A new thread in light of the rising tensions in the S. China Sea between China and the Phillipines and the unresolved conflicts between China and Taiwan and N. Korea and S. Korea.

DEFENSENEWS

China unveils new defense budget, with a 7.2% increase

By Gordon Arthur

Wednesday, Mar 6

CHRISTCHURCH, New Zealand — China is raising its defense budget by 7.2% for 2024, the government announced March 5 during the second annual session of the 14th National People’s Congress.

The new budget is nearly 1.7 trillion yuan (U.S. $236.1 billion) and continues a rebound after the COVID-19 pandemic. The budget had grown 6.6% in 2020, its lowest rate of increase for almost three decades.
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Asia Pacific
China unveils new defense budget, with a 7.2% increase
By Gordon Arthur
Wednesday, Mar 6




The Chinese military is the world's largest armed force, with an estimated 2.035 million active duty personnel. (Gordon Arthur/Staff)
CHRISTCHURCH, New Zealand — China is raising its defense budget by 7.2% for 2024, the government announced March 5 during the second annual session of the 14th National People’s Congress.

The new budget is nearly 1.7 trillion yuan (U.S. $236.1 billion) and continues a rebound after the COVID-19 pandemic. The budget had grown 6.6% in 2020, its lowest rate of increase for almost three decades.


“The percentage rise is the same as last year, and [it’s] the third year in a row where we’ve see an increase of 7% or more,” Meia Nouwens, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank, told Defense News.

China’s military expenditure is about four times that of Japan and around 12 times larger than that of Taiwan. Beijing considers the latter island nation a rogue province and has threatened to take it back by force.

“China makes a point to note that the defense budget as a percentage of GDP [gross domestic product] is lower than that of the U.S. or NATO. Of course, the official Chinese defense budget doesn’t include all areas linked to defense,” Nouwens said.

Indeed, China’s true defense spending likely falls higher than what is officially announced. For example, its space program, which is managed by the military; defense mobilization funds; provincial military base operating costs; military pensions and benefits; dual-use research and development efforts; and paramilitary organizations like the People’s Armed Police and the Coast Guard are not incorporated into the defense budget.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute think tank estimated that in 2022, China’s actual defense budget was 27% higher than what the country reported.

The government also said it is targeting economic growth of about 5% in the coming year, with the defense increase clearly above this level. This represents President Xi Jinping’s continued prioritization “Chinese Communist Party security goals, including pursuing control of Taiwan while belt-tightening elsewhere,” said Andrew Erickson, a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College.

However, defense spending growth is lower than the government’s overall expenditure increase of 8.6%. On the other hand, it is higher than other sectors such as public security, where spending went up 1.4%.

“The lead-up to the National People’s Congress was filled with numerous articles that mentioned Chinese officials or commentators who hinted that the increase would be reasonable and low,” Nouwens said. “It’s interesting to think about the purpose behind that messaging — whether it was intended for a domestic audience or a foreign one or both.”

“China’s economic context has not necessarily improved, and the government may have wanted to send signals that they’re not overspending on defense at the cost of other budgets. The education budget, for example, only received a 5% increase this year,” she added, noting that there was, however, a larger uptick in the science and technology budget.

The People’s Liberation Army is not enjoying the double-digit percentage increases from a decade ago, but Chinese defense spending has multiplied by a factor of 2.3 since 2013.

In delivering budget documentation to political dignitaries, Premier Li Qiang urged the government to “thoroughly implement Xi Jinping’s thoughts on strengthening the military, implement the military strategic guidelines for the new era, adhere to the party’s absolute leadership over the people’s military ... and fight hard to achieve the 100-year goal of the founding of the army.”


The PLA’s centennial occurs in 2027, and by then Xi aims to have built “a modern military.”

The same report from Li use the phrase “peaceful reunification” in reference to Taiwan. China executed more than 1,700 sorties in Taiwan’s air defense identification zone last year, compared to nearly 800 in 2021.

Li also outlined enhanced war readiness through an expansion of reserve forces, plus a pledge to improve defense-industrial capacity and coordination. Political loyalty was emphasized, too, following an ongoing anti-corruption campaign that has swept up two defense ministers and multiple generals in recent months.

About Gordon Arthur
Gordon Arthur is an Asia correspondent for Defense News. After a 20-year stint working in Hong Kong, he now resides in New Zealand. He has attended military exercises and defense exhibitions in about 20 countries around the Asia-Pacific region.
https://www.defensenews.com/global/...s-new-defense-budget-with-a-72-increase/

Chinese Coast Guard block an attempted resupply by The Philippine Coast Guard.

RUSSIA AND CHINA LOOK AT THE FUTURE OF WAR
Sep 14, 2023 - ISW Press
Download the PDF


By Matthew McInnis

This paper is part of ISW's?Military Learning & The Future of War?series.?Click here to go to the series homepage.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Download the full report here)

Russia and China share a common modernization objective: achieving dominance in decision-making in future wars. Both states are struggling to improve their military personnel quality and integrate the lessons from the wars of the past two decades. Russia is attempting to innovate within a narrower band of military doctrine and operations while addressing the early failures of its Ukraine invasion. China aims to use new doctrine, technology, and integration of civilian expertise with the People Liberation Army (PLA) to leapfrog over US military superiority. The United States must assess the threat from China’s and Russia’s modernization efforts and seek to exploit their respective blind spots and weaknesses.

Russia’s views of future war focus on the concept of “superiority of management” and the importance of the information domain. Russian military thinkers emphasize the need for better and faster decision-making than opponents and for shaping the adversary’s actions within a Russian decision framework. Russian theorists believe that information superiority is crucial for successful kinetic operations, contrary to the US’ conventional concept of information operations. The Russian military views hybrid war as an effort to shape the governance and geopolitical orientation of a target state, combining information campaigns with conventional military actions. Russian leadership saw the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as the culmination of a hybrid war but the conflict exposed strategic and operational failures of their military planning. Russia had observed valuable lessons from its experience in Syria and developed concepts such as “limited actions” and coalition operations for future conflicts. The war in Ukraine, however, revealed Russia’s limitations and its failure to close the gap in command-and-control capabilities with Western militaries. Despite this, Russia aims to prepare its conventional armed forces for large-scale conventional war in the future while continuing to prioritize the information domain in conflict.

China’s military modernization efforts are aimed at achieving decision dominance through a three-pronged approach: doctrinal transformation and ideological rigor; exploitation of advanced technology to shape the character of modern conflicts; and innovation of its training methods to compensate for the lack of wartime fighting experience. China has modernized its military since 1993 to close the capability gap with the US, with the goal of reaching parity or even superiority by 2049. PRC doctrinal thinking emphasizes “systems warfare,” which involves comprehensive contests between highly integrated systems, such as logistics, surveillance, and communications. The objective is to establish information and decision systems dominance over air, maritime, and other domain-centric approaches. Cognitive warfare, including information manipulation and subversive operations against adversary leaders and the population, is seen as crucial for shaping the battlefield before and during conflicts. China is additionally exploring the concept of hybrid warfare and its relationship to systems warfare. Strengthening Chinese Communist Party orthodoxy, loyalty, and control of the state have been central themes for President Xi Jinping since 2012, including bolstering the role of the political commissar in the PLA chain of command and reviving the Maoist concept of “people’s war.”

Achieving “informatization” and “intelligentization” has also guided the PLA’s technological modernization in recent decades. Informatization focuses on information technology to aid precision targeting and disrupting the adversary’s command-and-control systems, while intelligentization involves the integration of artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous weapons, and brain-controlled weapons to enhance the speed and complexity of warfare. Finally, the PLA’s lack of engagement in major conflicts since the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War poses a significant training and human capital development challenge. China is studying US and Russian military successes and failures since the end of the Cold War. The PLA tests potential US and Taiwan conflict scenarios by employing realistic opposition forces (OPFOR) in training, exercising against US and allied forces operating in the region, and conducting AI-enabled computerized wargames integrating expertise from technology firms and civilian gaming communities. Comparing Russia’s and China’s recent military experiences and modernization efforts reveals several strategic opportunities for the United States and its allies:

• The PRC’s modernization effort is more expansive and complex than Russia’s. The PLA lacks the testing and refinement that comes from real-world combat, however. Chinese future war concepts and execution are consequently less coherent as a whole and require greater speculative assessments.
• Russia’s strategic and operational military deficiencies during the Ukraine campaign exposed systemic weaknesses in training, personnel, and leadership. Lessons learned from campaigns in Syria have not effectively transformed Russian military thinking and Syrian experience within the Russian officer corps has been depleted due to casualties and demotions during the Ukraine war. Russia’s efforts to centralize military control and improve command-and-control-systems implementation have also been hindered by issues such as micromanagement and a culture of fear among officers.
• PRC ideological constraints and overconfidence in its ability to integrate AI and other modern technology into military decision-making and fix long-term human capital management challenges will inhibit the level of clarity it seeks in wartime strategy and operations.
• The subsequent Russian military failures after the US campaign of selective intelligence disclosures before the invasion of Ukraine illuminate the effect of over-reliance on information warfare in Russian doctrine. China’s more balanced approach employing information and conventional military operations to cognitive and hybrid warfare doctrine will likely prove more challenging for the United States than Russia’s.
Russia’s experience in Syria focused on pre-structured coalition operations and expeditionary operations. China’s concepts for expeditionary warfare are still under development.
• The PLA’s modernization program relies on strong defense and technology industries, but a slowdown in economic reforms and re-prioritization of state control of industry under President Xi Jinping may limit resources and innovation.
•Russian forces have overall struggled with heavy urban combat in Ukraine but are making advances in surveillance and UAV tactics in urban environments. The PLA may face significant challenges in future urban warfare from its overdependence on drones, hesitancy to allow small unit autonomy and misreading of the political environment and public perceptions in operational areas.
• China has likely surpassed the United States in employing modeling, simulation, and OPFOR. The more the PLA relies on gaming and simulations, however, the greater the chance of flawed strategic and operational concepts becoming embedded in PLA doctrine.

Exploiting adversary vulnerabilities and building on relative strengths will be crucial for the United States to succeed in its long-term military competition with China and Russia. At the operational and tactical level, the United States has battle-tested forces with extensive lessons learned from recent conflicts. The United States benefits from superior training and a decentralized command structure. However, at the strategic level, the United States struggles with slow and incoherent decision-making processes, making it difficult to establish clear objectives and execute coherent plans. The United States also tends to bifurcate war and non-war operations, unlike Russia and China, which see them as part of a singular conflict. The United States must integrate diplomatic, information, and conventional operations to counter Russian and Chinese hybrid warfare and political campaigns effectively. Despite these challenges, the United States possesses strengths in its alliances, partnerships, transparency, and advanced technologies that can mitigate structural and be the foundation for future success.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-and-china-look-future-war

The Hill

DEFENSE

North Korea’s Kim orders troops to prepare for war as US, South Korea wrap up exercises

BY BRAD DRESS 03/14/24 12:07 PM ET

North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un ordered his troops to make preparations for war during an exercise with his troops this week, making the comments as the U.S. and South Korea are wrapping up large-scale military exercises.

Kim oversaw a training session for tanks crews on Thursday in Pyongyang and praised the ability of the troops participating in the exercise, calling them the most powerful tanks in the world, according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency.

The North Korean leader also urged his troops to conduct more training simulations preparing for war, according to KCNA, which reported that Kim called for them to “take revolutionary measures” toward “perfecting war preparations.”

At the end of the training session, Kim also mounted a battle tank and drove it, according to KCNA.

Kim has grown more combative against the U.S. and South Korea in the past year. In January, Kim said he would no longer seek peaceful reunification with South Korea and ordered the tearing down of a statue that symbolized that goal.

His latest remarks come as the U.S. and South Korea are finishing Thursday an 11-day exercise on the Korean Peninsula.


Those military drills have angered North Korea, which has traditionally responded with missile tests and inflammatory remarks against the U.S. and South Korea.

Tensions have soared between North Korea and South Korea in recent years after mediation attempts under former President Trump’s administration failed.

