate pressure on the same groupings of Ukrainian defenders. The flank of one direction of advance is close enough to the flank of the adjacent direction to create synergistic effects. For example, a Russian tactical advance northwest of Svatove could also be seen as a tactical advance on the northern flank of the Russian effort west and southwest of Svatove or as an advance on the southern flank of the effort northeast and east of Kupyansk. A Russian advance in one of these directions places pressure not just on the Ukrainian forces defending in the immediate tactical area but also on Ukrainian forces that are defending against Russian offensive operations north or south of the direction in which Russian forces advanced.

Mutually supporting operations also set conditions for the tactical envelopment or encirclement of Ukrainian forces in some areas if Russian forces can advance rapidly enough or if Ukrainian defenders make mistakes. Many of the settlements along the Oskil River that Russian forces are apparently trying to capture can be reached by forces advancing along adjacent axes, which could allow Russian forces to envelop or encircle a settlement instead of attacking it frontally. Russian forces can approach northern Kupyansk-Vuzlovy by advancing from Synkivka and can approach southern Kupyansk Vuzlovy from the direction of advance northwest of Svatove, for example. Similarly, the Russian advances towards Kruhlyakiva from settlements along the PO7 highway northwest of Svatove and advances southwest of Svatove from Makiivka can set conditions for Russian forces to envelop or encircle Ukrainian forces defending Borova. The four mutually supporting directions present Russian forces with opportunities to envelop or encircle east bank Kupyansk, Kupyansk-Vuzlovy, Kurylivka, Kruhlyakivka, and Borova depending on the rate and timing of Russian advances. The mutually supporting operations do not provide these opportunities for areas near or north of Lyman, however, as Lyman is on the flank of the overall operational effort along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.

The likely Russian offensive operation towards the Oskil River appears to be a much more sustainable effort than previous Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. The following observations are based on the current tempo of Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and it is unclear if many of them would hold in the event of a significant intensification of the Russian offensive effort. Ukrainian artillery shortages and delays in Western security assistance are creating uncertainty in Ukrainian operational planning and are likely prompting Ukrainian forces to husband materiel.[51] These constraints on Ukrainian operations are likely limiting Ukraine’s ability to degrade and pressure Russian forces and logistics along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and it is unclear if the Russian military would be able to conduct a relatively sustainable offensive operation in the absence of these Ukrainian constraints.

Russian forces attacking along the Luhansk-Kharkiv axis appear to be attempting to use some of the principles of Soviet deep battle theory, particularly the principle of conducting multiple simultaneous attacks to pin the defender’s frontline forces and reserves.[52] Russian forces have shown a pattern of activity along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line that suggests that Russian forces are alternating intensified attacks along certain axes with regrouping and consolidation along others. Russian forces have alternated their intensified tactical activity in January 2024 among their four axes of advance and have only occasionally significantly intensified offensive operations in two directions at the exact same time.[53] Russian forces conducted routine regroupings during their localized offensive operation northeast of Kupyansk between October 2023 and January 2024 that likely allowed them to sustain that effort despite manpower and equipment losses.[54] Russian forces likely intend to alternate the intensity of operations along the four axes of advance in a staggered manner in order to allow Russian forces in each direction to similarly periodically regroup and prepare for future assaults. This rotating intensification throughout the frontline likely aims to maintain pressure on Ukrainian defenders all along the east bank of the Oskil River even as some Russian groupings regroup and reconstitute. This approach likely also aims to prevent Ukrainian forces from concentrating on a single Russian axis of advance. This rotating intensification pressures the entire Ukrainian force grouping defending in the area and complicates Ukraine’s ability to transfer forces between different defensive directions.

The current tempo of Russian offensives along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis, Russian force generation efforts, and the Russian ability to conduct operational-level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to conduct offensive operations along each axis of advance without pulling manpower away from another. The tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine is generating personnel losses at a rate roughly equal to the rate at which Russia is currently generating new forces through crypto-mobilization efforts.[55] Ukrainian military officials have noted that Russian forces in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions routinely make good their losses during periods of decreased offensive activity and regroupings.[56] The reported concentration of the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force in Ukraine and the fact that Russia appears to be able to replace losses on a one-to-one basis across the theater allows Russian forces to conduct routine operational level rotations throughout the theater.[57] The ability to conduct rotations in principle allows Russian forces to mitigate the degradation of attacking Russian forces that over time could cause Russian offensive efforts to culminate, thereby making Russian offensive efforts at current levels of intensity sustainable.[58]

The losses Russian forces have taken in their effort to seize Avdiivka prompted the Russian command to transfer elements from other sectors of the front to support that effort, but the Russian elements attacking along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line are doing so in a way that has not thus far required the commitment of reserves from other sectors of the front.[59] The 6th CAA, the 1st GTA, the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, and the 20th CAA’s 144th Motorized Rifle Division will likely be able to continue to replenish their losses and rotate degraded units at the current operational tempo without drawing on Russian reserves from other formations. The Russian military is replenishing losses with poorly trained and relatively combat ineffective personnel, however, and despite rotations and replenishment, losses over time will likely degrade the combat effectiveness of the attacking WMD elements and hinder their ability to sustain effective offensive operations.[60] The Russian offensive effort toward the Oskil River will thus likely culminate at or before the river line, and the Russians will likely have to conduct a fundamental reconstitution of the formations involved in this offensive before using them in subsequent major offensive operations.

The apparent Russian ability to conduct routine regroupings and resume offensive operations on individual axes without drawing combat power from other axes is letting Russian forces sustain operations on each axis at their own pace. The degradation of Russian forces on one axis does not appear to influence the tempo of operations on other axes along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Russian forces on a given axis could even potentially culminate short of the river line without fully disrupting the overall operational scheme. The limited number of crossings and the vulnerability of those crossings to Russian fires also mitigates the risks caused by the premature culmination of a given axis—Ukrainian forces could be driven to withdraw from the entire east bank by the threat of being cut off even if they manage to stop one or more axes of Russian advance short of the river. This situation would likely not hold, however, if the Ukrainian forces managed to block one or more of the Russian advances in such a fashion that the Russian command had to divert effort from another axis to sustain its coherent drive.

The apparent sustainability of the Russian offensive effort and the mutually reinforcing directions of Russian advance suggests that the Russian command may be learning from previous operational design failures. Russian forces have previously conducted offensive operations at tempos far beyond their ability to replace losses in manpower and materiel.[61] The tempo of Russian offensive operations during the Russian Winter-Spring 2023 offensive campaign and the Wagner’s Group concerted offensive to capture Bakhmut both required Russian forces to expend manpower and materiel at an unsustainable rate.[62] Those offensives both culminated prematurely--the Winter-Spring 2023 campaign achieved virtually no gains. The Wagner offensive ultimately took Bakhmut, but did so in a way that left Russian forces unprepared to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks and required the deployment of significant Russian reserves drawn from elsewhere in the theater to hold most of the gains made.[63] The seizure of Bakhmut combined with the Wagner Group‘s abortive armed rebellion also led to the effective destruction of the Wagner Group as a fighting force. The apparent relatively sustainable operation to reach the Oskil River is notable in this context and suggests that the Western Grouping of Forces has intentionally designed operations to avoid a premature culmination of its ongoing effort. Russian forces have also routinely attacked along diverging axes throughout the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an approach that has regularly prevented Russian forces from capitalizing on tactical gains and translating them into operationally significant [64]? The Western Grouping of Forces appears to be learning from this mistake as well.

The Southern Military District’s [SMD] 58th CAA proved during its defensive effort in western Zaporizhia Oblast against the Ukrainian summer 2023 counteroffensive that at least some Russian formations can internalize lessons learned and successfully adapt campaign designs and tactical preparations to the battlefield realities in Ukraine.[65] ISW has yet to observe a Russian formation demonstrate this adaptation for operational planning at scale while conducting an offensive operational effort, and recent waves of mass mechanized assault around Avdiivka in October and November 2023 suggested that the Russian command has not disseminated tactical lessons learned from previous failed Russian offensive efforts.[66] The Western Grouping of Forces‘ current offensive operation may be the first instance of a large formation capturing and implementing at least campaign design lessons. Russian offensives along the Oskil River have not shown tactical improvements or innovations, however. Russian tactical engagements continue to display many of the same mistakes Russian offensive operations have repeatedly shown, causing high losses of men and materiel for limited gains. Russian learning and innovation thus appear to be partial and possibly confined thus far to operational level planning and force generation.

Prospects of the Russian Offensive Operation on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Axis

Russian forces will likely struggle to translate minor tactical advances into operationally significant maneuver towards the Oskil River, and the effort will likely take months of campaigning regardless of its ultimate success or failure if Ukrainian forces retain the material capability to continue resisting as they have.
Russian forces have not learned how to restore mechanized maneuver to the positional battlefield in Ukraine and have not conducted any offensive operation that has resulted in a rapid mechanized advance since spring 2022.[67] A successful Russian advance to the Oskil River would very likely result from months of accumulated marginal tactical Russian gains at very high cost.

Rate of Advance and Types of Maneuvers

Russian forces are very unlikely to advance fast enough to encircle sizable pockets of Ukrainian forces.
The likely gradual rate of Russian advance will allow Ukrainian forces to prepare positions, deployments, and logistics around settlements on the east bank of the Oskil River well ahead of any potential Russian advance towards these settlements. A threatened Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces in these settlements rapid enough to prompt Ukrainian forces to withdraw to the west bank of the Oskil River is highly unlikely. The gradual rate of Russian advance will thus likely culminate in attritional frontal attacks against entrenched Ukrainian positions in and near settlements along the Oskil River before the final Ukrainian forces withdraw.

Russian forces have previously struggled to conduct significant operational encirclements and likely will continue to do so even if they can gradually envelop settlements along the Oskil River. Russian forces failed to operationally encircle Bakhmut in March 2023 and proceeded to fight through the city for two months in highly attritional assaults.[68] Russian forces have also failed more recently to operationally encircle smaller settlements such as Marinka and Avdiivka, although the threat of a tactical Russian encirclement forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Avdiivka on February 16.[69] Russian forces can advance in areas north and south of settlements along the east bank of the Oskil River and may envelop Ukrainian forces but Russian forces are very unlikely to complete operational encirclements. The fact that these settlements are backed up against a water feature may give Russian forces a better chance to trap Ukrainian forces against the river (effectively an encirclement), but only if the Russians can advance more rapidly than they have generally been able to do or if the Ukrainians either choose to defend a settlement to the last or make a mistake in timing their withdrawal. Russian forces will likely have to conduct assaults into and through east bank Kupyansk, Kupyansk Vuzlovy, Kurylivka, Kruhlyakivka, and Borova if they wish to capture these settlements. Russian offensive operations to capture even relatively small settlements with entrenched Ukrainian positions have lasted months, and in some cases years, and there is no reason to assess that fighting into and through these relatively small settlements will be much easier for Russian forces as long as Ukrainian forces have the materiel needed to continue defensive operations effectively.

Russian interdiction efforts will likely have greater chances of isolating the battlespace on the east bank of the Oskil River than elsewhere in Ukraine where Russian forces are conducting offensive operations, however. Six bridges (both railway and roadway bridges) cross the Oskil River between Kupyansk and the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant. Satellite imagery from mid-January suggests that many of these bridges have sustained some damage and a few appear unlikely to be usable by heavy equipment.[70] Russian forces likely damaged these bridges during a coordinated strike campaign on crossings along the Oskil River in September and October 2023, although this effort did not isolate the Ukrainian defense northeast of Kupyansk, and Ukrainian forces have not yet shown any signs of suffering from serious difficulties in supplying positions on the east bank of the Oskil River.[71] Russian forces may resume this effort to degrade Ukrainian logistics and force Ukrainian forces to transfer heavy equipment across the river with more vulnerable crossing equipment. Russian forces may also hope that advances closer to the Oskil River will allow Russian fire to interdict the Ukrainian GLOCs running along the west bank of the Oskil River (especially the P-79 and P-78 highways). Russian forces may envision conducting an interdiction effort that eliminates existing Ukrainian crossings to the east bank while also degrading logistics supporting areas on the west bank from where Ukrainian forces could deploy new crossings. The Russian command likely hopes that the isolation of the battlespace will allow Russian forces to conduct the operational encirclements and envelopments that they have previously failed to conduct.

Elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces, particularly of the 1st GTA, began this operation less degraded and better rested than Russian forces elsewhere along the frontline, which may allow these elements to conduct more effective offensive operations than other Russian force groupings. Russian forces have likely gradually reconstituted units of the 1st GTA through partial mobilization in September 2022 and subsequent crypto-mobilization following their severe degradation during the Ukrainian September 2022 counteroffensive and Russia’s failed winter-spring 2023 offensive.[72] ISW assessed that Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk direction likely do not need to reconstitute their kit to full doctrinal end strength as Russian forces rely on dismounted infantry assaults to conduct consistent assaults while conserving armored vehicles for periodic mechanized assaults in this direction.