The relationship reached a new low point last year after North Korea launched a spy satellite into space, which led to the abandoning of a military reduction agreement at the border.
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/...war-as-us-south-korea-wrap-up-exercises/

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MARCH 15, 2024
Mar 15, 2024 - ISW Press









China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 15, 2024


Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War


Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute


Data Cutoff: March 14 at 5 pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

• Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that it redefined its criteria for a “first strike” against PRC military assets, which now include a “first move” by PLA aircraft and vessels across Taiwan’s territorial boundaries.
• A PRC Taiwan Affairs official participated in the negotiations on Kinmen, which is inconsistent with the CCP policy of not holding official exchanges with Taiwan’s DPP government.
• Taiwan’s Kuomintang is implementing party reforms to restrain the influence of a hardline faction and better appeal to young voters in future elections.
• The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua stated that “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan remains the PRC’s policy despite the omission of the term “peaceful” from the Two Sessions government work report.
• The PRC, Russia, and Iran held the joint Maritime Security Belt – 2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman from March 11 to 15.
• The People’s Liberation Army increased the number of military aircraft flights through the Miyako Strait in March, likely as part of an effort to normalize flights outside of the first island chain.
• The PRC portrayed the Philippines as a provocateur rather than a partner for managing disputes in the South China Sea while the Chinese Coast Guard drives heightened tensions in the South China Sea.
• The PRC defined its coastal baseline that extends its territorial waters and claims of sovereignty in the Gulf of Tonkin. The baseline is not in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, to which the PRC is a signatory.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that it redefined its criteria for a “first strike” against PRC military assets, which now include a “first move” by PLA aircraft and vessels across Taiwan’s territorial boundaries. ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan that Taiwan reserves the right to take military countermeasures if enemy military planes or ships enter Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace and Taiwan fails to expel them by interception, identification, and warning. He did not clarify if the “first strike” concept applies to Taiwan’s outlying islands. Chiu said that the MND adopted the concept of a “first move” in February 2021. It further developed the concept after the large-scale PLA air and naval exercises around Taiwan in August 2022, which the PRC launched in response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Chiu said the MND’s definition of an enemy “first strike” before the policy change specifically referred to enemy artillery or missile fire at Taiwan. The reason for changing the definition was to counter the PRC’s “gray zone” operations around Taiwan.[1] The CCP has not publicly commented on the policy change as of March 13.

Chiu also described the security situation in the Taiwan Strait to legislators and explained that it is “on the brink” of escalating to a heightened threat alert level. He referenced recent events that have contributed to escalating tensions, including the PRC’s explicit denial of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and the death of two PRC fishermen near Kinmen, whose boat capsized while they fled from Taiwan’s Coast Guard. Chiu also said that the PRC has increased the frequency of its air and naval missions near Taiwan and that these missions take place closer to Taiwan than before. He said he did not expect war to break out, however.

The PRC is conducting dredging operations in the Liuwudian Channel near Taiwan’s Kinmen island group, possibly to facilitate the passage of PRC vessels. The Liuwudian Channel is located between Lieyu Island (known as Little Kinmen) and the islands of Dadan and Erdan, which are part of Taiwan’s Kinmen Island group. The ROC agreed in 2015 to let PRC ships pass through the Liuwudian Channel between Xiamen port on the PRC mainland and the sea even though the channel passes through Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited waters. The PRC did not make use of the channel after Tsai Ing-wen was elected president of Taiwan in 2016, however. Deputy Minister of Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council Chou Mei-wu said that the dredging activities were routine operations on the PRC side of the Liuwudian channel, but that the dredgers sailed through restricted and prohibited waters around Kinmen.[3]

Retired ROC General Lee Cheng-chieh said the dredging of the channel means the PRC plans to use the waterway in the future. He said the PRC could use ships in the Liuwudian channel in the future to block military supply shipments to Taiwanese garrisons on Dadan and Erdan.[4] Lee is a frequent commentator on foreign and military affairs whose opinions are often covered by KMT-aligned media and PRC media.[5] ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng said dredging vessels operating in Kinmen’s restricted waters do not constitute a “first strike” under the MND policy which authorizes Taiwan to respond with military force to enemy military incursions into its territory.[6]

Dredging sand in Taiwan-controlled waters is one of a growing range of “gray zone” tactics the PRC uses to harass Taiwan, assert its territorial claims, and strain Taiwan’s resources and response capability.[7]

Thousands of PRC dredgers have illegally operated in and around Taiwan’s restricted waters, including around the Kinmen and Matsu islands, for at least a decade. The dredgers usually extract sand and gravel from the seabed for use in construction projects.[8] Taiwan’s CGA interpreted illegal dredging to be non-political profit-seeking behavior in 2020 and agreed to cooperate with the PRC to crack down on the activity.[9] Taiwanese media and scholars were openly describing dredging activities near Taiwanese territory as “gray zone warfare tactics,” as of late 2023, however. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed a law to allow Taiwan to confiscate any vessels caught illegally dredging sand in its waters.

ROC National Security Bureau Director Tsai Ming-yen said the PRC’s "joint combat readiness patrols" around Taiwan are related to Taiwan’s exchanges with foreign countries. Tsai said the PRC patrols occur every 7–10 days on average and involve around 10 military aircraft and 3 to 4 naval ships. Tsai said that whenever other countries pass resolutions friendly to Taiwan, foreign vessels pass through the Taiwan Strait, or foreign dignitaries visit Taiwan, the PRC coordinates its existing regular patrols to coincide with these diplomatic events.

Tsai further said the PRC is likely to intensify its “push and pull” tactics against Taiwan before and after President-elect Lai Ching-te’s May 20 inauguration, including military and political intimidation combined with economic incentives for Taiwanese people to further the cause of “reunification.”[11] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said in a report to the Legislative Yuan that the PRC has stepped up “multi-front saturated gray-zone tactics” around Taiwan, including balloons, drones, and civilian vessels, along with increased patrols of military ships and planes. The MND report said the PRC aimed to "increase burdens of [Taiwan’s] naval and air forces and to obscure the existence of the median line in the strait.[12] ISW has reported that some of “gray zone” tactics increased during Taiwan’s 2023-2024 election season in tandem with influence operations over local Taiwanese officials and businesspeople, as well as the PRC’s ongoing push for economic “cross-strait integration.”

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) denied media reports that ROC-PRC negotiations on the “Kinmen incident” broke down and said they would resume after Kinmen prosecutors finish investigating the incident. The Kinmen incident refers to the February 14 event in which a PRC fishing boat in Taiwan’s prohibited waters near Taiwan’s Kinmen Island, which is roughly 10 kilometers from the PRC city of Xiamen, capsized while fleeing from a legal Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit. The capsizing resulted in the deaths of two of the four fishermen onboard. PRC and ROC representatives have held 15 rounds of negotiations on Kinmen to resolve disputes around the incident, including PRC demands that Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) apologize, reveal the truth of what happened, and return the capsized boat. Taiwanese media reported that the negotiations collapsed on March 6 because the two sides failed to reach a consensus and went home. The CGA claimed the negotiations broke down because the PRC demanded to interrogate CGA personnel and did not recognize Taiwan’s maritime boundaries or law enforcement rights.[13] The MAC denied that negotiations had “broken down,” however, and merely said the first phase of negotiations had ended. MAC officials said negotiations would resume after Taiwan’s judicial investigation into the incident concludes.

A PRC Taiwan Affairs official participated in the negotiations on Kinmen, which is inconsistent with the CCP policy of not holding official exchanges with Taiwan’s DPP government. Quanzhou Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) deputy director Li Zhaohui was one of three leaders of a PRC delegation to negotiate with Taiwanese authorities about the February 14 capsizing incident.[16] The other two were Jinjiang Red Cross chairman Cao Rongshan and Director of the Coordination Department of the China Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) Xu Weiwei.[17] Quanzhou and Jinjiang are PRC cities near the Kinmen islands. Although Li is a TAO official, PRC state media CGTN, Enlightenment Daily, and other PRC media described him as an associate or advisor to the Red Cross in articles about the negotiations.[18] The ROC side of the negotiations was led by CGA officials including Deputy Director-General Hsu Ching-chih and Fleet Branch Director Liao Te-cheng.[19]

The presence of a PRC government official at the negotiations is inconsistent with the CCP policy of not directly interacting with the Taiwanese government. This has been the CCP’s policy since Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party became president of Taiwan in 2016. The CCP insists that all cross-strait negotiations must be held on the mutual basis of the “1992 consensus,” which Tsai and the DPP do not recognize. The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” to be the People’s Republic of China, however, while the KMT interprets it to be the Republic of China.

Li’s involvement in the negotiations also undermines the CCP's effort to legitimize the KMT as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan in contrast with the DPP. KMT vice chairman Andrew Hsia traveled to the PRC and met with TAO director Song Tao on February 29 to discuss the Kinmen capsizing incident concurrently with the DPP government-led negotiations on Kinmen.

Northeast Asia

Japan

The People’s Liberation Army increased the number of military aircraft flights through the Miyako Strait in March, likely as part of an effort to normalize flights outside of the first island chain. The PLA flew a Y-9 medium transport aircraft in the Miyako Strait on March 9 and 10.[38] It then flew a Y-9 and two H-6 bombers through the Miyako Strait on March 12.[39] Japan’s Joint Staff noted in January 2024 that it scrambled fighters 555 times in the last nine months of 2023.[40] 98 percent of the scrambles responded to Chinese and Russian aircraft and more than 50 percent occurred near Japan’s southwest airspace, which encompasses the Miyako Strait. [41] The concentration of the PLA component of these intrusions in the southwest indicates the PLA’s intent to operate outside the first island chain.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC portrayed the Philippines as a provocateur rather than a partner for managing disputes in the South China Sea while the Chinese Coast Guard drives heightened tensions in the South China Sea. The PRC sent 11 proposals for “managing the situation at sea and carrying our maritime cooperation” to the Philippines in April 2023.[42] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbing claimed on March 12, 2024, that “the Philippines has not yet responded to most of the proposals and made frequent infringements and provocations at sea.” [43] Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr stated on March 11, 2024 that “we have not rejected any proposals that China has made to us but the premise is something that we questioned…that premise that China has made is that their territory follows what is now described as a 10 dash line.”[44] The 10 dash line is the expansive PRC territorial claim over the South China Sea and Taiwan. The PRC’s nine-dash line precursor claimed the same territory but with one less dash around Taiwan.

Wang’s comments aim to deflect blame from the PRC to the Philippines for heightened tensions over the Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. Scarborough Shoal is a contested atoll that the PRC and the Philippines claim and that has been under de facto PRC control since 2012. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) erected a floating barrier and intercepted Philippine Coast Guard vessels in February to deny the Philippines access to the shoal. The CCG has also disrupted Philippine Coast Guard missions near the shoal to ensure the security of Filipino fishermen in the area. The Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea which the Philippines and the PRC both claim. The Philippines controls the shoal with troops based on the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre. A CCG vessel attempted to block and collided with a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel escorting a supply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on March 5, causing minor damage to the Philippine ship. Two CCG ships also fired water cannons at a separate Philippine supply ship, injuring four Philippine personnel, and later collided with it.

The CCG actions in the South China Sea support PRC claims of sovereignty over nearly the entirety of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, through the “nine dash line” maritime boundary. The PRC rejects a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that found the nine dash line claims are unlawful. The PRC has constructed, seized, and attempted to seize many islands in the South China Sea so it can build a military presence throughout the critical waterway. The PRC has built military infrastructure on islands that it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase its ability to block critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. Developing the capability to monitor or restrict ships through the South China Sea would support a future PRC effort to implement a blockade of Taiwan or block US and allied reinforcements from reaching the Taiwan Strait in wartime.

The PRC and Philippines' bilateral diplomatic forums for managing tensions in the South China Sea are unlikely to change PRC behavior in the region. The CCP has a track record of engaging in dialogue while driving crises to achieve its political objective. In 2012 the party engaged in negotiations with the Philippines to end a standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, which Manilla administered at the time, while steadily increasing the number of Chinese Coast Guard ships near the shoal.[45] This resulted in the Philippines withdrawing its ships from the shoal in mid-June 2012 under a now-disputed agreement that the PRC would do the same.[46] The CCP subsequently kept its ships near the shoal and achieved its political objective of gaining de facto control of the Scarborough Shoal by July 2012.[47] In 2016 the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Arbitration Tribunal unanimously ruled in favor of the Philippines by rejecting the legitimacy of PRC claims to territory inside of the nine dash line and land reclamation activities.[48] The CCP has ignored the ruling by continuing land reclamation efforts and maritime coercion in the South China Sea over the last eight years.

These PRC efforts continue despite PRC Assistant Foreign Minister Nong Rong and Philippine Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Theresa Lazaro co-chairing the eighth meeting of the China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on the South China Sea in January 2024.[49] The PRC has continued its coercive behavior over the past decade in the South China Sea while not honoring prior diplomatic or international legal agreements.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-15-2024

North Korea is a big problem for Japan ! Their new cruise missiles are very dangerous and those tests they do are pure provocations.

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MARCH 22, 2024
Mar 22, 2024 - ISW Press









China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 22, 2024


Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War


Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute


Data Cutoff: March 22 at 12pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

• The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) is expanding efforts to erode the Republic of China's (ROC) sovereignty around Kinmen Island.
• The PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) warned the United States was “playing with fire” in stationing Green Berets on the Kinmen and Penghu islands.
• The PRC is framing the upcoming April 11 US-Japan-Philippines trilateral as a way for the United States to drive tension in the South China Sea.
• The PRC MFA framed the United States–South Korea Freedom Shield military exercise as causing instability on the Korean Peninsula.
• The PRC had its first public diplomatic meeting with a Hamas official and its first diplomatic visits to Israel and Palestine since Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) expanded its efforts to erode the Republic of China's (ROC) sovereignty around Kinmen Island. Four CCG ships operated in Taiwan’s territorial waters around Kinmen Island for two consecutive days for the first time on March 15 and 16.[1] One of the ships was a converted naval corvette that conducted the passage with its gun covers removed.[2] The CCG framed its operations as legitimate law enforcement to safeguard Chinese fishermen, including those from Taiwan.[3] The CCG’s removal of its gun covers during its passage through Taiwan’s waters illustrates its offensive posturing, indicating its actions are intended to intimidate the Taiwanese Coast Guard rather than uphold a safe maritime environment. CCG ships have previously used this tactic to intimidate rival law enforcement in contested waters, including the Philippines Coast Guard around Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.[4]

Kinmen is a Taiwan-controlled island with a large military garrison roughly 3 kilometers from the coast of the PRC. The Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA) enforces maritime laws around Kinmen and its lesser islands. The CCP does not accept Taiwan’s sovereignty over the waters around the island, however.[5]

The latest violations are part of a trend of CCG incursions following an incident on February 14 in which a PRC fishing boat in Taiwan’s prohibited waters near Kinmen capsized while fleeing from a legal Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit. The capsizing resulted in the deaths of two of the four fishermen onboard. The CCG pledged on February 18 to strengthen law enforcement activities around Kinmen. The CCG has maintained a persistent presence around Kinmen and repeatedly violated Taiwan’s maritime boundaries since then. The CCG boarded a Taiwanese sightseeing ship on February 19, marking the first time a CCG ship conducted inspections in Taiwanese waters.[6] Five CCG marine surveillance ships entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone around Kinmen on February 26, including one that crossed into territorial waters.[7] The total number of CCG ships around Kinmen reached 11 on February 27, including two that entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone. Normalizing operations around Taiwan’s waters sets conditions for the PRC to apply further pressure on Taiwan in the future.

The rapid normalization of CCG operations in Kinmen’s waters in response to the incident suggests the PRC had pre-formulated reactions to this type of contingency. The PRC exploited the capsizing incident as a pretense to initiate a concerted coercion campaign that serves to incrementally challenge and erode the ROC’s sovereignty in its adjacent waters.

The PRC has shown that it is unwilling to return to the status quo before the Kinmen incident. The CCG and CGA cooperated on a joint search and rescue effort after a PRC fishing vessel capsized in PRC-controlled waters around Kinmen on March 14.[8] Both coast guards conducted search operations within their respective jurisdictions. CGA Director Chou Mei-wu framed the cooperation as a means to ease tensions with the PRC after the initial capsizing incident in February.[9] The CCG’s successive border violations on March 15 and 16 demonstrate the PRC’s rejection of opportunities to de-escalate tensions as it continues to erode ROC sovereignty around its outer islands.

The PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) warned the United States was “playing with fire” in stationing Green Berets on the Kinmen and Penghu islands. US-based special operations-focused online publication SOFREP first reported on March 8 that US Army Special Forces (Green Berets) would be permanently stationed at the Taiwanese Army’s amphibious command centers on the outlying islands of Kinmen and Penghu.[15] ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng responded to media inquiries about the permanent presence of US troops in Taiwan on March 14 without confirming the details of the SOFREP report. Chiu stated that interactions with friendly countries fall within the scope of exchange and cooperation, and help Taiwan’s armed forces recognize blind spots and shortcomings in military preparedness.[16] US service members have trained Taiwanese military personnel for decades in an arrangement that Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen first acknowledged in 2021.[17] Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command John Aquilino said on March 20 that reports of US troops “permanently stationed” on Kinmen were inaccurate, however.[18]

PRC MOD spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang responded to the ROC claim on March 15 by stressing that the “Taiwan issue” is the first “insurmountable red line” in US-PRC relations. Zhang said that the US troop deployment and arms sales to Taiwan aimed to “weaken, hollow out, and distort” the one-China principle and warned that “those who connive at and support ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces will get burned for playing with fire and taste the bitter fruit of their own doing.” He said the PRC military will “resolutely smash ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities and external interfering attempts.”

China

The PRC signaled strong opposition to a US bill that would ban TikTok in the United States if TikTok’s PRC parent company does not sell its stake. TikTok is owned by the PRC technology firm Bytedance. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Wang Wenbin accused the United States of overstretching the concept of “national security” to hinder foreign competition, said the attempt to force the sale of TikTok was based on “sheer robbers’ logic,” and warned that the US moves would eventually backfire. Wang claimed the US government has never found evidence that TikTok poses a national security threat.[25] Wang also claimed the PRC’s bans on Facebook, Instagram, and other Western social media were “completely incomparable” to the US approach to TikTok because the PRC allegedly welcomes all foreign products and platforms “as long as they observe Chinese laws,” while the US government was discriminating against a specific company.[26]

TikTok has claimed it never shares US user data with the PRC, but the US government recommended that government employees avoid the app over concerns that it may allow PRC access to user data.[27] Former head of engineering for TikTok in the United States Yintao Yu claimed in 2023 that CCP officials could access US user data from the app.[28] TikTok’s parent Bytedance is a private company but has an internal CCP committee to regulate its “political direction,” like most large PRC firms.[29] The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) additionally stated that TikTok accounts run by a “PRC propaganda arm” targeted US Congressional candidates during the 2022 midterm elections.

Northeast Asia

Japan

The PRC MOD framed the growth of Japan’s defense budget increase as unjustified and militaristic rather than a response to regional security issues, including PLA military coercion targeting Japan. The Japanese Cabinet approved a USD 55.9 billion defense budget for Fiscal Year 2024 in December 2023. The budget stipulates annual increases until it reaches USD 62.5 billion for Fiscal Year 2027.[31] The PRC MOD claimed on March 15 that this increase makes “the international community question whether Japan… adheres to the path of peaceful development.”[32] The Japanese defense budget increase comes in response to PRC aggression around the Japanese home islands. Japan’s Joint Staff noted in January 2024 that it scrambled fighters 555 times in the last nine months of 2023.[33] 98 percent of the scrambles responded to Chinese and Russian aircraft, and more than 50 percent occurred near Japan’s southwest airspace, which encompasses the Miyako Strait.

North Korea

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko met with Chinese Special Representative on Korean Peninsula Affairs Liu Xiaoming in Moscow on March 19 to discuss the situation on the Korean Peninsula.[35] Rudenko and Liu accused the United States and its allies of threatening the military situation in northeastern Asia and warned the United States against the proliferation of Cold War-style “bloc thinking.”[36] The PRC MFA issued similar comments in framing the United States–South Korea Freedom Shield military exercise as causing instability on the Korean Peninsula.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC is framing the United States as a destabilizing force in the South China Sea ahead of the April 11 US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit.[37] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbin remarked on March 14 to a question about the summit that the “US has traveled halfway around the world to China’s doorsteps to form exclusive circles, flex muscles and make provocations.”[38] United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated an “ironclad” commitment to the US-Philippine alliance on March 19 in the ongoing aftermath of PRC revisionism in the SCS.[39] PRC MFA Spokesman Lin Jian responded on March 19 that the United States is “not a party” to South China Sea issues and therefore has no right to “intervene” in Sino-Philippine disputes.[40] The MFA’s rhetoric is consistent with previous PRC messaging about the US role in the region. The PRC MOD framed the United States as “creating bloc confrontations that escalate regional tension” after the June 2023 US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit.[41]

The messaging from the PRC MFA aims to deflect blame from the PRC for heightened tensions in the South China Sea, namely over the Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. Scarborough Shoal is a contested atoll that the PRC and the Philippines claim and that has been under de facto PRC control since 2012.[42] The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) erected a floating barrier and intercepted Philippine Coast Guard vessels in February to deny the Philippines access to the shoal.[43] The CCG has also disrupted Philippine Coast Guard missions to ensure the security of Filipino fishermen near the shoal. The Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea which the Philippines and the PRC both claim. The Philippines controls the shoal with troops based on the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre. A CCG vessel attempted to block and collided with a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel escorting a supply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on March 5, causing minor damage to the Philippine ship.[44] Two CCG ships also fired water cannons at a separate Philippine supply ship, injuring four Philippine personnel, and later collided with it.[45]

The CCG actions In the South China Sea support PRC claims of sovereignty over nearly the entirety of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, through the “nine dash line” maritime boundary. The PRC rejects a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that declared the nine dash line claims are unlawful.[46] The PRC has constructed, seized, and attempted to seize many islands in the South China Sea so it can build a military presence throughout the critical waterway. The PRC has built military infrastructure on islands that it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase its control over critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. Developing the capability to monitor or restrict ships through the South China Sea would support a future PRC effort to implement a blockade of Taiwan or block US and allied reinforcements from reaching the Taiwan Strait in wartime.

Europe

Russia-Ukraine War

The PRC advocated for direct dialogue between Russia and Ukraine without committing to the Ukraine-proposed “global peace summit” in Switzerland. PRC Ambassador to Switzerland Wang Shihting said in an interview on March 18 that the PRC supports direct dialogue between Russia and Ukraine as soon as possible. He also stated that the PRC is “examining the possibility of taking part” in the Ukraine-proposed “global peace summit." [52] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian subsequently avoided directly answering whether the PRC would participate in the summit or whether it would push for Russia to participate.[53]

Wang Shihting’s comments do not signal a change in PRC policy toward the war in Ukraine. The PRC has consistently backed peace talks or negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, in abstract terms, and portrayed itself as an impartial and “stabilizing” force in pushing for a political settlement to end the war. It has not committed to any specific peace talk proposals, however. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed Ukraine’s proposal for peace talks in Switzerland on February 17 during the Munich Security Conference, stating that there were not “ripe conditions” for peace talks, in comments that were omitted from PRC readouts.[54] Wang Yi told the National People’s Congress on March 7 that the PRC supports holding “in due course” an international peace conference recognized by both Russia and Ukraine.[55] Russia has said it will not participate in the summit even if invited.[56] PRC Special Envoy for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui reiterated PRC support for a “timely convening of an international peace conference” but acknowledged on March 22 that “there is a relatively big gap in [the Russian and Ukrainian] understanding of peace talks.” Li’s acknowledgement of differences in the two sides’ understanding of peace talks was absent from the PRC readout of his remarks.[57]

The PRC rhetorically aligns with Russian framing in criticizing NATO, portraying the Western security order and arms sales to Ukraine as fueling the war, opposing sanctions on Russia, and calling for respect for Russia’s “legitimate security concerns.”[58] The PRC has not shown any willingness to pressure Russia to end the war.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-22-2024

AP News

WORLD NEWS
Philippines lodges its ‘strongest protest’ against China over a water cannon assault in disputed sea

BY JIM GOMEZ
Updated 8:21 AM EDT, March 25, 2024


MANILA, Philippines (AP) — The Philippines lodged its “strongest protest” against Beijing on Monday and summoned a senior Chinese diplomat over a water cannon assault by the Chinese coast guard that injured Filipino navy crew members and heavily damaged their boat in the disputed South China Sea, officials said.