These elements may not necessarily have the combat capabilities required to conduct successful maneuver to the Oskil River line, however. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger questioned the Russian Western Grouping of Forces’ ability to conduct successful offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction after footage published in late December 2023 showed Ukrainian artillery, drones, and an armored vehicle easily repelling a Russian infantry assault with armored vehicle support columns near Synkivka.[74] The milblogger claimed that the Western Grouping of Forces is ”incompetent” and suffers from ”systemic problems” and conducts infantry-led frontal assaults that lack sufficient artillery support.[75] The milblogger compared the failed Russian assault near Synkivka to the Russian failure to learn after the heavily attritional Russian attacks near Vuhledar in 2023 and the failed Siverskyi Donets River crossing near Bilohorivka in 2022, in which Ukrainian forces destroyed columns of Russian armored vehicles.[76]

The manpower fill and combat-effectiveness of the newly formed 25th CAA may affect the Russian military’s ability to conduct and support successful offensive operations west of Kreminna where the formation is operating. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated in late August 2023 that Russian forces formed the 25th CAA as a “strategic reserve” and did not intend the formation to be combat ready before October or November 2023.[77] Budanov also stated that elements of the 25th CAA deployed to Luhansk Oblast in late August 2023 and were poorly trained and staffed with 80 percent of their planned manpower and only 50 percent of the necessary equipment, likely due to their rushed deployment.[78] The likely limited combat power of the 25th CAA may affect the Russian military‘s ability to hold positions near Kreminna as the 144th Motorized Rifle Division pursues advances toward the Zherebets River.

Advances towards the Oskil River will likely require successful mechanized maneuver in many places, and Russian forces remain unlikely to be able to conduct such maneuver across the entire Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Many of the areas where Russian forces are currently attacking are heavily forested, flanked by forested areas, or dotted with windbreaks, particularly near Synkikva and Kreminna. Ukrainian military personnel have previously noted that Russian forces take advantage of this terrain to provide cover for infantry heavy assaults.[79] The land further west of the frontline in the direction of the Oskil River, particularly northwest of Svatove, is far more open. Russian advances through this terrain will likely require at least some successful mechanized assaults while under Ukrainian fire with high visibility. Recent chaotic and costly Russian mechanized assaults throughout the theater, including along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, suggest that WMD elements will struggle to advance in these areas and that assaults will likely produce significant armored vehicle losses that slow and disrupt the offensive operations.[80] Russian forces have proven more capable of making marginal tactical gains in urban or semi-urban environments, although at the expense of heavy personnel losses, as seen with the seizure of Bakhmut and Avdiivka.[81] Russian forces throughout much of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line would have to advance roughly between eight and 35 kilometers through rural and open terrain to reach such semi-urban areas.

Wider Operational Considerations

The Kremlin may believe that delayed Western security assistance to Ukraine will give Russian forces opportunities to accelerate advances in the coming months, although it is unclear if this belief is accurate.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and other high ranking Russian officials have been expressing increasing confidence in Russian military prospects in Ukraine against the backdrop of weakened and delayed Western support for Ukraine.[82] This public confidence may be posturing ahead of the March 2024 presidential elections and a part of Russian information operations aimed at demoralizing Ukraine and pursuing preemptive concessions from the West.[83] The Kremlin’s public confidence may also reflect the Russian command’s perception of what the Russian military can achieve while fighting a less-well-provisioned Ukrainian army. Delays in Western security assistance are likely forcing Ukrainian forces to husband materiel, and shortages appear to be degrading Ukrainian counterbattery fire.[84] ISW has previously assessed that the husbanding of materiel and uncertainty in operational planning may force Ukrainian forces to make tough decisions about prioritizing certain sectors of the front over sectors where limited territorial setbacks are least damaging.[85] The Russian command may hope that the east bank of the Oskil River is a sector that Ukrainian forces are willing to cede in order to continue responding to Russian offensive operations elsewhere in eastern Ukraine.

The longer the Russian military maintains the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine the more opportunity the Western Grouping of Forces has to achieve its operational objective of pushing Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov assessed on January 30 that Russian forces will fail to reach the administrative borders of Luhansk Oblast or the Zherebets River and will likely be “completely exhausted” by the beginning of Spring 2024.[86] Russian forces around Synkivka conducted a localized offensive operation for four months without showing any signs that the effort was near culmination, although it is possible that further significant intensification of the Russian operation throughout the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line could result in an operational culmination by the time Budanov identified. The Russian ability to conduct routine regroupings, replenishments, and rotations alongside the current operational tempo suggests that Russian forces may be able to continue operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis for longer, possibly into summer 2024.

Budanov may be suggesting that muddy ground conditions in early spring 2024 would force the Russian operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line to culminate since the ground will no longer be conducive to mechanized maneuver. Heavy spring rains can also interfere with drone operations, affecting both sides. Russian forces notably launched localized offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in Fall 2023, however, precisely at a time when similar ground conditions were not conducive to mechanized assaults in an effort to seize and maintain the theater-wide initiative following the Ukrainian summer 2023 counteroffensive.[87] WMD elements will likely try to take advantage of frozen ground in the winter to conduct mechanized assaults along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis and may continue mechanized operations into spring 2024 since the multiple waves of mechanized Russian assaults around Avdiivka in fall 2023 suggest that the Russian command is willing to conduct such operations even in unfavorable conditions.[88] The Western Grouping of Forces may alternatively decide to continue operations through infantry-heavy assaults during the spring and resume mechanized maneuver as the ground and weather become more suitable in Summer 2024.

Russian forces could alternatively conduct the operation to reach the Oskil River in several active phases interspersed with operational pauses aimed at resting, replenishing, and preparing forces for resumed attacks in each direction of advance. The command of the Western Grouping of Forces has a wide range of options in determining both the tempo and the duration of its offensive effort precisely because the Russian military has the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine. Russian forces will be able to determine the location, tempo, operational requirements, and duration of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024.[89] The Western Grouping of Forces may intend to conduct a much longer effort or resume it at a later date in case of its initial failure if it concludes that there is no credible threat of a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area or elsewhere along the front.

Operational Effects of a Successful Russian Operation to Reach the Oskil River

The Russian seizure of the left bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would generate immediate operational benefits for Russian forces along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis and throughout the theater while also setting favorable conditions for future Russian offensive efforts.
Russian forces have not conducted offensive operations that have led to immediate operational-level benefits or set operational-level conditions for subsequent operations since Spring 2022.[90] Russian forces conducted nominally successful operations to seize Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in summer 2022 and Bakhmut in May 2023 and a nominally successful localized offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in February 2024, but those efforts have only generated limited tactical benefits for Russian forces.[91] A successful Russian operation to reach the Oskil River line would therefore be a significant inflection in over a year and a half of Russian campaigning in Ukraine.

A successful Russian operation to push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would deprive Ukraine of a potential area from which to launch a future counteroffensive operation into northwestern Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian forces previously attempted to advance towards Svatove and Kreminna after liberating Lyman in October 2022, and Russian forces committed a considerable amount of effort and manpower to stabilizing the line in the area and pushing Ukrainian forces back from the P66 (Svatove-Kreminna) highway.[92] The Russian seizure of all of Luhansk Oblast was one of the main objectives of the Russian Winter-Spring 2023 offensive effort in Luhansk Oblast and remains one of the Kremlin’s key objectives in eastern Ukraine.[93] Pushing Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would not only achieve the Kremlin’s objective of occupying all of Luhansk Oblast, but would also likely ensure that Ukrainian forces were not able to reverse the Kremlin’s achievement anytime soon. Russian forces captured all of Luhansk Oblast in July 2022, a victory that the Kremlin soon had spoiled by the Fall 2022 Ukrainian counteroffensive’s advance into Luhansk Oblast.[94] The Kremlin likely hopes that positions along the Oskil River will prevent a scenario in which Russian forces have to routinely fight to retain or recapture Luhansk Oblast and allow the Kremlin to tout the occupation of all of Luhansk Oblast as a permanent victory.

The Russian seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would also likely secure several Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Luhansk Oblast from regular Ukrainian interdiction efforts. Russian positions along the P66 (Svatove-Kreminna) highway would be well out of range of Ukrainian tube artillery on the west bank of the Oskil River, and Ukrainian tube artillery would have to be deployed very close to the river to strike sections of the P07 (Svatove-Kupyansk) highway. Russian forces may also hope to be able to conduct counterbattery fire further into Kharkiv Oblast and push long-range Ukrainian artillery systems and HIMARS launchers out of range of Russian logistics facilities and GLOCs further in the rear. Moving Ukrainian fire further west would essentially allow Russian forces to turn a considerable section of Luhansk Oblast into near and deep rear areas and establish less vulnerable logistics to support operations further west and south of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Ukrainian forces could still conduct long-range strikes against Russian targets in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast although Ukraine has limited numbers of long-range systems.

A successful Russian effort to seize the east bank of the Oskil River from Kupyansk to Oskil City would also create a defensible frontline very difficult for Ukrainian forces to attack and thereby allow Russian forces to transfer materiel and manpower to other efforts in Ukraine. The Oskil River would act as a significant water obstacle along a sizable sector of the frontline from the international border with Belgorod Oblast all the way to the Donetsk-Kharkiv Oblast border area. The only other sector of the frontline along a notable water barrier in Ukraine is the front along the Dnipro River in east (left) bank Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. The frontline along the Dnipro River has largely been inactive since the successful Ukrainian 2022 Kherson counteroffensive pushed Russian forces off west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022.[95] Ukrainian forces proceeded to conduct limited tactical activity along the Dnipro River and launched notably larger ground operations in October 2023 on the east bank of the Dnipro River that established a bridgehead in Krynky by November 2023.[96] The year of relative stasis along the Dnipro River allowed Russian forces to laterally transfer elements from east bank Kherson Oblast to the critical Russian defensive effort in western Zaporizhia Oblast in summer 2023 and permitted the Russian military to use rear east bank Kherson Oblast as a relatively secure area to train new forces and reconstitute degraded ones.[97]

The Western Grouping of Forces likely envisions a frontline along the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast resembling the frontline along the Dnipro River in some way. The Oskil River is nowhere near as wide or as deep as the Dnipro River (excluding in areas of the dried up Kakhovka Reservoir), and some sections of the Oskil River are narrow enough to ford with limited river crossing equipment and possibly even with armored vehicles. The Oskil Reservoir from southern Kupyansk-Vuzlovy to west of Oskil City is the Oskil River’s widest section before it narrows at the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant. This wide section of the Oskil River would be an easily defensible front, and even narrower sections of the river are still challenging terrain for Ukrainian forces to conduct counterattacks across. Ukrainian forces could more easily conduct cross-river tactical activity along the Oskil River than along the Dnipro River, but such activity would likely have poor prospects for reestablishing positions on the east bank of the Oskil River absent a larger Ukrainian crossing effort.

The relatively defensible frontline would likely require less Russian combat power to hold and allow the Russian command to transfer formations to other efforts in Ukraine or prepare for a subsequent offensive effort in northeastern Ukraine. The reduction in routine positional fighting along this frontline would allow the Russian command to transfer manpower and materiel currently operating in the northern sections of advance on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line relatively freely without endangering Russian positions in the area.

Conditions Setting for Subsequent Operations

A successful Russian operation to advance towards the Oskil River would also set conditions for potential subsequent campaigns in northern Donetsk Oblast and/or eastern Kharkiv Oblast, and the Russian command may have designed the Winter-Spring 2024 offensive effort on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis to prepare for successive campaigns in 2025 and beyond.

Conditions Setting for Subsequent Operations

A successful Russian operation to advance towards the Oskil River would also set conditions for potential subsequent campaigns in northern Donetsk Oblast and/or eastern Kharkiv Oblast, and the Russian command may have designed the Winter-Spring 2024 offensive effort on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis to prepare for successive campaigns in 2025 and beyond.
The months-long effort to seize the east bank of the Oskil River will likely require the Western Grouping of Forces to consolidate its gains and rest and reconstitute over several months before committing to another large offensive operational effort. Russian forces would likely be unable to launch a subsequent campaign from the area until winter 2024-2025, and any Ukrainian counteroffensive operation would likely delay such a subsequent campaign well into 2025 or beyond.

Russian forces previously attempted to seize the Ukrainian stronghold of Slovyansk in Spring 2022 as part of a wide campaign in eastern Ukraine that failed, and the seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would set several conditions for Russian forces to revive that effort. The Russian military intended to encircle Ukrainian forces in Donetsk Oblast in spring 2022 and attempted to conduct three corresponding maneuvers west from Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, south from Izyum, and north from Bakhmut to surround and seize Slovyansk.[98] The Russian command likely intended advances along the E40 highway (Izyum-Slovyansk-Bakhmut) highway and the capture of Slovyansk to facilitate the quick encirclement of Ukrainian forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast and open routes for further advances to the western borders of Donetsk Oblast.[99] Russian forces did not advance at the speed required to encircle Ukrainian forces, however, and by summer 2022 Russian forces prioritized the seizure of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk over the wider operational encirclement.[100] The Russian effort to drive on Slovyansk from Izyum culminated in mid-May 2022, and Russian forces likely intended to revive the effort from the Izyum-Lyman area at a later date.[101] Ukrainian forces liberated Izyum in early September 2022 and Lyman in early October 2022, however, effectively ending any Russian designs to resume a drive on Slovyansk.

The Russian seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast secures what would otherwise be a wide operational flank for a Russian effort to drive on Slovyansk from the northeast. A Russian effort to drive on Slovyansk from the Lyman direction would effectively be an offensive effort from an unstable salient unless Russian forces north of Lyman seize the Oskil River line. A Ukrainian presence along the east bank of the Oskil River would allow Ukrainian forces to counterattack a Russian drive on Slovyansk from the north, the west, and the south. The Russian seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River from Kupyansk to Oskil City would secure this operational flank, on the other hand, and allow Russian forces to attack along a wider front north of Slovyansk from positions backed by a secure Russian rear with the threat of Ukrainian counterattack confined to the south and west.