In response, China warned that relations were at a crossroads and the Philippines should choose a prudent path forward.

Two Chinese coast guard ships hit a Philippine navy-operated supply boat with water cannons Saturday in the latest and most serious confrontation between the rival Asian claimants near the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, which is surrounded by Chinese vessels in a bid to dislodge Philippine forces from there.

The repeated high-seas confrontations since last year have sparked fears of a larger conflict that could put China and the United States on a collision course.. The U.S. has warned repeatedly that it’s obligated to defend the Philippines — its oldest treaty ally in Asia — if Filipino forces, ships or aircraft come under an armed attack, including in the South China Sea.

The United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia and about 16 other countries have expressed support to the Philippines and the rule of law, according to the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila.

China accused Philippine vessels of “intruding” into Chinese waters. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said that the actions of the Chinese coast guard were “legitimate, professional and restrained” and that China would “continue to take resolute measures to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”

The Chinese Embassy in Manila issued a statement by the Chinese coast guard that warned the Philippines against “playing with fire.”

Philippine Foreign Undersecretary Theresa Lazaro in a phone call with her Chinese counterpart expressed “the Philippines’ strongest protest against the aggressive actions undertaken by the China coast guard and Chinese maritime militia against the rotation and resupply mission undertaken by the Philippines,” the Department of Foreign Affairs said in a statement.

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong told Lazaro that relations between their countries are at a crossroads and that the Philippines must act prudently in deciding which path to follow, a statement from the Chinese side said.

He accused the Philippines of provoking incidents at Second Thomas Shoal and attempting to transport supplies without China’s permission to an illegally beached ship in a bid to achieve long-term occupation of the reef, the statement said.

The Philippines separately summoned a senior Chinese diplomat in Manila to convey its protest and demand that Chinese ships immediately leave the waters around Second Thomas Shoal, which lies in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, and for China to stop violating international law.

Philippine defense, security and foreign affairs officials convened a meeting Monday to discuss new steps to deal with what they say is China’s unacceptable and provocative actions in the South China Sea. Their recommendations would be submitted to President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and were not immediately released to the public.

Second Thomas Shoal has been occupied by a small contingent of Philippine navy and marines on a marooned warship since 1999, but has been surrounded by Chinese coast guard and other vessels in an increasingly tense standoff. It’s the second time the Philippine supply boat has been damaged by water cannon in March.

The U.S. lays no claims to the busy seaway, a key global trade route, but has deployed Navy ships and fighter jets in what it calls freedom of navigation operations that have challenged China’s claims to virtually the entire South China Sea. Beijing says the strengthening of U.S. alliances in Asia, including with the Philippines, is aimed at containing China and threatens regional stability.

Aside from China and the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei also have overlapping claims in the resource-rich and busy waterway. Beijing has refused to recognize a 2016 international arbitration ruling that invalidated its expansive claims on historical grounds.
https://apnews.com/article/south-china-sea-philippines-shoal-f789f10b3a47ee0d22e8dec59df57eb2

As NATO chief, Rutte wants to strengthen ties with Asia

If outgoing Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte becomes the new Secretary General of NATO, he wants to commit to strengthening ties with Asia. The outgoing Prime Minister said this during a conversation with students at Beijing University.

IB 27-03-24, 06:07 Last update: 06:09 Source: ANP
According to Rutte, the relationship with Asia is important to "keep the world stable". He has so far said little about his possible future role as leader of the Atlantic alliance.

He is one of two candidates to succeed Jens Stoltenberg as NATO chief. The other candidate is Romanian President Klaus Iohannis. NATO's 32 countries must unanimously choose a successor.

Rutte said in the 'lecture tour' that China's close relationship with Russia is “puzzling” to him. He reiterated that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a direct threat to Europe. He will raise the issue later this day in a conversation with Chinese party leader Xi Jinping.

USNI NEWS

U.S., Japanese and Australian Warships Join Philippine Forces in South China Sea Patrol

Six warships and four aircraft from Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States conducted a joint patrol in the South China Sea on Sunday following Chinese harassment of Philippine Navy resupply missions in the region.

Officially dubbed the Australia – Japan – Philippines – United States Maritime Cooperative Activity, these joint patrols began last November in response to violent incidents between Manila and Beijing in the South China Sea, particularly around Scarborough Shoal and the resupply missions to BRP Sierra Madre (LT-57) at Second Thomas Shoal.

China Coast Guard and Chinese maritime militia have blasted water cannons, conducted blocking maneuvers, deployed long-range acoustic devices, and rammed vessels in a series of increasingly aggressive moves against Philippine vessels.

Last month, Philippine Navy sailors were injured by Chinese water cannons as a result of these attempts to block a resupply mission to Sierra Madre on two separate encounters. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos said there would be “a response and countermeasure package” to counter the “illegal, coercive, aggressive, and dangerous attacks by agents of the China Coast Guard and the Chinese maritime militia.”

While not explicitly linked to be a part of the response and countermeasure package, Manila originally pitched the idea of joint patrols with allies to show support and demonstrate deterrence against further Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, officials said.

“I am confident that this collaboration will contribute to a more secure and stable environment for our people,” Marcos said in November regarding the first joint patrol with the U.S. in response to Chinese harassment. Since then, and with incidents ramping up in scale and intensity, Manila has invited more countries to join these efforts. Canada, France and India have expressed their interest in being involved.

Sunday’s joint patrol not only marks the first combined multinational patrol but also the first time Japanese vessels and aircraft participated. Tokyo and Manila have expanded their defense ties over the last year, most notably through trilateral exchanges with the U.S. and the provision of naval radars to the Philippine Navy via Japan’s new military aid program. According to the Financial Times, the Philippines, Japan, and the U.S. are expected to strengthen their security cooperation during this week’s trilateral summit in Washington.

Alongside the number of involved nations, the joint patrol also included the most assets to date. Warships included Littoral Combat Ship USS Mobile (LCS-26), HMAS Warramunga (FFH-152), JS Akebono (DD-108), BRP Gregorio Del Pilar (PS-15), BRP Antonio Luna (FF-151) and BRP Valentin Diaz (PS-177). Shipborne helicopters as well as Two P-8 Poseidon aircraft from Australia and the U.S. were also involved.

Armed Forces of the Philippines spokesperson Col. Xerxes Trinidad stated there were “no untoward incidents” during the joint patrol. Concurrently with the combined activities, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that Chinese forces in the South China Sea would conduct their own joint naval and air patrol. The Chinese statement further added that “all military activities disrupting the South China Sea situation and creating buzzes are under control.”

In a joint statement released by defense officials from the four nations, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that this patrol “underscores our shared commitment to ensuring that all countries are free to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.”

Similar sentiments were communicated by his Australian, Japanese, and Philippine counterparts, with Philippine Secretary of National Defense Giberto Teodoro emphasizing that these actions show “the enduring friendship and partnership among the peace-loving peoples of the Philippines, United States, Australia, and Japan.”
https://news.usni.org/2024/04/07/u-...lippine-forces-in-south-china-sea-patrol

Bloomberg

China’s Huge Sea Buildup Dwarfs Philippine Push on Tiny Island


Andreo Calonzo
Sun, April 7, 2024 at 5:00 PM EDT

(Bloomberg) -- A tiny island in the South China Sea symbolizes the struggle — and disparity — in the Philippines’ efforts to assert its rights in disputed waters when compared to China, which claims much of the waters.

Manila is rushing to develop the 33-hectare Thitu Island, with the government planning to pour in billions of pesos to upgrade it. Just over 200 civilians and military personnel currently reside on the island.

But just some 27 kilometers (17 miles) southwest of the island, China has built a fully functioning military base on Subi Reef that is an estimated to be 12 times the size of Thitu.

That base is just one of Beijing’s 27 outposts in the South China Sea equipped with ports, runways and other infrastructure aimed at asserting its sweeping claims in the key waterway. In contrast, Manila occupies nine features that have few facilities or structures. Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan also have a presence in the area, and overlapping territorial claims.

This disparity explains, in part, the Philippines’ recent urgency in bolstering its defense alliances, most notably the US. Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has, over the past year, moved to assert his country’s rights in the waters. He’s been backed by unstinting US support. Marcos will meet US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in a trilateral summit at the White House on April 11 aimed at strengthening ties. Both Japan and the Philippines are treaty allies of the US.

On a recent visit to Thitu — which is also known as “Pag-asa,” the local word for hope — arranged by the Philippine Coast Guard, Bloomberg News saw first hand just how underdeveloped the Philippines’ largest-occupied feature in the disputed sea is.

Much of the island is still unpaved, with phone and internet signals hard to come by. There’s still evidence of the destruction caused by a 2021 typhoon: school buildings with damaged roofs and windows that are unusable.

Given its location — nearly 450 kilometers away from mainland Palawan province — residents sometimes wait days for basic supplies like noodles, coffee and soap to be ferried in. The Coast Guard’s new monitoring station appears largely rudimentary.

Still, the Southeast Asian nation is determined to maintain civilian and military presence on Thitu. Aircraft can now land on its runway after repairs and expansion. A landing dock and a port have also been built, and construction is in full swing to extend the island farther into the sea. There are plans to equip the area with a naval port and radars.

Manila also recently sent researchers to check marine resources near Thitu, yet another step to assert its rights in disputed waters. The research initially found dead corals and small species of fish that suggest environmental degradation in the vicinity of the island, but didn’t directly attribute the findings to Beijing’s presence in the area.

“Our overarching strategy involves continuous enhancement of facilities, modernization efforts, and fortification of assets and capabilities,” Philippine military spokesperson Colonel Francel Margareth Padilla said when asked about plans for Thitu. “These measures are vital in upholding our sovereignty over Philippine territorial waters.”

These Philippine attempts are likely to draw opposition from China, which has refused to recognize a 2016 arbitral ruling that dashed its expansive claims. Beijing maintains a constant watch on the island and its coast guard and militia ships regularly patrol close to Thitu. Some of the vessels were involved in a recent tense encounter over nearby sand bars.

“At first, this was intended to coerce the Philippines into abandoning the upgrades,” said Gregory Poling, who directs the Southeast Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “Now, it seems meant to merely intimidate the Philippines but with little chance of success.”
https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-huge-sea-buildup-dwarfs-210000583.html

China moving at 'breathtaking speed' in final frontier, Space Force says

News

By Mike Wall published April 10, 2024


"For the first time in decades, U.S. leadership in space and space technology is being challenged."

COLORADO SPRINGS — China is ratcheting up its space capabilities at an impressive clip, with an eye toward challenging the United States' long-held supremacy in the final frontier, U.S. officials say.

That supremacy was established in dramatic fashion in 1969, when NASA's Apollo 11 touched down on the moon and ended the Cold War space race with the Soviet Union. This lunar achievement has had real and lasting consequences: The United States' unparalleled space assets have given the nation's military a powerful edge over the decades, providing information-gathering and communications capabilities that other countries couldn't match.

The rest of the world isn't necessarily content with this situation, however. In particular, China seems intent on rising up the space-power ladder, as U.S. officials have repeatedly pointed out over the past few years — including, once again, on Tuesday (April 9).

"Frankly, China is moving at a breathtaking speed. Since 2018, China has more than tripled their on-orbit intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance satellites," Gen. Stephen Whiting, commander of U.S. Space Command, said here on Tuesday, during a talk at the 39th Space Symposium.

"And with these systems, they've built a kill web over the Pacific Ocean to find, fix, track and, yes, target United States and allied military capabilities," he added.

A "kill web," in case you were wondering, is "a dynamic network that seamlessly integrates intelligence and warfare capabilities across various domains, including land, sea, air, space and cyberspace," according to the U.S. Marine Corps.

And that's not all. China has also "built a range of counterspace weapons, from reversible jamming all the way up to kinetic hit-to-kill direct-ascent and co-orbital ASATs," Whiting said.