Advances towards Oskil City can set conditions for Russian forces to interdict and possibly cut the E40 highway between Izyum and Slovyansk. Oskil City and positions to the southeast are securely within tube artillery range of the section of the E-40 highway connecting Izyum and Slovyansk. Russian indirect fire in the area could disrupt the major Ukrainian GLOC connecting Kharkiv Oblast to northern Donetsk Oblast and force Ukrainian forces to reorient GLOCs towards Slovyansk from the northwest and west along smaller country roads or longer routes. The Russian command may also envision a subsequent operation from positions near Oskil City to reach and cut the E-40 highway. Interdicting and possibly cutting the E40 would recreate some of the effects of the northern envelopment of Slovyansk that Russian forces had initially created from positions near Izyum in Spring 2022.

The Russian command could alternatively attempt to conduct a sweeping envelopment of Ukrainian forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast as it had initially planned in spring 2022 by conducting simultaneous maneuvers from the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts and north from Bakhmut. The Russian command has previously shown an affinity for attempting wider operational maneuver across simultaneous axes in Ukraine, even if thos
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/23/24 12:49 AM

Dutch PM Rutte in strong position to lead NATO with US, UK, French and German backing

https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-backs-dutch-pm-rutte-become-next-nato-chief-2024-02-22/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/25/24 12:46 AM

Two years since the invasion time flies Meloni one of the real leaders of the West !

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/25/24 12:53 AM

Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/25/24 04:08 PM

Originally Posted by Hollander
Navalny was no saint


I don't believe he was a hardened racist like some of his critics have been alleging, but he was certainly a nationalist. It is quite ironic that someone who supported the invasion of Georgia and was so vehemently against open borders is now being championed by everyone on the left.

I give him credit for his anti-corruption activism. He really did a number on the Kremlin. They didn't kill him for nothing
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/25/24 06:23 PM

Originally Posted by Giacalone
Originally Posted by Hollander
Navalny was no saint


I don't believe he was a hardened racist like some of his critics have been alleging, but he was certainly a nationalist. It is quite ironic that someone who supported the invasion of Georgia and was so vehemently against open borders is now being championed by everyone on the left.

I give him credit for his anti-corruption activism. He really did a number on the Kremlin. They didn't kill him for nothing


The opposition is divided and mostly in excile like chess champion Kasparov and Khodorkovsky. That makes it easy for the Kremlin to deal with them next month fake elections lol.
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/25/24 10:38 PM

Originally Posted by Hollander
Originally Posted by Giacalone
Originally Posted by Hollander
Navalny was no saint


I don't believe he was a hardened racist like some of his critics have been alleging, but he was certainly a nationalist. It is quite ironic that someone who supported the invasion of Georgia and was so vehemently against open borders is now being championed by everyone on the left.

I give him credit for his anti-corruption activism. He really did a number on the Kremlin. They didn't kill him for nothing


The opposition is divided and mostly in excile like chess champion Kasparov and Khodorkovsky. That makes it easy for the Kremlin to deal with them next month fake elections lol.


The opposition is united against Putin, but divided over almost everything else. There is infighting, distrust and no clear agenda. As charismatic as Navalny was, he was never going to overthrow Putin anyway. He however may have sparked the brain that ultimately will. Time will tell!
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/25/24 10:43 PM

They did a good job with this one

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/25/24 11:33 PM

I've watched the Navalny documentary after his death two times one time with my father. Very good !

Zelenskiy puts figure on Ukrainian soldiers killed for first time at 31,000

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...-soldiers-killed-for-first-time-at-31000
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/27/24 01:26 AM

Vladimir Putin is 'running a massive mafia state' where it is 'often, if not always, about money'.

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/27/24 11:17 PM

Business Insider


Russia's economy is so driven by the war in Ukraine that it cannot afford to either win or lose, economist says


• Russia's economy can't afford to win or lose the war in Ukraine, one economist says.

• That's because Russia can't afford the cost of rebuilding and securing Ukraine.

• The cost of repairing its own nation is already "massive," Renaud Foucart says.

Russia's economy is completely dominated by its war in Ukraine, so much that Moscow cannot afford either to win or lose the war, according to one European economist.

Renaud Foucart, a senior economics lecturer at Lancaster University, pointed to the dire economic situation facing Russia as the war in Ukraine wraps up its second year.

Russia's GDP grew 5.5% year-over-year over the third quarter of 2023, according to data from the Russian government. But most of that growth is being fueled by the nation's monster military spending, Foucart said, with plans for the Kremlin to spend a record 36.6 trillion rubles, or $386 billion on defense this year.

"Military pay, ammunition, tanks, planes, and compensation for dead and wounded soldiers, all contribute to the GDP figures. Put simply, the war against Ukraine is now the main driver of Russia's economic growth" Foucart said in an op-ed for The Conversation this week.

Other areas of Russia's economy are hurting as the war drags on. Moscow is slammed with a severe labor shortage, thanks to young professionals fleeing the country or being pulled into the conflict. The nation is now short around 5 million workers, according to one estimate, which is causing wages to soar.

Inflation is high at 7.4% — nearly double the 4% target of its central bank. Meanwhile, direct investment in the country has collapsed, falling around $8.7 billion in the first three quarters of 2023, per data from Russia's central bank.

That all puts the Kremlin in a tough position, no matter the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Even if Russia wins, the nation can't afford to rebuild and secure Ukraine, due to the financial costs as well as the impact of remaining isolated from the rest of the global market.

Western nations have shunned trade with Russia since it invaded Ukraine in 2022, which economists have said could severely crimp Russia's long-term economic growth.

As long as it remains isolated, Russia's "best hope" is to become "entirely dependent" on China, one of its few remaining strategic allies, Foucart said.

Meanwhile, the costs of rebuilding its own nation are already "massive," he added, pointing to problems like broken infrastructure and social unrest in Russia.

"A protracted stalemate might be the only solution for Russia to avoid total economic collapse," Foucart wrote. "The Russian regime has no incentive to end the war and deal with that kind of economic reality. So it cannot afford to win the war, nor can it afford to lose it. Its economy is now entirely geared towards continuing a long and ever deadlier conflict."

Other economists have warned of trouble coming for Russia amid the toll of its war in Ukraine. Russia's economy will see significantly more degradation ahead, one London-based think tank recently warned, despite talk of Russia's resilience in the face of Western sanctions.
https://www.businessinsider.com/rus...pending-inflation-worker-shortage-2024-2
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 02/27/24 11:43 PM

Kremlin: European troops in Ukraine means conflict with NATO

A conflict between Russia and NATO becomes inevitable if European NATO countries decide to send troops to Ukraine. With this warning, the Kremlin responded to statements by French President Emmanuel Macron on Tuesday.

According to Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, there is no need to talk "about the probability, but about the inevitability" of a direct confrontation. He also said that sending troops is "absolutely not in the interests of these countries." “They should be aware of that.”

French President Macron said on Monday that he would not rule out sending soldiers to Ukraine. He added that there is currently no agreement on this. Several European countries said on Tuesday that they were not considering such a far-reaching measure.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/24 12:17 AM

Half of Russian artillery shells from North Korea proven inoperable

Defense News February 2024 Global Security army industry
POSTED ON TUESDAY, 27 FEBRUARY 2024 14:16


According to a senior Ukrainian defense official quoted by John Feng in Newsweek, over half of the more than a million artillery shells sent to Russia from North Korea are defective. Vadym Skibitsky, the second-in-command at Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR), stated that the Kremlin sought assistance from its secretive Asian ally to supplement Russia's limited arms manufacturing capabilities, albeit with varying degrees of success.

The shipments from North Korea are said to include significant quantities of artillery shells, such as 120mm mortars, 122mm and 152mm artillery shells, and 122mm rockets, which are compatible with Russian weapons used in Ukraine.

Skibitsky's remarks, disclosed to the Interfax Ukraine news agency on February 23, stated: "As per the available statistical data, Russia has already imported 1.5 million rounds of ammunition from the DPRK. However, these munitions date back to the 1970s and 1980s. Approximately half of them are non-operational, while the remainder necessitates either restoration or, at the very least, thorough inspection before deployment."

According to Bloomberg, satellite imagery from October to December 2023 showed hundreds of shipping containers being loaded onto and unloaded from Russian ships at North Korea’s Najin and Russia’s Dunay ports, suggesting a steady flow of military supplies between the two countries. This cooperation is reportedly enabling Moscow to maintain pressure on Ukraine amid the ongoing conflict, as Western nations have accused North Korea of aiding Russia's military efforts.

The United States, South Korea, and Japan announced in October that they had confirmed North Korea's provision of arms and military equipment to Russia for use against Ukraine. In response, Pyongyang sought Moscow's military assistance, though both Russia and North Korea deny these claims. The shipments are said to include significant quantities of artillery shells, such as 120mm mortars, 122mm and 152mm artillery shells, and 122mm rockets, which are compatible with Russian weapons used in Ukraine.

This ongoing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea (and Iran for drones), despite international sanctions and widespread condemnation, highlights the complex dynamics of international relations and the challenges in addressing the Ukraine conflict.
https://armyrecognition.com/defense..._from_north_korea_proven_inoperable.html
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/24 01:30 AM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/01/24 09:15 AM

FORBESBUSINESSAEROSPACE & DEFENSE

10 Shot-Down Jets In 10 Days. Russia’s Aerial Surge In Ukraine Is Getting More Of Its Pilots Killed.

David Axe
Forbes Staff

I write about ships, planes, tanks, drones, missiles and satellites.

Feb 27, 2024,04:18pm EST


The Ukrainian air force claimed it has shot down 10 Russian warplanes in 10 days: nine of the Russian air force’s best Sukhoi Su-34 and Sukhoi Su-35 fighter-bombers and also a rare Beriev A-50 radar plane.

This is many, many more warplanes than the Russians can afford to lose in a little more than a week. Hamstrung by foreign sanctions, the Russian aerospace industry is struggling to produce more than a couple of dozen new warplanes a year.

All that is to say, the Russians are losing jets 20 times faster than they can replace them.

The Ukrainian defense ministry announced this month’s ninth and tenth shoot-downs—both involving Su-34s—on Tuesday. “Oops, we did it again!” the ministry quipped. “And now it's 10 destroyed Russian planes in 10 days!”

How the Ukrainians are shooting down so many jets is unclear. It’s possible the Ukrainian air force has assigned some of its American-made Patriot missile launchers to mobile air-defense groups that move quickly in close proximity to the 600-mile front line of Russia’s two-year wider war on Ukraine, ambushing Russian jets with 90-mile-range PAC-2 missiles then swiftly relocating to avoid counterattack.

But the distance at which the Ukrainians shot down that A-50 on Friday—120 miles or so—hints that a longer-range missile system was involved. Perhaps a Cold War-vintage S-200 that the Ukrainian air force pulled out of long-term storage.

It also is apparent the Ukrainians have moved some of their two-dozen or so 25-mile-range NASAMS surface-to-air missile batteries closer to the front line. After all, the Russians found—and destroyed with a missile—their first NASAMS launcher near the southern city of Zaporizhzhia on or before Monday.

That actual answer to Ukraine’s air-defense hot streak might be that it’s deploying all the above systems, plus others, in more aggressive ways. If there’s a risk in this approach, it’s that the Patriot and NASAMS batteries fire U.S.-made missiles, and the United States hasn’t provided any ammunition to Ukraine since late December, shortly after Russia-aligned Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives blocked a vote on further aid.

In other words, Ukraine eventually—possibly soon—will run out of its best air-defense missiles.

But it’s possible Russian forces’ own actions—and inactions—also have contributed to their spike in aviation losses. After finally defeating, at incredible cost in people and equipment, the ammo-starved Ukrainian garrison in the ruins of Avdiivka in eastern Ukraine two weeks ago, the Russian army in Ukraine is advancing against other Ukrainian garrisons that also are running out of ammo, thanks to those Republicans in the U.S. House.

Sensing an opportunity, the Russian air force is flying more sorties, closer to the front line, lobbing glide-bombs to suppress Ukrainian troops so Russian troops can move forward. “The enemy has overcome the fear of using aviation directly over the battlefield,” the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies explained, “and although this results in the loss of aircraft, their ground forces gain a significant firepower advantage.”

This surge in Russian attack sorties presents Ukrainian air-defenders with more targets. So of course they’re shooting down more Russian planes.

It helps the Ukrainian effort that Russian pilots are increasingly blind to Ukrainian missile-launches. The Russian air force once counted on its nine or so active A-50 radar planes—organized into three, three-plane “orbits” in the south, east and north—to extend sensor coverage across Ukraine.

In damaging one A-50 in a drone strike last year and shooting down two more A-50s this year, the Ukrainians have eliminated a third of this sensor coverage, and created blind spots where Russian pilots might struggle to spot approaching missiles.

With both sides expending resources they can’t renew—the Ukrainians their American-made missiles; the Russians their Su-34s, Su-35s and A-50s—both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war are waging short-term campaigns they hope will secure them a long-term advantage.

The Ukrainian air force apparently aims to use its last few Patriot and NASAMS missiles to deplete the Russian air force and prevent future surges in bombing sorties. The Russian air force meanwhile aims to bomb more Ukrainian garrisons into submission, and help Russian ground troops to gain ground, before the Sukhoi squadrons are exhausted for a want of planes and experienced crews.

One man holds the power to upset this looming aerial impasse: Republican representative Mike Johnson, the speaker of the U.S. House, who alone brings bills to a vote.

The U.S. Senate already has approved $60 billion in fresh aid to Ukraine, aid that surely would include huge consignments of air-defense missiles. Johnson could put that aid to a vote today. Everyone agrees it would pass with a bipartisan majority.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...ne-is-getting-more-of-its-pilots-killed/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/02/24 01:17 AM

From the banks a trillion dollars to support the war industry
February 29, 2024
The "Finance for War. Finance for Peace" report reveals financing between 2020 and 2022
Between 2020 and 2022, the global financial sector invested at least $1 trillion to support arms production and trade.
Of this, almost half a trillion dollars, more than half of the estimated total investment in the sector, is provided by the United States, while 79 billion comes from the top ten European investors. The 15 largest European banks, however, invest in arms manufacturing companies for an amount equal to 87.72 billion euros. However, these figures are underestimated due to the lack of transparency in the sector.
These are frightening numbers documented by the "Finance for War. Finance for Peace" report which reconstructs and highlights the critical role of the global financial sector in facilitating military conflicts.
“This report aims to analyze the involvement of the financial sector in the production and trade of weapons used in large-scale conflicts, comparing the policies and practices of traditional banks with those of ethical, values-based banks ,” said Mauro Meggiolaro of Merian Research , a Berlin-based consultancy company that created the Report commissioned by Fondazione Finanza Etica and Gabv.

As mentioned, the numbers provided in the report are a conservative estimate of total global weapons financing. The report underlines how the information, although obtained from reliable and known sources, cannot be complete due to the difficulties in obtaining data also due to the lack of transparency in this field.
In fact, there is no official database that collects all the investments, loans and services of global financial institutions in the arms industry.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/02/24 04:12 PM

Ukrainian kamikaze drone causes damage to Putin's hometown

Saint Petersburg is said to have been hit by a Ukrainian kamikaze drone. The violent explosion destroys at least fifteen apartments.


German fighter jets intercept Russian aircraft near Latvian territorial waters

German fighter jets intercepted Russian aircraft near Latvian territorial waters on Friday. The fighter jets took off from the Latvian military base Lielv?rde. Ukrainska Pravda reports this.
The Latvian Air Force wrote on Facebook that this is the first time German Eurofighter jets from Lielv?rde have undertaken such a mission.

"NATO air police are fully operational and allies can respond immediately if necessary. Now, for the first time, German Eurofighter fighter jets have intercepted two Russian military aircraft near Latvian territorial waters," said Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spr?ds.
After repeated Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure close to the borders of other NATO countries, additional fighter jets have been sent to Romania, among others.

Berlin concerned about possible intercepted conversations with senior military personnel

German parliamentarians are concerned about reports that a confidential meeting of senior officers of the 'Bundeswehr' was tapped by Russians. Russian media reported communications that allegedly discussed the possibility of an attack on the Crimean Bridge over the Kerch Strait and also noted that "the British have people on the ground there."
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/03/24 01:49 PM

Germany: Opposition threatens inquiry over Russian spy leak
2 hours ago

Opposition politicians in Germany are suggesting a parliamentary inquiry, including questions for Chancellor Olaf Scholz, following Russia's release of audio of senior Bundeswehr officers discussing weapons for Ukraine.

https://www.dw.com/en/germany-opposition-threatens-inquiry-over-russian-spy-leak/a-68426571
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/03/24 08:48 PM

Major NATO exercise starts in Scandinavia on Monday

The Scandinavian countries and their NATO allies will launch a major military exercise, Nordic Response, on Monday. Until March 15, almost 20,000 soldiers from 13 NATO member states and the future member state Sweden will carry out maneuvers in the Arctic.

The epicenter of the military exercise is northern Norway, Sweden and Finland. There will be a lot of activity, especially at sea. More than 50 submarines, frigates, corvettes, aircraft carriers and amphibious ships are being deployed, NATO air command (Aircom) in Ramstein said.

More than a hundred combat, transport and reconnaissance aircraft will participate in the exercise in the airspace, as well as helicopters and special forces aircraft. On the ground, thousands of soldiers will practice with artillery systems, tanks and tracked vehicles.

Although Turkey and subsequently Hungary agreed to Sweden's accession to NATO, membership has not yet been formalized. Nevertheless, the country is participating in a major military exercise by the alliance for the first time. 4500 Swedish soldiers are deployed. Finland, which is already a member, is participating with more than 4,000 soldiers.

Nordic Response is part of Steadfast Defender (STDE 24), according to NATO the alliance's largest military exercise since the end of the Cold War.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/03/24 08:56 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/04/24 01:53 AM

How do you guys think it will end?

A) Putin makes peace, retires and enjoys a nice life with his family and dies an old age.

B) Putin going all out killing everybody on his way WW III.

C) Putin continues Zelensky continues another Cold War with the West.

D) Putin gets sick and chaos in Russia.

E) CIA /Ukraine takes him out.

F) His inner circle takes him out Mafia style.

G) He gets extradited to The Hague and spend the rest of his life in prison.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/05/24 03:52 AM

Thank You Mr Putin for making NATO great again. wink

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/05/24 05:25 AM

Politico: Russia infiltrated EU with Serbian agent

Russian intelligence services infiltrated EU institutions last year through a suspected Serbian agent who spread the Kremlin's position on the invasion of Ukraine, Politico reports, citing documents.

In October 2023, Serbian citizen Novica Antic, who is said to have worked closely with the Russian intelligence service FSB, held meetings with European officials in Brussels and in particular with members of the European Parliament. According to a briefing from a Western intelligence agency seen by Politico, the man is an "active influence agent" acting on behalf of the FSB.

According to Politico, those MPs include German Green parliamentarian Viola von Cramon-Taubadel, Italy's Alessandra Moretti of the Socialists and Democrats and Vladimír Bilcík, a Slovak member of the conservative European People's Party. There is nothing to indicate that they were aware of A.'s FSB ties when they met him. They have not yet responded to the message.

Antic, the president of the Serbian Military Union, is also said to have met with representatives of the Euromil and Epsu unions, which respectively represent military personnel and public service employees in the European Union.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/07/24 06:11 PM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/09/24 05:54 PM

Newsweek

World • Russia-Ukraine War • Russia • Uk

Russia Destroys 3 Abrams Tanks, 3 HIMARS and 8 Bradleys in 10 Days: Moscow

By Ellie Cook
Security & Defense Reporter


Russia has destroyed three U.S.-donated Abrams tanks in southern Ukraine since late February, according to Moscow, as Russia claims to have destroyed a slew of advanced U.S.-supplied equipment along the front lines.

On Wednesday, Russia said its forces had destroyed a U.S.-made Abrams tank operated by Ukraine close to the captured eastern city of Avdiivka, which Moscow has controlled since mid-February. Moscow claimed it knocked out a first Abrams tank in late February, and said on Monday that it had taken out a second one during clashes around villages west of Avdiivka.

The U.S. has sent 31 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, which arrived in the war-torn country in the fall of 2023. Analysts say the handful of tanks are a boost to Ukraine's stocks, but they came in too small a quantity to make a real difference to Kyiv's war effort.

Alongside the Abrams, the U.S. has delivered nearly 200 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles to Ukraine. Fighters deployed around Avdiivka earlier this year told Newsweek that Russian armored vehicle crews were "afraid" to launch operations "when they know that a Bradley will be against them."

But Russia said that since the end of February, it had taken out eight Bradleys. On Tuesday, the Russian Defense Ministry said it destroyed a Ukrainian Bradley infantry fighting vehicle on the eastern frontlines around Avdiivka. The previous day, Moscow said Ukraine lost three Bradleys west of the city, and another in battles early on during the weekend.

On February 28, Russia said Kyiv's fighters had lost two Bradley infantry fighting vehicles in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian troops lost another Bradley around Avdiivka the previous day, Moscow said.

Russia also said this week that it had destroyed three U.S.-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) in the east and south of the country. Analysts say figures from Russia on Ukraine's reported losses are generally inflated, and Ukraine rarely comments on its own losses.

Footage widely circulated online earlier this week appears to confirm the loss of one Ukrainian HIMARS. Russia has repeatedly claimed to have destroyed HIMARS since the system arrived in Ukraine in the summer of 2022, but this is the first visual evidence of the loss of one of the artillery systems.

Videos shared by open-source intelligence accounts in recent days also appear to show an Abrams tank in flames.

Last month, footage appeared to show two damaged HIMARS vehicles arriving in the United States from Ukraine for repairs.

The U.S. has donated a total of 39 HIMARS to Ukraine, and Kyiv has lauded their effectiveness against Russian forces.

Newsweek reached out to the Ukrainian military for comment via email.
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukr...adley-fighting-vehicles-avdiivka-1876809





Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/10/24 03:12 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/11/24 03:34 AM

Once again, the Ukrainians manage to surprise the Russians at sea: what is left of the infamous Black Sea Fleet?
It happened again in the Black Sea near Crimea. Kyiv reports having hit a large Russian landing ship with underwater drones. It would be the Caesar Kunikov. This marks yet another setback for President Putin and his once infamous Russian Black Sea Fleet. Moscow has not yet responded to the news.

'Russian Navy commander replaced after loss of several combat ships'

The commander of the Russian Navy, Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov, has been relieved of his duties. The Russian newspaper Izvestia reports this based on unnamed sources. Yevmenov will be replaced by Admiral Aleksander Moyseev, previously the commander of the Russian Northern Fleet.

The newspaper did not give a reason for the personnel change. Recently, Russia's Black Sea Fleet has lost several combat ships to Ukrainian attacks with missiles and so-called naval drones, unmanned boats loaded with explosives. As a result, part of the Russian naval units have withdrawn from the Crimean peninsula.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/13/24 09:47 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/14/24 12:15 AM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/14/24 01:48 AM

THE GUARDIAN

View image in fullscreen
NATO
Norway, Sweden and Finland host Nato military exercises
Nordic Response aims to strengthen cooperation between countries and bolster alliance’s ability to defend region


Miranda Bryant in Stockholm
Mon 4 Mar 2024 05.18 EST

A first-of-its-kind training exercise involving more than 20,000 soldiers from 13 countries has launched across northern Norway, Sweden and Finland as the region prepares to become a fully Nato territory within days.

The joint defence exercise, which runs until 14 March, was previously known as Cold Response and held in northern Norway, a founding Nato member, every other year. In recognition of Finland’s recent membership of the western military alliance, and with Sweden expected to join imminently, this year it is being designated Nordic Response for the first time.

The training exercise across air, land and sea – which will also include soldiers from the UK, US, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Canada – will incorporate a cross-border operations exercise in the Arctic Circle.

The Norwegian military said the exercise was intended to demonstrate “a unique level of cooperation and interoperability as they cross borders on land, sea and air”.

Nordic Response is part of an ongoing series of Nato exercises, Steadfast Defender, involving 90,000 soldiers. It is also closely aligned with the UK-led naval exercise Joint Warrior, which ran between Scotland, Norway and Iceland last week.

The latest exercise, which started on Sunday, will involve more than 50 submarines, frigates, corvettes, aircraft carriers and amphibious vessels at sea, over 100 combat, maritime surveillance and transport aircraft, and thousands of soldiers on the ground using artillery systems, tanks and tracked vehicles.

Most of the activity will be centred on northern Troms county and the west of Finnmark county in Norway, but there will also be maritime activity along the coast of the north of the country and exercises across borders in northern Finland and Sweden.

The newly elected Finnish president, Alexander Stubb, the Norwegian prime minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, and the Swedish crown princess Victoria are all scheduled to visit.

The Swedish government is anxiously awaiting the final signoff from Hungary to finally complete its Nato membership. It had been hoped the process could have been finished off last week, but having only been signed by the speaker of Hungary’s parliament on Sunday it still needs to be signed by the president before the documentation can go to Washington.

Last Monday, Hungary’s parliament approved the historically neutral country’s membership, nearly two years after it submitted its application. Finland became a member in April last year.

The Norwegian military said Nordic Response was aimed at strengthening Nordic cooperation and in turn bolstering the alliance’s ability to defend the region.

All relevant countries, including Russia, had been informed of the exercise, it said.

“With Finland and soon Sweden as allied neighbours, the exercise contributes to closer Nordic integration within the framework of Nato,” the Norwegian military said in a statement. “The exercise also strengthens operational total defence cooperation in the Nordic countries, which results in better cooperation in peace, crisis and conflict. Closer operational cooperation in the Nordic region strengthens Nato’s ability to defend the Nordic region.”
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/04/norway-sweden-and-finland-host-nato-military-exercises
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/15/24 11:45 PM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/16/24 02:59 AM

MILITARNYI

Media: The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy has been dismissed

Admiral Yevmenov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, has been dismissed.

The Russian media reported on this, citing sources.

According to the publication, Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, who had held the post since 2019, has been dismissed.

Citing their own sources, the journalists reported that the commander of the Northern Fleet, Alexandr Moiseev, was appointed as an interim acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.

The appointment of Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Moiseev to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy has already been communicated to the personnel.

From 2012 to 2016, Moiseev served as Commander of the submarine forces of the Northern Fleet, after which he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet and later Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Russian Armed Forces.