Indeed, China demonstrated direct-ascent ASAT, or anti-satellite, weapon technology back in January 2007, when it destroyed one of its defunct weather satellites with a missile. That test was widely decried as irresponsible, for it generated thousands of pieces of debris, many of which are still cluttering up Earth orbit.

Such activities show that China is now treating space as a war-fighting domain, Whiting said. And so, he added, is Russia, which has also conducted ASAT tests recently, including a destructive one in November 2021. Russia has also been aggressively building out its orbital architecture; since 2018, the nation has more than doubled its total number of active satellites, according to Whiting.

The U.S. government has taken notice of these trends.

"We are at a pivotal moment in history," Troy Meink, principal deputy director of the National Reconnaissance Office, which builds and operates the United States' fleet of spy satellites, said during a different talk on Tuesday here at the symposium.

"For the first time in decades, U.S. leadership in space and space technology is being challenged," Meink added. "Our competitors are actively seeking ways to threaten our capabilities, and we see this every day."

The U.S. must act if it wishes to beat back this challenge, Meink and Whiting stressed; it cannot rely on the inertia of past success to do the job.

For example, Meink highlighted the need to innovate with the nation's reconnaissance satellites, to make them more numerous, more agile and more resilient.

U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu also emphasized the importance of increasing resilience, a goal that she said could be achieved by diversifying the nation's space capabilities.

"We must assess ways to incorporate radiation-hardened electronics, novel orbits, varied communication pathways, advancements in propulsion technologies and increased cooperation with our allies," Shyu said in another talk on Tuesday at the symposium.

Such conversations aren't unprecedented: While the specifics of the currently escalating great-power competition in space are new, the general idea is not, as Whiting pointed out.

"In reality, space was birthed in great-power competition," he said. "In 1957, the Soviet Union won the opening chapters of the space race when they launched the first object, the first man and the first woman, and that created a crisis of confidence, certainly, here in the United States."

The space race came and went without a war in the final frontier, and the same positive outcome is possible today, Whiting stressed.

"Let me be crystal clear: Those of us in U.S. Space Command do not want a war to start in, or extend into, space," he said. "War in space is not inevitable and, in fact, it would be detrimental to the United States, our allies and our way of life."
https://www.space.com/china-space-progress-breathtaking-speed-space-force

China Builds Up its Presence Ahead of Historic U.S.-Philippine Exercise

PUBLISHED APR 23, 2024 9:58 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

China has doubled the presence of maritime militia and military vessels in and around the Philippine exclusive economic zone in advance of major U.S.-Philippine naval drills, according to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 124 Chinese vessels are in the area, with the largest concentrations found near three strategic locations: Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal and Pag-asa Island.

"This upsurge is out of the normal," Philippine Navy spokesman Commodore Roy Trinidad told GMA. For the last two months, the Chinese maritime presence has ranged from 33-69 vessels, he said, with an average of 60.

China's coast guard has attacked Philippine supply boats near Second Thomas Shoal in the recent past, and the maritime militia has played a key role in Chinese blockades. Though the uptick in presence is concerning, Trinidad said that the AFP expects Chinese forces to "behave" during the exercises because the U.S. Navy will be there.

"I don’t expect them to do anything illegal because of the presence of foreign warships," Trinidad told Rappler. "Historically, the illegal, unprovoked, uncalled-for actions of China will only be [towards the Philippines]."

Beijing's English-language opinion outlet, Global Times, has expressed outrage that the Philippines will be using an aging Chinese-built product tanker for a sinking exercise as part of the Balikitan 2024 maneuvers. The BRP Lake Caliraya - a decommissioned Philippine Navy oiler - will be targeted with U.S. Navy and Philippine Navy missiles until sunk. Lake Caliraya once belonged to the Philippine National Oil Company, and it was built to merchant tanker specifications by a Chinese shipyard.

"It is a ludicrous performance by Manila . . . showing clear provocative intent," complained Global Times. "We hope that the Philippines will not allow the 'spiritual victory' of sinking target ships to make them too excited, leading to the illusion that they can take on real ships."

The Philippine Navy had planned to use Lake Caliraya as a target ship at least as early as July 2023. The first attempt failed when the derelict tanker drifted aground in a storm. It has since been refloated and prepped for Balikatan 2024.

"The vessel has been used in the Philippines for a very long, long time," Philippine Navy Vice Adm. Toribio Adaci told 24 Oras. "Just like in any sinking exercise around the world, they use old vessels as the target of the exercise and the same thing we are doing with Lake Caliraya."
https://maritime-executive.com/arti...head-of-historic-u-s-philippine-exercise

Chinese water cannon damages ship in new South China Sea flare-up, Philippines says


By Kathleen Magramo, Dhruv Tikekar and Brad Lendon, CNN

Published 4:26 AM EDT, Tue April 30, 2024

China’s coast guard fired water cannons that damaged a Philippine vessel on Tuesday, marking the latest flare-up of violence between the two countries in the disputed South China Sea, Philippine authorities said.

The Philippine Coast Guard said the incident occurred as one of its ships and a fisheries agency vessel carried out a “legitimate patrol” near Scarborough Shoal, a Chinese-controlled rocky outcrop 130 miles (200 kilometers) west of the main Philippine island of Luzon and inside Manila’s exclusive economic zone.

Video supplied by the Philippine Coast Guard showed two larger Chinese vessels firing water cannons from opposite sides of the Philippine ship.

“The Philippine vessels encountered dangerous maneuvers and obstruction from four China Coast Guard vessels and six Chinese Maritime Militia vessels,” Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela said in the statement.

The Philippine Coast Guard ship suffered “damage to the railing and canopy,” according to its statement. No injuries were reported.

In a post on social platform Weibo Tuesday, the China Coast Guard said it had expelled the Philippine vessels for “intruding” into the waters, “in accordance with the law.”

Beijing asserts ownership over almost all of the South China Sea in defiance of an international court ruling. Over the past two decades, China has occupied a number of obscure reefs and atolls far from its shoreline across the South China Sea, building up military installations, including runways and ports.

Scarborough Shoal, which China calls Huangyan Island and is also known as Bajo de Masinloc, is a small but strategic reef and fertile fishing ground.

There are no structures on the shoal, but China has maintained a continuous coast guard presence around it since 2012, according to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.

The Philippines also said Tuesday that China had reinstalled a 380-meter (1,247-feet) floating barrier that “covers the entire entrance of the shoal, effectively restricting access to the area.”

Scarborough Shoal is one of several disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea, which have long been a flashpoint of territorial disputes between the two nations.

In March, Chinese coast guard ships fired water cannons against a Philippine vessel on a resupply mission to a contingent of Filipino marines on another contested South China Sea feature, Second Thomas Shoal, causing “heavy damages.”

That shoal sits about 200 kilometers (125 miles) from the coast of the Philippine island of Palawan. In the 1990s the Philippines grounded an aging World War II-era transport ship called the BRP Sierra Madre on the shoal, to help enforce its claim to the area. The ship is now mostly a rusted wreckage and is staffed by marines stationed on rotation.

Following that incident, the China Coast Guard said on Weibo it had taken “control measures in accordance with the law” against the Philippine vessels, which it said had “illegally entered the waters adjacent to Ren’ai Reef,” as Beijing calls Second Thomas Shoal.

Earlier in March, Chinese water cannon hit a Philippine resupply boat as it headed to Second Thomas Shoal, shattering windows and injuring four Filipino sailors.

Beijing and Manila’s South China Sea disputes have heated up since the 2022 election of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who has taken a stronger line against China than his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte.

The clashes have also raised fears they could lead to a wider conflict, as Manila maintains a mutual defense treaty with the United States, which Washington says covers Philippine vessels in the disputed waterway.
https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/30/asia...-philippines-ship-intl-hnk-ml/index.html

Asia’s next war could be triggered by a rusting warship on a disputed reef


By Rebecca Tan, Regine Cabato and Laris Karklis

April 26, 2024 at 2:00 a.m. EDT

MANILA — In the most hotly contested waterway in the world, the risk of Asia’s next war hinges increasingly on a ramshackle ship past her time, pockmarked with holes, streaked with rust and beached on a reef.

To buttress its claims in the South China Sea, the Philippines in 1999 deliberately ran aground a World War II-era landing ship on a half-submerged shoal, establishing the vessel as an outpost of the Philippine navy. The BRP Sierra Madre, which has remained on Second Thomas Shoal ever since, has now become the epicenter of escalating tensions between the Philippines and China — and a singular trip wire that could draw the United States into an armed conflict in the Pacific, say officials and security analysts.

China claims the vast majority of the South China Sea and, in recent months, has ramped up efforts to prevent the Philippines from providing supplies to personnel aboard the Sierra Madre. Analysis of ship-tracking data and videos over the past year shows that Chinese coast guard and militia ships have repeatedly swarmed and collided with Philippine resupply vessels. The Chinese vessels have also increasingly deployed water cannons at close-range, at times disabling Philippine ships and injuring sailors.

Any further escalation, warn Western and Philippine officials, could lead to open conflict.

Biden administration officials have stressed that an armed attack on a Philippine military vessel, such as the Sierra Madre, would trigger a U.S. military response under a 1951 mutual defense treaty. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said after meeting with President Biden in Washington earlier this month that the killing of Philippine service members by a foreign power would also be grounds to invoke the treaty.

China has spent the past three decades expanding its presence in the South China Sea, a strategic waterway through which a third of global shipping passes, according to the United Nations. Beijing may not intend to start a war here, analysts say, but repeated confrontations at sea between vessels have raised the potential for fateful accidents, also potentially provoking a U.S. response.

Adding to the uncertainty is the question of what to do with the 328-foot Sierra Madre, which is no longer seaworthy and badly degraded after decades of exposure to the elements. The Chinese say replacing the ship with a more permanent structure is unacceptable. But in interviews, top Philippine officials said emphatically they will not give up control of Second Thomas Shoal.

At no time in recent decades have geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea reached such a prolonged and precarious state as they have recently at Second Thomas Shoal, said Harrison Prétat, deputy director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) at the D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The dispute over that shoal — one of dozens of contested islands, reefs and other features — is part of an increasingly perilous competition among the countries that border the South China Sea for sovereignty over these strategic waters and control of the energy and other resources that lie below.

As China under leader Xi Jinping has grown ever more aggressive in pursuing its claims, Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia have been taking steps — some in public, some largely below the radar — to assert their own claims and pursue their own economic interests, potentially bringing the region closer to war than at any time in years.

Before every mission to resupply the Sierra Madre, Marcos is briefed, said Philippine officials, as is the U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, according to U.S. officials. The United States has significantly increased its deployment of Navy personnel in the Philippines in direct response to the situation at the Sierra Madre, said a U.S. State Department official. Not since the siege of Marawi in 2017, when Islamic State-affiliated rebels seized a town in the Philippine south, has the United States provided such extensive support for a Philippine military operation, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he had not been authorized to speak publicly on the issue.

To many in the Philippines, Chinese behavior at Second Thomas Shoal, which they call Ayungin Shoal, has become a symbol of Beijing’s increasingly brazen projection of power. Orlando Mercado, a former Philippine secretary of defense, called it “the biggest, most graphic illustration of bullying.” Commodore Roy Trinidad, a spokesman for the Philippine navy, said it is a display of China’s “expansionist” ambitions.

“What’s happening in the West Philippine Sea is only a microcosm of what China wants to do to the world,” Trinidad added, using the Philippine name for the waters that it claims.

The Chinese Embassy in the Philippines declined requests for interviews and responded to questions by pointing to a previous statement saying that the Philippines has been violating China’s sovereignty. “We demand that the Philippines tow away the warship,” the statement said. Until it is removed, the statement added, China will “allow” resupply missions only if “the Philippines informs China in advance and after on-site verification is conducted.”

Research groups say China has hundreds of vessels deployed across the South China Sea at any time — a mix of coast guard and maritime militia, which are government-funded ships registered for commercial fishing but used to establish China’s presence in disputed waters. These vessels have loitered around the Sierra Madre for years but began to surge in number in 2023, according to ship location data tracked by AMTI. In 2021, China on average deployed only a single ship each time the Philippines conducted one of its resupply missions, which are carried out by civilian boats staffed with navy personnel. By 2023, the average had jumped to 14. During one mission last December, researchers found at least 46 Chinese ships patrolling Second Thomas Shoal.

During the Dec. 10 resupply mission, Chinese ships largely based at nearby Mischief Reef tried to form a “blockade” at a greater distance from Second Thomas Shoal than before, said Ray Powell, director of SeaLight at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. “They made the approach as tense and as difficult as possible.”

Videos from that day show that as one of the four Philippine ships, M/L Kalayaan, began to near Second Thomas, two significantly larger Chinese vessels pulled up on either side of it, and one blasted it with a water cannon. The M/L Kalayaan’s engine was damaged and had to be towed back to shore, according to Philippine officials. The vessel could not reach Second Thomas, though another Philippine ship, the Unaizah May 4, made it through.

Once rare, the use of water cannons has become routine since December. During a resupply mission on March 5, two Chinese vessels deployed water cannons within several feet of the Philippine ship, shattering its windscreen and injuring four sailors on board.

The Unaizah May 4 returned to shore without delivering its cargo. When it tried again three weeks later, it was again targeted by water cannons. This time, the Chinese ships “didn’t stop until the vessel was entirely disabled,” said a Philippine military official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to share undisclosed details of the incident. The water cannons caused the ship to lose propulsion and wrecked its wooden hull, forcing the crew to transport the supplies to the Sierra Madre on inflatable dinghies. When the Chinese boats came close, the official added, Chinese personnel on board also yelled at the Philippine crew. “They were shouting at us, saying, ‘Construction? Construction?’” said the official.

China has for months accused the Philippines of secretly transporting construction material to the Sierra Madre in an attempt to “permanently occupy” Second Thomas. Philippine officials deny this. Since last October, the Philippines has been conducting “superficial repairs” to the Sierra Madre to ensure habitability for soldiers, but it has not been constructing a new outpost, say officials.

With several Philippine resupply ships damaged and concerns growing over the escalating violence, Philippine officials said they have been rethinking how best to conduct the missions. “We will not be deterred,” said Trinidad, the navy spokesman. But neither, say security analysts, will the Chinese.

To map the behavior of Chinese and Philippine vessels, The Washington Post drew upon data collected by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation at Stanford University.

Both organizations track vessels based on location information transmitted by their Automated Identification System (AIS). Researchers say the data paints a representative picture of ship behavior but is incomplete because not all ships turn on their AIS. Chinese vessels, in particular, are known to turn off the AIS, or “go dark,” in the South China Sea.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...ggered-by-rusting-warship-disputed-reef/

BBC

Close enough to see their faces': Chased down by China in South China Sea

Jonathan Head

Role,South East Asia Correspondent

Reporting from the South China Sea

1 May 2024

We could see the larger Chinese ship moving closer, both our ships going at high speed. The Chinese crew were close enough for us to see their faces. Two of them filmed us, as we filmed them.

The BBC was onboard the Philippines coast guard vessel BRP Bagacay when it was accosted by Chinese vessels on Tuesday.

Filipino crews raced to hang yellow foam barriers over the side, preparing for a collision. Suddenly the Chinese ship made a sharp turn across our bow, forcing the Filipino captain to slow down abruptly. The two vessels were less than five metres apart.

We were racing towards Scarborough Shoal, a tiny coral atoll 220km (137 miles) west of the Philippines coast, but also claimed by China.

The Chinese ships were determined to stop us, and there were a lot of them - at one point of time there were 10 of them from the coast guard and maritime militia.

The Filipino captain relied on the speed and manoeuvrability of his Japanese-made ship to outrun the Chinese, and got to within 600m of the shoal, the closest yet, he told us.

But there was a new barrier installed recently by the Chinese, just visible under the water. Their ships were right behind us, two positioning themselves on either side of the Filipino ship, at which point they began firing their powerful water cannon.

We were rushed inside, from where we could hear the jets of water thundering against the metal walls of the ship. They smashed the awning in the stern, and mangled a railing on one side.

The second ship in our convoy, carrying supplies for Filipino fishermen, was more badly damaged, after taking 10 direct hits from the water cannon.

This game of maritime cat-and-mouse is nothing new in the South China Sea. But these encounters have become more frequent, and more serious, since President Bongbong Marcos authorised the coastguard to challenge the Chinese presence in disputed areas far more robustly than in the past.

“The Chinese government has always said there is a red line”, said Commodore Jay Tarriela, the coast guard spokesman for the West Philippines Sea, the Filipino name for the areas it claims.

“They said we could not cross the 12 nautical mile limit from the shoal. But under this administration we have already broken that red line, to show that China is not respecting international law.”

The mission we were on is a part of that stronger response.

Officially its goal was to supply food and fuel to the Filipino fishermen who have worked on Scarborough Shoal for decades, but who have complained of constant harassment since the Chinese coast guard took control of it in 2012.

It was also to demonstrate the determination of the Philippines to press its claim to the shoal, which lies within the country’s legally-recognised exclusive economic zone, and is much closer to the Philippines than to China.

An international court ruling in 2016 said major elements of China’s claims in the South China Sea, such as its nine-dash line along with a number of activities in Philippine waters, were unlawful. China says it does not recognise the ruling.The numbers of Chinese ships visible around the shoal were intimidating.

We could see them in every direction, hugely outnumbering anything that the Philippines can deploy.

“We are David to their Goliath,” said Commodore Tarriela.

It is difficult to see where this new policy of President Marcos will lead, though he has been given strong backing by US President Joe Biden, and has scaled up a long-term modernisation programme for the armed forces.

The Chinese ships were clearly skilled in their tactics, risky though they were. They can probably maintain their blockade almost indefinitely.

After our encounter with their vessels, China put out a statement that it had successfully driven out the Filipino ships, which it accused of entering its territorial waters.

It is true that the BRP Bagacay did pull back from Scarborough Shoal after being battered by water cannon from two sides. The second vessel, with the supplies and with much of its electronic equipment damaged, was still hemmed in by Chinese ships more 20km behind us, so our ship returned to assist it.

But both ships stayed at sea, outside China’s "red line" but still well within its infamous "nine-dash line", delineating its expansive claim to almost the entire South China Sea.

By morning dozens of fishing boats were gathered around us to receive their aid. From a distance a Chinese coast guard ship kept watch. With what they see as China’s bullying tactics once again exposed, the Philippines coastguard views this mission as successfully accomplished.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c51n21zr941o

Xi Jinping went to France, Hungary and Serbia, China needs Europe and we need the Chinese for our technology.

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MAY 24, 2024
May 24, 2024 - ISW Press

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China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 24, 2024

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: May 24 at Noon ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

• Tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Legislative Yuan on May 21 and May 24 to protest the advancement of a controversial legislative reform bill in the Legislative Yuan.
• The PRC launched two days of joint military exercises around Taiwan to “punish” Taiwan for the election of President Lai Ching-te and what the PRC deemed separatist “provocations” in Lai’s inauguration speech. PRC and ROC media cited analysts who said that the exercise’s name, Joint Sword 2024A, suggests that there may be additional exercises in the series later this year.
• The Fujian branch of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) conducted “law enforcement” drills that entered restricted waters around the Taiwanese Wuqiu and Dongyin islands. The CCG coordinated the drills with PLA joint exercises on May 23 and May 24. The CCG also carried out drills east of Taiwan on May 24.
• The PRC announced new sanctions on three US defense firms over arms sales to Taiwan.
• The PRC referenced UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to block Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization’s 2024 annual assembly.
•The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) released new law enforcement procedures on May 15 likely as part of PRC efforts to assert territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Legislative Yuan on May 21 and May 24 to protest the advancement of a controversial legislative reform bill in the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan (LY) began voting on the joint Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) reform bill on May 17, which would grant the LY the ability to call on anyone to testify before an investigative committee, establish penalties for perceived non-compliance or dishonesty in responses, confirm political appointments, and mandate the president to give an annual national address on the state of the union.[1] The “Contempt of Congress” aspect of the bill is a focal point of the controversy, as it entails punishment such as fines and jail time for individuals whose compliance with LY investigators’ inquiries is deemed unsatisfactory, including government officials. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators opposed the reform bill in the LY on May 17, which climaxed in a physical confrontation between members of the legislature. Mass demonstrations took place outside the LY on May 21 and 24 as the general assembly continued voting on the bill’s provisions.[2] The LY is set to continue voting on the bill on May 28.

DPP legislators have criticized the bill as unconstitutional and labeled it a political tool that the KMT and TPP will abuse to expand their power. DPP Caucus Whip Ker Chien-ming articulated the threat that the bill poses to the executive branch, calling it a “limitless expansion of powers” and a “constitutional monster” whose purpose was to weaponize the legislature.[3] KMT Caucus Deputy Secretary-General Lin Szu-ming, one of the main authors of the reform bills, earlier highlighted the LY’s need to possess “strong weapons” to supervise the government.[4] DPP Caucus Secretary-General Rosalia Wu stated on April 1 that the DPP will fight against the law with all its strength, and would request action from the justices of the Constitutional Court if the bill passed the LY.[5]

The DPP China Affairs Department highlighted the Contempt of Congress aspect of the bill among a series of KMT actions that benefitted CCP interests.[6] DPP legislator Puma Shen criticized the Contempt of Congress law during LY proceedings on May 24 for granting legislators excessive penal authority and claimed that the law could be used arbitrarily to punish those with opposing views, including individuals that the CCP might accuse of separatism.[7] Ker claimed that the bill amounted to Taiwan’s “Hong Kong-ization,” referring to the territory’s democratic backsliding and political assimilation with the PRC.[8] The DPP argues that the law carries national security risks, as military or government officials could be compelled to disclose confidential information during questioning from an LY investigative committee or face indictment under the law.[9] The bill includes a stipulation that exempts sensitive national security information from disclosure.

The DPP and protestors are also condemning the KMT and TPP for using opaque and undemocratic methods to advance the reforms in the legislature. The DPP accused the KMT of automatically advancing the bill to the general assembly without proper review in the relevant committee on April 15.[11] The KMT and TPP introduced an amended version of the bill on the morning of May 17, which the parties did not make available to the public or disseminate to the general assembly before initiating voting.[12] TPP Caucus Whip Huang Kuo-chang stated in an interview on May 17 that the amended version was “top secret.”[13] Huang later pushed back against the DPP and protesters’ accusations of opacity and circumvention of legislative procedures and criticized the DPP for using violence to obstruct the bill’s advancement.[14]

KMT Chairman Eric Chu expressed the party’s strong resolve to achieve its political objectives in defiance of what it views as an uncooperative DPP. Chu stated on May 19 that the KMT would no longer be “restrained and courteous” in its fight to achieve reform and invoked the KMT’s mandate to carry out the public’s expectations for reform, which is based on the party’s dominant presence in the LY.[15] Chu criticized the DPP on May 22 for staging the protests to obstruct democracy and the will of the majority.[16] KMT Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi, who spearheaded the bill’s sponsorship, vowed on May 24 to finalize its passage next week after the LY proceedings continued into the night.

The PRC framed ROC President Lai Ching-te’s inaugural address as hostile and provocative for cross-strait relations. Lai took office on May 20, marking the start of the DPP’s third consecutive term in power. Lai’s inaugural address emphasized the importance of upholding Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy.[18] PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua rejected Lai’s assertions of Taiwan’s sovereignty and self-determination as “separatist fallacies” that made clear his desire to realize Taiwan’s formal independence.[19] Chen described Lai as a separatist zealot who poses a danger to cross-strait peace and does not represent mainstream public opinion in Taiwan. Chen criticized countries that sent representatives to attend Lai’s inauguration and warned against foreign interference in Taiwan that violates the recognition of the PRC as the sole government of China.[20] Chen specifically called out the United States for having diplomatic relations and “official exchanges” with Taiwan. There were no official government representatives in the US delegation and the United States does not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi, speaking at a foreign ministers’ summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, stated that nothing can stop the PRC from reunifying with Taiwan, and that “separatists will be nailed to a pillar of shame.”[21]

PRC state broadcaster CCTV claimed widespread disapproval of Lai’s alleged independence-minded rhetoric in Taiwan.[22] The segment featured spokesperson Yu Chih-pin of Taiwan’s New Party, a pro-unification party that grew out of the KMT, who framed the DPP as the antagonist in cross-strait relations and criticized Lai for stating that “neither side of the strait was subordinate to the other.” The piece highlighted a Taiwanese poll released on May 20 that showed more than half of respondents did not have confidence in Lai’s ability to manage cross-strait relations.