Since May 2018, he has been acting commander of the Black Sea Fleet, after which he was officially appointed to the post. In 2019, Moiseev was appointed Commander of the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy.


Reshuffle in the Russian Navy Command

As previously reported, a month earlier, on February 15, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia, Admiral Viktor Sokolov, was dismissed from his post.

The changes in the command and the resignation of the commander took place against the backdrop of a series of serious defeats of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea in February this year.

Under Sokolov’s leadership, the Russian fleet in the region lost more than 20% of its composition to damage and destruction.

Only in February, MAGURA V5 kamikaze drones of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine sank the Russian Project 12411 guided missile corvette Ivanovets and the landing ship Caesar Kunikov.


The Russian Project 12411 Ivanovets corvette before its destruction, February 1, 2024. Photo credits: DIU
Viktor Sokolov replaced Admiral Igor Osipov in September 2022, under whose leadership Russia lost its flagship, the Moskva missile cruiser.
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/media-the-commander-in-chief-of-the-russian-navy-has-been-dismissed/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/18/24 10:40 PM

Russian expert blows the whistle and is interrupted on TV
Updated: Today, 12:37Today, 11:14abroad?
A Russian political scientist and well-known commentator was rudely interrupted live on Russian TV because he was talking out loud about what he believes are President Putin's real plans.


65-year-old propagandist Aleksandr Sytin spoke about foreign policy, but forgot for a moment what the Kremlin's official position is: Russia has been attacked and is only defending itself. According to Sytin, 'Russia is following a certain expansionist course. That's a fact'. To continue: “And not only in Ukraine, by the way.”

Discussion leader Andreij Norkin intervened at that moment. Just as Sytin explains why NATO wants to stop the Russians and how they want to do it, he is interrupted. “Not true!” shouts the moderator. “This is not expansion, but rather the defense of national interests and security.”

Norkin does not wait for Sytin's answer and says: “We have to interrupt. We're back after a break. Short break…"

The subtitled images were posted online by Julia Davis of the Russian Media Monitor. She follows and criticizes the Kremlin. She has been on Putin's sanctions list since May 2022.

It is not the first time that Aleksandr Sytin has gone off the rails. In October 2022, he criticized Putin live on TV, who was at the time bombing Ukraine's energy supply. “That way they cannot be broken,” said Sytin, who reminded people that Ukrainians were once residents of the Soviet Union. “They won't surrender because they suddenly have to fry their bacon over a candle.”
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/19/24 09:44 AM



https://www.lemonde.fr/en/internati...on-the-mafia-s-honor-code_6632409_4.html

Sergei Medvedev: 'Russian society was built on the mafia's honor code'
According to this Russian historian and specialist of the post-Soviet period, Russia is a warring and policing power which, over the centuries, has fought not only its neighbors – but also its own people.

Interview by Marie Jégo
Published today at 12:00 am (Paris)
\
Sergei Medvedev is a Russian historian who specializes in the post-Soviet period. In his latest book, A War Made in Russia, published on February 15, he analyzes the violence that permeates Russian society, from within families through to public institutions.

You have written that Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine is consistent with the logic of Russian history. What did you mean by this?
Russia is, and always has been a warring and policing power. A quote attributed to Nicolas I [emperor of Russia between 1825 and 1855] essentially says that Russia has no vocation to become an industrial, commercial or agricultural power, and that its essential function is to threaten the rest of the world. Studying its history, it's clear to see that war has always played a central role, both inside and outside the country.

Over the centuries, Moscow has fought not only against its neighbors, but also against its own population, by monopolizing resources and preventing private property from developing – as well as the social class that comes with it. Indeed, its rulers see it as just another resource, a "second oil." Human life is cheap in Russia. The great military victories of World War Two – the battle of Stalingrad, the capture of Berlin – were achieved at the cost of colossal losses. Back then, the ratio was ten Soviet soldiers killed for every German; today, in Ukraine, it's three Russians for every Ukrainian. In 1945, when [American General Dwight] Eisenhower was astonished at the massive losses on the Soviet side, Marshal Georgy Zhukov retorted: "It doesn't matter; our women will give birth to more soldiers." Vladimir Putin thinks the same way. He claims to have a right over citizens' physical bodies, calling on women to increase the number of births and stigmatizing LGBTQ+ people. He doesn't need individuals, human beings. All he needs are soldiers to fuel his wars.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/21/24 03:06 PM

'Russia is preparing for large-scale war with NATO'

Russia appears to be preparing for a full-scale war with NATO. Various financial, economic and military indicators point to this, according to the Institute for the Study of War. Such a conflict could arise in the short term, the leading think tank suspects. "Not immediately, but probably faster than some Western analysts think."

The ISW bases itself on statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who in recent years emphasized stabilizing Russia's financial future. This is noticeable in Western countries, including Poland, where President Andrzej Duda suggested that Russia has switched to a war economy. The intention would be to attack NATO as early as 2026 or 2027.

Denmark is also watching for a possible war with Russia. For example, Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen said on February 9 that new intelligence indicates that Russia could attack a NATO country within three to five years.

The ISW also notes military restructuring and changes in legislation in Russia. These would pave the way for short-term success in Ukraine and prepare Russia for a confrontation with NATO in the future. “Continued personnel changes within the Russian Ministry of Defense could be further indicators of Russia's preparations for long-term conflict,” the think tank added.

Troops at the borders and provocations: will a second war break out on European soil?
Will a second war break out on European soil after the one in Ukraine? In an analysis in The Wall Street Journal, authors from the think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies warn that 2024 could be the year when the bomb explodes in Serbia and Kosovo, partly due to Russia.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/22/24 06:49 PM

Shooting and blast reported inside concert hall in Moscow region
By Mariya Knight, CNN
Updated 2:37 PM EDT, Fri March 22, 2024
Smoke rises above the burning Crocus City Hall concert venue following a reported shooting incident on the outskirts of Moscow, Russia, on March 22.
Reuters
Smoke rises above the burning Crocus City Hall concert venue following a reported shooting and blast in the outskirts of Moscow, Russia, on March 22.
CNN

Three armed men opened fire inside the Crocus City Hall concert hall in the Moscow region, according to Russian state media agencies TASS and RIA Novosti.

There are believed to be dead and wounded, Russian state media reported, without specifying any numbers.

“People in camouflage, at least three, burst into the ground floor of the Crocus City Hall and opened fire with automatic weapons,” RIA Novosti reported Friday, citing its correspondent on the scene.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/22/24 08:02 PM

Warning graphic footage.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/23/24 04:38 AM

U.S. Says ISIS Was Responsible for Deadly Moscow Terror Attack
After a period of relative quiet, the Islamic State has been trying to increase its external attacks, according to U.S. counterterrorism.
ISIS K terrorist group, a branch of the Islamic State that has operated in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, claimed the attack.
The regional affiliate has a haven in Afghanistan and carried out recent bombings in Iran, suggesting it has capacity for major atrocities.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/23/24 04:47 AM

Well Putin another major problem in your backyard invade Afghanistan again would be terrible the Soviets were humiliated there before.
It's now the most powerful ISIS branch in the world.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/23/24 12:23 PM

Do we believe Western intelligence or FSB hehe?

The death toll from the attack on a concert hall on the outskirts of Moscow has passed 115. The FSB security service says that all four attackers have been arrested. The attack was claimed by Islamic State, but Russia points to Ukraine.
Eleven people have been arrested, according to the FSB.
FSB: "The terrorists who took part in the attack in Crocus tried to escape towards the Russian-Ukrainian border. The terrorists planned to cross the border and had contacts on the Ukrainian side."
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/24/24 01:34 PM


NOS News

Yesterday, 6:54 PM
Why would IS attack Moscow? Four questions and answers

Heavily armed men entered a concert hall in Krasnogorsk, near Moscow, last night. They opened fire on visitors and staff, detonated explosives and started a fire. At least 133 people have died.

Although Russian President Putin tries to establish a link with Ukraine without evidence, experts and Western sources point to the terrorist organization IS as the perpetrator of the attack.

But why would Russia be a target for IS? This requires consideration, among other things, of Russia's (military) role in conflicts in Syria, among other places. Four questions and answers:

Why is IS mentioned as a possible perpetrator for the attack in Moscow?
Yesterday, the attack was quickly claimed by a Telegram account attributed to the terrorist group IS. "Islamic State fighters have attacked a large group of Christians in the town of Krasnogorsk on the outskirts of the Russian capital Moscow, killing and wounding many and causing widespread destruction before safely returning to their base," the message read. Telegram channel. This afternoon the same Telegram account shared a photo of four people who allegedly committed the attack for IS.


A US official last night called the IS claim "credible". According to this anonymous American source, the US has warned Russia in recent weeks about a possible attack by IS branch ISIS-K.

This branch is said to have "concentrated on Russia in recent months". It is not clear whether the Telegram account in which the attack is claimed is indeed from this IS branch.

Putin has dismissed the terror warnings, Hubert Smeets of the knowledge platform Window on Russia, Ukraine, Belarus told NOS. "According to Putin, these warnings were only intended to destabilize Russia." Putin does not respond to IS' Telegram message claiming responsibility for the attack. He states that the perpetrators, who have now been arrested, were on their way to Ukraine and have contacts there. Putin does not provide any evidence for this claim, with which Putin suggests a link between the terrorists and Ukraine.

What is ISIS-K?
ISIS-K, also known as ISKP or ISPK, is a branch of IS. The name stands for Islamic State Province Khorasan, referring to the old Persian name for the region in which the terrorist organization operates.

The split occurred in 2014 in eastern Afghanistan. Terrorism expert Bibi van Ginkel tells the NOS that this branch is active in Afghanistan, Pakistan and to a small extent in Iran. "But they also have all kinds of connections with other regional IS branches, especially those in the Caucasus."

The IS branch is particularly strong in Afghanistan, although the Afghan Taliban government is relatively successful in combating the terrorist group. This emerges from a recent analysis by the think tank The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. According to the think tank, ISIS-K has therefore expanded its terrorist horizons; In 2022 and 2023, the group committed attacks in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and the Maldives. Attacks in Germany, India and Turkey were thwarted.

In an attack in Iran earlier this year that killed 84 people, the US intercepted information indicating that ISIS-K was responsible, according to Reuters sources.

How does ISIS-K compare to the Islamic State?
The terrorist group that once renamed 88,000 square kilometers in Syria and Iraq into a 'caliphate' lost its last piece of land in 2019. IS then fragmented into various cells spread across the world. Larger and smaller IS cells emerged in Africa, but also in Central Asia (in countries such as Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan).

"With the end of the caliphate, we already knew that IS had not yet been defeated," says Van Ginkel. ISIS-K has gained in strength, especially since the dismantling of the caliphate, such as in Afghanistan. "All kinds of small groups with extremist ideas are already active there. They are trying to involve ISIS-K."

The group was able to establish the caliphate at the time due to the political and military vacuum in Syria due to the civil war and a weak Iraqi central government. ISIS has made a specialty of exploiting weak regimes and unresolved local conflicts.

According to experts, ISIS-K has benefited from the Taliban's takeover in Afghanistan and the US withdrawal. The collapse of the US-backed Afghan army gave the ISKP opportunities to seize weapons. The Taliban's lack of air power has given the group an opportunity to gain and hold ground.

Why would this group target Moscow?
According to Van Ginkel, previous attacks in the region were aimed at defending extremist Islamic ideas. "Russia has played a pretty important role in Syria in the fight against IS, so the attack in Moscow may also have something to do with that," she says. Russia is a loyal ally of President Assad, who has ruled Syria in a ruthless, bloody manner for years. With Russia's help, Assad also fought IS.

Furthermore, the Kremlin maintains a relatively good relationship with the Taliban, which is therefore hostile to ISIS-K. Although the Taliban are still officially classified as a terrorist organization in Russia, their leaders have been received in Russia several times. In 2022, ISIS-K claimed a deadly attack on the Russian embassy in the Afghan capital Kabul.

According to the aforementioned anonymous US official, ISIS-K accuses Russia of "having the blood of Muslims on its hands." ISIS-K refers to the Russian interventions in Afghanistan, Syria and Chechnya.

Earlier this month, the Russian security service FSB announced that it had thwarted an IS attack. According to IS, the attack in Moscow should be seen "within the context of the war between Islamic State and countries fighting against Islam."
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/24/24 11:54 PM

Russia ain't fucking around lol

Russian forces torture Moscow terror suspect by hooking his genitals up to 80v battery leaving him foaming at the mouth - and feed another his own EAR: Battered men appear in court as new footage emerges of the slaughter that killed at least 140

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ar...or-suspect-hooking-genitals-battery.html
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/25/24 07:16 AM

From fleeing Pakistani military to carrying out deadliest attack in Russia, a history of Islamic State Khorasan

Khorasan is a historical term for areas populated by peoples speaking Iranian languages in northeastern Iran, the Transoxania part of Cent...

Read more at: https://www.deccanherald.com/world/...istory-of-islamic-state-khorasan-2949696
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 03/25/24 07:21 AM

How Ukraine war distracted Moscow from Isis-K threat
Russia’s security services have shifted focus away from Islamist terror

https://www.ft.com/content/4cad8ebe-9a07-4c6d-b270-5c991ad349f6
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/02/24 01:50 AM

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has concluded a three-day visit to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. During his tour, he met with leaders and ministers from each country and also visited the NATO Liaison Office in Georgia.

A big fuck you to Putin.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/02/24 02:02 AM

The history of Azerbaijan-NATO relationship dates back to March 1992. Azerbaijan's membership in NATO would represent a long list of benefits for the Alliance, and all in a highly strategic region.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/03/24 11:42 PM

It's a pretty big story in the Netherlands.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/05/24 11:56 PM

Russian staff members expelled from NATO headquarters: 'Conducted intelligence work'

Several Russian personnel have been expelled from NATO headquarters. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed this to the German Bild.

According to Stoltenberg, the reason for the removal of the employees is that they were doing work other than that for which they were employed. “We realized that they were carrying out activities that were not actually diplomatic work, but intelligence work.”

It is not clear when the expulsions took place. The number of staff members removed from the headquarters in Brussels is also unknown. Stoltenberg also did not provide clarity about what the Russian intelligence would be.

Czech Republic sounds the alarm: Russian attacks on European railways

Czech Transport Minister Martin Kupka has indicated that Russia is trying to sabotage European railways. He made this claim in the British business daily Financial Times.

Russia would not only focus on public transport. All kinds of infrastructure are at risk in Europe. Estonia accuses the Russians of disrupting GPS signals, causing smartphones, aircraft and weapon systems, among other things, to malfunction. The British Air Force also appears to have been affected by this.

“Russia has made thousands of attempts to sabotage Europe's railways since the start of the war against Ukraine,” Kupka said. "We are facing a complex situation, but I am satisfied that we can defend ourselves against the attacks."
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/13/24 07:30 PM

Newsweek
World. Russia-Ukraine War
Russia
Ukraine
Avdiivka Map Shows Russia's 'Significant' Advances in Eastern Ukraine
Published Apr 08, 2024 at 8:53 AM EDT
Updated Apr 09, 2024 at 9:12 AM EDT


New maps show Russian forces advancing west of the captured Ukrainian stronghold of Avdiivka, with anxieties over future military aid deepening in Kyiv, just weeks before Ukrainian officials say that Moscow could kick off a new offensive in the east of the country.

Russia's "most significant gains" over the start of this month were around the village of Pervomaiske and between the settlements of Tonenke and Umanske, as well as around Semenivka, Julian Röpcke, a defense specialist with German tabloid newspaper Bild, said in a post to X, formerly Twitter, on Sunday.

Semenivka sits immediately southeast of Berdychi, perched northwest of the village of Orlivka. Russia has been advancing west of Avdiivka since it took control of the strategic eastern Ukrainian city in mid-February, following months of bitter and bloody fighting. Ukraine rushed to re-establish defensive lines, but has been largely unable to stop Russia's slow gains.

In late March, Russia's government said it had captured Tonenke, and Moscow is also believed to control the village of Orlivka, just north of Tonenke.

The U.S. think tank, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said on Sunday that Russian forces had advanced southeast of Umanske — west of Orlivka and Tonenke — and in southern Semenivka. Moscow has also made some gains northwest of Pervomaiske and to the center of the village, the ISW added.

The Centre for Defense Strategies, a Ukrainian security-focused think tank, said on Sunday that Russia had advanced southwest of Umanske, into the center of Pervomaiske, as well as in southern and central Semenivka.

Ukraine's military said on Monday that it had "repelled" eight Russian attacks around Pervomaiske and the village of Nevelske, southwest of Pervomaiske, and close to Netailove, northwest of Pervomaiske.

Russia's Defense Ministry said in a statement on Monday its forces had fought off five Ukrainian counterattacks, including around Berdychi and the village of Novokalynove, northeast of Berdychi.

The fall of Avdiivka was the most significant win for the Kremlin since it captured the now-decimated city of Bakhmut in May 2023.

Earlier this month, Ukraine said fighters with the country's 25th Airborne Brigade had stopped a "massive" Russian attack close to Tonenke, destroying a handful of Russian tanks and armored vehicles. The ISW think tank described the attack as Moscow's "first battalion-sized mechanized assault" since the Kremlin kicked off its offensive on Avdiivka in October 2023.

Ukraine did so while contending with deeply felt shortages of crucial supplies, not least ammunition, from its Western backers.

Last week, Kyiv "successfully repelled intensive enemy attacks across the entire line of contact, despite the persistent material resource constraints," Ukraine's Centre for Defense Strategies said on Sunday.

Ukrainian officials have said Russia could launch a renewed offensive on Ukrainian positions as early as next month. They have emphasized the importance of military aid packages from the West to enable Ukrainian forces to fend off new attacks.

A new tranche of military, economic and humanitarian aid for Ukraine, worth around $60 billion, has been bogged down in Congress for months by infighting. The U.S. security assistance is the backbone of Western support for Kyiv.

"If there is no U.S. support, it means that we have no air defense, no Patriot missiles, no jammers for electronic warfare, no 155-milimetre artillery rounds," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told The Washington Post in an interview published in late March.

"It means we will go back, retreat, step by step, in small steps," Zelensky said. Should the front lines not hold out because of shortages, he added, "the Russians could go to the big cities."

Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Kyiv's military intelligence agency, said in an interview published over the weekend with German broadcaster ARD that Russia will focus on the Donbas region of Ukraine, or the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in the late spring and early summer.
https://www.newsweek.com/avdiivka-map-ukraine-russia-pervomaiske-tonenke-umanske-1887895
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/13/24 07:40 PM

BBC

Russian troops arrive in Niger as military agreement begins


Chris Ewokor in Abuja & Kathryn Armstrong in London - BBC News
Fri, April 12, 2024 at 1:13 PM EDT


Dozens of Russian military instructors have arrived in Niger as part of a new agreement with the country's junta, which has cut links with the West.

State media reported that they arrived along with a state-of-the-art air defence system.

They are expected to install the system and teach Niger's army how to use it.

The West African country is one several in the Sahel region ruled by military authorities to have recently strengthened ties with Russia.

A spokesperson for Niger's military government on Friday said the Russians were in the country to train soldiers.

The Russian Defence Ministry's paramilitary group Africa Corps, also known as the Russian Expeditionary Corps (REK), wrote on Telegram that this was the first group of servicemen and volunteers to go to Niger.

In an attached video, a serviceman of the corps said in French that they were there to "develop military cooperation" between the countries and had brought "various special military equipment" to help with training.

Footage of the Russian instructors unloading a cargo plane full of equipment was broadcast on Niger's state television.

Ulf Laessing, a specialist in the Sahel region for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which promotes democracy, told the BBC World Service's Newsday programme that the military supplies appeared to be part of a "regime survival package".

Niger's democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum was overthrown last year by the junta, which has since cut military and diplomatic ties with France - the former colonial power - and revoked an agreement with the US.

The European Union suspended its security cooperation with the country in the wake of the coup.

Mr Laessing said the military government was still concerned about some form of physical interference in Niger by the political and economic alliance of West African states, known as Ecowas.

He added that this is probably the reason for the supply of a Russian air defence system, rather than to help suppress Islamist fighters.

"I don't have any other explanations because jihadists don't have planes," Mr Laessing said.

Kabir Adamu, of the intelligence organisation Beacon Security, said Niger was moving closer to countries outside the Western bloc including Russia, China and Iran. He said he feared the alliance with Russia could encourage the junta to further delay a return to civilian rule, as has happened in neighbouring Mali.

Abdel-Fatau Musa, Ecowas commissioner for political affairs, peace and security, noted that Niger was following in the footsteps of Mali and Burkina Faso - the three countries have formed a military alliance.

Niger had already been suspended from Ecowas - which has been urging the country to return to democratic rule along with Burkina Faso and Mali - but in January, the junta-led countries announced they would quit the bloc.

He expressed fears of a long period of conflict in the Sahel region.

"Our position is clear. We shall hold the country of origin responsible for any egregious human rights violations.

"We urge countries in the region not to facilitate another cycle of proxy wars in Africa," Mr Musa told the BBC, although he said sovereign states had a right to choose their international partners.

Niger has been facing increased violence by the Islamic State group, as well as the continuing threat of Boko Haram militants along its border with Nigeria.

Earlier this week, at least six soldiers were killed in a blast in the Tillabery region near the border with Mali.

Niger's defence ministry, which confirmed the attack, said an army patrol vehicle hit a landmine near the south-western village of Tingara earlier this week, killing some of the soldiers. Others were wounded and were taken to hospital.

The ministry said it had carried out an air strike to neutralise those responsible for planting the homemade landmine.

While the military government cited worsening insecurity in Niger as the reason for the coup, reports indicate that insurgents have continued to carry out attacks in parts of the country - almost on a monthly basis - especially in the Tillabery region.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68796359?xtor=AL-72-%5Bpartner%5D-%5Byahoo.north.america%5D-%5Bheadline%5D-%5Bnews%5D-%5Bbizdev%5D-%5Bisapi%5D
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/13/24 11:55 PM

Speaking at the NATO Open Door Conference in Helsinki, NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoan? welcomed Ukraine’s readiness to join NATO and said that “NATO’s door remains open” and “no violence or intimidation can stop that”. The embassies of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia had organised the event, in collaboration with the Finnish Institute for International Affairs and the Atlantic Council of Finland, to mark the twentieth anniversary of their countries’ accession to NATO.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/18/24 10:31 PM

Ukraine is losing and the west faces a stark choice
Ukraine is losing the war. If the west does not help now, it will face a resurgent and aggressive Russia.

CIA director warns Ukraine could lose war with Russia by the end of the year unless US sends more aid
CIA Director Bill Burns on Thursday warned that unless US sends more military support, Ukraine could “lose” the war against Russia by the end of the year.

Poland arrests man over suspected plan to kill Ukraine’s Zelenskyy
Prosecutors say Polish national suspected of supplying information to Russian military intelligence.

Germany detains two over alleged plotting of attacks in complicity with Russia
The suspects targeted military infrastructure and industrial sites in Germany as well as facilities of the US forces, according to German prosecutors.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/20/24 11:18 PM

US House approves long-awaited $61 billion Ukraine aid package
Lawmakers in the US House of Representatives on Saturday quickly passed legislation to provide to Ukraine and Israel, bolster Taiwan while also threatening a ban on TikTok if it fails to divest from Beijing.

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240420-%F0%9F%94%B4-us-house-approves-long-awaited-61-billion-ukraine-aid-package

Well this will give a big boost to strong allies like Germany, Netherlands, UK, Canada etc who also have to step up now.
In particular France who can do much more !
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/21/24 01:00 AM

This is how it begins . . .

US weighs sending additional military advisers to Ukraine as Russia gains momentum

The troops would be serving in a non-combat role, officials said.

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/20/us-troops-ukraine-00153499
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/21/24 12:29 PM

Russia says US facing humiliation in Ukraine like in Vietnam

This content was published on April 21, 2024 - 13:45
4 minutes
By Guy Faulconbridge

MOSCOW (Reuters) -Russia said on Sunday U.S. lawmakers’ support for $60.84 billion more in aid for Ukraine showed that Washington was wading much deeper into a hybrid war against Moscow that would end in humiliation on a par with the Vietnam or Afghanistan conflicts.

President Vladimir Putin’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has touched off the worst fall-out in relations between Russia and the West since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, according to Russian and U.S. diplomats.

On Saturday, the U.S. House of Representatives passed with broad bipartisan support a $95 billion legislative package providing security assistance to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, over bitter objections from some far-right Republicans.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said it was clear that the United States wanted Ukraine “to fight to the last Ukrainian” including with attacks on Russian sovereign territory and civilians.

“Washington’s deeper and deeper immersion in the hybrid war against Russia will turn into a loud and humiliating fiasco for United States such as Vietnam and Afghanistan,” Zakharova said.

Russia, she said, will give “an unconditional and resolute response” to the U.S. move to get more involved in the Ukraine war.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns warned last week that without more U.S. military support Ukraine could lose on the battlefield, but that with support Kyiv’s forces could hold their own this year.

The United States has repeatedly ruled out sending its own or other NATO-member troops to Ukraine, which is fighting a grinding artillery and drone war with Russia along a heavily fortified 1,000-km (600-mile) front.

The United States lost more than 58,000 military personnel in the 1955-75 Vietnam War, which ended with Communist North Vietnam’s victory and takeover of the South, while hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed.

In the 2001-2021 war in Afghanistan, the U.S. reported 2,459 dead and over 20,000 wounded in the conflict which ended with the withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition forces and return to power of the Islamist Taliban movement.

The Soviet Union lost 14,453 personnel in the 1979-1989 war in Afghanistan. Civilian deaths in both the wars in Afghanistan were vast.

UKRAINE WAR

Russia now controls about 18% of Ukraine – in the east and south of its neighbour – and has been incrementally gaining ground since the failure of Kyiv’s 2023 counter-offensive to make any serious inroads against Russian troops dug in behind minefields patrolled by drones and guarded by heavy artillery.

Ukraine has for months been begging the United States to release more money and weapons to help it fight, though Russian officials have asserted that U.S. aid will not change the ultimate course of the war.

Zakharova said that ordinary Ukrainians were being “forcibly driven to slaughter as “cannon fodder” but that the United States was now no longer betting on a Ukrainian victory against Russia. Washington, she said, was hoping Ukraine could hold on until the U.S. presidential election in November.

The U.S. legislative package includes measures that would allow the U.S. to seize billions of dollars’ worth of Russian assets frozen by sanctions imposed on Moscow. That, said Zakharova, was simply “theft”, adding that the true beneficiaries of the whole package were U.S. defence companies.