China

The PRC launched two days of joint military exercises around Taiwan to “punish” Taiwan for the election of President Lai Ching-te and what the PRC deemed separatist “provocations” in Lai’s inauguration speech. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command (ETC) carried out two days of joint military exercises around Taiwan on May 23-24. The exercises, titled “Joint Sword 2024A,” took place in nine distinct locations in the waters to the north, south, and east of the main island of Taiwan and around the Taiwanese islands of Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin. ETC spokesperson Senior Colonel Li Xi said that the ETC was organizing services including the army, navy, air force, and rocket force for the joint drills. Li said the drills would focus on joint sea-air combat-readiness patrol, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision strikes on key targets. He also said the exercises would involve the patrol of vessels and planes closing in on areas around Taiwan and “integrated operations” inside and outside the island chain to test the joint combat capabilities of the ETC’s forces.[24] The ETC also released a map of the exercises on May 23 that showed PLA Navy (PLAN) warship formations approaching Taiwan from five directions on all sides of the main island.[25]

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported 49 PLA aircraft around Taiwan on May 23, the first day of the joint exercises. 35 of the aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered the north, central, and southwest parts of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).[26] It did not report on the number of ships that day. The MND again reported 49 PLA aircraft along with 19 PLAN vessels and 7 Chinese Coast Guard vessels around Taiwan on May 24, the second day. 35 of the aircraft crossed the median line and entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ that day.

NDU’s Centre of Strategic Studies wrote in the same article that the drills to the north, south, and east of Taiwan have specific meanings. The drills to the north send warning signals to “important political and military targets,” including the ruling DPP, based in Taiwan’s capital Taipei in northern Taiwan. The exercise to the south is a “political attack” and an “economic blockade” of the city of Kaohsiung, which is a DPP stronghold and Taiwan’s largest port as well as an important garrison for Taiwan’s maritime forces. The exercise to the east is aimed at blocking the “lifeline for Taiwan’s energy imports,” a possible escape route for Taiwan’s “independence forces,” and support lines for the United States and allies to aid Taiwan. All these lines rely mainly on the eastern Taiwanese port of Hualien.[37]

The exercises are comparable to the PLA’s large-scale exercises around Taiwan in August 2022 in response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the Joint Sword exercises in April 2023 after then-Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen met then-US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California. The 2022 exercises featured a larger number of military assets and involved the firing of ballistic missiles over Taiwan. Those exercises initially lasted five days from August 4-7, with additional drills until August 10.[38] The 2023 exercises lasted three days, compared to the two days of Joint Sword 2024A. The Joint Sword 2024A exercise expanded the area of operation compared to previous joint exercises, however, operating in nine distinct areas including around Taiwan’s outlying islands compared to six areas not including outlying islands during 2022. Joint Sword 2024A also came closer to Taiwan’s east coast than previous exercises.[39]

The MND condemned the exercises and called them an “irrational provocation” that would destabilize regional peace and security.[40] Taiwan President Lai and representatives of the DPP, KMT, and TPP all condemned the PLA drills.

PRC and ROC media cited analysts who said that the exercise’s name, Joint Sword 2024A, suggests that there may be additional exercises in the series later this year. Follow-on exercises would be named Joint Sword 2024B, Joint Sword 2024C, and so on.[42] The PLA held only one Joint Sword exercise in 2023, the first in the series.

The Fujian branch of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) conducted “law enforcement” drills that entered restricted waters around the Taiwanese Wuqiu and Dongyin islands. The CCG coordinated the drills with the PLA Joint Sword exercises on May 23 and May 24. The CCG also carried out drills east of Taiwan on May 24. CCG spokesperson Gan Yu announced the drills on May 23 and said they were intended to test the Fujian CCG’s joint patrol, rapid response, and emergency handling capabilities. The CCG released maps that showed its patrol routes around the islands. The maps showed a route that passed within 2.8 nautical miles north of Wuqiu and another route that passed within 3.1 nautical miles east and south of Dongyin.[44] The routes entered the “restricted waters” around the islands but not the “prohibited waters.”[45] The CCG also conducted patrols in restricted waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin on May 24 but did not release a map that day.[46] Taiwan does not claim territorial waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin partly due to their proximity to the PRC. It instead designates “prohibited” and “restricted” waters around the islands, which it treats as equivalent to "territorial waters" and a "contiguous zone," respectively. The Fujian CCG has conducted similar patrols that intruded into prohibited and restricted waters around the Taiwanese island of Kinmen on multiple occasions since February 2024.[47] The PRC does not recognize any “restricted” or “prohibited” waters around Taiwan’s outlying islands.

The CCG also carried out law enforcement exercises in waters east of Taiwan on May 24. The exercises focused on training in verification, identification, warning, and expulsion and testing joint patrol and emergency response capabilities. It released photos of the exercises but no map.[48] It is not clear how close the CCG vessels came to Taiwan’s coast.

The PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times cited an unnamed “source close to the matter” who said this was the first time CCG vessels had entered the “restricted waters” around Dongyin and Wuqiu. The source said the exercise and the published maps sent a message of deterrence to Taiwan. The source said the PRC might replicate the “Kinmen model” if the Taiwan government remains “obstinate,” which could include entering the prohibited waters around the Wuqiu and Dongyin islands or boarding and inspecting Taiwanese vessels in the waters around the islands. The source said Wuqiu and Dongyin are of “high strategic importance” and military value because they are close to the mainland PRC, oversee key transportation routes in the Taiwan Strait, and are the front line for Taiwan’s defense operations. The same source also said the CCG patrols showed heightened coastguard-military coordination, as PLA forces concurrently carried out exercises around the islands.[49] PRC authorities did not release maps showing the precise movements of the PLA forces. NDU Professor Major General Meng Xiangqing noted in his China Daily article that PLA forces also approached the islands of Dongyin and Wuqiu for the first time during the Joint Sword 2024A exercises. He said the exercises near those islands sent a warning that if “‘Taiwan independence’ forces escalate their provocation, the PLA may enter the ‘prohibited waters to carry out inspections of Taiwan ships in the area and conduct combat-readiness patrols.”[50] There are no known instances of the PRC using military forces to inspect Taiwanese ships in this way.

Wuqiu and Dongyin are administratively part of Taiwan’s Kinmen and Matsu regions, respectively. The CCG’s patrols around Wuqiu and Dongyin mark the seventh and eighth CCG intrusions into the restricted waters of Kinmen or Matsu in May 2024.[51] The CCG has normalized patrols in restricted waters around the main islands of Kinmen since an incident on February 14 in which two PRC fishermen drowned while fleeing from a Taiwan Coast Guard pursuit.[52] These CCG patrols serve to erode Taiwan’s control over waters around its territory.

The PRC announced new sanctions on three US defense firms over arms sales to Taiwan. The PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced that it was adding General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems, and Boeing’s Defense, Space & Security unit to an “Unreliable Entity List” for selling arms to Taiwan. MOFCOM made the announcement on May 20, the same day Lai Ching-te was inaugurated as President of Taiwan. The PRC forbids entities on the Unreliable Entity List from conducting export and import business with the PRC and from making new investments in the PRC. The sanctions also ban senior managers of the companies from entering or staying in the PRC. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon’s Missile and Defense division have been on the Unreliable Entity List since February 2023.[53] The PRC previously froze the assets of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems held in the PRC in April 2024. It imposed sanctions on Boeing Defense, Space, and Security President and CEO Ted Colbert in September 2022 over Boeing’s sale of Harpoon missiles to Taiwan.

The PRC opened an anti-dumping investigation against polyoxymethylene (POM) copolymers from the United States, European Union, Japan, and Taiwan. The PRC Ministry of Commerce launched the investigation on May 19 after six major PRC POM copolymer producers applied for the investigation on April 22.[55] POM copolymer, also known as polyformaldehyde copolymer or acetal copolymer, is a thermoplastic resin widely used in various industries ranging from auto parts to electronics.[56] Imports supplied nearly 45 percent of the PRC’s POM copolymer demand in 2022. The EU, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States were the third through sixth largest sources of the material, respectively, in the first quarter of 2024.[57]

PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times denied Western media speculation that the “regular and normal anti-dumping investigation” was retaliatory. It said the application to begin the investigation predated US President Joe Biden’s new tariffs on the PRC and that the broader anti-dumping investigation in this industry actually began in 2016, leading to duties on POM copolymer imports from South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia in 2017.[58] The article claimed that US media speculation that the investigation was retaliatory shows that the United States fears PRC countermeasures to the new tariffs.

The PRC referenced statements from the UN Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures to bolster its opposition to unilateral Western sanctions. The special rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, Alena Douhan, visited the PRC from May 6 to May 17. She met with government departments, enterprises, civil groups, and other entities in Beijing, Shenzhen, and Xinjiang to study the negative impact of unilateral sanctions on the PRC. Douhan concluded that unilateral sanctions against the PRC as well as the “over-compliance” of foreign businesses with those sanctions have harmed the human rights of “vulnerable groups” by increasing unemployment and causing other economic disruptions in affected regions like Xinjiang. She claimed that any “unilateral sanctions” that are not retaliatory and implemented without authorization of the UN Security Council are illegal. She further said that all secondary sanctions imposed on individuals and entities as punishment for circumventing sanctions regimes on third countries are illegal. She said that unilateral sanctions should not be used as a foreign policy tool and a means of economic coercion.[60]

The PRC is using Douhan’s credentials as a UN expert to strengthen its rhetoric against Western sanctions and human rights narratives. PRC Assistant Foreign Minister Miao Deyu, MFA spokesperson Wang Wenbin, and state media such as Xinhua and Global Times publicized and echoed Douhan’s views that “unilateral coercive measures” against the PRC violate international law and human rights.[61] Wang urged “relevant countries” to immediately lift their “illegal unilateral sanctions.”[62]The claim that unilateral sanctions are illegal and the conflation of economic development with human rights, which are core premises in the special rapporteur’s mandate and reports, parallel longtime CCP rhetoric.[63]

The Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures is not an impartial expert or authority, however, and the PRC may have shaped the outcome of her study to support PRC narratives. The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) created the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures in 2014 to study the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights and to work with UNHRC and other bodies to minimize the negative effects of unilateral coercive measures.[64] Iran introduced the mandate for the special rapporteur on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.[65] The United States and most of its allies opposed the mandate.[66] A Special Rapporteur is an unpaid independent expert that the UN Human Rights Council appoints to produce reports on a specific theme. Douhan is a professor of international law at Belarus State University who took up the post of Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights in 2020.[67] She has previously urged the lifting of unilateral sanctions on Qatar, Iran, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Syria.[68] A 2022 report by the nonprofit UN Watch found that Douhan received a $200,000 donation from the PRC government in 2021.