The leaders of the West and Ukraine have cast the war in Ukraine as an imperial-style land-grab showing that post-Soviet Russia is one of the top two biggest nation-state threats to global stability, alongside China.

Putin presents the war as part of a much broader struggle with the U.S., which he says ignored Moscow’s interests after the Soviet Union’s 1991 break-up and then plotted to cleave Russia apart and grab its natural resources.

The West denies that it wants to destroy Russia, which in turn denies that it intends to invade any NATO member state.

(Reporting by Reuters; editing by Mark Heinrich)

https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/russia-says-us-facing-humiliation-in-ukraine-like-in-vietnam/76153574
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/26/24 02:12 AM

AP
Ukraine pulls US-provided Abrams tanks from the front lines over Russian drone threats


BY TARA COPP
Updated 8:00 PM EDT, April 25, 2024

POLITICS

WASHINGTON (AP) — Ukraine has sidelined U.S.-provided Abrams M1A1 battle tanks for now in its fight against Russia, in part because Russian drone warfare has made it too difficult for them to operate without detection or coming under attack, two U.S. military officials told The Associated Press.

The U.S. agreed to send 31 Abrams to Ukraine in January 2023 after an aggressive monthslong campaign by Kyiv arguing that the tanks, which cost about $10 million apiece, were vital to its ability to breach Russian lines.

But the battlefield has changed substantially since then, notably by the ubiquitous use of Russian surveillance drones and hunter-killer drones. Those weapons have made it more difficult for Ukraine to protect the tanks when they are quickly detected and hunted by Russian drones or rounds.

Five of the 31 tanks have already been lost to Russian attacks.

The proliferation of drones on the Ukrainian battlefield means “there isn’t open ground that you can just drive across without fear of detection,” a senior defense official told reporters Thursday.

The official spoke on the condition of anonymity to provide an update on U.S. weapons support for Ukraine before Friday’s Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting.
https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-abrams-tanks-19d71475d427875653a2130063a8fb7a
Posted By: Toodoped

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/27/24 06:04 PM

Originally Posted by Toodoped


Dont get me wrong but if I had an enemy who is known for killing political opponents, maybe Im going to kill one of them myself so I can blame my enemy....just my two cents




....as I previously said:

https://www.politico.eu/article/alexei-navalny-vladimir-putin-death-order-russia/

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-likely-not-directly-order-navalnys-killing-rcna149663
Posted By: Giacalone

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/27/24 06:59 PM

Originally Posted by Toodoped
Originally Posted by Toodoped


Dont get me wrong but if I had an enemy who is known for killing political opponents, maybe Im going to kill one of them myself so I can blame my enemy....just my two cents




....as I previously said:

https://www.politico.eu/article/alexei-navalny-vladimir-putin-death-order-russia/

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-likely-not-directly-order-navalnys-killing-rcna149663


This is an interesting development. I would not be surprised if he was killed by a Russian entity who wants Putin out. We might never know. I wouldn't remove Putin's name from the list of suspects just yet, but all in all, I'd say good call TD
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/27/24 10:25 PM

Ukrainska Pravda

Ukrainian forces dismiss as fake information about withdrawal of Abrams tanks from battlefield due to drones

KATERYNA TYSHCHENKO — SATURDAY, 27 APRIL 2024, 17:19

The 47th Separate Mechanised Brigade of Ukraine's Armed Forces has dismissed as fake the report by the Associated Press that the Ukrainian Defence Forces have withdrawn US-supplied Abrams tanks from the battlefield due to the threat of Russian drone attacks.

Source: 47th Separate Mechanised Brigade on Telegram

[Linked Image]

Details: The brigade posted a screenshot of the story with a link to an Associated Press report, marking it "Fake".

Quote: "Tanks perform well on the battlefield, and we are definitely not going to hide something from the enemy that usually makes them hide themselves. Moreover, we are not going to leave our infantry without such powerful fire support.

However, we will not comment publicly on the purpose, location, and equipment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

We ask you to trust only verified information and to contact the press service for official comments before releasing any materials."

Background:

On 26 April, the Associated Press reported, citing US military officials, that the Ukrainian Defence Forces had withdrawn the US-supplied Abrams tanks from the battlefield due to the threat of Russian drone attacks.
Before that, The New York Times reported that Russian forces had taken out five M1 Abrams main battle tanks out of 31 that were sent to Ukraine from the US last autumn. The NYT said that drones can be used to take out tanks.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/27/7453276/
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/27/24 10:41 PM

NEWSWEEK
Russia Suffers Deadliest Day in Weeks: Kyiv

Published Apr 25, 2024 at 6:49 AM EDT
Updated Apr 25, 2024 at 11:51 AM EDT

By David Brennan
Diplomatic Correspondent

Ukraine's military reported another 1,040 Russian troops "eliminated" between Wednesday and Thursday, which if accurate would make that 24-hour period the deadliest for Moscow's forces since 1,050 were reported eliminated on March 22.

The latest toll brings the total number of Russian casualties claimed by Kyiv since February 2022 to 462,980. The figure is higher than U.S. estimates, which as of February were at around 315,000 Russian troops dead or wounded.

The Ukrainian military on Thursday also reported another 13 tanks destroyed for a total of 7,255 since February 2022, another 28 artillery pieces for a total of 11,836, and one more air defense system for a total of 772.

Newsweek cannot independently verify the Ukrainian figures and has contacted the Russian Defense Ministry by email to request comment.

Neither Kyiv nor Moscow releases their own detailed casualty figures. BBC News Russian and independent Russian media outlet Mediazona have confirmed around 50,000 Russian deaths since February 2022, and another 25,000 or so killed fighting for Moscow from the occupied Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.

A New York Times report in August 2023 cited U.S. officials as putting the Ukrainian death toll at close to 70,000. President Volodymyr Zelensky in February acknowledged 31,000 Ukrainians killed in action since the start of the full-scale invasion.

Russian forces appear to be sustaining significant losses as Moscow's plodding offensive grinds on along the eastern front. The Kremlin's troops are on the offensive around the captured Donetsk cities of Avdiivka and Bakhmut, while also pushing forwards in southern Zaporizhzhia Oblast and along the border of Luhansk and Kharkiv Oblasts in the east.

Ukrainian troops are resisting while grappling with a severe ammunition shortage, partially caused by the long delay to the U.S. $61 billion funding package, which was finally signed by President Joe Biden this week.

It was also revealed this week that the U.S. has already provided Ukraine with the long-sought-after long-range MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System—colloquially known as the ATACMS. Ukrainian forces have reportedly already used the weapon, including in a strike on a military airfield in occupied Crimea.

Ukraine is girding itself for an expected summer Russian offensive, preparatory operations for which are now ongoing. Among the possible targets for the fresh thrust is the strategic city of Chasiv Yar.

"Russian forces have been establishing operational- and strategic-level reserves to support their expected summer offensive effort, but likely have been doing so based on the assumption that even badly-trained and poorly-equipped Russian forces could make advances against Ukrainian forces that lack essential artillery and air defense munitions," the Institute for the Study of War wrote on Saturday.
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-suffers-deadliest-day-kyiv-casualties-1894085
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/27/24 11:15 PM

I do believe Russia eventually will control large parts of Ukraine, but Ukrainian resistance in Russian-occupied Ukraine will be fierce and ugly.

Partisan groups began to be organized in mid-2022 and are getting stronger.
These groups have been involved in intelligence-gathering, sabotage, and assassinations. Much of their activity has taken place in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/27/24 11:40 PM

Their victories are bought in blood.
Posted By: Toodoped

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/28/24 03:54 PM

Originally Posted by Giacalone
Originally Posted by Toodoped
Originally Posted by Toodoped


Dont get me wrong but if I had an enemy who is known for killing political opponents, maybe Im going to kill one of them myself so I can blame my enemy....just my two cents




....as I previously said:

https://www.politico.eu/article/alexei-navalny-vladimir-putin-death-order-russia/

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-likely-not-directly-order-navalnys-killing-rcna149663


This is an interesting development. I would not be surprised if he was killed by a Russian entity who wants Putin out. We might never know. I wouldn't remove Putin's name from the list of suspects just yet, but all in all, I'd say good call TD


Thanks bud but as you already said, Putin still remains a suspect.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 04/29/24 12:32 AM

I believe Navalny still have a lot of support but they have to be very careful.


Russia has reportedly arrested two journalists who have been working with international news outlets.

Sergei Karelin - a Russian and Israeli citizen - was detained on Friday, the Associated Press reported. He has previously worked with the news agency.

He is accused of "extremism" in connection with alleged work for the late opposition leader Alexei Navalny's foundation - charges he denies.

A day earlier, Konstantin Gabov was detained on similar charges.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68915764.amp

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/01/24 02:37 AM

Frontline report: Ukrainian drones neutralize Russian air defenses, stall offensive near Robotyne

Ukrainian forces have systematically eliminated 9 Russian air defense systems and 3 electronic warfare assets near Robotyne, paving the way for drone dominance that has stalled the Russia’s offensive operations in the area.

BY REPORTING FROM UKRAINE
30/04/2024
4 MINUTE READ

Frontline report: Ukrainian drones neutralize Russian air defenses, stall offensive near Robotyne

Day 795: 28 April

On 28 April, there are a lot of updates from the Orikhiv direction. Here, Russian forces are continuing their offensive operation in an attempt to finally capture the village of Robotyne as a first step to eliminate the bridgehead created by Ukrainian forces in the counteroffensive last summer. To support their frontal effort, they tried to put as much pressure as possible by conducting a flank attack from the southwest of the village.

Russian forces continue to face fierce Ukrainian resistance in front of Robotyne. The main reason why they struggled to push Ukrainians out of the village with brute force was the fact that Ukrainians had spent the last month destroying enemy air defense and electronic warfare systems.

Ukrainian fighters published dozens of geolocated videos showing precise hits with HIMARS and other systems, including FPV drones, against Russian air defense systems Strila-10, TOR-M2, and BUK. Some of those attacks were coordinated and captured in real-time by the Ukrainian surveillance drone SHARK, which was created specifically to monitor and adjust fire on the battlefield.

Among the most precious targets were the Russian electronic warfare system Palantin and the radar and command center of the S-400 air defense system, both successfully destroyed by HIMARS rockets. It is worth mentioning that based solely on publicly available internet footage, Ukrainian forces managed to destroy an astonishing total of nine air defense systems and three electronic warfare systems within a short time frame in this relatively small segment of the front line in the Orikhiv direction.

This allowed Ukrainians to use drones more openly and in big volumes, which led to Russian military bloggers stating that Russian forces had decreased the tempo of their offensive operations near Robotyne exactly due to these extensive drone strikes. This put pressure on Russian commanders to overcome this localized Ukrainian air superiority.

Ukrainian sources admit that even though Russian electronic warfare is limited, it is still felt by Ukrainian drone units. However, they are adapting to this significant threat in the area by routinely switching their drones’ frequencies. By doing this, even though Russians still retain some ability to control the sky, it is enough for Ukrainians to block any enemy advance in the region.

This effective use of Ukrainian FPV drones not only limited the Russian attacks with armored vehicles near Robotyne, as confirmed by many available geolocated videos of damaged vehicles in the region, but created a deadly fire pocket that prevented all frontal attacks on the village.

What effect those conditions created by the Ukrainians have on the Russian forces can be seen in the following geolocated video published by Russian military bloggers. It shows an attempt to storm the south-west part of Robotyne. A Russian infantry fighting vehicle is trying to get to the outskirts of the village to deploy infantry. It instantly comes under Ukrainian artillery and cluster munition fire even at the early stage of the attack, but even after suffering a hit, it continues to move forward.

Several surviving Russian soldiers managed to deploy in one of the first houses, where they looked for shelter to establish positions. They were quickly eliminated by the Ukrainians with the use of further artillery and FPV drones.

After many such attempts, Russians decided to put further pressure on the Ukrainian defenders in Robotyne by conducting a flank attack southwest of the village, which was again successfully rebuffed by the Ukrainians with the help of FPV drones, artillery, and mortar fire.

As a result, Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces in the Orikhiv direction are now trying to move into small infantry groups.

All attacks on the settlement yielded limited results, and there has been no Russian progress, as stated in previous days by some of the most prominent Russian analysts, who started to doubt whether prioritizing Robotyne in this direction was the right choice. Another Russian military blogger sounded the alarm by claiming that Russian forces operating in the Zaporizhzhia direction do not have enough drones and that those operating near Robotyne lack adequate counter-battery and electronic warfare capabilities.

Overall, Ukrainian forces managed to control the Russian momentum and hold the front line south of Orikhiv stable despite all enemy efforts. The situation remains difficult, as Russians do not relinquish the idea of regaining ground here.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief described Russian assaults near Robotyne as localized offensive operations that aim to recover previously lost territory. Ukrainian forces orchestrated numerous strikes targeting Russian air defense and electronic warfare systems to discourage them from potential attacks in this direction.

These precise maneuvers, which led to the crucial establishment of limited air superiority by Ukrainian drones, proved pivotal in countering Russian tactical approaches. Hopefully, the Ukrainian forces will soon receive the much-awaited artillery shells from their Western partners, which will help them to stabilize the front line even more and possibly even retake the initiative.
https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/04...-defenses-stall-offensive-near-robotyne/
Posted By: U talkin' da me ??

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/02/24 06:49 AM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/02/24 07:21 PM

Since their independence from the Soviet Union, Georgia and Ukraine have forged close political and cultural relations.