The PRC used UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which admitted the PRC to the UN as the sole representative of China and expelled the ROC from the UN in 1971, to block Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization’s 2024 annual assembly. PRC officials including the PRC ambassador to the United Nations and spokespeople for the MFA and TAO have claimed that the resolution confirms the “one China principle” in international law by definitively establishing the PRC as the only legal government of all of China, of which Taiwan is a part.[70] The MFA cited the resolution on May 13 and May 24 when explaining the PRC’s decision to block Taiwan from participating in the World Health Organization’s 2024 World Health Assembly (WHA), which begins on May 27. It argued that because Taiwan is part of China and the PRC is the sole legal representative of China, Taiwan cannot participate in international organizations without permission from the PRC's central government. It claimed that Taiwan’s DPP government has “stubbornly adhered to the separatist stance of ‘Taiwan independence’” since it took power in 2016 and thus invalidated the political basis for Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. [71] The PRC has repeatedly cited Resolution 2758 in its reasoning for blocking Taiwan’s participation in the WHO since 2017.[72] Taiwan participated as an observer in the WHA under the name “Chinese Taipei” during the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou from 2009-2016, however.[73]

PRC officials strongly criticized statements by US officials such as State Department China Coordinator Mark Lambert and various US senators which refuted the PRC’s interpretation of UNGA 2758.[74] An MFA spokesperson claimed on May 20 that “some people in the United States maliciously spread fallacies” in arguing that the UN resolution did not resolve Taiwan’s status and does not prevent Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. The spokesperson said such “absurd and dangerous” arguments “not only challenge China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also challenge “international justice and conscience” and the post-war international order.”[75] The same spokesperson claimed on May 15 that the US “distorting and slandering” of UNGA Resolution 2758 showed that the United States uses international law inconsistently to maintain its “hegemony.”[76]

Broader international acceptance of PRC arguments that interpret UNGA Resolution 2758 as an international legal consensus that Taiwan is part of the PRC would serve to further undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. It would hamper Taiwan’s international participation, lend legitimacy to PRC coercive actions against Taiwan as a “domestic issue,” and lend credence to PRC arguments that the United States and other countries’ engagement with Taiwan without PRC consent is illegal.

The PRC’s use of UNGA 2758 in tandem with the 1992 Consensus to block Taiwan from participating in international organizations could also support its legal argument for its broader effort to legitimize the KMT over the DPP as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan. It did not block Taiwan’s participation in the WHO during the KMT administration of Ma Ying-jeou because Ma and his party officially accept the “1992 Consensus” that Taiwan and mainland China are part of “one China.” The PRC may return to this more permissive policy under the next KMT administration in Taiwan, with the argument that the KMT recognizes the supposed “international legal consensus” of the One China principle and the DPP does not.

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Foreign Minister’s Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. The SCO is a Eurasian regional cooperation organization that the PRC and Russia established in 2001 with several central Asian countries. It now also includes India, Pakistan, and Iran.[77] The Foreign Minister’s meeting was primarily in preparation for a full SCO summit in July. Wang called on the SCO the bolster security cooperation, information sharing, joint operations, and personnel training. He accused “a few countries” of pursuing hegemony, forming “small circles,” interfering with and suppressing other countries, “decoupling,” and even fueling the “three forces” in the region with the aim of suppressing the strategic autonomy of the Global South.[78] The “three forces” is a reference to terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. Wang did not specify which countries he was talking about, but most of his rhetoric echoed criticisms the PRC commonly directs at the United States. Wang met individually with many other foreign ministers at the summit including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.[79] Lavrov confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping would meet again at the SCO meeting in Astana on July 3-4.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) released new law enforcement procedures on May 15 likely as part of PRC efforts to assert territorial claims in the South China Sea. The CCG released the Coast Guard Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures (CGALEP), which states that the CCG can arrest and detain foreigners illegally entering or exiting PRC territorial boundaries for up to 30 days without trial. The CCG has the option to extend detentions up to 60 days in “complicated cases.”[81] The procedures will come into force on June 15.[82] The CCG announced the new procedures as the PRC is increasingly asserting its claims over disputed maritime features in the South China Sea, such as Scarborough and Second Thomas Shoal, amid heightened tensions with the Philippines. The PRC deployed research vessels and divers to the Sabina Shoal in May, potentially as part of a campaign to prevent the Philippines from defending its claim to the Second Thomas Shoal. This is a change from last month when the PRC deployed the Chinese Coast Guard to block Philippine ships from reaching Second Thomas Shoal and did not conduct efforts to reclaim Sabina Shoal.[83] The PRC also conducted its largest-ever blockade at Scarborough Shoal in May in an attempt to block a fleet of Philippine civilian ships from resupplying fishermen near Scarborough Shoal.[84]

The CCG could use the new law enforcement procedures to justify the arrest and detainment of non-PRC nationals and vessels, such as Philippine resupply ships or Filipino fishermen, within the boundaries of PRC territorial claims. The Philippine civilian group Atin Ito sent a convoy to resupply Filipino fishermen near Scarborough Shoal from May 14 to May 16. An advance party of the Atin Ito convoy delivered 1,000 liters of fuel and 200 food packs near Scarborough Shoal on May 16.[85] The convoy leaders declared the mission accomplished on May 16 in light of this news and decided not to sail closer to Scarborough Shoal.[86] The CCG also fired water cannons and collided with Philippine ships in March while attempting to block a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal.[87] These confrontations show the situations in the South China Sea under which the CCG could detain Philippine nationals under the CGALEP. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. condemned the CGALEP and called it “completely unacceptable to the Philippines” and pledged “to always protect our citizens.”

The map below depicts the PRC's claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands within the “nine-dash line” maritime boundary with the 12-nautical mile territory boundary depicted around each of the maritime features that the PRC claims. The map does not depict contiguous zones, economic zones, and continental shelves that the PRC also claims because these do not constitute territorial waters.[89] These island groups include the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands), Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands), Pratas Island (Dongsha Islands), as well as Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal (Zhongsha Islands).[90] In addition to territorial waters within 12 nautical miles of each maritime feature, the PRC claims straight baselines around the Paracel Islands as a group, which means it considers waters between these islands to be its internal waters even when they are more than 12 nautical miles from any individual island. The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in 2016 that there is no legal basis for the PRC’s nine-dash line claims and that the PRC’s actions had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights.[91] The PRC rejected the ruling.

Europe

The PRC threatened to impose retaliatory tariff controls on European agricultural goods in response to EU subsidy investigations into PRC firms. This threat is part of a PRC campaign to dissuade the European leaders from implementing more hawkish economic policies that run counter to the PRC’s interests. The China Chamber of Commerce to the EU stated on May 18 that it “was informed… if the EU continues its actions [subsidy investigations into PRC firms in the electronic vehicle, wind turbine, and security equipment sectors], the Chinese side will have no choice but to implement a series of retaliatory measures.” It also stated that “European wine and dairy products may find themselves caught in the crossfire.”[93] The PRC wine and dairy imports are less than three percent of all of the PRC’s imports from the EU.[94] EU Agriculture Commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski’s visit to the PRC in late April aimed to increase food exports to the PRC.[95] The PRC threat of agricultural tariffs is one means to oppose this EU policy goal and coerce it into eliminating investigations into PRC companies at minimal cost to the PRC. The PRC is the EU’s third largest export market for agricultural products, at six-point-four percent, however.

Russia

United Kingdom Defense Minister Grant Shapps stated on May 22 that US and UK intelligence have evidence that the PRC “is now or will be” providing lethal military assistance to Russia, a statement that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan questioned.[97] Shapps stated that this evidence is a “significant development” as the PRC has previously presented itself as a “moderating influence” but did not provide further information about the supposed intelligence. Sullivan stated during a press conference that he has previously warned that the PRC may supply Russia with lethal military assistance but that the US has “not seen that to date.”[98] Sullivan stated that he will speak with his British counterparts to ensure that the US and UK have a “common operating picture” and to clarify Shapps' comment.

The PRC has provided non-lethal assistance to Russia to support its defense industrial base since at least 2023. Over 90 percent of Russian microelectronics imports came from the PRC in 2023, for example. These dual-use materials are key for manufacturing weapons.­­[99] The CCP also provided Russia with military assistance such as rifles and smokeless powder at varying points in 2023.[100] United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated in April and May 2024 that the PRC provided dual-use components, such as machine tools, to the PRC as part of “invaluable support to Russia’s defense industrial base.”
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-24-2024

NEWSWEEK

Is China Hacking Undersea Cables? What We Know

By Micah McCartney
China News Reporter

U.S. officials are worried undersea communications cables, through which flows 95 percent of the world's online traffic, could be sabotaged or tapped into by China to siphon information, from personal data to intellectual property and classified military intelligence.

The Biden administration has reportedly warned Silicon Valley giants such as Meta and Google, who have invested in submarine cables, about the potential threat of Chinese cable repair ships.

These fears, first reported on by The Wall Street Journal, have emerged against the backdrop of the U.S.-China rivalry across a number of sectors, including information technology, with Washington successfully limiting China's involvement in international submarine cables that connect with U.S. territory.

CCP leverage over companies
Chinese firms are required by law to hand over data to the Chinese Communist Party government upon request. This has fueled concerns over espionage and data collection in the U.S. and many other countries—fears that prompted Congress to pass a law last month that will ban TikTok if its Chinese parent company, Bytedance, does not divest it.

While the U.S. has introduced restrictions against Chinese telecom operations within the country, citing national security concerns, there are no checks on cable laying ships from China or any other nation from accessing the fiber optic cables crucial for modern communications.

"Tapping cables may produce huge intelligence gains, given that data can be sorted—identifying relevant needles from a digital 'haystack'—and decrypted as necessary," Lane Burdette, an analyst for telecommunications market research company TeleGeography, wrote in 2021.

Of particular concern to U.S. officials are ships belonging to Shanghai-based Submarine Systems (SBSS), part of a three-company consortium conducting cable maintenance around Asia.

According to ship-tracking data, over the past five years, SBSS ships have periodically switched off their automatic identification systems—location transponders the United Nations' maritime safety regulator requires ships to use—causing them to go undetected for days at a time while at sea.

This does not mean that the ships are hacking into underwater cables, but "it would raise suspicions if it happens repeatedly, especially if they are operating in the vicinity of a cable that might have strategic significance," the WSJ cited one unnamed official as saying.

A source familiar with the company told the news agency poor satellite coverage might explain why the ships were "running dark" from time to time.

Newsweek reached out to SBSS and the U.S. State Department for comment.

'Completely unfounded'

"For a ship that size, there is no apparent reason it would have its required safety equipment turned off—and that's what an AIS transponder is," Ray Powell, director of the Stanford University's SeaLight initiative, which tracks Chinese coast guard and paramilitary vessels in the South China Sea, told Newsweek.

"This is especially concerning given the busy shipping lanes the ships appear to be operating in," he said.

"As the strategic importance of cable networks grows, authoritarian control of companies raises geopolitical concerns because state actors can choose when, where, and how cables are built and enable data interception and development of technological dependence through other countries' borders," the United States Naval Institute wrote in an analysis last year.

In at least six instances in recent years, the U.S. has succeeded in efforts to either exclude a Chinese company from contracts to lay down new cables or prevent major international cables from being extended to China, Reuters reported.

The Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., called the suspicions over SBSS vessels "completely unfounded," and said it strongly opposed the U.S.'s "overstretching the concept of national security and abusing state power to go after Chinese products and companies."

"Weaponizing economic and trade issues will exacerbate security risks in global industrial and supply chains and inevitably backfire," embassy spokesperson Liu Pengyu told Newsweek. He called on Washington to abide adhere to the principles of fair competition and market economy.
https://www.newsweek.com/china-hacking-undersea-cables-1902970

NOS News
•
Today, 01:29
North Korea defies its southern neighbor with new missile tests

North Korea has conducted another series of ballistic missile tests. This is what South Korea, Japan and the United States say. The missiles were fired towards the Sea of ??Japan. No damage has been reported.

Tensions in the region have increased further in recent times. That's because North Korea is increasing the number of weapons tests. The fact that South Korea is holding military exercises with the United States and Japan also plays a role.

The latest missile tests follow a failed attempt by Pyongyang to put a spy satellite into orbit around Earth. The rocket engine exploded during flight. Following this test, the UN Security Council will meet on Friday.

Weapon support
North Korea claims it already succeeded in launching a spy satellite in November. It would still function, but South Korea has expressed its doubts about this. According to Seoul, North Korea has received help from Russia in the efforts in exchange for arms support.

South Korea and the US have strongly condemned the missile tests, pointing out that they violate a series of UN resolutions.

Balloons
Yesterday, North Korea also sent more than 200 balloons containing waste to South Korea. It contained plastic bottles and batteries, as well as feces. It would be a response to balloons that South Korea had sent to the North with propaganda material.

Tensions in the region actually brought China, Japan and South Korea a little closer together this week . The countries discussed trade, but also about strengthening defenses against ballistic missiles. The latter in view of North Korea's growing number of missile tests and multi-year plans to hold joint military exercises.