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/02/24 10:31 PM

EU, US urge Georgia to halt ‘foreign agents’ bill as protests continue

https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...ign-agents-bill-unacceptable-2024-05-02/
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/03/24 12:28 AM

The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (GUR) announces the mass
desertion of mercenaries from Nepal from the Russian army units fighting in Ukraine.


According to Ukrinform, this was reported by the GUR.

According to the intelligence, "the escape of mercenaries from Nepal, assigned to the military unit 29328 of the Russian Armed Forces, was caused by huge losses in "meat assaults", the cruelty of field commanders, including extrajudicial executions for refusing to obey orders to go to certain death, as well as non-payment of promised money."

Groups of Russian invaders are actively searching for fugitives in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian settlements, in particular in Luhansk region, where the personnel of the military unit 29328 was located, but as a rule, this process does not yield results, the GUR noted.

The leaders of the Russian motorized rifle military unit in their reports and reports to the higher command explain the desertion of the Nepalese by the alleged "departure to their home country due to the earthquake."

However, getting from the occupied Luhansk region back to Nepal alone is not an easy task. In addition, Nepalese citizens may face prosecution in their country for participating in hostilities against Ukraine as part of the Russian army," the GUR emphasized.
https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-at...-russian-army-en-masse-intelligence.html
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/03/24 12:49 AM

Reuters

Europe

Russia breached global chemical weapons ban in Ukraine war, US says



By Jonathan Landay and Daphne Psaledakis
May 1, 20243:51 PM EDT. Updated a day ago

WASHINGTON, May 1 (Reuters) - The United States on Wednesday accused Russia of violating the international chemical weapons ban by deploying the choking agent chloropicrin against Ukrainian troops and using riot control agents "as a method of warfare" in Ukraine.
"The use of such chemicals is not an isolated incident and is probably driven by Russian forces' desire to dislodge Ukrainian forces from fortified positions and achieve tactical gains on the battlefield," the State Department said in a statement.

The Russian embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Chloropicrin is listed as a banned choking agent by the Hague-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was created to implement and monitor compliance with the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
German forces fired the gas against Allied troops during World War I in one of the first uses of a chemical weapon.

Earlier this month, Reuters reported the Ukrainian military as saying Russia has stepped up its illegal of use riot control agents as it presses its biggest advances in eastern Ukraine in more than two years.
In addition to chloropicrin, Russian forces have used grenades loaded with CS and CN gases, the Ukrainian military says. It says at least 500 Ukrainian soldiers have been treated for exposure to toxic substances and one was killed by suffocating on tear gas.

While civilians usually can escape riot control gases during protests, soldiers stuck in trenches without gas masks must either flee under enemy fire or risk suffocating.
The State Department said it was delivering to Congress its determination that Russia's use of chloropicrin against Ukrainian troops violated the CWC.
Moscow's use of the gas "comes from the same playbook as its operations to poison" the late opposition leader Alexei Navalny in 2020 and Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in 2018 with the Novichok nerve agent, the statement said.

Russia denied involvement in both cases.
The department also determined that Russia has breached the CWC's prohibition on the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare, the statement said.
It said it was sanctioning three Russian state entities linked to Moscow's chemical and biological weapons programs, including a specialized military unit that facilitated the use of chloropicrin against Ukrainian troops.

Four Russian companies that support the three entities were also sanctioned, it said.
The sanctions freeze any U.S. assets belonging to the targeted entities and generally prohibit Americans from doing business with them.
Separately, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on three entities and two individuals involved in purchasing items for Russian military institutes involved in the country's chemical and biological weapons programs.
The sanctions were among new measures announced by the United States on Wednesday targeting Russia over its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The CWC bans the production and use of chemical weapons. It also requires the 193 countries that have ratified the convention, which include Russia and the U.S., to destroy any stocks of banned chemicals.
The State Department was expected to convey its determination that Russia has violated the CWC to the OPCW.
Russia and Ukraine have accused each other of breaching the treaty in OPCW meetings. But the organization says it has not been formally asked to open an investigation into the use of prohibited substances in Ukraine.
Reuters has not been able to independently verify the use of banned chemical substances by either side.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...pons-ban-ukraine-war-us-says-2024-05-01/
Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/03/24 12:57 AM

Newsweek
Russia on Course for Deadliest Week in Months: Kyiv

Published Apr 30, 2024 at 11:31 AM EDT
Updated Apr 30, 2024 at 1:06 PM EDT

By Brendan Cole
Senior News Reporter

Russia's daily personnel losses have surpassed 1,000 for the fifth time in the last seven days, according to Kyiv's latest figures.

In its update on Tuesday, Ukraine's Defense Ministry said that Russia had lost 1,250 troops over the previous day, taking the total since the start of the war to approximately 468,720

The latest daily total is the fourth day running that Russian losses have topped four figures, following Kyiv's announcement on Monday of 1,320 the previous day, 1,096 the day before that, and 1,124 on April 27.

Over the past week, the spike in the daily tally, which includes both those killed and injured, follows a push by Russian forces in the Donetsk region, following their capture of the town of Avdiivka in February. It comes as Kyiv awaits the delivery of military assistance approved by U.S. Congress.

According to Kyiv, there were 1,040 Russian casualties on April 25, and the tally over the last week has been 7,660. This is a daily average of 1,094—almost twice the mean of 588 over the entire course of the war, signaling how Russian losses have increased significantly in the latter half of April. In March, the 1,000 daily figure was surpassed nine times, 13 times in February, and only four times in January.

An accurate number of Russian losses in the war is difficult to ascertain with Ukraine's tally higher than other estimates. Moscow has not updated its official number of losses revealed in September 2022 as just under 6,000.

However, a British estimate has come close, with U.K. Secretary of State for the Armed Forces Leo Doherty saying on April 27 that Russia had personnel losses of 450,000, which like the Ukrainian figure, includes those who have been killed or wounded.

Nazar Voloshyn, spokesman for Khortytsia Operational and Strategic Troop Grouping, said on April 25 that 85 percent of Russian losses of personnel and equipment took place in the eastern direction of the front.

In February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Russian losses totaled 180,000 killed and up to 500,000 wounded as he revealed for the first time that 31,000 of his troops had been killed, although this is believed to be an underestimate.

On April 26, independent Russian media outlet Mediazona, along with BBC Russian, confirmed they had the names of 51,679 Russian soldiers killed in the war, an increase of 1,208 since its last update in mid-April.

The outlets emphasize that the actual figures are likely considerably higher since their figures only come from public sources such as obituaries, social media posts and reports by local authorities. Its tally includes over 3,400 officers, with 395 holding the rank of lieutenant colonel.

Newsweek reached out to the Russian Defense Ministry for comment.
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-losses-deadliest-week-1895619

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/04/24 10:55 PM

Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/04/24 11:16 PM

Posted By: CNote

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/06/24 06:36 PM

AP

What are tactical nuclear weapons and why did Russia order drills?

BY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Updated 8:59 AM EDT, May 6, 2024

Russia’s Defense Ministry said Monday that the military would hold drills involving tactical nuclear weapons — the first time such an exercise has been publicly announced by Moscow.

A look at tactical nuclear weapons and the part they play in the Kremlin’s political messaging.

WHAT ARE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Unlike nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles that can destroy entire cities, tactical nuclear weapons for use against troops on the battlefield are less powerful and can have a yield as small as about 1 kiloton. The U.S. bomb dropped on Hiroshima during World War II was 15 kilotons.

Such battlefield nuclear weapons — aerial bombs, warheads for short-range missiles or artillery munitions — can be very compact. Their small size allows them to be discreetly carried on a truck or plane.

Unlike strategic weapons, which have been subject to arms control agreements between Moscow and Washington, tactical weapons never have been limited by any such pacts, and Russia hasn’t released their numbers or any other specifics related to them.

WHAT HAS PUTIN SAID ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Since launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded Western nations about Moscow’s nuclear might in a bid to discourage them from increasing military support to Kyiv.

Early on in the war, Putin frequently referenced Moscow’s nuclear arsenal by vowing repeatedly to use “all means” necessary to protect Russia. But he later toned down his statements as Ukraine’s offensive last summer failed to reach its goals and Russia scored more gains on the battlefield.

Moscow’s defense doctrine envisages a nuclear response to an atomic strike or even an attack with conventional weapons that “threaten the very existence of the Russian state.” That vague wording has led some pro-Kremlin Russian experts to urge Putin to sharpen it to force the West to take the warnings more seriously.

Putin said last fall that he sees no reason for such a change.

“There is no situation in which anything would threaten Russian statehood and the existence of the Russian state,” he said. “I think that no person of sober mind and clear memory could have an idea to use nuclear weapons against Russia.”

WHY DID RUSSIA SEND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BELARUS?

Last year, Russia moved some of its tactical nuclear weapons into the territory of Belarus, an ally that neighbors Ukraine and NATO members Poland, Latvia and Lithuania.

Belarus’ authoritarian president, Alexander Lukashenko, had long urged Moscow to station nuclear weapons in his country, which has close military ties with Russia and served as a staging ground for the war in Ukraine.

Both Putin and Lukashenko said that nuclear weapons deployment to Belarus was intended to counter perceived Western threats. Last year, Putin specifically linked the move to the U.K. government’s decision to provide Ukraine with armor-piercing shells containing depleted uranium.

Neither leader said how many were moved — only that Soviet-era facilities in the country were readied to accommodate them, and that Belarusian pilots and missile crews were trained to use them. The weapons have remained under Russian military control.

The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, which has a 1,084-kilometer (673-mile) border with Ukraine, would allow Russian aircraft and missiles to reach potential targets there more easily and quickly, if Moscow decides to use them. It has also extended Russia’s capability to target several NATO allies in Eastern and Central Europe.

Follow the AP’s coverage of the war at
https://apnews.com/hub/ukraine
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/06/24 11:59 PM

When Ukraine get their F-16s they will get an advance in the air, without air support it's difficult for the tanks and ground troops.

Although Ukraine is struggling to contain Russia's latest offensive efforts on the frontline in the Donbas, at some stage Ukraine might decide to focus its offensive efforts on Crimea.

Most analysts believe Ukraine would struggle to liberate Crimea completely, but the strategically important port of Sevastopol is a centre of gravity for Vladimir Putin - something he will not want to lose.

Ukraine does not have a navy, but has successfully targeted the Russian Black Sea Fleet and pushed it further east.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/09/24 12:28 PM

Putin hails army 'heroes' and warns off West in WW2 parade

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c89z22d3v5lo
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/10/24 01:18 PM

Russian forces attack Ukraine's Kharkiv region, opening new front
By Sergiy Karazy and Tom Balmforth
May 10, 20242:19 PM GMT+2Updated an hour ago


Item 1 of 5 Firefighters work at a site of a Russian missile strike, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kharkiv, Ukraine May 10, 2024. REUTERS/Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy

Summary
Kyiv says fighting rages in Kharkiv region's border areas
Source says Russia advanced in push to create buffer zone
President Zelenskiy says Ukraine was ready to meet assault
No immediate comment from Russia
KYIV, May 10 (Reuters) - Russian forces launched an armoured ground attack on Friday near Ukraine's second city of Kharkiv in the northeast of the country and made limited gains, opening a new front in a war that has long been waged in the east and south.
Ukraine sent reinforcements as fighting raged in the border areas of the region, the defence ministry said, adding that Russia had pounded the frontier town of Vovchansk with guided aerial bombs and artillery.
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"At approximately 5 a.m., there was an attempt by the enemy to break through our defensive line under the cover of armoured vehicles," the ministry said.
"As of now, these attacks have been repulsed; battles of varying intensity continue."
A senior Ukrainian military source who declined to be named said Russian forces had pushed 1 km (0.6 mile) inside the Ukrainian border near Vovchansk.
The source said Russian forces were aiming to push Ukrainian troops as far back as 10 km inside Ukraine as part of an effort to create a buffer zone, but that Kyiv's troops were trying to hold them back.
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There was no immediate comment from Russia.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy told a press conference in Kyiv that Ukrainian forces had been prepared to meet the assault, but said Moscow could send more troops to the area.
Ukraine chased Russian troops out of most of the Kharkiv region in 2022, following Russia's full-scale invasion in February of that year. But after weathering a Ukrainian counteroffensive last year, Russian forces are back on the offensive and slowly advancing in the Donetsk region that lies further south.
Ukrainian concerns grew in March over the Kremlin's intentions in the Kharkiv region when Russian President Vladimir Putin called for the creation of a buffer zone inside Ukrainian territory. He said this was needed to protect Russia from shelling and border incursions.
Since then, Kharkiv, which is particularly vulnerable because of its proximity to Russia, has been hammered by air strikes that have damaged the region's power infrastructure.
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In Vovchansk, a Kharkiv region border town with a pre-war population of 17,000 that has dwindled to a few thousand, authorities said the settlement and surrounding areas were under heavy shelling.
Authorities were helping civilians evacuate, Tamaz Gambarashvili, head of the Vovchansk military administration, told Hromadske radio.
More than two years after its invasion, Russia has the battlefield momentum and Ukraine faces shortages of manpower and stocks of artillery shells and air defences.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...forces-attack-kharkiv-region-2024-05-10/
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/12/24 02:20 AM

Ukraine and Georgia will become a member of the EU eventually they want freedom and money Russia is no good.
Posted By: Hollander

Re: War! The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. - 05/12/24 06:36 PM

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